

**SEPARATISM  
AND  
DISINTEGRATION**

*A comparative investigation*

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with the collaboration of

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There is a strong family resemblance about the misdeeds, and if you have all the details of a thousand at your finger ends, it is odd if you can't unravel the thousand and first.

—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, *The valley of fear* (1915)

Those who do not forget the past are masters of the future.

—Sima Qian, *The scribe's records (Shǐjì)* (-84, Han dynasty)

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# Preface

What are the forces which bind together the different ethnic or linguistic elements of a state? How does a minority population become a nation and, on occasion, go on to form a state? Under what circumstances and in what manner does the disintegration of a multilingual state come about? Why do some disintegrations occur by stages over several centuries (like for instance Austria or Denmark) whereas others occur suddenly (like for instance Yugoslavia)? Such questions have aroused the curiosity of numerous sociologists and historians.

The novelty of the present approach lies in the following simple but unconventional features: (1) We study clusters of events rather than individual events. By so doing we try to give some predictive power to our investigation. If 20 separatist movements of a certain type have all failed it is likely that the 21st will fail too. (2) We focus on the question “how?” rather than on the question “why?” which is so dear to historians. (3) Separatism is a multifaceted subject; treating all of them is to risk treating none of them well; that is why we concentrate our attention on a specific class of social groups, the so-called homeland minorities. Moreover, as far as possible, we restrict ourselves to those phenomena for which quantitative data are available.

One of the essential differences between sociology and history is the fact that sociology studies sets of similar events while history studies single, individual events. In other words sociology would be closer to comparative history. But comparisons between complex systems are a delicate matter and can be made in many different ways; some will lead to clear-cut results while others will not. As the choice of a specific methodology is of crucial importance we would like to explain it in some detail by using the following analogy.

To compare ten different automobiles, we may choose between two methods. The first would have us open the hoods and compare motors, test suspensions, and evaluate the aerodynamics of bodyworks. In the second method one would assemble the cars on the starting line of a track and race them so as to judge their performance from the outside. During this test race, one could compare many characteristics, such as average speed, fuel and oil consumption or tire wear.

This analogy illustrates several important ideas of our comparative approach. The

first method can be referred to as a structural comparison, but, because an automobile is a relatively complex system, dismantling each car and comparing them is a long, complicated and controversial procedure. Why, for example, is the motor lacking in power? It could be because the ignition advance is improperly adjusted but there can be other reasons as well. A human society is undoubtedly more complex than an automobile, and yet most historians and sociologists use the structural-type comparison. As a matter of fact, this is quite understandable since the historian can examine the system from the inside without even “opening the hood.” A great many of the mechanisms are already familiar to him. Does he not himself belong to a society more or less similar to the one which he intends to describe? The trouble is that there will be as many answers to each question as there are historians. Why did the aristocracy lose its dominant role in European societies between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries? Each historian will offer his own interpretation according to whether his approach favors the economic, religious, military or social point of view.

The second approach seems appealing in its simplicity and, because at the end of the race we should have clear-cut and unambiguous answers, it seems to be more independent of subjective viewpoints. Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that this approach raises delicate methodological problems. Which track shall we choose for our race? For example, if we wish to test the maximum speed of our vehicles, we will choose a track with a number of straightaways. On the other hand, if we want to compare their acceleration, we will pick a track where a number of chicanes are interspersed with the straightaways. Furthermore, it is essential for comparative analysis to learn how to separate the skills of the drivers from the performance of the cars. One possible solution is to run several races on the same track, with the same cars but with different drivers. Transposed to the study of history, these questions reflect the practical difficulties inherent in any comparative analysis. One of our main tasks will be to suggest ways to overcome these difficulties.

In fact, our main problem in this study will be to break down the complex phenomena of separatism into sufficiently simple and well-defined mechanisms that lend themselves to comparative analysis. This book should be judged more on the pertinence of this approach than on the detail of the proposed models because we are well aware that an extensive documentary and conceptual effort will be needed to turn this analytical method into a reliable tool.

The writing of this monograph was an exhilarating journey in the course of which the history of many different liberation struggles was explored. We may in some places have erred; that is almost inevitable if one considers the diversity of the data that needed to be processed. Needless to say, we welcome in advance notification of possible errors or omissions. Another observation is in order regarding repeti-

tions. Few readers will probably read this book throughout from first to last chapter; accordingly, some useful definitions or arguments have been purposely repeated in different chapters. For instance, it is difficult to evoke the struggle for autonomy in the Bernese Jura without briefly recalling where this region is located.

We take special pleasure in thanking the people who have supported this effort from its beginning. Their advice, encouragement and warm support have been invaluable. Through the powerful impact of his own research Charles Tilly has shown us the direction and has given his valuable support on numerous occasions. Without the friendly help of Joan and John Deller this work would not have appeared in its present form. We would like to assure them of our deep gratitude.

In 1998 during three months spent as a visiting scholar at Harvard, I gave a number of lectures on the topics of this book which found willing ears and critical comments at several universities: at Harvard (Stanley Lieberman), the University of Arizona (Michael Hechter and Sun-Ki Chai), the University of California, Davis (Jack Goldstone and John Hall), Middlebury College (Walker Connor) and the State University of New York (Immanuel Wallerstein). Furthermore, Peter Flora (Center for European Social Research, University of Mannheim) welcomed a talk on this work in an early stage of its development. Many thanks to all these hosts for their interest and hospitality.

My collaboration with Leonard J. Rahilly has extended over several years, but with his characteristic modesty Leonard has requested that he be considered a collaborator rather than a co-author. Nevertheless this book would certainly not have been written without his aid; many thanks to him for his skill, patience, hospitality and sense of humor.

This is a follow-up study of “Separatism and Integration” which was published in 2002 by “Rowman and Littlefield”. The decision to go ahead with this publication was taken in 2016 after we realized that the previous one was, so to say, nipped in the bud by the publisher: from 2002 to 2006 the book was sold at the price of \$75. That was already expensive but in 2007 its price was raised to \$82.50 and in 2008 to \$117<sup>1</sup>. Whereas 223 copies were sold between 2002 and 2006, it is hardly surprising that not a single one was sold after 2007. In an email that he sent me on 29 November 2016, Leonard properly observed that “the logic of raising a price on something that is not selling [much] is completely contrary to common sense”. To this day, the reason why a publisher may wish to “kill” one of its own books remains a mystery.

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<sup>1</sup>At the same time in 2007 the publisher discontinued sending us annual sales statement; therefore we did not even know that the price had been raised by 53%. It is only in 2016 that we discovered the truth through the response to an inquiry addressed to the royalties department.

An essential part of this work involved the collection of the necessary documentation and in this respect the help of the librarians at the University of Paris and the National Foundation for Political Science (F.N.S.P., Paris) was invaluable. I am especially grateful to Catherine Sacier and Isabelle Tarier for their kindness as well as their competence and efficiency.

The help of my colleagues at the Institute for Theoretical and High Energy Physics (L.P.T.H.E.) of the University of Paris was much appreciated; many thanks to Laurent Baulieu, Jean Letessier, Annie Richard and Ahmed Tounsi.

This book is dedicated to our wives and children whose cheerful encouragement and stimulating support have been priceless.

University Pierre and Marie Curie (UPMC), Paris, 30 November 2016



# Chapter 1

## Overview of Separatism


As far as documents permit us to look into the past, we can see the crucial role played by separatist movements. Still, it is not for their historical importance that these movements are the subject of this book. We were attracted to this study mainly because the question has the distinct advantage of being relatively “simple” (we will explain this notion further on). A second reason was the fact that history would offer a large number of recurrent episodes, thus making this topic a good choice for applying the methods of comparative history or more specifically the methods of analytical history as it will be defined in chapter 2. Our objective in this chapter is to place the phenomenon of separatism within the more general framework of minority groups.

### Liberation Struggles in History

In this book we study nations rather than countries or states. However, it can be mentioned that in some countries, such as England, France or Spain, a form of patriotism has appeared fairly soon. For instance the threat of an invasion by the “Great Armada” in 1588 certainly brought about a feeling of national loyalty even among British Catholics. Similarly at about the same time, the support provided by Spanish troops to the Catholic Ligue during the religious wars in France eventually generated much resistance among moderate Catholic Frenchmen. In this section we briefly examine some historical landmarks, first, for the period after 1800 and, second, for the period before 1800.

#### The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

The number of sovereign countries has grown constantly throughout the twentieth century. Up until the First World War, this growth was relatively slow, but has accelerated since that time (see Figure 1.1). The trend is in clear contrast to the patterns observable in the last century. Although the nineteenth century has been called the “century of nationality” a significant decrease in the number of sovereign states occurred between 1850 and 1900, mainly as a result of the formation of the German



**Figure 1.1 Evolution in the Number of Independent States.** The huge decrease that occurred in the first half of the nineteenth century was mainly due to the progressive unification of Germany. In 1803 there were about 500 sovereign or autonomous kingdoms, bishoprics and other ecclesiastical territories; a first step was the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806; in 1833 there were still 31 German states. The independence of India in 1947 occurred simultaneously with the disappearance of about 140 local kingdoms and principalities; it is unclear to what extent these entities could be considered as really independent within British India which is why they were not taken into account in the present chart. *Sources:* *Statesman's Year-Book* (various years); Passant (1960); Quid (1997); U.N. information leaflet about membership and admission dates.

Empire. In a long-term perspective, the obvious question is whether the current trend will continue or whether a new phase of coalescence will set in. The term “phase” does not seem really appropriate, however. In the past, the processes of coalescence and separatism were often at work simultaneously. Between 1815 and 1900, for example, there was the disintegration of the Danish, Spanish, and Ottoman Empires, while both Italy and Germany achieved national unity. Both movements were in fact the result of a shift from religion and royal sovereignty to language and democracy as the bases of national unity.

Since 1945 the tendency toward fragmentation has gained more and more momentum. There are numerous examples of countries which have broken into several parts. The breakdowns of the U.S.S.R. (1991) and Yugoslavia (December 1991) are among the most spectacular examples, but there have been many others: the secession of Iceland from Denmark (1944), Singapore from Malaysia (1965), Bangladesh from Pakistan (1971), Somaliland from Somalia (1991), Eritrea from Ethiopia (1992), and Slovakia from Czechoslovakia (1993). Within the countries with substantial

**Table 1.1 Attempts at Fusion or Federation in the Twentieth Century**

Federation	Countries	Creation	Dissolution
Federation Rhodesia-Nyasaland	N. and S. Rhodesia, Nyasaland	1953	1963
West Indian Federation	Jamaica, Bahamas, Barbados, etc.	1958	1962
United Arab Republic	Egypt, Syria	1958	1971
Arab Federation	Iraq, Jordan	1958 (Feb.)	1958 (Aug.)
Federation of Mali	ex-French Sudan, Senegal	1959	1960
United Arab Emirates	Seven Emirates	1971	
Federation of Arab Republics	Egypt, Lybia, Syria	1972	1974
Senegambia	Gambia, Senegal	1982	1989

*Note:* The only federation still in effect in 1999 is the United Arab Emirates. This federation does not include Bahrain, Kuwait or Qatar. The European Union is not on this list because it is still (1999) an economic and monetary union rather than a federation or confederation.

linguistic diversity, there has been a constant tendency toward the multiplication of autonomous regions: In India, there were 13 states and 6 territories in 1957, while in 1995 there were 25 states and 7 territories; Nigeria went from 4 states in 1960 to 36 in 1996; even such an ancient country as Switzerland saw the creation of a new canton in 1976. The same tendency can be observed in the fact that the constitution of federations by independent states did not work except for a few exceptions (see Table 1.1).

### **Before 1800**

Before 1800, available documents are relatively fragmentary. Table 1.2 gives several examples of insurrections against a foreign occupier. On this list, the number of failures outweighs the number of successes by three to one. The failures have probably left fewer traces in the archives than have the successes, which leads us to think that the real proportion is even greater than it would appear to be. It is interesting to note that the Spanish Empire came apart in successive waves, with each wave separated from the previous one by an interval of about one century. The first wave occurred between 1540 and 1580; the independence of the northern Low Countries in 1581 was a major loss, since this was the most prosperous country in Europe at that time; it can be recalled that in 1600, two-thirds of the ships crossing the strait between Denmark and Sweden were Dutch. The wave of revolts between 1640 and 1680 resulted only in temporary successes. A third wave between 1810 and 1830 ended in the independence of Latin America. A fourth wave between 1880 and 1900 brought about the independence of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. At its height, it

**Table 1.2 Examples of Struggles for Independence before 1800**


Nation involved	Year (beginning)	Occupying power	Success (S) or failure (F)
Egypt	-484	Persian Empire	F
North Africa	17	Roman Empire	F
Judea	66	Roman Empire	F
Egypt	110	Roman Empire	F
Judea	132	Roman Empire	F
Egypt	172	Roman Empire	F
North Africa	741	Omayyad Caliphate	F
Swiss cantons	1307	Austria	S
Wales	1400	England	F
Vietnam	1420	Chinese Empire (Ming)	S
Sweden	1521	Denmark	S
Mexico (Mayas)	1546	Spanish Empire	F
Netherlands	1567	Spanish Empire	S
Ireland	1598	England	F
Catalonia	1640	Spanish Empire	F
Ireland	1641	England	F
Naples	1647	Spanish Empire	F
Wampanoags, Narragansetts	1675	New England	F
Scania	1678	Sweden	F
Northern Mexico (Pueblo)	1680	Spanish Empire	F
Scotland	1745	England	F
Ceylon	1761	Holland	F
United States	1774	England	S
Ireland	1798	England	F

*Note:* This is not an exhaustive list. These examples are given to show that for centuries there have been struggles for independence in every empire. In order to judge the extent of these struggles, it would be interesting to know the number of victims in each one; such an evaluation is not possible at the present time because for many cases reliable data are not available. Regarding colonialism in the Roman Empire see for instance *Jesus and the spiral of violence* by R. Horsley or *Les empereurs gaulois* by Bouvier-Ajam.

was said that the sun never set on the Spanish Empire, yet it disintegrated piecemeal over a period of four centuries.<sup>1</sup>

## Minorities

There are different kinds of minorities, and the different criteria used to classify them



**Figure 1.2 Classification of Minorities.** In this book we focus our attention on homeland minorities; in subsequent chapters it will be seen that separatist struggles take a very different form whether one considers minorities of type A or of type B.

are closely linked to the theoretical approach used. Furthermore, the problems differ in difficulty and in scope according to the types of minorities being studied. In other terms, the choices made in this section are crucial for our study.

## Classification

Certain writers (for example Gurr) have chosen to study all existing minorities.<sup>2</sup> In this book, however, we will concentrate our attention on a particular type of minority known as *homeland minorities*. These are minorities whose social and cultural life is associated with a specific territory. Their roots give great stability to the group and this stability allows us to study the group for periods of several centuries. Among the minorities not associated with a homeland (non-homeland minorities), there are several subdivisions. The branchings shown in Figure 1.2 are three examples of subdivision, but not the only ones possible. Of these three types, the religious minorities are the best defined. Without a linguistic criterion, ethnic minorities are difficult to define precisely. For African-Americans, for example, skin color is habitually used, but this criterion is far too arbitrary a choice among the hundreds of characteristics which make up the physiognomy and morphology of an individual.

The expression “historical minority” refers to groups which differ from the larger population in which they are immersed only in that they have a different past. The Korean minority living in Japan, for example, is hardly distinguishable from the Japanese; the distinction resides in a Korean-sounding family name and especially in

a distinct history and origin. The Acadians mentioned in Figure 1.2 are inhabitants of the Canadian Maritime Provinces who were deported by Great Britain to other parts of North America (some later returned to their province). The only difference between them and other French-speaking inhabitants of the Maritime Provinces is that they keep the memory of this historic episode; yet, this is enough to give them a special national identity which is celebrated every year in large annual gatherings. As a matter of fact, all homeland minorities are at the same time historical minorities in the sense that their past has played a major role in their feeling of identity.

We distinguish two large categories among the homeland minorities: minorities dispossessed of their land (and most often of their culture) and those which have kept their lands but whose language and culture are discriminated against (in access to education and government jobs, for example). One of the best-known examples of a minority dispossessed of its land is the Irish people. The six-hundred year history of its struggle is particularly illustrative in that it shows the entire process: dispossession, recurrent but abortive insurrections and finally the struggle which leads to independence.

Linguistic integration in the United States is a case in point in illustrating the different types of minorities. The immigrants not belonging to homeland minorities became integrated within one or two generations. For the Spanish speakers of New Mexico, who belong to a homeland minority, integration was slower: around 1990, about 28 percent still used Spanish; Spanish speakers in Puerto Rico also belong to a territorial minority, but since they are isolated on an island, the number of Spanish speakers has remained above 90 percent.<sup>3</sup>

## Terminology

Walker Connor was one of the first to insist on the fact that the terminology used today is potentially confusing and may lead to misunderstandings which can only be harmful to a reasoned approach to these questions. He remarks that if everyone knows the difference between “state” and “nation” the very same authors who give correct definitions do not hesitate to use the word “nation” in an improper manner. The adjective “international” in such expressions as international relations or international politics concerns states rather than nations. The United Nations, in fact, should be called the “United States.” Since this name is already in use, it should be called the “Society of States” or the “League of States.” What makes the distinction between state and nation especially crucial is that only a small number of states (about 1 in 10) are made up of one nation; on the contrary, almost half the states are made up of more than five different nations.<sup>4</sup>

The word “nationalism” is commonly used to designate fidelity to a state rather than adherence to a nation. In order to arrive at a more exact usage, Connor proposes

that the word “patriotism” be used for allegiance to a state, with “nationalism” reserved for membership in a nation. Large countries like China or the United States are composite wholes, in the sense that they are made up of different ethnic groups; this makes the notion of patriotism extremely complex. In this book, we will concentrate our attention on more restricted and homogeneous groups, like the Welsh or the Scots. To designate the sense of belonging to such a group, we will sometimes use the term “proto-nationalism.” This expression, which is used particularly by the *Times Atlas of World History* (1989), has the advantage of suggesting the idea of something that is in becoming; this is the sense of the prefix “proto” which suggests the fact that more elaborate models will succeed the prototype.

Proto-nationalism is a feeling of belonging to and identifying with a group, but at this stage we will not attempt a more precise definition. As J. Hobsbawm says at the beginning of *Nations and nationalism since 1788*: “This book assumes no a priori definition of what constitutes a nation.” This definition will become more precise as we proceed. Expressions like “nationalism” or “proto-nationalism” are words which can be given precise operational definitions only once a satisfying theory is available. The same could be said of the word “heredity”: before the formulation of the Mendelian laws, “heredity” did not refer to any precise mechanism. Through his experiments Mendel was able to give it an operational sense at least in certain simple cases like the wrinkled peas on which he worked. Nevertheless, the notion of heredity still remains somewhat mysterious, for instance, with regard to the delicate question of the relationship between genetic traits and the environment. In the same way, the concepts of “nationalism” and “proto-nationalism” will become more precise as a testable and falsifiable theory is developed.

Another problem in terminology concerns the use of the adjectives “autonomist” and “separatist.” These terms are often used interchangeably which can be justified by the fact that autonomist claims frequently lead to separatism and that there is really no clear separation between the two ideas. Ireland is a case in point: the demand for Home Rule which had mobilized the country for decades suddenly became a separatist claim after 1916. The Fenian movement had certainly made this claim in the late nineteenth century, but they had been a minority within the Irish society and had had little success. When the two expressions are not used as equivalents, the term “autonomist” will refer to a moderate movement which is more open to comprise than a “separatist” movement.

### **Separatism versus Strength of Central Government**

In terms of structural cohesion a state resembles the solar system rather than a chunk of granite. If the gravitational attraction of the sun weakens the planets will drift apart; the most remote ones (i.e., Pluto, Neptune) will escape from the sun’s attrac-



tion first, followed by the inner planets until complete disintegration of the solar system. Even in normal times, comets, whose orbits are very elliptic, may free themselves from the sun's attraction and leave the solar system for ever; conversely, it may also happen that some celestial objects are captured by the sun's gravitational field which previously did not belong to the solar system.

The situation is similar for states, the sun's attraction being replaced by the central government and the planets by the various regional components which make up a nation-state. If the central government weakens some regional components will demand autonomy or even independence. The most peripheral groups will detach first, followed by groups which are closer to the core of the nation-state.

That process occurred repeatedly in recent centuries as illustrated by the following examples.

- During the French Revolution there was a brief power vacuum during the transition from monarchy to republic and several autonomist uprisings broke out in various regions (Bordeaux, Lyons, Marseilles) in late 1793; this was the so-called Federalist Movement.

- The year 1905 was marked in Russia by a succession of strikes and uprisings; several regions took advantage of that chaos to proclaim their autonomy. This resulted in the proclamation of the Chita Republic, the Ruin Republic, and the Krasnoïarsk Republic. Similarly, in 1990–1991 when the U.S.S.R. fell apart several republics gained their independence almost without a struggle.

- During the period of chaos which followed the defeat of Germany in 1918 there were autonomist movements in Munich and in the Rhineland.

Needless to say such phenomena are particularly frequent in countries where the central government is rather weak even in normal times. Iran during the two world wars was a case in point. In spite of its claimed neutrality the country was occupied by British and Russian troops with the result that the central government almost collapsed; not surprisingly the two periods were marked by autonomist movements in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan.

In the rest of this book we will mainly focus our attention on separatist movements; however, one should keep in mind that the success or failure of such movements greatly depend upon the strength of the central government.

## Separatist Movements: An Enigma

The development of separatist movements is an enigma both for history and sociology. They do not spring from economic motives or from purely linguistic (or ethnic) roots. At this point it is easier to say what proto-nationalism is not, rather than what it is.



## Economic Explanations

Do economic conditions exert an influence on the development of proto-nationalism? Certain examples might lead us to answer in the affirmative. Ireland immediately springs to mind. In the nineteenth century, the standard of living in Ireland was substantially lower than in the rest of the United Kingdom; Michael Hechter has written a fascinating study of this question. In a similar way, Maoris live considerably less well than the rest of the population in New Zealand. This is, however, rather a consequence than a cause, as suggested by the following examples.<sup>5</sup>

In Figure 1.2 the term “type A” minorities designates the minorities which have been deprived of their land. Land deprivation brings minorities into a state of destitution for in a predominantly rural society the land is the main source of revenue. But land deprivation brings not only poverty, it also brings desperation. For a rural society land is not only the main source of livelihood, it is also a major component of its pride as a people. For type A minorities, poverty is certainly a consequence of dispossession, but the feeling of humiliation goes far beyond the purely economic aspect.

Once again, Ireland may provide an illustration in the sense that radicalization of the separatist movement took place *after* an agrarian reform had occurred in the early 1910s which gave land back to Irish farmers. The reform did not stop the struggle; on the contrary, the fight for home rule became a fight for independence.

**The Basque Country and Catalonia** The Basque Country and Catalonia were the two Spanish regions most active in demanding autonomy. In spite of a longstanding tradition of self-government it was mainly after 1960 that separatist claims developed in the Spanish Basque Country. In 1969, among the 14 Spanish regions, the Basque Country had the largest income per capita. Among the four provinces that make up the Basque Country, the two provinces at the forefront of the autonomist movements, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya, also had the largest per-capita income of any of the 50 Spanish provinces. On the other hand, Navarra, where there had never been strong sentiments for autonomy, came in seventh position. In this case, there is a complete opposition between separatism and economic underdevelopment.<sup>6</sup>

A similar line of reasoning could be applied to Catalonia, which has always been an especially dynamic commercial and industrial region of Spain. The same absence of correlation between economic underdevelopment and autonomist claims appears in the following example of the Bernese Jura; in this case, it is possible to make a precise statistical verification.

**The Bernese Jura** From a statistical point of view, Switzerland has numerous advantages for the study of autonomist movements. There are detailed statistics in the economic, linguistic and demographic areas, all available at the cantonal and “com-

**Table 1.3 Correlation between Separatism and Different Factors (Bernese Jura)**

	<b>Religion</b>	<b>Ancestry</b>		<b>Language</b>	<b>Economic factor</b>
	Catholicism	Jura citizenship	Bernese citizenship	French language	Income per capita
Correlation for 122 communes	0.88	0.81	-0.80	0.51	0.17

*Note:* The degree of separatism has been estimated through the “yes” vote in answer to the question “Do you want to form a new canton?” (referendum of 23 June 1974). The sample consists of 122 predominantly French-speaking communes. The notion of Jura and Bernese citizenship is explained in the text.

*Source:* Jenkins (1988).

munne” (i.e., local community) levels. The availability of these statistics allowed John Jenkins to make an extremely detailed and rigorous study of the elements of the separatist movement in the Bernese Jura. This region, along the French border in western Switzerland, is both Catholic and French-speaking; it was attached to the canton of Bern (Protestant and German-speaking) by a decision made at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The opposition of the people to this attachment had been expressed for 150 years, and resulted in the formation of a new canton in the 1970s.

The results of the referendum about the creation of the new canton permit to estimate the strength of separatist feelings at the level of the communes. As Table 1.3 shows, the per capita income level of the 122 communes has almost no correlation with separatist aspirations.<sup>7</sup>

As suggested by the above examples for type-B minorities the economic situation is almost irrelevant either as cause or consequence. The feelings of identification with a group are psychological phenomena whose roots lie in geography and history, and have little correlation with the standard of living. W. Connor was one of the first to defend this thesis, which today seems to be generally accepted.

***Economic factors as seen by Karl Deutsch*** In *Nationalism and social communication* which was published in 1953, Karl Deutsch concluded: “Not before the vast poverty of Asia and Africa will have been reduced substantially by industrialization [...] will the end of nationalism and national diversity see the beginning of its end.” What should we think of such a statement which is at variance with the above views? As is frequently the case in the social sciences, disagreement may come from the fact that two different things are being discussed. The ideas of Deutsch

on nationalism were heavily influenced by observation of the American melting pot, where economic prosperity undoubtedly played a crucial role. In a general way, economic growth certainly improves the capacity of *states* to absorb waves of immigrants. While a powerful economy like that of the United States can assimilate a flood of immigrants, a fragile economy like that of Kenya will have great difficulty absorbing a substantial Indian minority. It is certain that periods of economic depression are often accompanied by increased xenophobia; however, this is a short-term effect which has little relationship to the mechanisms being explored here. In a general way, these phenomena result from the reaction of the host states. In this book we are primarily interested in the behavior of minority groups. The reactions of host states are more complex, and will be looked at only occasionally.

### **The Linguistic Element**

For the German historical school of the nineteenth-century language was the critical criterion for the definition of a nation. This is all the more understandable as the German language was the principal argument for the unification that was attempted in 1848 and realized in 1870. While observation confirms that language is indeed an important element of proto-nationalism, it also shows that it is not the only one, and it may not be the most important. To illustrate this statement, let us look again at the examples of Ireland and the Bernese Jura. The statistical handbooks published by Peter Flora and his colleagues show that in Ireland around 1910 Irish was spoken by only 18 percent of the population, compared with the 51 percent who spoke the language around 1800. Yet, this did not lessen the feeling of identity among the Irish, nor did it stop the radicalization of their struggle. In the Bernese Jura, all the communes of the southern part of the region refused to be associated with the separatist movement which sought to form a new canton (referendum, 23 June 1974). Nevertheless, all these communes have a majority of French speakers. This qualitative result is confirmed in Table 1.3 by a correlation of only 0.51 between language and separatist tendencies. In short, while the linguistic element certainly plays an important role in separatist tendencies, in most cases it is not the primary element.

### **The Ancestral or Historical Component**

To the question, “What is a nation?” Walker Connor gives the following answer in his article of 1993: “A nation is a group of people who feel that they are ancestrally related.” Because of the word “feel” this definition might seem extremely subjective. Are we dealing with conscious or unconscious feelings, or perhaps both at the same time? Furthermore, how can we probe and test statistically the feelings of people? If we could remove the word “feel” the preceding definition would become more objective and testable; we could then say, “A nation is a group of people who are

ancestrally and historically related.”

This definition is remarkably well verified by statistical observation in the case of the Bernese Jura. We refer once again to the remarkable study by John Jenkins (Table 1.3). To this point, we have discussed only the first two columns of the table; here, we turn to columns 2 and 3, which correspond to an essential component of separatism, with correlations above 0.80. What do we understand by the expressions “Jura citizenship” and “Bernese citizenship”? Every Swiss citizen has what is called a *commune d’origine*, i.e., the community neighborhood where his ancestors have been living. This appears on his passport, and he will be called upon to use this fact in numerous administrative transactions. The *commune d’origine* is the commune inhabited by the ancestor of the person in the middle of the nineteenth century when the modern system of civil registry came into being. The *commune d’origine* is transferred from the father to his children over the generations. For individuals who immigrated to Switzerland after the middle of the nineteenth century, the *commune d’origine* is the one in which naturalization was acquired.

An example is given by Jenkins which shows how this institution functions. Josef Meier is a resident of the commune of Brugg in the canton of Aargau (northern Switzerland). His commune of origin is Hergiswil in the canton of Lucerne (central Switzerland), because his great-great grandfather Andreas Meier was born in that commune in 1829 and resided there until his death. His grandson, namely, Josef Meier’s grandfather, left Hergiswil in 1902.

The commune of origin is more than a historical relic; it corresponds to a true notion of citizenship on the communal level. A Swiss is first of all a citizen of his commune; the naturalization of a person from another country requires residency in the same commune for a certain number of years. This is decided at the level of the commune, sometimes even by vote of the inhabitants.

This Swiss particularity allows precise knowledge of where the ancestors of present-day residents of the Bernese Jura lived in the mid-nineteenth century. In the second half of the nineteenth century, there were important population movements, primarily due to industrialization. Many German-speaking Protestant inhabitants of the canton of Bern went to the south of the Bernese Jura at that time. Through the generations, via the habitual mechanisms of the melting pot, these people adopted the French language of their neighbors, yet they remained Protestants. The column, “Bernese citizenship” thus refers to the inhabitants of the Bernese Jura whose commune of origin is situated in the part of the canton of Bern that lies outside the Bernese Jura, while the column, “Jura citizenship” refers to inhabitants of the Bernese Jura whose commune of origin actually belongs to the Bernese Jura. As the results of Table 1.3 show, the former essentially voted “no” on the referendum of 23 June 1974, while the latter group voted “yes.” The strong correlation of 0.80 (see Table 1.3) between

Jura citizenship and separatism emphasizes the crucial role of the ancestral roots. One question remains. Insofar as immigrants from the rest of the canton of Bern have also kept their Protestant religion, we might ask if their separatist aspirations were influenced by their commune of origin or by their religion. As these two characteristics are to some extent overlapping, no statistical test will completely separate the two. It should be noted that, as a general rule, the borders of Swiss cantons were established on religious bases because at the time they were established in the sixteenth century, religion was a substitute for nationality. There are two notable exceptions to this, the cantons of Graubünden and Aargau; they show that the coexistence of two populations of different religions in the same canton does not necessarily bring about separatist feelings. Within the present-day lay state of Switzerland, ancestral origin rather than religion was certainly the principal factor in the separatism of the Bernese Jura.

## Which Questions Are within the Scope of Our Inquiry?

The preceding paragraphs show how we can more precisely define the limits of our study. Among all the possible kinds of minorities, we will concentrate on homeland minorities. Economic, social or political variables can play a role in the development of separatist tendencies, but we will focus rather on spatial and historical variables. In the following paragraphs, instead of listing the questions that will be examined in this book, we first identify those which will be left aside.

### Doable versus Undoable Questions

The distinction between so-called doable and undoable questions has been introduced by Stanley Lieberson and Charles Tilly (1993).<sup>8</sup> We believe this distinction to be very important.

Wishing to foresee the future is undoubtedly a natural tendency of the human mind. The Romans saw good or bad omens in the flight of birds or in the entrails of fowl. A cabalistic reading of the Bible answered the same need (there is an episode of this kind in Tolstoy's *War and Peace*). Astrology, which until the sixteenth century was confused with astronomy, is another attempt to predict the future. In the study of separatist struggles, it would certainly be satisfying to be able to predict which movements will develop or succeed within the next 20 or 30 years. The strong point of the analyses of Lieberson and Tilly is precisely to emphasize which questions cannot be answered scientifically. These writers use two analogies to illustrate their thesis.

### *Lieberson's stardom analogy*

Suppose, says Lieberson in *Making it count*, I wish to find out the factors that lead a small number of people to reach stardom in motion pictures. It might well be possible to find certain characteristics of the individuals which affect their chances, personal attractiveness, for instance, or persistence, connections, even acting talent. Efforts to go beyond the establishment of probability functions for each type of characteristic are doomed to failure. Sure, every special case could in a sense be “explained”; but the relevance of such ad hoc, a posteriori reasoning is doubtful.

Like the achievement of stardom, the emergence or success of a separatist struggle depends sequentially upon a large number of special circumstances among which are the emergence of a charismatic leader, external support, a favorable international context, etc. Each of these factors in turn depends on a set of more or less random conditions which make any kind of prediction impossible. Figure 1.3 illustrates the multiple branching of this sort of phenomenon with the case of Ireland between 1910 and 1922.


*Tilly’s traffic jam analogy* Tilly’s example is interesting because it emphasizes the futility of any prediction as to the start of a movement. It also shows that once the process has been put in motion, one can reasonably attempt to predict its development. Tilly establishes a parallel with the development of a traffic jam on a freeway. Traffic jams depend on a number of factors, such as the timing of the traffic, the response of drivers to weather conditions, patterns of highway maintenance, the location of automobile accidents, and a number of other factors, each of which is largely independent on the others. The coincidence of these factors is so complex as to seem almost a matter of chance; this makes a general theory specifying necessary and sufficient conditions almost inconceivable. However, once begun, traffic jams display fairly recurrent patterns regarding their duration or the behavior of drivers.

*A biological analogy* The previous analogy can be completed by an illustration taken from biology, namely, the development of a cancerous tumor. There seems to be no well-defined answer to the question of why a tumor develops in a certain place. To hide our ignorance, we resort to a multifactorial process involving heredity, the environment, age and various other factors. However once a tumor develops, it tends to obey well-defined rules of development, as do traffic jams.

### **Classification of Problems according to Their Difficulty**

In a remarkably innovative work published in 1988, J. Tainter looks at the disintegration of empires of the past, like the Roman or the Mayan. There comes a moment in which the central state no longer has the means to federate the different components which make up a country; centrifugal forces overcome the forces of cohesion, and





**Figure 1.3 Undoable Problems.** Predicting the successive stages of the Irish struggle for independence is an “undoable problem” in the sense Stanley Lieberson gave to this expression and which is schematized by this figure. It took a number of steps to get from 1910 to the Easter Rising; at each of these steps history had to select one of several possible options. The same argument applies to the steps that lead from the Easter Rising to independence. If we assume that there were eight steps and two equally likely options at each step, the actual trajectory (schematized by a thick line) has a probability of  $0.5^8 = 0.004$ , that is to say a negligible probability. We have here a system in which the presence of too many bifurcations frustrates prediction.

chaos sets in; soon, the entire country breaks up into smaller parts. This is a fascinating problem with many illustrations available throughout history.

However, one must be aware that this is a very complex problem in which many phenomena coexist: economic, for instance, with respect to the fiscal receipts; military, for instance, through repression of separatist insurrections; and social, for instance, regarding the relations between the ruling class and the rest of society. In short, such a problem depends upon almost all the facets of the society.

In an effort to gauge the level of difficulty of this type of problem, we have introduced a classification based on the number of interactions (see Table 1.4). The more a problem brings with it different interactions, the more difficult will it be to study. This principle is illustrated and confirmed by a parallel with theoretical mechanics. For instance, the problem considered by Tainter would belong to level four. In this book, we try to restrict ourselves to problems belonging to level two.

### “Modest Goals”

**Table 1.4 Classification of Problems in the Social and Natural Sciences According to the Number of Interactions Involved**

	Definition of the system		Examples		
	Number of entities in the system	Number of interactions between entities	Sociology	Economics	Mechanics <i>(in italics, whether solved or not)</i>
1)	1	0	One (homogeneous) group	Economy with only one sector	An isolated celestial body ( <i>solved</i> )
2)	2	1	a) Minority within a state b) Interaction between two minorities (or two social classes)	Economy with two sectors	a) Interaction between a planet and the sun ( <i>solved</i> ) b) Interaction between two planets ( <i>solved</i> )
3)	$N$	$N(N-1)/2$	Interaction between $N$ identical groups (e.g. nomadic groups)	Interaction between $N$ wheat markets	Interaction between $N$ stars or between $N$ molecules in a gas. ( <i>partially solved</i> )
4)	$N$	$2N$	Interaction between $N$ different minorities in a multi-ethnic state (or interaction between $N$ social classes)	Economy with $N$ sectors	Interaction between all celestial bodies in the solar system ( <i>unsolvable analytically, only computer assisted solution</i> )

*Note:* The parallel with known systems in mechanics permits an estimate of the degree of difficulty of these problems. The numbers 1 to 4 are in order of increasing difficulty. In this book, we will confine ourselves to problems arising from the first two levels; in fact, we are essentially interested in those of the second degree because having no interaction the first degree systems are purely static and their description is therefore fairly trivial. It can be noted that there are only  $N(N-1)/2$  interactions on level 3 because we consider in this case only interactions between pairs of objects. A numerical example immediately shows that the number of interactions is much larger on level 4 than on level 3; thus for  $N=10$ , we obtain:  $N(N-1)/2 = 45$ ,  $2^N=1024$ .

The greatest progress in every science came when, in the study of problems which were modest in scope as compared with ultimate aims, methods were developed which could be extended further and further. Free fall is a very trivial physical phenomenon, but it was the study of this exceedingly simple fact and its comparison with astronomical material which gave birth to the science of mechanics [...] The sound procedure is to obtain first utmost pre-



cision and mastery in a limited field, and then to proceed to another, somewhat wider one, and so on.

As von Neumann and Morgenstern point out in this excerpt from *Theory of games and economic behavior* the choice of a problem should not be guided by its political and social importance, but by the ability to solve it completely and decisively. J. Jenkins's study of the Bernese Jura is an excellent illustration of this notion. The Bernese Jura, with 70,000 inhabitants, is a very small region, even on a Swiss scale; but thanks to the place that communes have in the political organization of Switzerland, separatism in the Bernese Jura can be studied statistically with a unique precision and rigor.

The same philosophy underlies this book. Accordingly, we will concentrate our attention on the best documented cases, and leave aside those cases which are lacking in precise information. One might be tempted to deplore the apparent arbitrariness of this way of proceeding; should not a systematic comparison incorporate all existing cases? To this possible criticism, we reply by assuring the reader that each new case which is accompanied by data of a satisfying quality will be considered with great attention.

## Connection of This Book with Previous Research

One may have the impression that research in the social sciences develops in ways that are more often parallel than convergent; only rarely does knowledge build on knowledge. The cumulative mechanism characterizing the development of knowledge in the natural sciences seems to be essentially inoperative in the social sciences. In our opinion, this is primarily because the social sciences approach complex problems without trying to break them down into simpler elements.

The phenomenon of nationalism, for example, has too many dimensions to allow for a global theory, and many general books stumble on that difficulty. Examples are the works of Breuille, Gellner, Greenfeld, and Hobsbawm. Armstrong, on the other hand, limits himself to a particular aspect (the origins of modern nations); the author clarifies a number of interesting points, despite the paucity of sources for the period he studies (the end of the ancient world and the beginning of the Middle Ages). Likewise M. Hroch has adroitly focused his attention on a certain number of small European peoples: Czechs, Estonians, Finns, Slovaks, and the Flemish; this choice is ideal for comparative analysis; his study is related to our work in chapter 8.<sup>9</sup>

In this book, we will pursue the following objectives.

- We distinguish clearly between the separatist struggles in which land is at stake and those in which cultural recognition is at the forefront.

- We establish a relationship between geographical factors (isolation, cross-border support) and the survival of minority languages.
- We underline the importance of historical factors; we will show in particular that collective historical memory plays a determining role in the consolidation of minority feelings as well as in the development of the forms of struggle.


By confining ourselves to the three objectives just described, we are aware that we bypass a number of other interesting aspects of nationalism, for example (1) the way in which political claims are taken over by political parties, (2) the role of the elites, and (3) the involvement of social classes in the development of separatist studies. We do not take up these questions, not because they are unimportant but because one cannot investigate too many factors at the same time. The three principal aspects that interest us are virtually independent one from the other. If one or the other of these building blocks can be helpful to twenty-first century sociologists this book will not have been useless.

E. Durkheim, V. Pareto, K. Deutsch, S. Lieberman, C. Tilly, W. Connor, M. Hechter, D. Laitin opened up the road. Thanks to their contributions, we can move forward with more assurance. We will briefly sketch out their contributions in the following paragraphs (Figure 1.4).

### **The Role of Social Interactions**

Deutsch laid the bases for a theory of social integration, founded on the frequency and intensity of interactions and contacts. Interactions occur through a process of diffusion. Just as a piece of sugar slowly melts and mixes with water, a minority placed in a much larger social group gradually loses its particular characteristics. Relying on a substantial number of statistical observations, Deutsch has shown that interactions are more frequent in urban than in rural settings, and that they are more numerous in a modern society than in a traditional rural society. His work fits into the best tradition of the quantitative sociology of Durkheim. The model proposed by Deutsch is implicitly based on observation of the American melting pot; it pays substantial attention to the role of modern communications technologies.<sup>10</sup>

The emergence of numerous separatist movements in industrialized societies during the 1960s and 1970s seemed to refute Deutsch's theses, which were slowly pushed aside. Deutsch had proposed a global theory, and as soon as one of its predictions was shown to be erroneous, the entire theory became suspect. A more sensible attitude would have been to ask which hypotheses should be reexamined. When Newtonian mechanics was contradicted by observations of the planet Mercury, the essential part of Newton's theory was nevertheless retained; the revision concerned only movements in the neighborhood of a strong gravitational field. It is true that Deutsch had not established clear distinctions between homeland-based minorities and other



**Figure 1.4 Building Blocks of Knowledge for the Problem of Separatism.** The contributions listed in the figure were important landmarks in the study of separatism. Naturally this list is fairly subjective and does not intend to be exhaustive; for the most part it is restricted to contributions that have been published in English or French. The contributions of the present study are referred to as “This book.”

minorities. However, he had shown that even under the most favorable conditions, assimilation is a slow process which may take several generations; he had not fully realized that for homeland minorities, geography and history together form a particularly resistant shell. To return to our earlier analogy, it is as if a sugar cube were dipped in a layer of honey that would prevent the cube from dissolving. This “shell” slows down the process of diffusion; to break the shell, either a very long time is needed, or the historical crucible must be particularly intense. The revolutionary period in France, or the Second World War in the United States were especially effective crucibles.

In his various works since the early 1950s, Deutsch has worked on the problem of nationalism using the concepts of systems theory; in so doing he was a precursor, since this theory did not become popular in the social sciences until the 1970s. Since then, enthusiasm for systems theory has waned somewhat. Nevertheless, we think that the viewpoint of systems theory provides an extremely useful framework and starting point for investigations in the social sciences; that viewpoint helps to shield the sociologist from the alluring chimera of anthropocentrism.

## The Role of Languages

In a series of articles and books published in the 1970s and 1980s, Lieberman identifies a certain number of factors which contribute to the survival of minority languages. Basing his work on quantitative and comparative data gleaned from censuses and surveys taken in several countries, he was able to estimate the impact of these factors over long periods of time, on the order of a century. Our analysis of minority languages in chapter 4 is an extension of Lieberman's work. We will pay special attention to the microsociological mechanisms which are at the root of the retention or decline of minority languages. Such a microsociological approach was pioneered by Laitin in a series of books and papers. Through detailed field studies, Laitin analyzed three kinds of case studies: multilingualism in eastern Africa, the dynamism of Catalan, and linguistic issues in the republics that have sprung up in the wake of the former Soviet Union and which contain a number of important minorities. Our approach will be complementary in the sense that we will apply the same microsociological approach to long-term historical evolution.<sup>11</sup>

## The Determining Role of the Initial Contact

Studies in the area of ethology over the last thirty years have shown the importance of the phenomenon of impregnation. As the duckling emerges from the egg, it may consider any immediately comforting presence as its mother, even if it is a hen or a human. A somewhat similar phenomenon is seen among social groups, in the sense that the manner of making the first contact between groups seems to condition their later relationship. As Lieberman pointed out in a pioneering article "the nature of the initial contact between ethnic groups helps explain various ethnic outcomes found in different societies" (see his 1991 presidential address and his paper of 1961). In an important work, Michael Hechter showed how the nature of the conquest phase affected the later destiny of the three Celtic fringes of England, namely, Ireland, Scotland and Wales.

By looking at the history of a large number of minorities, Walker Connor explains the apparently mythical origins of the feeling of identity. He shows how the distinction between a minority and the exterior world, between being "at home" as opposed to the "others" is one or even the essential factor in the emergence of separatist feelings.<sup>12</sup>

## Pattern and Repertoire

The temptation to form premature theories upon insufficient data is the bane of our profession.

—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, *The valley of fear*

“What is this book trying to prove?” is a question that a number of acquaintances asked while this book was being written. My answer that “It isn’t trying to prove anything but merely trying to see if certain empirical rules will emerge from observation” generally brought about frustration, disappointment and even reprobation. This anecdote shows the extent to which the public expects the social sciences to defend a thesis or a scale of values. If a physicist were studying the flow of air over an airfoil, would we ask him what thesis he is trying to prove? He is satisfied with observing and measuring the important variables. Our objective will be similar: to bring out the important variables and to see if there are empirical regularities.

Pareto was undoubtedly the first sociologist to propose a method to find, identify and classify qualitative regularities. In his *Treatise of general sociology* he shows how to identify common elements in a set of facts; he calls them the residue, a term which he uses in the sense it has in chemistry, that is, to say what remains after filtration.

Here is an example of his approach. Pareto begins with a series of observations. (1) Christians observe the custom of baptism. (2) Pagans too use lustral water. (3) Other examples show that in these sorts of rites, water can be replaced by other liquids. Pareto then observes that in this variety of facts, the constant is the feeling that the integrity of an individual who has been altered by certain causes can be restored by specific rites based on the use of a liquid. It is that constant element which he calls the residue. The more or less rational cloak by which different religions justify these rites is what Pareto calls derivations. For instance, Christian religions tells us that the rite of baptism is celebrated in order to remove the original sin.

In a general way, Pareto applies this methodology principally to the study of prejudices and superstitions. In this sense, his treatise on sociology is a work in psychosociology, as revealed by the title of the English translation, *The mind and society*. Needless to say, this method can be used in other areas as well.

Charles Tilly renewed and perfected this approach through his analysis of popular protest demonstrations. He was able to show that demonstrators in a particular region use a repertoire which remains relatively unchanged over time. This repertoire is analogous (albeit in a totally different area) to the residue of Pareto. The “cloak,” the apparent motives of the demonstrators, can take multiple forms. Following the path opened by Tilly, we are especially interested in repertoires. The ideological “cloaks” will be set aside, not because they are less important but because they are fluctuating and difficult to seize in a comparative investigation.

## Methodological Options

So far we have delineated our objectives; we now need to explain how we propose to carry them out.

*Long-term study*     We will often have occasion to emphasize that cultural or lin-

guistic assimilation are very slow phenomena whose progress can be measured only over several centuries. This fact impels us to study these phenomena in a long-term perspective. As a general rule, we will go back into history as far as the available sources allow.

*The study of forms of action of separatist movements* We will concentrate on forms of action rather than motivations, for two main reasons.

- Separatist forms of action can be described more objectively than motivations. At first, it might seem that motivations are clearly stated in nationalist manifests and in the literary production, but this is an illusion. Stated motives may be only a part of conscious motives, which in turn are merely the tip of an immense iceberg of more or less unconscious motives linked to collective historical memory. Furthermore, the literary output reflects the views of a very narrow fringe of the population; military figures, financiers, artisans, and farmers write little.

- Motives, to the extent that we can seize them, have changed substantially over the centuries. From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, the feeling of identity was largely based on religious affiliation (we will return to this point). Later, language seems to play a major identity role. Before the sixteenth century, allegiance to an overlord and identification with a clan seem to have been the primary moving forces. Still, separatist reactions have changed little in their form. One finds the same rejection of intruding foreign elements and also the same mechanisms of assimilation; even in Ireland, where nationalist polarization was to remain so strong over centuries, a wave of colonists arriving from across the Irish Sea between the tenth and the twelfth centuries was able to establish itself and be assimilated.

By studying what people do rather than what they think, we will find ourselves in a favorable position to search for regularities, which is our primary objective.

*Estimating the intensity of a separatist struggle* Quantitative analysis hinges on a central question: how can we estimate the intensity of a separatist movement? First of all, we must realize that the success or failure of a separatist struggle gives no basis for a judgment on the intensity of the struggle. The issue depends on a great number of factors, mostly outside the minority itself. The international situation and the strength of the central power, for example, play a determining role. When the USSR fell apart in 1991–1992, several republics gained independence without a struggle. Similarly, a country like Luxembourg (400,000 inhabitants) became independent through international treaties rather than through a struggle by the population. On the other hand, there are minorities, such as the peoples in Kashmir or northern Sumatra, which have fought for decades without obtaining autonomy or independence.

In a general way, the intensity of separatist struggles varies over periods of several



decades. In the words of Laitin “Nations are not out here to be counted; they are a function of social, political and economic processes.”<sup>13</sup> A sudden and massive influx of immigrants, for example, will bring about a general strengthening of feelings of identity. This strengthening may be temporary, as were the flare-ups of “nativism” in the United States, but it may also be the triggering factor in a deeper crisis.

This duality can also be found in biology. Treatments for allergies are based on the fact that successive, but weak, allergic attacks will produce a progressive attenuation of reactions in the organism. On the other hand, under certain circumstances, the organism will react to repeated allergic attacks by more and more violent reactions, which may even result in death from something as trivial as a bee sting.

*The presentation of historical material* Every comparative historical study is confronted with a difficulty that we also meet in this book: how can one present historical material relating to twenty or thirty different cases? Even a summary account would require a book of at least 800 pages on the base of 20 pages per case, which would surely tax the patience of most readers. A comfortable solution would be to publish this material in the form of an “historical handbook” a reference book that might be consulted like a dictionary or an encyclopedia. This is the solution adopted by M. Hroch, who devotes a separate volume to a factual history of individual nations (unfortunately, this book is available only in Polish). We have chosen a different solution. Each chapter has two parts. The first is devoted to exposing a small number of representative cases so as to give the reader an intuitive idea of the mechanisms. The mechanisms are then analyzed in the second part on the basis of a greater number of cases. This method is, of course, a compromise solution. It is not completely satisfying in that the reader does not have available all the elements that went into the comparative analysis. It would be ideal to be able to publish these elements in the form of a “Handbook of Separatist Disturbances.” Such a work would furnish the sociologist with a reference as indispensable as is a catalogue of stars for the astrophysicist.

## Presentation of the Book

In this section, we present some of the results of our study, before passing on to a brief survey of the chapters of the book.

### Some Results

#### *Classification*

The distinction between homeland minorities and other minorities emerged as absolutely essential in the early stages of our study of separatism. The other distinctions

proposed in the classification in Figure 1.2 rather occurred to us little by little. The possession of land plays a primordial role in rural societies, and to deprive a group of its land is an attack, not only on its ability to survive but also on its very identity. This has important consequences for the forms of struggle, which are generally more violent than when language or culture are at stake.

These latter cases are found only in societies where education and urbanization have made progress. As a society grows more complex and as contacts multiply, language becomes a more precious commodity and thus a more important stake in the struggle. These struggles are largely led by middle-class intellectuals.

When political power is confiscated the ruling elites lead the struggle. This struggle will be all the more intense as the country has enjoyed a long period of real sovereignty. A typical case is the situation in Egypt, after the English occupation in 1882; this occupation came at a moment when the country had essentially shaken off Ottoman domination.

In summary, we can say that the classification in Figure 1.2 illustrates one of the essential results of this book. It is essential in particular because it conditions and models the remainder of the study. Chapter 7 examines struggles in which land is at stake, while chapter 8 analyses cases in which language and culture are the objects of dispute.

*Religion versus language* Figure 1.2 makes a clear-cut distinction between religious minorities and homeland minorities. Unfortunately, in historical reality, things are not quite so simple. Before the mid-eighteenth century, religion left its imprint on all social life to the extent that national identity was subordinate to religious identity. One could not be English, for example, without embracing the Anglican religion. Religion, in short, played the role that language plays today.

The shift from one regime to the other had important political consequences. This period of transition was marked by two opposing movements: the disintegration of multilingual empires whose internal cement was religion and the unification of entities with a common language. Among the former, we can mention (1) the kingdom of Denmark (separation from Scania in the south of Sweden, from Norway, from Schleswig and from Iceland); (2) the disintegration of Catholic empires: the Austrian (separation of Belgium, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) and the Spanish (separation of Portugal and Sardinia); (3) the decomposition of Muslim empires: the Ottoman (separation of Albania and Egypt) and the Persian (separation of Afghanistan). Among the examples of unification we can count the United States, Germany and Italy.

*Similarities of recurring struggles* Another result of a general nature which reappears throughout this book concerns the forms that successive separatist insurrections



take. We can see that if the environment remains relatively stable, the best predictor for insurrection number  $n$  is insurrection number  $n - 1$ . In short, the best predictor for tomorrow is yesterday. Nothing so resembles a separatist crisis in the Bernese Jura as another crisis in the same region, even if separated by a century. Conversely, the separatist protests in the Bernese Jura bear little resemblance to the protests in the Italian Alto Adige (also called South Tyrol), despite a separation of little more than 300 kilometers. Nothing more closely resembles autonomist unrest in Belgium in the 1960s about languages than the unrest about the role of religion in Belgian schools in the 1880s. In short, the forms of separatist action are specific to each region and show great stability over time. If we wish, for example, to know what form separatist agitation will take in the Indonesian Moluccas in the future, we need only look at the forms this activity took in the 1950s.

In the following chapter, we introduce a technical word to describe this kind of identity: we will speak of *paronymic* struggles. This term comes from linguistics; for instance, collision and collusion are two paronymic words. The term has the advantage of emphasizing that the similarity is in the form and not in the significance.

**Geographical determinants** In chapter 5, we define an index which describes the geographical isolation of a region within a country. We also note that the retention of a minority language is heavily favored if the same language is spoken in a neighboring country. The use of Alsatian in eastern France, for example, is favored by the fact that the same language is spoken in Baden, the neighboring German region across the Rhine. The index of isolation in chapter 5 takes this aspect into account. The index will permit us to predict the decline in the percentage of people speaking a minority language. We will also see in chapters 5 and 8 that there is a notable correlation between the degree of isolation of a region and the separatist activity that occurs there.

**Historical determinants** It is banal to say that what is happening in a given region at a given moment depends on the prior history of this region; in that form the statement is far too vague to be of any usefulness. However, we will see in chapters 6 and 8 that in the case of separatist movements, this observation can be given a testable, quantitative form. There is, for example, a direct relationship between the degree of intensity of separatist struggles in the period 1845-1945 and the degree of intensity of such struggles in the period after 1945. This result shows in particular that the movements which occurred in the 1970s had deep historical roots.

**The fate of colonists** When a country  $A$  takes control of a region  $R$ , people from  $A$  frequently move to  $R$  as colonists. What is the fate of these colonists when  $R$  becomes independent? This question has been asked a number of times in the past century: with respect to the English “colonists” in Ireland after 1922, the Russian

“colonists” in the former Soviet Republics after the collapse of the USSR, and the European colonists in the English, French or Portuguese colonies in Africa. These colonists have often been settled in *R* for several generations, sometimes even several centuries, as they were in Ireland. Nevertheless, after independence they felt that they were no longer “at home” as Connor put it.

Fundamentally, if their group is outnumbered in terms of population, colonists have three possible options: (1) Assimilate, which means adopting the language and sometimes the religion of their adopted country. (2) Keep their identity separate and fight for their rights. (3) Emigrate and return to the country of their ancestors.

In chapter 7, we look at this question with particular reference to the decolonization process in Africa. The proportion of colonists who emigrated is directly proportional to their numbers before independence. Intuitively, this result can be explained as follows. Lands occupied by colonists were to a large extent confiscated from Africans. We have previously noted the sensitivity of rural societies to this type of confiscation, thus it is hardly surprising that the war for independence was more violent in a country where there were more colonists. The more violent the war, the deeper the chasm formed between the two communities; as a result, more colonists left after independence.

In Africa, the proportion of colonists with respect to the total population was never above 10 percent; in Algeria and in South Africa, this proportion was near 10 percent. It is obvious that the rule just stated is not applicable if the proportion of colonists is above 30 percent or 40 percent, since in this event the balance of forces will be very different. This is the case, for example, in Ulster, New Caledonia or New Zealand.

### **Summary of Subsequent Chapters**

The primary message of the three-chapter methodological prologue is to emphasize that in order to make the most of comparative analysis it must be limited to well-defined problems. To make a comparative analysis of the French and English economies in the nineteenth century is tempting for the historian, but well-defined conclusions would be expected in vain. The number of variables is too great with respect to the number of cases studied. In order to resort to comparative analysis, a complex phenomenon needs to be broken into smaller components. It would be more judicious to compare the glass industry or the cereals markets, or the fiscal policies of France and England. However, even for more focused problems of that sort the number of variables is much greater than the number of cases.

Chapter 2 introduces a number of concepts used in the rest of the book: the notion of paronymic events, the distinction between “why” and “how.” By way of illustration: this approach is applied in chapter 3 to a question which is deliberately outside the main theme of this book. The idea was suggested by discussions with friends

from various countries; most of them had the impression that the transmission of the AIDS virus to hemophiliacs occurred only in their own country, and were therefore tempted to blame the behavior of their national health authorities. A comparative analysis shows, however, that this problem occurred in all industrialized countries (except Belgium) because of a procedure in which blood from a large number of donors was mixed; such a conclusion may be useful in the future.

In chapter 4, we examine three factors which play a major role in the long-term evolution of separatist movements: (1) control of land, (2) language and (3) geographical isolation. The effects of these factors accumulate over time, from which we conclude that time is another essential factor.

In chapter 5, we study the influence of the spatial factor. Even a summary observation shows that separatist movements always occur on the outskirts of a country, on islands or peninsulas. The index of spatial isolation is a tool which allows us to test this hypothesis quantitatively.

Chapter 6 delves into the historical roots of separatist groups and into their collective memory. We will see that shared ordeals favor the formation of a feeling of identity. We attempt to evaluate the influence of collective memory on the development of separatist struggles by introducing an index which allows measurement of the degree of continuity between two successive historical periods.

Chapter 7 looks at situations involving the confiscation of land, the so-called type A minorities. We look at the cases of Ireland, Algeria, Bulgaria, Guatemala and Burundi. Then, in order to emphasize the contrast, we look at two other cases, Egypt and Ghana, where only political power was taken away. Further on, we look at the qualitative regularities issuing from the comparison of these episodes: the closing off of communities, massacres of colonists, reforms which come too late, the actions of extremist colonists. Finally, we analyze a certain number of quantitative regularities.

Chapter 8 deals with situations in which the conflict is cultural. We begin with a look at Hungary, the Bernese Jura, Wales, Croatia, Kosovo and Casamance. Further on, we examine the qualitative regularities which can be drawn from a comparison of these episodes: the failure of too rapid attempts at assimilation, the necessary conditions for a successful melting pot, the impact of a sudden increase in immigration. Finally, we study the quantitative regularities between (1) the intensity of separatist movements in the second half of the twentieth century and their intensity in the preceding century and (2) the intensity of separatist movements and the index of geographical isolation.

In the concluding chapter, we discuss the links between sociological theories and the history of international relations in the wake of the world wars. First, we show that predictions have little influence on the course of events, quite simply because

no one believes them; in a surprising way, this is the case even when predictions are remarkably accurate. Next, we try to understand on which hypotheses territorial divisions were made following the two world wars. Finally, we emphasize that the discussion of the respective merits of unitary states compared with federal states is biased from the outset if the crucial distinction between mono- or plurilinguistic states is not made. Monolingual states, whether unitary or federal, are relatively stable, while plurilinguistic states appear historically to be fragile, without regard to their federal or unitary status.

## Chapter 2

# Analytical History, the Science of Clusters of Events

The idea leads the experiment.

—Claude Bernard (Physiologist, 1813–1876)

Are historical events unique? On the answer that we give to that question depends the epistemological status of the historical discipline. If we answer in the affirmative, which is the historian's traditional response, history can hardly be considered as a science for it is difficult to imagine a scientific study of unique events. On the other hand, we can also consider historical events from a perspective in which they cease to be unique. This is the point of view adopted by historical sociology. Analytical history, which is the topic of the present chapter, can be considered a branch of historical sociology; one of its main characteristics is that it tries to study and understand complex phenomena by decomposing them into simpler components. The object of this chapter is to delineate the contours of such an approach.

Are historical events unique? Of course they are if we consider them from a chronological point of view. There was only one American Civil War, and there will never be another. However, a little reflection shows that, *stricto sensu*, every event is unique whatsoever. For instance, the event “This morning, I left my house at 7:30 to go to work” is never repeated twice in the same way. The temperature, the appearance of the clouds, the wind speed, the position of the moon in the sky, all these variables are never identical twice in succession; there are other variables which could be mentioned as well: my age, my mood, what I did the previous evening. In short, once we describe it in detail, even such a routine action as going to work will become as unique as the Civil War.

On the other hand if I ask, “How long did it take to get from my home to the office?” the description of the event will be reduced to a number. One day it will take forty minutes, on another it will take forty-three minutes; even if these times are different the simple fact that I can compare them shows that seen in this way the event “going to work” is no longer unique but belongs to a set of similar events.

I might be tempted to ask an even more ambitious question: “Does it take longer to go to work when it is raining than when it is not?” This apparently simple question requires a detailed analysis. How should one define the expression, “it is raining”? Is it sufficient for the ground to be wet, or must rain be falling? If the latter, then is a light mist considered the same as heavy rain? One will also have to eliminate all the parasitical factors which could affect the test. If, for example, traffic is heavier on Fridays, then Fridays should be eliminated from the sample; it might also be necessary to make a correction to account for the fact that it is still dark at 7:30 in the winter, while in summer the sun is already well up in the sky at that hour of the morning. These reservations foreshadow the methodological precautions that have to be taken in the work of historical sociology.

One might object that the event we described is fairly trivial and has not much significance in a historical or scientific perspective; yet the same reasoning also applies to scientific experiments. As an example, consider the vibrations of a pendulum. *Stricto sensu*, this experiment cannot be repeated twice in the same way. Indeed, a multitude of factors may vary from one experiment to another: air currents in the laboratory, the movement of people in other rooms, automobile or train traffic outside. All these factors cause vibrations which are transmitted through the walls of the building to the pendulum’s point of support and therefore affect the movement of the pendulum. One could also mention the gravitational effects of the moon and the sun, as well as the influence, albeit much weaker, of the planets. In short if one describes the vibrations of a pendulum with much details this experiment becomes as unique as the Civil War.


On the other hand, if one asks “How long does it take for the pendulum to complete one swing?” then the description is reduced to a simple number. If we are satisfied with an accuracy on the order of a tenth of a second, the preceding factors become unobservable and we would be inclined to say that the experiment can be repeated with identical results. On the other hand, if we could measure that time with an accuracy on the order of a nanosecond (i.e., a billionth of a second), the influence of the factors mentioned above would be discernible, and we would not obtain twice the same result. Nevertheless, the different measurements would obviously describe a set of similar events.

In history, things may be seen in the same way. Instead of specifically thinking about the Civil War, one may more generally consider the phenomenon “rebellion of a state or a group of states against the authority of the federal government.” Seen in this way, the Civil War would belong to a larger set of events and ceases to be unique. Even if we restrict our attention to the United States there are (at least) two other rebellions of a state or territory which were broken up only by the intervention

of federal troops: the rebellion in the Utah Territory in 1857-1858 and the rebellion in the state of Mississippi in 1962; they are briefly described in appendix A. In short we can say that these three episodes make up a cluster of events which illustrate the phenomenon “rebellion against the federal government.” If we extend the scope of our investigation to other countries it is possible to find other illustrations of this phenomenon, which are also described in appendix A. To sum up, we may say that while history is period-centered, analytical history will always be problem-centered.

Before moving on let us look at another example of the passage from a unique event to a cluster of events. Toward the end of 1997, the French daily *Le Monde* published an article entitled “The Risks of the Euro” (*Le Monde*, 25 November 1997). The article developed an argument due to the American economist Milton Friedman to the effect that political unity can lead to monetary unity, but that to reverse the order and attempt to achieve monetary unity without political unity can only lead to failure. In the discussion of this question, the author of the article completely ignores the possible lessons of history in the sense that he does not devote a single line to previous attempts at monetary unity, for example, in the United States in the years following independence or in Germany in the years after 1870. It is true that in most cases, political unity had been achieved before monetary unity; however, there are also cases where the same currency is used by independent countries; the sterling area and the French franc area are two examples. In short, instead of relying on historical evidence and observation the author of the article preferred to oppose theoretical (one could even say ideological) arguments; in so doing the article was typical of a widespread tendency: while historical observation should be our first source of knowledge, this step is often passed over. Is it not odd that people would try to guess the future without looking at what the past may teach us?

We may outline the approach delineated in this chapter as comprising the following steps:



The definition of a mechanism represents what Claude Bernard calls the idea; this idea directs observation in the sense that the historian will look at different countries and periods where the mechanism can be seen at work. Once these episodes are identified, isolated and documented, it will be possible to compare them and to see their common features. The more numerous the observations the more precise the regularities that can be identified. In the example of the rebellion against the central

government, we had to confine ourselves to three examples if we restrict ourselves to the United States only, and to six if we also include instances that occurred in the mid-nineteenth century in other countries. It may appear dangerous to draw conclusions from such a limited number of cases but this provides at least a first insight into that phenomenon. Everything else being equal, the study of a mechanism will be all the more precise and fruitful as the number of observations increases. The same rule also applies to other areas. For instance we know much better the conditions leading to volcanic eruptions than those leading to glaciations. In the first case, there are several thousand episodes; in the second, there are only four: the glaciations of Ginz (-950,000), Mindel (-400,000), Riss (-200,000) and Würm (-80,000).

In this chapter, we will attempt to specify the conditions that must be respected to make the study of clusters of events as rigorous as possible. First, we will explain why we call the study of clusters of events “analytical history.” The second section will emphasize that analytical history answers questions which are different from those addressed by traditional history: while the latter is interested in “why?” analytical history is interested in “how?” The third section will underscore the important role played in human actions by repetition, what we will call “paronymy,” a form of repetition which allows of slight variations. In the fourth section, we will insist on the fact that analytical history cannot develop in other than a dispassionate climate where all facts are accepted, even those which are “disturbing.” In the final section, we will ask what rules apply to the definition of clusters of events.

## Analytical History

I thought that I would have enough of the four following (precepts), provided that I took a firm and constant vow never to fail to observe them [. . .]. The second [is] to divide each difficulty that I examined into as many parts as possible and which be necessary to solve the problems. The third [is] to direct my thoughts in an orderly manner, beginning with the objects that were the simplest and easiest to know, in order to climb little by little, gradually, toward the knowledge of the most complex. The last [is] always to make enumerations so complete, and reviews so general, that I would be sure of omitting nothing.

—René Descartes<sup>1</sup>

Is it a mere coincidence, or a proof of the pertinence of Descartes’s precepts that, three centuries later, the rules mentioned in the previous citation remarkably well describe our approach in this book? The third rule which suggests beginning with the simplest objects was developed in the previous chapter. The numerous tables



summarizing data about episodes of similar type, which occur throughout this book, are an illustration of the last rule. As for the rule relative to the analytical method, that is the subject of the present section.

According to a standard English dictionary (*Longmans Dictionary*, 1990), the adjective “analytical” refers to “methods of careful examination used in order to separate things into their parts.” To show how this approach can be used in the study of history, we will consider a concrete example, namely, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the identity crisis which followed it. The former Soviet Union found itself in unusually chaotic circumstances, in which it experienced economic, social and political crises, along with the resurgence of nationalistic feelings. Two approaches are conceivable for the analysis of a situation of this complexity.

- Find a global model with the aim of predicting the possible outcomes of the crisis. Given the present state of the social sciences and the fact that the number of unknown parameters in such a model would necessarily be very great, this procedure appears fairly utopian. To make things even worse historical retrospective offers little comparable situations which would permit an adjustment of these parameters.

- The approach of analytical history consists of pointing out that even if economic, social, political or ethnic crises are interdependent and interwoven, they are derived from logical and behavioral categories which are, in fact, different. Separate analyses of these partial crises will be made easier for two reasons: (1) their modeling involves a smaller number of parameters (2) while Russia had never experienced a crisis like the current one, there had been a number of social and political crises which could provide at least partial models; for instance the abolition of serfdom by Alexander II in 1861, the failed revolution of 1905, and, of course, the revolution of 1917 were first magnitude social crises experienced by Russia between 1850 and 1920. Problems linked to proto-nationalism have also recurred throughout Russian history: the revolts of the Cossacks in Ukraine, the insurrections in Dagestan and Chechnya (1830–1859), the uprising in Georgia in 1924 are a few examples.

In this analytical approach, the overall problem of the evolution of the Russian society is fragmented into several questions which can be studied separately. Such an approach might at first seem disappointing because, although it provides partial answers, it gives no definite answer about the future overall evolution of Russia. Yet even if a magic crystal ball were to allow us such foresight, it would hardly be useful because no one would believe in it, and with good reason; there are numerous unforeseeable events which can upset predictions.

At that point it must be stressed that even if analytical history aims at becoming an observational science on a par with astrophysics, geophysics or meteorology, it will

never be a deterministic science. In this sense, the freedom of choice of individuals and societies remains intact. In that respect one should recall that even the most “exact” natural sciences, such as physics or astronomy, have for decades accustomed us to the idea that an experiment can have an entire spectrum of possible outcomes which can then be ranked in order of decreasing probabilities. The growing awareness of the importance of chaos in processes which are in themselves fundamentally deterministic (as in the case of meteorological phenomena) has reinforced the idea that for a large number of phenomena there can be no accurate predictions.

## The “How?” and the “Why?”

To begin with we emphasize that the natural sciences provide detailed answers to the question “how?” but scarcely any answer to the question “why?”

### The Natural Sciences

Not so long ago, when children asked why we hear thunder, it was common for adults to give the following answer, half seriously and half in jest: “Because the angels are bowling in the sky.” This explanation was, in fact, not so far from the one commonly given at the time of Descartes: it was thought that there were avalanches of snow between two layers of clouds.

As a matter of fact, physics became a science only when it abandoned the question “why?” which children ask so naturally, in favor of the question “how?” In that line of thought we would like to propose the following experiment to the reader. If you know a professor of physics, ask him (her) why the speed of a body in motion cannot exceed the speed of light. “Good heavens” he (she) will certainly answer, “it all has to do with the Lorentz transformation which governs the composition of velocities as described in Einstein’s special relativity theory.” Should you be dissatisfied with this answer, he (she) will probably tell you that it is the consequence of an historic experiment completed in 1881 by the American physicist A. Michelson. This answer will probably not satisfy you, either.

Another, essentially similar but simpler, question is “Why does my toaster heat?” The first response a physicist would probably give is: “Well, this is simply a consequence of Ohm’s Law  $P = RI^2$ .” If this answer does not satisfy you, he (she) may explain that the heat results from the collisions between the flow of electrons and the atoms making up the resistor. But this is no more than an image and in addition it leaves open the crucial question of how collisions at subatomic level can generate heat.

These examples make it clear that physics is much more concerned with the “how?” than the “why?” issue. It tells us very precisely how two velocities should be added,

but not why they have to be added this way, or how much heat an electrical current will generate, but not why it produces heat.

Many other questions of the “why?” type can be mentioned which physics is unable to answer: (1) Why do two positive charges repel each other? (2) Why do a positive and a negative charge attract each other? (3) Why does a bicycle wheel spinning freely at high speed have a tendency to maintain a fixed axis of rotation in relation to the stars? Here again, we know how to write the equations describing how the wheel moves but we do not know why it moves in such a way.

### **The Heavy Burden of the Search for Causes**

As shown by the above thunderstorm anecdote the search for causes seems to be a natural tendency of the human mind. Every book on the American Civil War devotes a voluminous chapter to the causes of the war. Numerous books have analyzed the causes of the French Revolution. Economists have devoted volumes to analyzing the causes of the Great Depression; similarly extensive discussions were dedicated to the causes of the hyperinflation in Germany in 1923. Still, from a scientific point of view, these questions do not make much sense: each historian, each economist can bring personal responses and there is no objective criterion which would permit to judge whether one answer is better than another.

To illustrate this point, let us take the case of the German hyperinflation episode. Between 1914 and the end of 1923, prices in Germany were multiplied by a thousand billion. It is certainly tempting to ask what were the causes of such a spectacular phenomenon. Unfortunately many possible causes can be mentioned, as for instance the impact of war reparations, the role of the military occupation of the Ruhr by Belgium and France, the influence of the monetary policy of the German government, the part taken by the creation of money at the level of major private companies, etc. Were we to decide on the respective importance of these diverse factors, we would have to rely on a quantitative econometric model, yet the fact that certain factors are of a qualitative type and that they acted only indirectly (the occupation of the Ruhr, for example) makes this task fairly tricky. Nevertheless let us suppose that this were possible. We must then ask how the analysis of causes should be stated in the statistical language of econometrics. This general problem was assiduously studied by econometricians in the 1970s and 1980s. In the late 1980s A. Zellner, one of the experts in the field, made the following assessment: “With all the work in the past two decades on definitions of causality and tests for causality, it may be asked how many causal economic laws have been produced by this work. I believe that an honest answer is, not a single one” (Zellner, 1988). Thus even under ideal conditions, in which all the variables can be grasped quantitatively, the search for causes is doomed to fail. It will be the same a fortiori when the variables have only

a qualitative definition. In other words, the search for causes can be interesting from an anecdotal point of view, but from a scientific point of view, the problem is poorly defined.

The difficulties encountered in formalizing the question of causality can be illustrated with an example taken from P. Veyne. He considers the case of a car that skids after braking on a wet, cambered road.<sup>2</sup> What are the causes of this event? To the police, the cause is excessive speed or worn tires; to the Highway Department, the camber of the road is the culprit; to the head of a driving school, it is the law, usually not well understood by learners, which requires that braking distance increase more than proportionately with speed. The descriptions as well as the causes of this accident are countless. If, instead of looking at a unique accident, we look at a *series* of accidents which have occurred on this same road, our perspective changes completely. We will no longer be tempted to invoke the different possible causes, but rather to see if the accident statistics produce common features which can lead us to useful lessons. If the statistics show that 75 percent of the accidents occurred at the same turn, we would conclude that there is a problem on the road at this point. In other words, the study of a cluster of events may allow us to eliminate a large number of circumstantial causes.

The comparative approach also completely changes our perspective with regard to hyperinflation. By looking at all hyperinflations that occurred in the twentieth century, we will find common elements in the various episodes. Such an analysis was made in a pioneering paper by P. Cagan and in a book by S.-H. Chou.<sup>3</sup> These studies revealed useful statistical regularities and provided a solid point of departure for a theory.

The search for causes in the social sciences consumes a great deal of time and energy and gives little tangible results. Even worse, work which is not directly centered on the search for causes is often brushed aside on the claim that it does not address the central issue. In this sense the search for causes hinders the development of comparative analysis in the social sciences.

Before closing this section on the how/why? dilemma, we must look at another somewhat related question.

### **Individual Behavior and Collective Phenomena**

The social researcher is not only an observer, he also belongs to the society that he describes. Even before he approaches the study of a phenomenon, various (alleged) mechanisms and ways of reasoning are implicitly present in his mind. He knows how certain societal mechanisms work because he has experienced them in his own

life. He knows, for example (or thinks he knows), how a family cell, a political party or a labor union function.

*The anthropocentric prism* We use the term “anthropocentric prism” to designate the prior knowledge which the researcher possesses about the society that he is studying and which tends to alter his perception of reality. A priori, it might be thought that such a scheme would be helpful. Does it not provide a kind of inside look? We think that, on the contrary, this knowledge has more disadvantages than advantages: (1) Because the researcher is tempted to put himself in the place of the social actors he will devote much time to examining their motivations. Unfortunately motivations are essentially subjective. (2) Because he is not necessarily conscious of the many links which connect him to the society the researcher will tend to describe the society in individual terms, even though the majority of social and economic phenomena are of a collective nature. We use this term here in the sense that a group is more than the juxtaposition of individuals; it presents us with radically new phenomena. A symphonic orchestra is more than the juxtaposition of the players. A molecule of water can neither freeze nor boil; this is true as well of a billion molecules if they are kept apart from one another. On the other hand, if the molecules are brought together to a point where they attract each other, then they form water, a new substance with properties not possessed by the individual molecules, such as, for example, the ability to solidify or to become vapor.

Our knowledge of the reactions of social or economic actors primarily concerns their reactions as isolated individuals. When a collective phenomenon occurs, for example a stock market panic, each actor thinks that by selling his shares as quickly as possible he acts for the best in his own interest. In fact, because that behavior will accelerate the collapse the real result can be at opposite poles from the desired goal. To show how the anthropocentric prism affects the social sciences, we describe in the next paragraph a virtual experience which one could call the parable of the Andromeda visitor.

*The parable of the Andromeda visitor* Imagine that an extraterrestrial from the Andromeda galaxy comes to explore our world. Suppose that he is interested in the establishment of the Nazi dictatorship between 1933 and 1939. How will he proceed? He will not try to know, and even less to understand, the motivations of the Germans at that time, because these are outside his mental universe. He will look for statistics of membership in organizations controlled by the National Socialist Party: political or paramilitary organizations, professional or cultural societies, women’s groups, etc. He will look for the number of people imprisoned, missing or assassinated. He will find it useful to compare these data with similar statistics from countries which had experienced fates similar to the German experience: Italy,

Portugal, Spain, Hungary, Poland. He might wish to complete his case samples by including examples of dictatorial governments from other eras, such as the absolute power exercised by the Council of Ten in Venice, the power of the Convention in the France of 1793, or even that of the Mormon hierarchy in Utah between 1850 and 1877. Once these statistics are assembled, our extra-terrestrial will find himself in the same situation as Kepler when he tried to deduce the trajectories of the planets from the observations of the Danish astronomer, Tycho Brahe. Our alien will have to guess at the rules which govern the leanings of a society toward an authoritarian regime. Even if this task is not easy, we will at least assume that the problem is well stated. Now let us look at the more anthropocentric approach that may be attempted by a (terrestrial) historian or sociologist. He will probably consult the German newspapers of the period and read the commentaries of contemporary people; he might even interview Germans who had lived through the period of dictatorship. He will try to decide why average Germans, call them Müller, Honauer and Diebold, were convinced to accept this regime. After he has discussed their motivations, according to their social, political and religious affiliations, he will undoubtedly begin to believe that the more he closes in on reality, the less obvious it becomes. Could Mr. Honauer have accepted the regime simply because his neighbors Diebold and Müller had done so and because it would have been difficult to do otherwise in the social climate of the period? The main point that we want to underline here with this somewhat naive example is the fact that, despite their arid appearance, the statistics collected by the Andromeda visitor have more chances to reflect and describe the collective character of the movement than do the expression of motivations and individual wishes. Paradoxically, the Andromeda visitor will get a better chance to understand the root of the phenomenon than terrestrial historians who have much more information at their disposal.

## Paronymy and Forgetfulness about the Past

In this section we advance the thesis that men placed in similar situations have a tendency to behave in similar ways. In other words, historical events tend to repeat themselves, if not identically, then with slight variations. To depict this semirepetition, we will refer to paronymic episodes, an expression introduced in linguistics to designate similar words: for example, collusion and collision, graduation and gradation are paronymic words. This term has two interesting characteristics. On the one hand, it suggests that variations can affect any link in an episode represented by the entire word. Second, it emphasizes the fact that the similarity is not in the meaning or the objectives of the episodes under consideration, but rather in their form. The similarity bears on the “how?” rather than the “why?”



In general, we can say that the semirepetition of events rests on three essential elements: (1) The capacity to forget, which allows past events to have minimal repercussions on present and future events. (2) A permanency which holds onto traditions and geographical constraints. (3) The fact that the execution of a complex task is facilitated by its repetition.

In the following paragraphs, we look successively at these three notions in more detail.

## Forgetting the Past

That men do not learn very much from the lessons of history is the most important of all the lessons that history has to teach.

—Aldous Huxley, *A case of voluntary ignorance*

Huxley's statement asserts a profound truth which can be illustrated with a few brief examples.

- One of the most recurrent examples of forgetting the past is seen in episodes of speculative euphoria, in real estate or in the stock market. During these episodes, operators and the public imagine that the rise in values will continue indefinitely, even though the past gives many examples of speculative bubbles that burst after five, ten or fifteen years, leaving the most daring of speculators ruined or deeply in debt. There is no doubt that some individuals who pulled out of the market in time made substantial profits, but the size of the speculative bubbles is sufficient proof that most investors are intoxicated to the point where they completely forget the lessons of the past.

- During, the decolonizing process between 1945 and 1975, the colonial powers repeated the same episodes without taking into account the lessons of the past. Despite the disturbances in Tunisia (1945–1955) and Morocco (1951–1955) which led to independence in these countries, France followed practically the same policies in Algeria between 1954 and 1962. In spite of numerous previous examples of decolonizing, Portugal fought a rear-guard action in Angola and Mozambique between 1962 and 1975. Later between 1972 and 1979 when almost the entire African continent had achieved independence, Rhodesia colonists put up a costly resistance. South Africa did the same in Namibia between 1977 and 1990.

- The dominant opinion in economics at the end of the twentieth century is that an activity is better managed by the private sector than by a public company. This is confirmed by historical observations in many cases but for a few exceptions. Railroads provide an illustrative example. In almost all countries, railroads were in the hands of private companies at the time of their creation around 1850. Over time, they experienced financial losses and were salvaged only through partial or to-

tal nationalization. This change was so systematic that, among forty major countries, around 1960 only the United States had kept its railroads in private hands. It might be thought that companies are managed more efficiently at the end of the twentieth century than they were in the nineteenth, yet the Channel Tunnel, which was constructed entirely by private companies, was a resounding financial disaster. The Eurotunnel company was formed in 1985 by five British companies in association with five French companies. Work began in 1988 and was completed in 1994. The cost of the project surpassed the initial predictions by about 100 percent. At the beginning of 1996, the Eurotunnel company was nearly bankrupt; newspaper headlines asked: "Should Eurotunnel be nationalized?" Once again, the situation was similar to that of the late nineteenth century, when private companies could survive only with the help of the state.

As another example one can mention the fact that the construction of a canal between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans was attempted unsuccessfully three times by private companies: in 1826, 1881–1888 and in 1890–1892. Eventually the Panama Canal was built by a company controlled by the American Defense Department.

### **Geographic and Institutional Constraints**

Throughout this book, we will have the opportunity to see that the best way to predict the forms that a certain kind of event will take is to look at the forms similar events have taken in the past. For example, to predict the forms of struggle that the separatists in the Bernese Jura would adopt in the 1960s, the best guide is a study of the forms that this same struggle took in the nineteenth century. This paronymy of the forms of struggle is quite natural; it emphasizes the permanence from one century to the next of the social, religious, geographical and cultural environment of the Bernese Jura. The inhabitants of the Bernese Jura are Catholics and French-speaking, while the rest of the canton of Bern (to which the Bernese Jura is attached) is made up of Protestants and German speakers; this was true in the nineteenth century as well as in the twentieth. The same observation holds for other geographic and political features; for instance, the citizens of the Bernese Jura live in a mountainous region which makes communication with the rest of the canton fairly difficult; and like all Swiss, the inhabitants of the Bernese Jura preferred to try all lawful means before resorting to illegal means. This list of permanent factors could be extended considerably. In short (and this will be seen in more detail in a subsequent chapter) the separatist struggles of the twentieth century bore a strong resemblance to those of the nineteenth century. Of course we do not deny that cultural traditions or linguistic factors may change in the course of time. In the case of Switzerland such changes are minimal because Swiss are particularly respectful of tradition; this explains why paronymy is more pronounced there than in countries which have undergone sub-



stantial changes.

### **The Execution of a Complex Task Is Facilitated by Repetition**

The usefulness of military maneuvers and exercises rests on the general principle that a group of men will accomplish a task better and more quickly if this task has been previously repeated a number of times. This principle can also be applied to civilian activities. Observation has shown, for example, that assembly time for an airplane diminishes as more and more airplanes are built. More precisely, it has been observed that for the  $n$ th built assembly time is smaller by a factor of  $n^{0.3}$  compared to the first airplane; this is true, at least, for the first few airplanes assembled. Thus, compared with the first airplane, it will take only half as much time ( $10^{0.3} \simeq 2$ ) to assemble the 10th airplane.

It seems that a similar effect is at work in social life. To illustrate this idea, let us take the case of a large street demonstration. Looking at a big crowd parading through the streets, one tends to forget the work that was required to organize such an event: writing and printing tracts and posters announcing the demonstration, distributing them, outfitting a sound truck, discussing with municipal authorities in order to create traffic detours, contacting the media, etc. This task is nearly as complex as the assembly of an airplane. It is obvious that this organization will run much more smoothly on the occasion of the 10th demonstration than it will for the first. This principle is illustrated by the episodes of demonstrations which occur recurrently for instance every week. In the recent past, this happened in East Germany in the autumn of 1989 and in Serbia in the spring of 1997. It is much easier to organize ten demonstrations in a row than ten demonstrations spaced out over several years.

### **“The Truth, the Whole Truth, Nothing but the Truth”**

Anyone who feels the urge to undertake a task like a study of the art of war must spare no time or effort, fear no earthly power or rank, and rise above his own vanity or false modesty in order to tell, in accordance with the expression of the Code Napoleon, the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

—Karl von Clausewitz, *On war*

By studying the military campaigns of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Clausewitz aimed to identify common features which could guide general staffs in the conduct of war. If the historical information on which the study is based is in error, imprecise or skewed, the analysis will result in erroneous rules. The same is true of analytical history. In short, if objectivity is of course a requirement for period-centered history, it is even more crucial for problem-centered history. In the first paragraph below, this statement is illustrated by a number of examples. In the second

paragraph, we will look at the obstacles which stand in the way of the historian in his search for the truth.

### “The Whole Truth”

For analytical history, the most pernicious form of deformation is undoubtedly omission.

*Semi-omissions and their consequences* In later chapters, we will study the struggles for liberation in former colonies. In this perspective, let us consider the first struggle for liberation in modern times, namely the American Revolution. The existence of loyalists, that is to say, colonists who sided with the English, has always been a fact recognized by historians. The only real question was about their number. Were they a small minority as nineteenth-century historians have long maintained, or did they represent a substantial fringe of the population, as established by twentieth-century historians who developed the pioneering researches by Van Tyne?<sup>4</sup> In the first hypothesis, the overall turn of events would seem incomprehensible. (1) How could the war have lasted six years if the British army had found only negligible support from the population? If it was unable to buy provisions, as well as the wagons and horses to transport them? (2) Since a great number of eighteenth-century American colonists had been born in Britain, how can one expect them to have turned their backs on their motherland and their king so unanimously? This would be contrary to all that we know about the attachment of men to the land in which they were nurtured. (3) Finally, the absence of a civil war between colonists and freedom-fighters would be contrary to all observations regarding subsequent liberation struggles. In short, if in a spirit of unanimity we were to forget the civil war which brought loyalists and revolutionaries into confrontation, the progress of the American Revolution would become a historical anomaly.

We use the word “anomaly” in the sense that a five-legged sheep or a sheep with a pig’s head are biological anomalies. Before the work of classifiers like Linnaeus (1707–1778) or Lamarck (1744–1829), no clear distinction was made between the improbable (a five-legged sheep) and the impossible (a sheep with a pig’s head).

The preceding example concerns a half- omission which was essentially corrected later, but it would be easy to cite semi-omissions which were not. Why do we say “semi-omission”? Because when a historical fact is omitted by all historians, it is impossible to learn of it without returning to archival sources, a highly demanding task which can only seldom be undertaken.

The slave trade is a typical case of semi-omission. We know that this trade existed. The African population of both Americas proves it, yet none of the powers that engaged in the slave trade trumpets their participation. England, for example,

was responsible for more than half of the world slave trade; France was second with 23 percent, while the Netherlands took third place with 11 percent (*Annual Register* 1769, p. 114). Nevertheless, the slave trade does not figure in the statistics of English trade (e.g., Mitchell 1971), despite the fact that it made up a substantial part of foreign commerce. In 1768, the number of Negro slaves bartered for by Great Britain on the coast of Africa was 594,000. Basing an estimate on an average price of 30 pounds per slave after the Atlantic crossing (Tinker 1974, *Historical Statistics* 1975, p. 1174), we get a total of 1.8 million pounds, or 19 percent of British exports.<sup>5</sup>

As another example one can mention the gaps in the accounts of some historians about the religious antagonism in Britain during the late sixteenth century. The civil wars in France, Germany or Switzerland are well known, yet by reading certain historians one would get the impression that in Britain the transition from Catholicism to Anglicanism was smoother. If true that would undoubtedly constitute another historical “anomaly.” Fortunately, several historians filled in this omission by telling us about the religious repression in the second half of the sixteenth century, for instance, the one that followed the defeat of the Northern Rebellion in November 1569 when many northern Catholics were executed.<sup>6</sup>

*The social role of semi-omissions* People are people; every nation has a tendency to emphasize certain aspects of its history and to erase or minimize others. In London, there is a Trafalgar Square and a Waterloo Station, but there is no Fontenoy Square. In Paris, we find the rue de Wagram and the Gare d’Austerlitz, but there is no Boulevard de Leipzig. Just as the next-of-kin mourn the loss of a loved one and thus are able to go on with their lives, it might be that after tragic and painful events, a nation needs a “period of healing” to allow it to forget and move on. Even though the overall population may benefit from this relative forgetfulness, the process should not extend to specialized publications, and especially not to official statistics, without which the historian’s work becomes impossible. We would not reproach a historian of the Elizabethan period (especially if he is writing for the general public) if he expounded more on the victories of Admiral Drake or on Elizabethan writers or architects rather than on the “bloody penal laws against Papists” in the words of Macaulay. Is there a solution to reconcile the human nature of the historian with the need for objectivity? We believe the solution to this problem resides in quantitative history.

### *The solution of quantitative history*

The historian has long been a kind of Stygian judge given the task of apportioning blame or praise to dead heroes. This attitude must correspond to a deeply-rooted instinct. Every professor who has had to correct student works

knows how reluctant these young people are to drop the role of Minos or Osiris.<sup>7</sup>

According to a German proverb (*Wörter sind geduldig*), words are subject to interpretation; a number, however, is a number. If we wish to speak of the penal laws under Elizabeth, we need not devote dozens of pages to the topic, but we would have to give the number of persons (Anabaptists, Catholics, Puritans) arrested, deported or executed for religious reasons. This will permit comparison with similar phenomena of religious intolerance from the same period in other European countries. In the same way, the number of slaves transported and the relative importance of the slave trade in overseas commerce would give a good idea of the extent of this phenomenon. Words not only are subject to interpretation, but unlike numbers, they can carry a strong emotional charge. Witness the power of words in an article from *The Times* (10 July 1973) about a reprisal carried out by the Portuguese army against villages during the struggle for independence in Mozambique. Setting up a parallel between different massacres of civilians, the newspaper speaks of the “massacre of villagers in Mozambique,” the “shootings at Sharpeville” (South Africa) and the “My Lai scandal” (Vietnam). The words seem to impose a kind of hierarchy on these three events. Their choice has almost certainly not been left to chance. An issue of *The Observer* (26 August 1973) carries the headline “The ugly face of Portugal: Portuguese troops in Mozambique, callous and incompetent.” If the reporter for *The Times* had simply stated that 100, 69 and 500 people had been killed, respectively, in these three episodes, he would have given his readers more precise information while withholding moral judgment.

Here is another example of the virtues of quantitative history. British historians refer to the revolt of 1857–1858 in India with expressions like “Indian mutiny,” “Mutiny of the Indian army” or “Sepoy War” (see Metcalf’s bibliography<sup>8</sup>). Indians, on the other hand, refer to this insurrection as “The First War of Independence.” There are obviously two radically different interpretations behind the choice of terms used to label the events. How can one decide which one is correct? If the number is much greater than those of the indigenous armed forces, the event would constitute a popular revolt; in the contrary case, the interpretation of a simple mutiny would be plausible.

### **“Nothing but the Truth”**

The approach of quantitative history that we recommended in the previous paragraph can be used only if accurate data are available. If governments or organizations set up systems of disinformation, it may become impossible to know the truth. We then move to another register: no longer are we dealing with simple psychological reticence, but rather with the deliberate intention to camouflage or deceive. Disin-

formation is a difficult art. The following paragraphs sketch some of the steps in the development of disinformation between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries.

**Unsophisticated disinformation** The first newspapers in France and England were dependent on the government. The *Gazette*, published by Renaudot, a physician, first appeared in April 1631; it was patronized by Louis XIII. The *London Gazette* first appeared in 1665; its director was an officer of the secretary of state. In the early eighteenth century, the House of Commons assumed regular censorship of the press. In France, censorship was in the hands of the Parlement de Paris and of provincial parlements. In both countries, forbidden books were burned or destroyed by an executioner. In short, in those times censorship was carried out without disguise.<sup>9</sup>

No doubt that state control was prejudicial to historical truth; this can be illustrated by the following example which refers to the Irish revolt in 1641. To begin with, the writings from the Catholic side were burned by order of Parliament. Then an immense mass of depositions was collected under doubtful conditions: hearsay evidence of the loosest kind was freely admitted, and there were sometimes twenty or thirty depositions referring to a single crime. The records totaled 32 volumes. From this documentation, historians like Sir John Temple (1766) arrived at completely exaggerated estimates of the number of Protestants killed during the insurrection. He estimated that “in two years, above 300,000 Protestants were murdered in cold blood”; this number exceeds by a third the estimated number of Protestants in Ireland, and was ten times larger than the number of Protestants who were living outside walled towns, that is to say, in the only places where massacres took place. According to Lecky and other historians a maximum of 10,000 people lost their lives.<sup>10</sup>

**Hidden disinformation** More elaborate systems of disinformation were put into effect during the First World War. The method used resembled the one mentioned for the Irish insurrection in 1641, but, in 1914, this method was put into effect with considerably better means. One of the first areas of activity of the British Department of propaganda in Wellington House concerned (alleged) atrocities committed by German troops in Belgium. First, as in 1641, a commission chaired by Lord Bryce, a noted historian and former ambassador to the United States, was charged with collecting the depositions of witnesses. This became the fodder for many of the books written by British writers and subsidized by Wellington House. Well-known writers like A. Conan Doyle or Rudyard Kipling took part in this operation. Doyle was moderate, but Kipling was fairly unrestrained in his writings. At the end of the war, most of the testimonies of witnesses disappeared from British records, which made subsequent checks impossible. Nevertheless, in December 1925 the British government eventually admitted in the House of Commons that the atrocity stories which appeared in *The Times* and other newspapers about the behavior of German



troops were false.<sup>11</sup>

A department of propaganda and censorship was also at work in France during the First World War, but the French methods were so primitive that few people were fooled. The renowned historian Marc Bloch, who had experienced trench warfare, reported (1974: 95): “in the trenches, the prevailing opinion was that everything could be true except what was allowed to be printed. We did not believe the newspapers, nor even the letters that we received knowing that they had also been censored.” News travelled orally; Bloch reports that cooks played a special role in this process because of their numerous contacts.<sup>12</sup>

In the United States psychological warfare has received much attention and has become a subtle and sophisticated business. As an early illustration one can mention the following episode. Las Casas published his *Brief relation of the destruction of the Indians* in the mid-sixteenth century. Subsequently it was reedited in the United Provinces with graphical plates showing scenes of torture due to De Brys. Nowadays, it is widely recognized that the figures given by Las Casas were completely unrealistic. For instance he accused the Spaniards of having killed three million people on the island of Hispaniola (Haiti). But in 1508, that is to say sixteen years after Columbus discovered the island, a census estimated the Indian population at 60,000; in 1885, the first year for which modern census data are available, the population of the island was about 1.5 million. This, however, did not prevent Las Casas’s account to be used recurrently for the purpose of spreading anti-Spanish feelings. As it happened, Las Casas’s book was reedited in New York in 1898, that is to say, in the year when the United States waged war against Spain. On that occasion the original title was cleverly replaced by a more explicit one, namely: “An historical and true account of the cruel massacre and slaughter of 20,000,000 of people in the West Indies by the Spaniards.” Needless to say, the figure of twenty million was quite as delusive as the three million on the island of Hispaniola.<sup>13</sup>

**Disinformation by selective amplification** Disinformation became even more subtle, and much easier, with the advent of the television age after World War II. Society today is characterized by an overabundance of both visual and written information. In such a world, it is no longer necessary to block undesirable information. Censorship has become obsolete. One only needs to select in an appropriate fashion the news items that are to be widely disseminated, and to allow others to be swallowed up in the mass of information. What is the importance of a sidebar or even of an article published on page 5 of a newspaper if the information has not appeared on television? In a TV report the commentary will have little impact if the images suggest the opposite; conversely, well-chosen images can suggest what one does not wish to say explicitly.

## Conclusion

In the present-day global economy, the image of a country has a “marketing value” that is well defined in terms of investments, tourism, the opportunity to host international sporting events, etc. In this process, it seems as if history has become a major piece in the game. This brings to mind the slogan of the totalitarians who control the state in George Orwell’s novel *1984*: “He who controls the past controls the future.” Such a phenomenon may put the very existence of history as objective knowledge at risk. Is this fear excessive? We hope so. In any case, the practice of comparative history is undoubtedly the best antidote. By looking at the behavior of various countries in similar situations, we find that their reactions are often similar. For example, to go back to a previously cited example, a state that is faced with guerilla warfare will be unfailingly tempted to use procedures which will elicit general disapproval elsewhere in the world. There is no people that is per se more cruel than another; there are simply different traditions. In medieval Europe, the inhabitants of a garrison that had been stormed were often put to the sword in order to discourage resistance in other places; pillage was quasi-systematic, since the spoils of this activity made up an important part of the remuneration of the troops and their officers.

We will conclude with a wish expressed by Marc Bloch in *The historian’s craft*: “The sciences have always been more fertile, and in the end more useful in practice, to the extent that they abandoned the old anthropocentrism of good and evil. Today, we would laugh at a chemist who would separate gases into evil (chlorine, for example) and good (oxygen).” We share these sentiments wholeheartedly.

## How Can We Define Clusters of Events?

There remains a fundamental question. Is the definition of a cluster of events purely a matter of intuition or can one formulate certain rules for that purpose? We begin the discussion with an event that might seem trivial: the fall of an apple from a tree. There are two questions that can be asked: “Why did the apple fall?” and “How did the apple fall?” We have already looked at the difference between these two questions, but we return to that topic to draw up a more complete list of the different possible answers.

There are numerous answers to “why?” The gardener will say that the apple has matured and grown to the point where it must fall; the meteorologist will explain that a low over the Atlantic provoked a gust of wind that blew the apple from the tree; the engineer will show how the vibrations of the branch contributed to the fall of the apple. The list could go on indefinitely.

The question “how?” invites us to define both a certain mechanism and the cluster

of events which illustrate it. Here are some illustrative examples.

- We could also analyze the rupture of the link between the stem (the peduncle, in botanical terms) and the branch. This kind of study would touch upon the science of materials and breakage. Galileo devoted a part of his main work, *Mathematical discourses concerning two new sciences* to the question of the breakage of bodies.<sup>14</sup>

- If we consider the free-fall phase the cluster of events would include the fall of apples, pears, nuts, rain drops, or hailstones of different sizes. Such a cluster of events is focused on the law governing falling bodies and would lead us to follow a line of investigation that was historically pioneered by Galileo.

- We could also look at the shock of the apple as it hits the ground. According to the hardness of the soil, the apple will be more or less damaged. This phenomenon has an economic interest for as every gardener knows a bruised apple cannot be kept for a long time. In this case, the cluster to be investigated would comprise fruits of different fabric, consistency and hardness, such as apples, peaches, or tomatoes.

The reader might be surprised that we have not yet mentioned Newton, who conceived the theory of gravitation after seeing an apple fall. How was he able to establish a link between such an event and the universal law of gravity? The cluster of events that would lead to this discovery would comprise the fall of apples, the fall of cannon balls, and the “fall” of the moon toward the earth. Undoubtedly the inclusion of this last phenomenon was a flash of genius; it represented a fantastic conceptual leap.

From this example, we can see that the definition of the cluster of events is the crucial point. If this definition is truly innovative, as was the case for Newton, it can bring about considerable progress. In practice, the choice of the clusters of events is greatly influenced by the availability of data and by the competence of the historian.

In short, two ingredients are essential in comparative analysis: (1) The patient spadework needed to find the right data sets and to replace preconceived and vague notions by proven concepts. (2) The right intuition as to the definition of the cluster of events.

General principles alone are not sufficient guaranty for success. An illustration was given by the work of Descartes that we mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Although in his *Discourse on method* he stated that problems had to be studied by starting with the simplest ones, when he subsequently applied his method to real issues he asked questions that would puzzle even twentieth-century physicists. Here are a few examples.<sup>15</sup> Why, in contrast to wax, does water pass from the solid state to the liquid state without an intermediary stage? Why does water contract with lower-



ing temperatures, whereas the passage from water to ice brings about an increase in volume?

Although these questions could be formulated in a simple way their solution was well beyond Descartes's reach. Could the principles which we set forth in the previous chapter have been useful to him? It would seem so. The areas in physics which were developed first are those which concern weak and infrequent interactions: the analysis of interactions between isolated bodies (mechanics), the study of gases, optical geometry, etc. The interactions which maintain the cohesion of a piece of glass or wax are both powerful and numerous. In this case, one has to deal with collective phenomena. By their very nature collective phenomena are difficult problems. Galileo made a similar error of appreciation. We mentioned previously that in his *Mathematical discourses concerning two new sciences* he was interested both in the falling of bodies and the breaking of materials. The first is characterized by a single interaction while the second comprises numerous interactions. One should not be surprised that he was able to make little progress on the second question.

## Appendix A: Rebellions against Central Governments

At the beginning of this chapter we stated that in the United States the phenomenon “rebellion against the federal government” was not limited to the Civil War. To illustrate this statement we briefly review some events of that kind both in the United States and in the rest of the world

### United States: Armed Rebellions against the Federal Government

It is generally thought that the southern States went from latent rebellion to open warfare by their action against Fort Sumter in Charleston, South Carolina, on 13 April 1861. The fort was federal property and was occupied by federal troops. As we shall see, these two aspects, the destruction of federal property and the intervention of federal troops, are found in both episodes treated in the following two paragraphs.

*The Utah rebellion (1857–1858)* The Mormons settled near the Great Salt Lake around 1845. Their first intention was to found a state that would have been independent of the federal government, the Deseret State. Even though Utah became a Union Territory in 1850, the Mormons did not recognize the authority of the federal government. In a message to Congress on 8 December 1857, President Buchanan described the situation as follows (Lemonnier 1948): “The people of Utah belong almost exclusively to the Mormon Church, and believing fanatically that Brigham Young was nominated by God to be governor of the Territory, they obey his orders as if these were divine revelations.”

On 4 October 1857, 72 wagons in a convoy of the U.S. Army on its way to Salt Lake City were burned by Mormons: 80 tons of flour, 45 tons of bacon, 4.5 tons of coffee and 1.5 tons of ham were destroyed (Lemonnier 1948, Furniss 1960). On 26 June 1858, a regiment of the U.S. Army reached Salt Lake City, but only via a compromise which did not settle fundamental questions. As late as 1862, Harding, the federally appointed governor of the territory, could not carry out his functions and was eventually obliged to leave the territory. The law against polygamy enacted by Congress in April 1862 was not applied until the mid-1880s. For thirty years, Utah had kept itself outside the authority of the government of the United States.

*The rebellion in the state of Mississippi in 1962* In some ways, this episode can be considered a repetition of the racial problems that led to the Civil War a century earlier. The dispute between the governor of the state of Mississippi and the U.S. attorney general, Robert Kennedy, involved the desegregation of the universities. On 27 August 1962, the Supreme Court confirmed the right of James Meredith to enroll at the University of Mississippi. On 20 September, accompanied by federal marshals, Meredith unsuccessfully tried to enter the campus. On 26 September, Meredith was

accompanied by a group of state troopers and a number of county sheriffs, but he was again denied admission. A third attempt to enter the campus was frustrated on 27 September. Governor Barnett, who had spoken openly against Meredith's admission, was at the height of his popularity after this success. Confederate flags blossomed from radio aerials all over the Magnolia State, and local stations played *Dixie* all day long. Several hundred American Legion members in Mississippi wired the governor that they were ready "to bear arms under his command to protect state sovereignty." Governor Barnett was tried in absentia by the Fifth Federal Circuit Court of Appeals; he was fined \$10,000 for each day after 20 October that Meredith was kept out of the university. Finally, on 30 September, the state of Mississippi surrendered to the government of the United States. Meredith was allowed to register at the university with the protection of federal troops, but a riot broke out on campus and resulted in two deaths. Incidentally it can be mentioned that the three important protagonists in this attempt to impose the federal law were shot in the following years: President John F. Kennedy on 22 November 1963, James Meredith on 6 June 1966 (he was only wounded), and Robert Kennedy on 5 June 1968.

### **Secession Attempts in the Rest of the World**

Here we will look at four similar episodes which occurred at the same time as the American Civil War. In all four cases the federal government prevailed.

*Bavaria (1866)* Bavaria had been part of the 39 states of the German Confederation since 1815. Beginning in 1834, Bavaria participated in the Zollverein, a customs union organized under Prussian leadership, which excluded Austria-Hungary. Bavaria, with its five million inhabitants, was the most important participant in the Zollverein, after Prussia. Under these conditions, it was obvious that to avoid a pure and simple absorption into Prussia, Bavaria had only one option, that of allying itself with Austria in an attempt to "counterbalance" Prussia's hegemony. The war of 1866 was the crucial episode in that power struggle. After the Austro-Bavarian defeat, the way was open to the formation of the German Empire under the aegis of Prussia. It is interesting to note that the population of Bavaria made up the same percentage (20 percent) with respect to Prussia as the Confederate States with respect to the American Union.

*Hungary (1848–1849)* Before 1848 Hungary had risen several times against Austrian domination. In 1848, during the revolutionary fervor that inflamed Europe, Hungary revolted again. Although it was at first victorious at Gran on 18 April 1849, Hungary was eventually forced to yield to the combined offensive of the Austrians and Russians. The Hungarians and their allies made up about one-third of the population of Austria.

**Table 2.1 Comparison of Secessionist Attempts between 1830 and 1885**

Core region	Population [millions]	Secessionist region	Population [millions]	Pop. ratio	Rebellion	
					Beginning	Duration [years]
Austria	29	Hungary	10.0	2.9	1848	1
Brazil		Rio Grande do Sul			1836	about 1
Canada	2.3	Quebec	0.8	2.7	1835	0.5
Canada	4.3	North West	0.06	76.8	1885	0.3
China		Xinjiang			1864	14
Ottoman Empire		Egypt	2.5		1832	1
Prussia	20	Bavaria	5.0	4.0	1866	0.3
Switzerland	2.4	Sonderbund	0.5	5.0	1847	0.3
United States	22	Utah	0.04	550	1857	about 6
United States	22	Confederacy	5.5	4.0	1861	4

*Note:* The half century between 1830 and 1885 saw a flare-up of secessionist movements in nation-states that were in formation. The secession of Bavaria and the Confederate States differ from other movements in that the people in revolt spoke the same language as the rest of the nation. All these attempted secessions were successfully repressed by the central government in sharp contrast with the trend prevailing in the second half of the twentieth century. The American Civil War was by far the most costly of these conflicts (more than 600,000 deaths). Geographically all these regions are located in the periphery of the corresponding states; for example, the Rio Grande do Sul is located in the most southern region of Brazil, Xinjiang is located in the most western part of China.

***The Sonderbund rebellion in Switzerland (1847)*** In 1847, seven cantons (Fribourg, Lucerne, Schwyz, Underwalden, Uri, Valais, Zug) formed a Catholic coalition, the Sonderbund, in opposition to the federal government. The core of the dispute was the possible expulsion of the Jesuits from Switzerland. This revolt was easily put down by General G. Dufour (approximately 100 deaths). The Catholic cantons made up about 20 percent of the total population.

***The rebellion of Xinjiang in China (1864–1878)*** The temporary secession of Xinjiang in western China was not an isolated phenomenon in mid-nineteenth-century China. It fitted into a general weakening of the central government, and enjoyed British and Russian support. Coupled with geographical isolation, this explains why the revolt lasted a number of years in spite of the enormous disproportion in populations: Xinjiang had only 4.6 million inhabitants in 1946, while China had 550 million. The rebellion began in 1865 in the west of Xinjiang and progressively spread to the rest of the province. In 1870, Yakug Beg became supreme leader of the rebellion. The Chinese reconquest began in 1876 and was completed within two years.

*The rebellion of Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil (1835–1845)* In 1835 the province of Rio Grande do Sul in the south of Brazil rebelled against the Brazilian monarchy and formed a republic with Porto Alegre as the capital city. Although the city was retaken by Brazilian troops two months later the secession continued for almost ten years. In July 1839 the republicans were able to briefly occupy the city of Santa Catarina.

Incidentally it can be noted that in 1838 there was another secession, this one successful, which led to the separation of Uruguay from Argentina.

# Chapter 3

## Methodological Illustration: Pharmaceutical Catastrophes

How can pharmaceutical accidents illustrate the approach of analytical history delineated in the previous chapter? This methodology implies the following requirements. (1) The existence of a relatively universal phenomenon which is likely to occur in different countries at different times. (2) The possibility of comparing events that are similar in their principle but differ in magnitude, details or other aspects. (3) The possibility of a statistical quantification via a small number of variables.

The study of pharmaceutical accidents meets all three of these criteria. Furthermore, the topic has a much more limited scope both geographically and historically than separatist movements. All these features contribute to make this topic an ideal laboratory for demonstrating and testing comparative methods.

In the phenomenon that we consider the basic mechanism is human error, which in turn results in the marketing of defective drugs. Observation shows that such errors occur in practically every country which has a pharmaceutical industry, despite controls which are put into place to avoid such mistakes. In the entire world, more than a dozen drugs are taken off the market each year. Most of these cases do not result in major accidents. Nevertheless, there have been some large scale tragedies: DES, thalidomide, blood tainted by HIV, or human growth hormone. Along with these serious cases, there were a number of similar but less severe episodes. We will see that the possibility of studying the phenomenon under consideration at different levels of gravity is particularly useful in the sense that often the minor cases allow us to better understand major accidents.

From a statistical point of view, we are on particularly favorable ground because a certain number of these illnesses (AIDS, Creutzfeldt-Jakob syndrome) must be reported at the international level, thus guaranteeing a certain reliability and comparability in the statistics.

What are our objectives in this chapter? They are, in fact, quite different from those of most authors who have written on this topic.<sup>1</sup> In these studies the main objective of

the authors was to establish the responsibilities and faults of firms and health organizations. In general, however, responsibilities are distributed along a chain extending from the presidents of pharmaceutical companies to directors of public health organizations and the physicians and biologists in charge of controls.

As a matter of fact, Lewis Richardson's argument about wars seems also applicable here; in *Statistics of deadly quarrels* he notes: "The less a type of behavior is subject to free choice, the less also is it subject to moral condemnation. So I did not know quite what to condemn until I had found out what was mechanical." By underscoring the recurrent features of various scenarios, we will see that attitudes and reactions which seem at first like a succession of more or less aberrant, even criminal, behaviors become, under wider scrutiny, much more understandable. We will see that from one country to another there are differences more of degree than of type. It is therefore not unrealistic to consider episodes occurring in different countries to be variants of the same basic process. When we notice similar reactions the world over, we are more inclined to explain than to judge them. In that respect our attitude will be modeled on Richardson's philosophy which he expresses by recalling that "to condemn a lot is to understand little" even "if to understand everything is not necessarily to pardon everything."<sup>2</sup>

From a methodological point of view, the study of pharmaceutical accidents possesses another advantage which warrants a remark here. One of the main difficulties in the social sciences is the fact that there are few closed systems which can be studied independently of their social environment. Fortunately the questions which are treated in this chapter are limited to three principal areas: the transmission of scientific information, the pharmaceutical industry and its control by the state, and finally, the functioning of the judicial system. If there are indeed connections with other components, such as the media or political life, these connections are rather episodic.

The way a society reacts to pharmaceutical accidents is revealing of deeper social idiosyncrasies. In a sense they can be used as testing probes very much in the same way as the English physicist Sir Joseph Thomson explored the structure of the atoms by studying the deviations experienced by electrons when they collide with atoms. Similarly the responses of the judicial or political systems to pharmaceutical accidents and the cross-national comparison of these responses are revealing of the inner structure of societies.

In the first and second section, we relate several pharmaceutical accidents. In the third section, we analyze successively several of the base mechanisms of this phenomenon. Finally, in the last section, we discuss national specifics.

## From Local Accidents to Worldwide Catastrophes

*Errare humanum est* [Making mistakes is part of human nature], this Latin dictum applies to all human activity and can be illustrated in several contexts. Between 1973 and 1992, in the United States alone, automobile manufacturers initiated 573 recall campaigns involving nearly 141 million vehicles.<sup>3</sup> Because in the pharmaceutical industry errors can have the gravest consequences it is subject to controls that are much stricter than those applied to other industries. Nevertheless, this does not guarantee a total lack of errors. Errors can occur in the development stage, during the testing phase preceding the arrival of the drug on the market, or during manufacture. Errors can also be made in the prescription and administration of drugs.

Errors in prescription are most often isolated and therefore escape public attention. Nevertheless, they exist, as was shown in a study conducted at two large Boston hospitals by the Harvard School of Public Health. In six months, from January to July 1993, this research team logged 334 drug errors. Doctors prescribed wrong doses or missed patients' drug allergies, and nurses made mistakes in the distribution of drugs to patients. Seventy patients were harmed, although only fourteen of the errors were life-threatening. To put these errors in perspective, it should be pointed out that 700,000 drug doses were administered at the two hospitals during the study; the 70 serious errors are in a proportion of 1:10,000. This reliability index of 0.9999 is undoubtedly greater than that of many other human activities.<sup>4</sup>

### Accidents in Segmented Markets

The pharmaceutical industry has become globalized principally since the 1960s. Previously, the distribution of drugs was confined to limited geographical areas. The following paragraphs briefly describe two examples of accidents that remained limited to only one country.

**The Morhange talc case** In April 1972, 6.3 percent of hexachlorophene, a powerful antiseptic, was introduced by mistake into a 600-kilogram lot of baby talcum by a company in eastern France. After being absorbed by the skin such a product could penetrate the blood circulation and seriously injure the nervous system. The accident caused the death of 36 babies and resulted in 145 cases of handicapped children primarily in the northeast of France. The cause of the deaths was not clearly identified until August 1972. At the trial, damages of eight million francs (\$1.6 million) were awarded to the victims. Five directors were sentenced to from one to twelve months in prison.<sup>5</sup>

**The Stalinon case** Stalinon was a drug based on tin and iodine and designed to combat furunculosis (boils). It was invented in 1953 by a French pharmacist, Georges Feuillet, and was granted government approval on 29 June 1953.<sup>6</sup> This drug



turned out to be extremely toxic, in part because of an error in its manufacture. It is estimated that the drug caused the death of around one hundred persons. It was taken off the market in September 1954. After a trial at the end of 1957, Georges Feuillet was sentenced to two years in prison, and the manufacturer was fined 100,000 francs (\$20,000). The sentences were essentially upheld in June 1958, in the Court of Appeals in Paris. Afterward, the insurance companies of the inventor and the manufacturer, which had been obliged to indemnify the victims, filed suit against the government, claiming that permission to market the drug had been issued although all safeguards had not been put in place. Their claims were nonsuited by the administrative court and then, on 30 June 1968, by the Council of State (Conseil d'Etat).

These two cases staged the three principal actors which we shall meet later, that is, the pharmaceutical companies and their insurers, the victims, and the state. Nevertheless, through several of their characteristics these cases belong to the past. First of all, the accidents were confined to one country, or even (as in the case of Morhange talc) to one region; then, the harmful effects of the medicine were relatively easy to establish, given that they affected a substantial number of patients in a fairly short time after administration of the medicine. In the later cases, the harmful qualities of the drug would affect only a small percentage of patients, and then after a period of latency of several years. It thus becomes more difficult to establish the cause-to-effect link between the medicine and the illness.

### **Accidents in Global Markets**

The fact that at the present time a drug is intended for distribution in a large number of countries has two important consequences. Given that each country brings its own controls into play, the drug will be subjected to a stricter oversight. In the United States in particular, the possible side effects of the drug will be under the scrutiny of a group of federal agencies (the Food and Drug Administration, the Health Research Group, the Center for Disease Control) which have virtually no equivalent in the rest of the world. It is then hardly surprising that most of the problems which we will describe were originally identified in the United States.

*Tandéril, an anti-inflammatory drug* It is not entirely by accident that we begin by examining the case of an anti-inflammatory drug. Almost all products of this family have potentially serious side effects, such as, for instance, the disappearance of certain blood cells, hemorrhages, or perforated stomach ulcers. In 1983, in Great Britain alone, four anti-inflammatory drugs were prohibited. In the case of Tandéril, it was the manufacturer who took the initiative in removing the product from the market.

The affair began in 1983 in the United States, when a health-research group founded

by Ralph Nader became interested in two anti-inflammatory substances, phenylbutazone and oxyphenbutazone. This group revealed that out of 150 million people who had taken one or the other of these products, 1,182 deaths were recorded, with 311 in the United States.<sup>7</sup> One of the drugs implicated was Tandénil, made by the Swiss firm, Ciba-Geigy. Following these revelations, Ciba-Geigy strengthened its warnings to physicians about possible side effects. As might have been expected (cf. the discussion below) this effort had little effect and the drug continued to be widely prescribed. In April 1985, Ciba-Geigy decided to withdraw the drug from the world market. It must be noted, however, that an investigation in France in February 1986 revealed that the drug was still available in a large number of pharmacies a year later. We will return to this point.

*Aspirin and Reye's Syndrome* Aspirin is one of the most widely sold drugs in the world. By 1985, 30,000 tons of aspirin were being consumed throughout the world. This is the equivalent of 75 billion aspirin tablets. Although no drug is completely free of side effects, it was thought until 1963 that the side effects of aspirin were well known, and not serious. In 1963, Douglas Reye described in the British journal *The Lancet* a particularly serious side effect of aspirin (later named Reye's Syndrome) which affects only children and young adolescents and consists in encephalitis and degeneration of the liver and kidneys. Altogether, in the period before 1981, 221 cases were reported, out of which 58 were fatal. Nonetheless, the annual frequency of these cases is low: 10 to 20 cases per million subjects below the age of 18 months.<sup>8</sup> In February 1982, the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta published a report on this topic. The information caused a sensation when the largest television networks devoted several minutes to the report during prime time; the information was then discussed again on the morning programs aimed at stay-at-home mothers. In 1986, children's aspirin was taken off the market in Great Britain, but not in other European countries.<sup>9</sup>

*A typical scenario* The preceding episode follows a scenario that we will encounter several times hereafter. The initial alarm comes from one or several scientific articles. Then an alert is sounded by an American health agency or by an organization dedicated to public safety. After a more or less lengthy delay, health agencies of other countries follow suit. The delay between the publication of the scientific article and the withdrawal of children's aspirin in Great Britain was twenty-three years. Whenever the frequency of accident cases is low, it is normal that reaction time should be slower. We will treat this point in a more quantitative manner subsequently. In addition, in such border-line cases one cannot exclude the fact that industrial politics may play a role, since by withdrawing aspirin from the market, a clearer field is left open for competing products, like painkillers based on paraceta-

mol.

## Facts and Figures

In this section, we describe four major pharmaceutical accidents, taken in their chronological order. The use of the word “facts” in the title should not make us lose sight of the fact that the causal relationships between the use of a drug and its possible side effects are generally not easy to prove. For example, in the case of thalidomide, and despite an impressive statistical correlation between the distribution of the drug and the appearance of birth defects, the manufacturer continued to maintain that, based on its own experiments, the drug was not responsible.

### DES (Diethylstilbestrol)

*The medical situation* Between 1941 and 1970, DES was given to pregnant women for the prevention of miscarriages. Two million women were given this treatment in the United States; in the rest of the world, between four and six million women received DES.<sup>10</sup> The treatment is based on the observation that women at risk of premature childbirth have a low level of DES. Nevertheless, in 1953 an American researcher showed that this low level was an effect rather than a cause, and that it was therefore useless to correct the problem. An investigation involving a sample of 1,600 patients indeed confirmed that the drug was ineffective. It was taken off the American market in 1970, whereas in France it was not prohibited until 1977.

DES was not harmful to the women who took the drug; it is their children who were affected. In a small number of cases (around 1:10,000), a rare form of vaginal cancer appeared in girls. In addition, extensive studies showed that about 60 percent of the daughters exposed to DES had some abnormality in the size and shape of the uterus. Upon reaching adulthood, males whose mothers were exposed to DES can have various reproductive and urological abnormalities, which may impair their ability to have children.<sup>11</sup> Studies on animals have even suggested that carcinogenic effects of DES could appear in the granddaughters of women who took the drug.<sup>12</sup> Eight years after the completion of a similar study in the United States, an inquiry in France showed that the probability of a full-term pregnancy was lowered by half for the daughters of women who had taken DES.

Unlike other cases, this affair was never given extensive coverage in the media. In 1984, the Health Research Group urged the U.S. federal government to alert about two million women to increased risks of cancer; nonetheless, the recommendation was not followed, and the next year, the director of the HRG complained of a coverup of his recommendations.<sup>13</sup>

*Legal aspects* Several lawsuits have been filed in the United States since 1974.

However, there were several legal obstacles for the plaintiffs. Because of the existence of a large number of commercial forms of DES, it was not easy, twenty or thirty years later, to establish precisely which pharmaceutical company was the responsible party. Furthermore, there was the question of delays in prescription. It was only in 1986 that the state of New York changed legislation which would pave the way for possible legal action. Several previous (but isolated) cases aside, we find that substantial damage awards have been made only since 1991.

*A foreshadowing of the future* Because the harmful effects of DES are relatively difficult to uncover few statistics are available, which makes any comparative study difficult. Nevertheless, the case is of interest because it foreshadows problems that may occur in the future. As we have seen, this drug had harmful effects for three generations. The development of drugs which affect hormonal, cellular and even genetic mechanisms may lead to a multiplication of such accidents in which not only the patients but also their descendants are affected.

## **Thalidomide**

*Historical overview* In 1957, the German firm Chemie Grünenthal developed and marketed a new tranquilizer which was named thalidomide. In tests conducted by the manufacturer, high doses had been given to rats without causing problems or congenital defects. The informational pamphlet accompanying thalidomide in Belgium stated: “Softénon (the Belgian commercial name for thalidomide) is tolerated extremely well; even an overdose occasions no toxic symptoms.”<sup>14</sup> With this tranquilizer, in fact, suicide became impossible, as was not the case with barbiturates. Used as a tranquilizer in small doses, and as an aid to sleeping, the drug had an immediate success, especially in Germany. However, from 1960 on, a particular type of congenital birth defect appeared, namely, the absence of lower limbs. In Germany, the incidence of this kind of defect increased from an average of 25 per million births to 5,000 per million in 1961, that is, an increase by a factor of 200. On 25 November 1961, the manufacturer withdrew the drug from the market and sent a circular to physicians, hospitals and pharmacies asking them to return their stock. The manufacturer claimed to be acting out of prudence, but took no responsibility for the effects of the drug. On 2 December 1961, Great Britain prohibited the drug, but thalidomide was not prohibited in Belgium for another eight months. It is estimated that around 50 percent of the future mothers who took thalidomide between the 4th and the 6th week of pregnancy had deformed babies. In 1967, at Aix-la-Chapelle, seven company directors were put on trial for involuntary homicide and injuries. In 1970, the trial had already been going on for two-and-a-half years when an out-of-court settlement was reached; the victims agreed to a compensating award in exchange for abandoning the lawsuit.

**Table 3.1 Thalidomide's Victims Still Alive in 1962**

Country	Number of victims
Australia	23
Belgium	20
Britain	390
Canada	40
Germany	5,000
Japan	63
Sweden	30
United States	10

*Note:* Thalidomide was neither authorized nor marketed in the United States, but some doctors gave it to their patients on an unofficial basis.

*Sources:* Australia, Canada, Germany, United States: *New York Times* (12 Apr. 1962); Belgium, Sweden: Paulus et al. (1963); Japan: *New York Times* (14 Oct. 1974)

**Comparison** The drug was distributed in a number of countries, except Austria, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States. It should be noted, however, that requests to authorize marketing of the product had also been made in France and the United States. If the harmful effects of the drug had not been revealed so quickly, there is no doubt that it would also have been sold in both of these countries. Table 3.1 gives the number of cases observed in different countries. Unlike the cases of later pharmaceutical catastrophes, damage awards were paid by the pharmaceutical companies and their insurers without the intervention of the state.

## Human Growth Hormone

**Historical overview** Between 1977 and 1985, children who were “abnormally” small received a treatment based on a growth hormone. At that time, this hormone could not be synthesized, and had to be extracted from the pituitary glands of cadavers. Approximately 50 pituitary glands were needed to treat one person for one year.<sup>15</sup> In Great Britain, a total of at least 900,000 pituitary glands were removed for this purpose. In late 1984, a young American woman who had been treated with human growth hormone as a child developed a case of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and died from it. This is a very rare illness, with an incidence of 0.6 to 1 cases annually per million inhabitants. Within three months, three other cases were reported, two in America and one in Britain.<sup>16</sup> A preliminary report was published on this issue in the United States; as a result, the United States and Great Britain decided to halt the distribution of human-growth hormone until the synthetic hormone could be developed. Other countries, notably Denmark, France, Germany and Switzerland decided

**Table 3.2 Number of Cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease among People Who Were Treated with Human-Growth Hormone**

Country	Number of people who were treated with human-growth hormone	Number of cases of CJ disease	Percentage of people treated who developed the disease
Britain	1,900	17 (1995)	0.9 % (1995)
France	2,000	24 (1993)	1.2 % (1993)
		50 (1997)	2.4 % (1997)
United States	6,284	7 (1993)	0.1 % (1993)

Sources: Britain: *Times* (5 Nov. 1993; 4 Sep. 1995); France: *Le Monde* (29 Jul. 1993, 1 Jan. 1997); United States: *Le Monde* (29 Jul. 1993).

to continue treatment. In France, for example, a procedure for inactivating hypothetical agents for the disease was used until 1988. In that country several persons who had been in charge of collecting the pituitaries were investigated by mid-1993.

**Comparison** At the time of writing there is no reliable test which permits a diagnosis of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Since the period of latency for the disease can exceed 10 or 15 years, Table 3.2 can only give provisional figures.

## Tainted Blood

**Historical overview** Hemophilia, the absence of certain coagulants in the blood, is a condition which affects 1 person in 10,000. When there was no treatment for this affliction, hemophiliacs experienced effusion of blood, particularly inside their joints. Episodes in which the joints doubled in volume were painful, and could have lasting effects on the joints.

There have been several phases in the medical treatment of this illness.

- At first, fresh blood was transfused directly from a donor to a hemophiliac. The donor, who was called upon only in emergencies, was often the same person, and a relationship ensued because of the transfusions. For the hemophiliac, the gift of blood was truly a gift of life.

- In the second phase, only plasma was given. The principal advantage was that plasma could be frozen and therefore kept longer than whole blood. From this moment, the direct link between the donor and the receiver was broken.

- Later, several improvements allowed choosing only the coagulation factors which were lacking in the blood of hemophiliacs. Type-A hemophiliacs represent 80 percent of all afflicted persons; they received a factor called “Factor VIII.” Since



the separation of Factor VIII from plasma is a fairly long and complicated process, it would have been unproductive to do this in small quantities. Plasma was thus prepared in large batches of blood given by several thousand donors.

The down side of this development is that one donor with a single transmissible disease (hepatitis B and C, Aids, Creutzfeldt-Jakob syndrome) could contaminate the entire batch. It should be noted in passing that the problem with growth hormone was also the result of “industrial logic.” In this case, pooling was somewhat less important because only 500 to 2,000 pituitaries were involved in any single batch. In the treatment of hemophilia, the danger connected with pooling was pointed out as early as January 1983, in an article published in the *New England Journal of Medicine* (J. Desforges: AIDS and Preventive Treatment in Hemophilia). Throughout 1983 numerous articles were published on the same topic in major medical journals (*Annals of Internal Medicine*, *The Lancet*, etc.). In December 1984, an article gave the following rates for HIV seropositivity among hemophiliacs: 32 percent in Great Britain, 53 percent in Germany, 72 percent in the United States.<sup>17</sup>

At that time, two different solutions were contemplated:

(1) Returning to older treatments, which would have been less dangerous because they involved very small batches of 2 or 3 donors.

(2) Developing and testing a satisfactory method for the sterilization of coagulant factors, and during a transition period, reserving unsterilized products for hemophiliacs already shown to be seropositive.

The first solution was not adopted anywhere. Nevertheless, the example of Belgium shows that recourse to the traditional method gave excellent results. In that country, which had voluntarily chosen to remain with processing methods involving only very small batches, the rate of infected hemophiliacs remained very low. The second solution was applied everywhere else, including the United States, which remained at the forefront of research.<sup>18</sup>

**Comparison** Looking at publications concerning the problem of infected hemophiliacs, one cannot help but be surprised by the great spread between the statistics given by various sources. Some figures which were published were patently false. For example, the French daily *Libération* (23 October 1993) reports only 40 infected hemophiliacs in Great Britain, whereas the real number is above 1,000; Ruffié and his collaborators in a book published in 1996, give the rate of infected hemophiliacs in Denmark as 60 percent, while the actual number is around 25 percent.

Most often, however, many of the data given simply lack rigor. By definition, the percentage of contaminated hemophiliacs is a ratio. Frequently, both the numerator and the denominator of this ratio are ill-defined. The numerator gives the number

**Table 3.3 Number of Hemophiliacs Who Contracted AIDS Virus from Blood-Clotting Products**

Country	Number of hemophiliacs who contracted AIDS (including deceased) (1986)	Estimated number of hemophiliacs (1975)	Number of hemophiliacs who were treated	AIDS-contaminated hemophiliacs as a percentage of hemophiliacs treated	AIDS-contaminated hemophiliacs as a percentage of total number of hemophiliacs
				percent	percent
Belgium	30	960	500	6	3
Britain	1,200	5,520	3,122	38	21
Denmark	89	490	350	25	18
France	1,500	5,100	3,120	48	29
Germany(West)	1,840	5,950	3,000	46	31
Japan	1,800	1,030	4,500	40	17
Spain	1,560	3,360			47
Sweden	104	800			13
Switzerland	100	620			16
United States	9,800	2,050	1,550	63	48

*Note:* The total number of hemophiliacs has been estimated on the basis of a ratio of 1 for 10,000 inhabitants; it can be noted that in each instance where the total number of hemophiliacs is known independently it coincides fairly well with the above estimate.

*Sources:* Belgium: *Le Monde* (26 Jun. 1992); Britain: *Guardian* (20 Feb. 1988), *The Independent* (19 Aug. 1991); Denmark: *Le Monde* (20 Nov. 1991); France, Germany: *Nouvelle Revue Française d'Hématologie* (29, 4, 1987); *Quid* (1992, p. 127), *Le Monde* (9 Oct. 1993); Japan: *Washington Post* (16 Mar. 1996), *Cahiers du Japon* no. 69; Spain: *La Croix* (17 Mar. 1993); Sweden: *Le Monde* (14 Mar. 1990); United States: *Herald Tribune* (18 Feb. 1988).

of infected hemophiliacs, but are these the seropositives who are still alive at a particular moment, or does the figure also include those who have already died? The definition of the denominator is even more subject to error. Are we dealing with the total of all hemophiliacs or only with those who have received Factor VIII? In this regard, it should be noted that the deficiency in coagulation factors varies from one hemophiliac to another. According to the degree of this deficiency and to the type of life led, one hemophiliac will not use the same products, nor in the same quantities as another. Thus we see that the distinction between treated and untreated hemophiliacs is, in fact, progressive and gradual, rather than well defined. For these reasons, we give in Table 3.3 the percentage of infected hemophiliacs both in relation to the estimated number of treated hemophiliacs and to the total number of hemophiliacs in the country (right-hand column of Table 3.3).

In this column, only Belgium stands out because of its low rate. The high rate in the



United States is easily explained by two circumstances: treatment with a concentrate base is widespread there, and the AIDS epidemic appeared earlier in the United States than elsewhere.

## Basic Mechanisms of Pharmaceutical Accidents

The various episodes previously described can be broken down into a certain number of successive stages. We will particularly focus our attention on the social attitudes and collective behavior. However, it should be noted that apparently individual decisions often reflect a collective process. For example, when a director of the Food and Drug Administration decides to publish a warning about a particular drug, his decision will be based on reports from his investigators, on the observations of doctors who are in contact with patients, or on the complaints of patients themselves. When a New York State judge allows the suit of a victim against a drug company, or establishes the amount of an award, this is certainly an individual decision in the sense that a judge in Texas might not have made the same decision. Nevertheless, if the judgment is upheld in an appeal in federal court, it becomes in the end an expression of the collective will.

In the next paragraph we examine the different mechanisms in chronological order, from the moment in which doubt is expressed in a scientific journal about the side effects of a drug to the withdrawal of the drug and subsequent court trial.

### From the Scientific Article to the Withdrawal of the Drug

How does information published in a scientific journal reach medical practitioners or officials at public health organizations? Given the great number of articles published each year, it is impossible for one individual to have an exhaustive knowledge of all of them, even in résumé form. Furthermore, the number of pharmaceutical specialties which must be kept in view is enormous. Thus, in 1962, at the moment when the thalidomide affair broke, there were in Belgium alone 8,200 drugs. Information must be channeled, directed and amplified in some manner. This difficulty is effectively confirmed by observation, as the following examples show.

- To gauge the real efficacy of an already commercialized drug, the best tests are made on a fairly large number of patients. Because of their cost, such tests are relatively rare. It is interesting to see to what extent their results are taken into account by medical practitioners. Between 1974 and 1979, tests of this type were done for anticoagulants. The results of the tests were negative, or at best doubtful with regard to the efficacy of these drugs. Despite this study, there was an increase in the use of the products. In France, the amounts spent on them went from \$29 million to \$85 million.<sup>19</sup>

- In 1970, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration issued a comprehensive list of 369 drug products it considered either ineffective or dangerous. It should be noted that the list included some of the 200 most prescribed drugs in recent years. A study made a month later in 18 cities showed that practitioners were largely unaware of this information.<sup>20</sup>

How can such a lack of communication be explained? In the 1970s, there were 600,000 physicians in the United States. Each of them had his (her) own prescription habits based on personal judgment, patients requirements and solicitation of pharmaceutical companies. It is easy to understand that such solidly founded prescription habits cannot be upset by a simple scientific report. In the case of DES, seventeen years passed (1953 to 1970) between the publication of the first study showing the ineffectiveness of the drug and the official position taken by the FDA. In Britain, aspirin was not withdrawn from the market until 23 years after publication of the dangers of aspirin for children (1963 to 1986). In the case of the growth hormone, Doctor Ann Hartree, director of the British pituitary harvesting program, had resigned in 1980 to protest the danger of infection with Creutzfeldt-Jakob syndrome, yet five years were to pass before the hormone was withdrawn.<sup>21</sup> In France, the danger of unsterilized coagulants was revealed by Professor Soulier to the general assembly of the French Association of Hemophiliacs on 4 January 1983. Nevertheless, unsterilized coagulants were not withdrawn for two years.<sup>22</sup>

The fact that it takes some time for a new idea to be accepted is a recurrent phenomenon in the history of sciences. In several milestone studies published in 1964 and 1966 Coleman and his colleagues showed that medical news is transmitted from person to person by a process of diffusion. One of Coleman's graphs shows that as late as a year after the introduction of a new drug, only 60 percent of practitioners have included it on their prescription lists. It should be pointed out that, contrary to drug withdrawals, the introduction of a new medicine benefits from pharmaceutical advertising. Seen in this light, the previously noted inertia should not surprise us any longer.

### **Comparison of Reaction Times**

We have already shown how a pharmaceutical accident brings to light hidden collective social factors. The reaction time of health organizations in the case of a drug emergency is certainly an interesting parameter to consider. Two other variables are given in Table 3.4, namely, the percentage of patients affected by the illness and the time until their illness is brought to light.

The relationships between these variables is shown graphically in Figure 3.1. There is a definite relationship between the "visibility" of the illness and the reaction time.

**Table 3.4 Comparison of Medicopharmaceutical Accidents**

Drug	Percentage of patients affected	Time between treatment and illness	Delay until the drug is withdrawn from the market
		D <sub>1</sub>	D <sub>2</sub>
Stalidon			1 year
Thalidomide	50%	several months	about 1 year
DES	0.01%	5-10 years	30 years
Human growth hormone	1.2% (1997)	10 years	3-6 years
Tainted blood	40%	a few months	2-3 years
Aspirine for children	0.001%	a few months	at least 35 years


*Note:* D<sub>1</sub> is the delay between the moment when a patient begins treatment and when its illness (a consequence of the treatment) is diagnosed. D<sub>2</sub> is the time between the appearance of the first cases and the withdrawal of the drug.

*Sources:* See text.

### From Withdrawal of a Drug to Its Disappearance from the Market

The inertia which we have noted at the level of medical authorities and physicians is also seen among pharmacists. It is not enough for a pharmaceutical company to withdraw a drug to assure that it will indeed be removed from all stocks and pharmacies. That issue created great indignation at the time of the tainted-blood episode, but as we shall see, this is by no means an isolated phenomenon. In France, there are 20,000 pharmacies.<sup>23</sup> On the basis of a similar percentage of pharmacies per inhabitants, namely one pharmacy per 3,000 people, one arrives at an estimated 75,000 pharmacies in the United States. The sheer magnitude of that number helps to understand why the withdrawal of a drug is fundamentally a collective phenomenon for which we must expect diffusion mechanisms similar to those described in the preceding paragraph. Here are several examples of delays in drug withdrawals which illustrate some of these problems.

***Tandéril, an anti-inflammatory drug*** In April 1985, the Swiss firm Ciba-Geigy decided to withdraw Tandéril from the market (see above), yet a study carried out in France in 1986 showed that this product was still for sale in a large number of pharmacies. What is the explanation for this anomaly? The study showed that on 30 September 1985, fully five months after the official announcement of the withdrawal, the manufacturer had written the following letter to its wholesalers: “You may return your stock to our plant in Lyons; upon receipt, we will establish a credit account according to normal practices.”<sup>24</sup> Between October 1985 and February 1986, it appears



**Figure 3.1 Relationship between the “Visibility” of an Illness and the Reaction Time of Medical Authorities.** The horizontal scale represents a parameter  $T/p$  which characterizes the “visibility” of the illness:  $T$  is the time interval (expressed in years) between the moment when the patient contracts the illness and the moment when the illness becomes detectable;  $p$  is the proportion of the patients who contract the illness after taking the drug. When  $T$  is of the order of several years it is not easy to establish a causal link between the drug and the disease. The same observation applies to drugs for which the proportion of the patients who contract the illness is small. The vertical scale indicates the reaction time of the medical authorities, that is to say, the delay between the moment when the problem is identified for the first time and the moment when the drug is prohibited. The two axes have logarithmic scales. The graph shows that the two variables increase together. Sources: See text.

that pharmacists reacted very slowly to this recommendation. The manufacturer, released from further obligation by the official announcement of the withdrawal, had no particular reason to hasten the process of returning the stocks. Note that reimbursement instead of credit for returned stocks might have provided a greater incentive. Quantitative evaluations of this phenomenon are fairly rare; an interesting study was conducted in France by a consumer organization in May 1982; it showed that a special medication containing amidopyrine, which had been withdrawn from the market three months previously, was still available in 23 percent of the pharmacies surveyed.

**Thalidomide** In August 1962, that is, nine months after the withdrawal of the drug by the manufacturer, an inquiry conducted by the Food and Drug Administration showed that many U.S. pharmacies had stocks of thalidomide, even though this drug had never been officially approved.<sup>25</sup> Overall, from July 1949 to April 1962,

there have been more than 1,100 prosecutions involving illegal sales of drugs which ended in the convictions of about 1,900 defendants. Eighty-eight percent of those convicted were druggists and their employees.

The delay in removing thalidomide from the shelves was not unique to the United States. In a Belgian trial at Liège in November 1962 a government prosecutor declared that seven months after the withdrawal of the drug, he had been able to find and buy thalidomide in a Belgian pharmacy.

**Physiatron** Pharmacists are not the only persons resisting the withdrawal of a drug; patients are equally involved. An example taken from a case in France helps us to better understand the reasons for this. In January 1985, the government prohibited the sale of an anticancer drug called “physiatron,” which had been developed by Dr. Solomidès. This drug, in fact, had never received official approval to be sold for medical use. Its sale had been allowed for more than ten years as a simple dietary product, until it was discovered that it could have toxic side effects. After its withdrawal, there was panic among the habitual users of this product. Rightly or wrongly, they were convinced that they were alive thanks only to physiatron. These consumers created an association which established a parallel sales network, through which the products were packaged in Belgium and sent to purchasers by mail.

**Tainted blood** With the exception of thalidomide, the examples given so far in this section concern cases whose consequences were not too serious. It might not be surprising to learn that the same mechanisms were at work in more serious accidents, like the case of growth hormone or contaminated blood. The common attitude of several countries (France, Germany, Switzerland, the United States) was to establish a transitional period, during which the stocks of old products (hence, heavily contaminated), would be used for hemophiliacs already shown to be seropositive. The example of Switzerland is particularly telling. In April 1985, in the early days of screening blood supplies for the AIDS virus, the New York Blood Center sent a telex to the Red Cross of Switzerland advising it that a small part of its shipment of Swiss blood appeared to have tested positive for HIV. Nevertheless, for at least twelve months after the warning, the Swiss Red Cross continued to use and distribute untested blood products. AIDS screening was made mandatory on 1 May 1986, but the Red Cross still failed to recall potentially contaminated blood products from clinics and hospitals.

### **Financial Constraints**

In addition to the inertia previously mentioned, financial reasons came into play which may explain this wait-and-see attitude. Some figures will illustrate the magnitude of the funds involved. In 1993, sales of the most widely sold drug in the world

(Zantar, an anti-ulcer medication) totalled \$3,520 million and sales of the drug in twenty-fifth place in this listing of the most-sold drugs (Zestril, an antihypertensive medication) amounted to \$969 million.

From a commercial standpoint, the drugs mentioned in the previous paragraphs have very different statuses. Thalidomide was fairly inexpensive, which explains why manufacturers expected a substantial market for it. Coagulation factors or human growth hormone, on the other hand, are costly but are intended only for a limited number of patients.

In the early 1990s the annual treatment cost for a hemophiliac was between \$6,000 and \$100,000 annually in the United States and Germany, respectively.<sup>26</sup> The notably lower cost in the United States is explained by smaller dosages and by the lower cost of the coagulation factors (in 1989: \$0.43 per unit in Germany against \$0.11 in the United States). In the industrialized countries, among a total population of around 60,000 hemophiliacs and assuming an average annual cost of \$20,000, the potential market has a value on the order of two billion dollars. This is the same order of magnitude as that of the most widely sold drugs in the world. Another illustration of the importance of this market is the fact that one-half of the 10 million liters of blood collected annually worldwide was used in making coagulation factors.<sup>27</sup> This market was expanding rapidly at the beginning of the 1980s; in France, sales went from \$17 million in 1982 to \$30 million in 1984.<sup>28</sup>

The cost of treating a child with the synthetic growth hormone (on the market since 1985) is estimated at \$12,000 per year.<sup>29</sup> In 1990, 3,500 children were under treatment in France. If we accept a worldwide estimated number of patients around 30,000, the annual total sales would be \$360 million.

In the light of these numbers, it is easy to understand that administrators would hesitate to scrap such expensive products, especially when the information which they have received is riddled with uncertainties.

### **The Role of the Media**

A common factor in most of the pharmaceutical accidents is the wall of silence which meets the victims. We will give two illustrations.

- In April 1962, Michael Carr-Jones, a former RAF pilot whose wife had delivered a deformed baby, contacted the newspapers and formed a victims' association with a view to obtaining compensation awards. At first, his efforts met with little interest. The task of British newspapers was made especially difficult by the fact that Distillers, the company which distributed thalidomide, has always made clear that they would regard any comment or inquiry as contempt of court. The campaign begun in 1972 by the *Sunday Times* was interrupted by a ruling of the House of Lords



right after the appearance of the first article. In 1979, the European Court on Human Rights ruled that the British government had illegally infringed on freedom of the press by preventing publication of the *Sunday Times*' articles.<sup>30</sup>

- In 1985, Jean Garvanoff, a French hemophiliac who had become seropositive after transfusions of coagulant factors, tried to bring the problem to public opinion. He wrote hundreds of letters to politicians and contacted the editors of newspapers, but to little effect. This may be explained by the fact that the French Association of Hemophiliacs, which normally should have headed up such a campaign, was subsidized by the transfusion centers and did not want to stir up a scandal involving those centers. The situation in the United States was similar in the sense that the New York based National Hemophilia Foundation was partly financed by blood-product manufacturers.<sup>31</sup> In France, public opinion was not "mobilized" until 1989, when the *Canard Enchaîné* published internal documents of the National Transfusion Center. Finally, the French directors responsible for blood transfusions were convicted in the wake of the press campaign of 1991.

In the United States, there was a turnabout in 1988 in the way in which the press treated the problem of infected hemophiliacs. Previously, there had been very complete and well-documented articles, whereas after 1988 articles became concise to the point of failing to give any real overview of the problem. This may be due to the large number of lawsuits filed toward the end of the 1980s, which may have put a damper on the press.

In Germany, there was an important press campaign on the question of infected hemophiliacs in 1993, in which the weekly *Der Spiegel* played a role similar to that of the *Canard Enchaîné* in France. As a result, two directors of the UB-Plasma firm in Cologne were arrested and convicted. In sum, the media played a major role not only in changing public opinion but also in affecting government positions and even the attitude of the courts. We may recall that it was a press campaign, led in particular by the *Financial Times*, which brought the British government to decide in December 1990 to compensate hemophiliacs. In a similar manner, after the 1993 press campaign the German government raised substantially the awards made to hemophiliacs.

### **Through the Maze of the Courts**

In general, only action by the state permits victims to be compensated collectively within reasonable amounts of time. Cases brought before the courts generally are resolved in about ten years, as shown by Table 3.5.

The times shown in the table are underestimates; several delays can in fact occur between the announcement published in the press and the actual payments to the



**Table 3.5 Delays in Compensatory Awards to Victims after Lawsuits**

Drug	Country	Number of years between withdrawal of the drug and compensatory awards [years]
Stalidon	France	4
Thalidomide	Britain	12
Thalidomide	Germany	9
DES	United States	10-20
Tainted blood	United States	11+

*Sources:* See text.

victims, for instance appeals to higher courts or payment in installments.

Why are these delays so long? There are two main reasons.

(1) In most countries, compensation for injury depends on proof of fault, which means that the burden is on the injured party to show that someone has fallen below generally accepted standards of care. This may be a very technical question that depends on expert evidence.

(2) Pharmaceutical companies are both legally and financially well equipped to take advantage of all legal maneuvering. For many victims, the ultimate deterrent is that of legal costs, now perhaps \$4,000 a day in High Court (which does not include many thousands of dollars required for preparatory work).<sup>32</sup> In fact, the principal concern of pharmaceutical companies seems to be to avoid judgments which establish legal precedence. Frequently, and especially in the United States, the drug companies offer an out-of-court settlement when the court is about to settle an award on the plaintiff.

Given the multiplication and especially the widening scope of pharmaceutical accidents, there has been a recent tendency among governments to establish a ceiling on awards to victims. Here are two illustrations of this tendency.

- In Germany, a 1987 law fixes a financial ceiling in individual cases: either a lump sum of DM 500,000 (\$340,000) or an annuity of DM 30,000 (\$20,000). Maximum liability in respect to any one drug is fixed at DM 200 million (\$136 million) or annuity payments of DM 12 million (\$8 million).<sup>33</sup>

- In the United States, after intense lobbying, pharmaceutical companies and physicians succeeded in being included in a sweeping measure taken up by the House

of Representatives that would set limits in all of the nation's courts on damages awarded in civil lawsuits. According to one amendment, the pharmaceutical industry would be immune from punitive damages from suits involving drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration.<sup>34</sup>

- In March 1995, a federal appeals court reversed a lower court and ruled that thousands of hemophiliacs who contracted the AIDS virus from blood-clotting products cannot join in class-action suits against the manufacturers, in part because a suit might bankrupt the pharmaceutical industry.<sup>35</sup>

## National Specifics

In the preceding section, we have shown the constraints and the general mechanisms which seem to govern pharmaceutical accidents across national boundaries. Nevertheless, it is obvious that each country has specific idiosyncrasies which cause cases in Europe to be treated differently from those in the United States. This section describes some of these differences.

### The United States

A great difference appears when one compares the United States on the one hand with Europe or Japan on the other. In the United States, the federal government deliberately leaves the settlement of suits to the courts alone, and does not participate in the compensation of victims. In the past twenty years, this manner of proceeding has been demonstrated several times. In October 1995, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear six AIDS-related cases that raised significant constitutional issues; one of these cases was the propriety of a federal class-action suit on behalf of thousands of hemophiliacs.<sup>36</sup> Another peculiarity of the American system is the rarity of criminal indictments. Even in cases where there has been malfeasance or clear-cut errors, lawsuits concern only the payment of damages.

In November 1993, for example, laboratory controls found signs of bacterial contamination in the last 40,000-bottle batch of Albuterol, a respiratory drug used by asthmatics and manufactured by Copley Pharmaceuticals, Inc. In spite of the warning, Copley shipped another 127,000 bottles before it issued a limited recall on 27 December. It took another two weeks and an FDA inspection to bring about an urgent recall of all the Albuterol on the market.<sup>37</sup> This incident was, in fact, only the last of a long series of manufacturing errors from 1991 onward which caused a total of fourteen deaths. Despite such obvious errors, there seems to have been no legal sanctions against the president of this company.

Penal sanctions seem to be limited to deliberate attempts to contravene federal inspections. Thus the former chief executive officer of the Halsey Drug Company was

sentenced to 41 months in prison for conspiracy to defraud the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. The company was said to have misrepresented information about the research and testing of certain drugs.<sup>38</sup>

### **Great Britain**

British rules regarding indemnisation are positioned halfway between the American and continental models, with a tendency toward the latter in the past decade. At the time of the thalidomide affair, the government made very clear its intention not to indemnify the victims. Twenty years later, in the case of the contaminated blood, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher affirmed the same position. Only after her replacement by John Major in 1990 did the government lean toward compensating victims with government funds.

### **Continental Europe**

In most countries of continental Europe the governments have shown a willingness to compensate victims of recent accidents. This was true both for the tainted blood cases and the more recent growth-hormone accidents. Several countries such as France and Germany have given serious attention to the attribution of penal responsibility. All throughout the postwar cases, from Stalinon in 1958 to the indictments in 1993–1994 (growth hormone) there have been lawsuits and, generally, prison terms for those presumed responsible.

## Conclusion

### Main observations

In this chapter we have tried to convince the reader that looking at similar events in parallel fashion permits a better overall understanding of pharmaceutical accidents than a detailed study of isolated cases. That approach will be used over and over again in subsequent chapters; all our studies will heavily rely on cross-national comparisons.

In the present chapter we have seen that certain aspects, such as, for instance, the delay in the reaction of health authorities, the length of judiciary proceedings or the role of governments in the compensation of victims follow fairly well-defined patterns. We have also seen that any production procedure in which blood, organs or bones from several thousand animals are mixed up entails great potential risk in the sense that the whole batch can be contaminated by a single infected animal. The mad-cow disease that erupted in Britain in the 1990s was still another illustration of that danger. In that case the mass production of the food destined to cows lead to an unprecedented large-scale dissemination of the disease.

Later on in this book we will often insist on the necessity for having at our disposal the largest possible set of cases, but the widening of the sample of cases should not be made at the expense of its homogeneity. This constraint can be illustrated by the example considered in this chapter. As we mentioned at the beginning, more than a dozen drugs are taken off the market each year and problems or some sort occur for an even larger number. Specific examples mentioned in *Pills, profits, and politics*, published in the 1970s by M. Silverman, include: Alival (anti-depressant), Chloramphenicol (antibiotic), Glifanan (sedative), Tryptophane (amino acid). However in those cases the problems varied from one patient to the other; for one there were kidney problems, for another cutaneous eruptions, for a third liver problems. Such a diverse array of symptoms would make any systematic study fairly difficult and this explains why these cases could not be included in the sample of cases considered in this chapter.

### Transfusion risks: the cases of Isaac Asimov and Robert Ashe

In the course of this chapter we have given many data; let us close it with a more personal note which refers to the renowned scientist and science fiction writer Isaac Asimov.

After a heart attack Asimov had triple bypass surgery in December 1983 at the age of 64. When he died 8 years later on 6 April 1992 at the age of 72 the cause of death was given as heart and kidney failure. Although this was the immediate cause (as in

a majority of deaths) it was not the underlying cause. In fact, he had contracted HIV from a blood transfusion received during his bypass operation. In the present chapter, we focused our attention on hemophiliacs but there were also other patients who were infected by blood transfusions. It is because their number is not well known that we did not include them in our investigation.

The reason such deaths are not well documented is illustrated by Asimov's case. Asimov himself had wanted to go public about his HIV infection but his doctors convinced him to remain silent (Wikipedia, article in English entitled "Isaac Asimov"). After his death, Asimov's family considered again disclosing his condition.

One would expect that the doctors again advised against disclosing the truth as they had done earlier. However, there was also another element. On 10 April 1992, that is to say in the days following Asimov's death, the American tennis star Arthur Ashe disclosed that he had AIDS due to a blood transfusion during heart surgery in 1988 (New York Times 10 April 1992). He was compelled to do so because the daily "USA Today" was about to publish a story about his condition. It seems plausible that the controversy generated by this disclosure (New York Times 30 April 1992) led the members of Asimov's family to change their mind.

Incidentally, one may wonder why medical authorities were unable to dissuade the editors of "USA Today" to publish the news about Ashe's illness.

The truth about Asimov's death was revealed in 2002 by his wife in a re-edition of Asimov's autobiography entitled "It's Been a Good Life".

# Chapter 4

## The Roots of Identity: Language, Time and the Land

The people are the land, and the land is the people.

—Fijian proverb, cited in *Blood on their banner* by D. Robie

Language is the essence of human existence.

—Maori proverb, cited in *The nations within* by A. Fleras and J. Elliot

Societies are constructed upon a delicate balance between diversity and social communication. Too much diversity makes communication difficult, with an ensuing risk of chaos. Conversely, too much uniformity may limit cultural “cross-fertilization.” To guarantee the stability of a society, there must therefore be a cement or binder which assures a minimum of internal cohesion despite individual differences. This binder can take several forms: an attachment to a geographical space and life style, or to a language, religion, or values held in common. These elements in fact form the framework of a society. Attachment to a geographical setting and to a language play an especially fundamental role. These two elements also have the advantage of lending themselves to statistical measurement, which explains the particular attention given to them in this chapter.

The attachment of man to the soil on which he lives is particularly evident in traditional rural societies, but observation shows that this connection exists in modern societies as well. In the establishment and in the consolidation of this bond between a place and its inhabitants, the crucial element is time: for a strong bond to form decades or even centuries are required. The bond itself can take various forms. There can be a relationship between the land which one cultivates and in which one’s ancestors are buried, or in a less material fashion, the bond can consist of a shared history. In all cases, however, time is essential for the formation and reinforcement of this bond; the roots which attach a community to a region will be formed over generations. This mechanism is one of the principal themes of this book.

In this chapter, we will try to detail and analyze the constituent elements of the

bond between a community and its living space. However, one should not forget that among soil, time and language, there is a synergistic, mutually reinforcing effect, in other words the whole cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts. For instance, identification with the soil does not mean only attachment to landscapes or agricultural land, it also implies an affinity for the names of places or the language spoken by the inhabitants. Conversely, language is nourished by the land and derives from it many expressions. Separating these elements for analysis deprives them of a large part of their meaning. It is as if one were to describe separately the roadbed and the pylons of a bridge over an estuary; neither of these two elements has any sense taken alone. Historically, the raw material which makes up the bond between a community and its land can take various forms. Among these, one of the most important is membership in a linguistic community; this has the advantage of being open to objective and quantitative observation. Through surveys or censuses it is relatively easy to estimate the percentage of a population which speaks a given language. On the other hand, it would be much more difficult to determine how many people identify themselves with a common past, because this identification is for the most part subconscious. In the past, as we shall see, religion has often played a major role in community identification, in the same way that language does in our day. The section which we shall devote to religion should be seen in this perspective. What will be of interest to us will not be religion itself but rather its role as a vehicle for national or community identification.

## The Land

It is tempting, especially for city dwellers, to make too rapid an identification between the land and agriculture. In fact, rural societies of the past exhibited an extremely rich and diversified social fabric. The penetrating analyses of Henri Mendras are especially useful here.<sup>1</sup> At the level of professional activities, for example, if farmers were in some way the nucleus of a rural society, they were also surrounded by a large number of tradesmen and craftsmen who were closely linked to agriculture: coopers, saddlers, smiths, shoemakers, millers, innkeepers, roofers, joiners, and so on. In a society like that of nineteenth-century Ireland, for example, where the land was for the most part in the hands of great non-Irish landowners, tradesmen could to exercise their crafts in the service of landlords. However, historical observation has shown that the whole population, and not just the farmers, were affected quite directly by any “disappropriation” of the land. Again, this confirms the multiplicity of links between a land and the population.

The kind of osmosis which is created between the land and the community which inhabits it can be illustrated with a biological analogy; this is the subject of the next



paragraph.

## **Genetic Adaptation to the Environment**

Observation shows that when a species is introduced to a given region (to simplify matters, we can consider the case of an island), there occurs an adaptation to the environment which progressively brings about a genetic drift. After several centuries, this species will have acquired enough specific characteristics to be catalogued as a new and original variety of the initial species.

In the 1950s, the geneticists Dobzhansky and Pavlosky completed an experiment which brought to light this genetic drift.<sup>2</sup> Using a population of flies (*Drosophila pseudoobscura*) procured by crossing a variety from Mexico with another from California, the researchers produced ten groups of twenty individuals chosen at random. For a year and a half (which represents twenty generations), these groups were put into separate-but-identical cages. It is noteworthy that among humans, twenty generations are equal to between 400 and 600 years, a considerable span of time from the historical point of view. Because of the fecundity of these flies, at the end of this time span each population comprised between 1,000 and 4,000 adult individuals. What is surprising is that these populations had acquired different genetic constitutions. This can seem paradoxical for populations deriving from the same stock and put into identical environments, but there was, in fact, no identity among the collection of genes of the original batches. With these genes, evolution tried in some way to do its best to make up a group of genotypes both adapted to the milieu and coadapted one to the other.

In the case of the relationship between a population and its homeland, it is easy to conceive of what this coadaptation consists: links between local animal or vegetable resources and culinary traditions, links between mineral and vegetable resources and the kind of habitat, links between social and family structures, and so on. In other terms, a symbiosis will be formed between the soil and the human community that it supports; from this coadaptation there will arise a socio-geographical divergence even among neighboring groups. Subsequently we will see an illustration of such mechanisms in the field of languages.

Undoubtedly, the most direct method for gauging the strength of a link between a people and its land is to observe what happens historically during a process of expropriation. Observation shows that the reactions of populations to expropriation are quite violent. Several examples are considered in the following paragraphs which will illustrate this mechanism. Chronologically, these examples are spread out from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries. We have deliberately chosen both ancient and modern episodes to show the permanency of these mechanisms.

**Table 4.1a Catholic Landownership in Ireland**

	1603	1641	1688	1703	1778	1870	1906	1916
Catholic ownership	90%	60%	20%	15%	5%	3%	30%	62%

*Note:* For 1870, 1906 and 1916 the data give the percentage of landowners in the population.  
*Source:* Edwards (1981).

## Ireland

The example of Ireland is especially interesting, for it allows us to follow the cycle in its entirety. The appropriation of the soil by immigrants was so deeply resented that it led to numerous and bloody revolts. Although the land was essentially restored to the Irish in 1910, this restitution hardly changed the feelings of the people of Ireland toward the English, as the events of 1916–1921 demonstrate. As a result of their trials over several centuries a particularly strong feeling of identity based on a shared history developed among the Irish.

Although English incursions into Ireland began at the end of the twelfth century, the decisive periods in the appropriation of land were from 1602 to 1612 and 1641 to 1691. During the first period, in consequence of repeated rebellions, 2,064 square kilometers of land (i.e., 2.5 percent of the total area of Ireland) in the province of Ulster became vested in the crown. James I (1603–1625) divided the land among those of his English and Scottish subjects who chose to settle there. The main dispossessions took place, however, after the insurrection which followed the English Revolution and its repression by Oliver Cromwell. Lands possessed by Catholics went from 60 percent to 20 percent (see Table 4.1a). The Act of Settlement sent Catholics to the west of Shannon, which is to say that nearly two-thirds of the island were reserved for English colonization. The last stage of this process of expropriation occurred after the revolt of 1688–1691, when 8.1 percent of Irish territory was confiscated and given primarily to Dutch members of the court of William III.<sup>3</sup>

As Table 4.1b shows, this dispossession brought about a reallocation of land, the inequality of which was perpetuated until the end of the nineteenth century. Ireland's land distribution was even more unequal than in some Latin American countries dominated by latifundio ownership. From 1880 on, there were several attempts in the English Parliament to remedy this state of affairs. The first Irish Land Law Act was approved in 1881 and set the conditions by which tenants might become proprietors, but the law had few practical results. The 1903 Wyndham Law had the first real impact. It permitted the repurchase of all the great landholdings by the state, which

**Table 4.1b Concentration of Land Property in Different Countries**

Country	Date	Percentage share of total land held by 1 percent top landowners	Gini index of concentration ( <i>g</i> )
Wales	1877	60%	
Ireland	1876	48%	0.93
Guatemala	1979		0.85
East Prussia	1895	33%	0.83
Germany	1895	29%	0.77
Algeria	1950		0.72
India	1970		0.63
Bavaria (Germany)	1895	8%	0.59
Bangladesh	1974		0.57
South Korea	1974		0.32

Notes:  $g=0$  means perfect equality: everyone holds the same share of land;  $g=1$  means complete concentration: all the wealth is in the hands of a single landlord.

Sources: Wales: Howell (1977); Ireland: *Grande Encyclopédie 1887* (p. 953); Guatemala: Black et al. (1984); Bavaria, East Prussia, Germany: *Statistik des deutschen Reichs* (1895); Algeria: Ageron (1979); Bangladesh, India, South Korea: Griffin (1981).

paid a cash compensation to the landholder, with a bonus for a rapid sale. Tenants were to pay rent to the state, and could in this way become titular owners of their lands after the payment of 68 annual installments. There were about 85,000 repurchases between 1903 and 1906. Between 1923 and 1930, tenants continued to pay the British Treasury nearly 5 million pounds.<sup>4</sup>

After DeValera's return to power in April 1932, the Irish government refused to continue to pay land compensation. Great Britain countered by imposing a duty on Irish products; the resulting "tariff war" lasted until 1938.

## Algeria

The conquest of Algeria began when France took Algiers on 5 July 1830, yet the attempts to take possession of the interior met strong opposition for several decades. Napoleon III opposed the policy of colonization, which consequently did not develop until after 1870. Occupation of the territory by Europeans generally took place in two phases. In the first period, the tribes whose lands were coveted were restricted to one-half or one-third of the territories which they had traditionally occupied. Confiscated lands were appropriated by powerful financial interests, such as the Société Genevoise. In the second period, these lands were profitably resold to colonists; some colonists even rented land to the indigenous peoples who had pre-

viously had access to them either freely or through a fee paid to a local chief. This expropriation did not fail to provoke a number of insurrections, which were themselves used as pretexts for new expropriations. In 1930, 24 percent of real property was in the hands of Europeans, while in 1950 this figure was 27 percent, even though Europeans made up only 10 percent of the total population. It should be pointed out that the property of Europeans (who besides the French also comprised Spanish and Italian nationals) was for the most part situated in the coastal zones; the property of the native populations was confined to the interior, where the land was mountainous and often arid.

### **Southern Rhodesia**

We bring up Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) as representative of the situation in other African countries, like Kenya, South Africa and Madagascar. Southern Rhodesia was not brought into the British Empire until the end of the nineteenth century; the settlement of a substantial population of colonists did not take place for the most part until after 1914. In 1921, the European population numbered about 34,000 persons; in 1931 it was 50,000, while in 1970, it had risen to 220,000. Here is the distribution of land between indigenous peoples and colonists around 1925:<sup>5</sup>

	Area	Percentage of total area
Total area	385,000 sq. km	100%
Land "alienated" to Europeans	192,000 sq. km	50%
Native reserves	88,000 sq. km	23%
Native purchase areas	27,000 sq. km	7%

We see that the European population, which had represented only 0.4 percent of the total population in 1921, had set aside 50 percent of the land for itself. To put this number into the more general perspective of distribution of property (cf. Table 4.1b), we note that in East Prussia, a region of large landholdings, 0.77 percent of the population owned 30 percent of the land. The real property which the European population had put aside for itself in Southern Rhodesia was therefore three times greater than in parts of Europe where large landholdings were the norm.

### **New Zealand**

In 1840, the treaty of Waitangi was signed by Maori chiefs and representatives of the British crown. Sovereignty was ceded to the British in return for a guaranteed continuing possession by Maoris of their lands, forests and fisheries. The Maori granted the right to purchase their lands solely to Queen Victoria. At that time, the

Maori population was more numerous than the European population, even though it had diminished substantially compared to the 1770 level. During the 1840s and 1850s, white settlers arrived in New Zealand in large numbers, until by 1858 they outnumbered the Maoris. In 1860, the Maori wars began after the governor of New Zealand attempted to take possession of a fertile region at Waitara in the western part of the northern island and his troops were resisted by the local chief. After the Maori wars, the government punished the tribes by confiscating about 1.3 million hectares representing 5 percent of the total area of New Zealand. Attempts to regain the lands lost after the Treaty of Waitangi were unsuccessful. In 1928, compensation was offered to the various tribes who refused the offer, demanding instead the return of their lands. In 1946, the government made a revised offer of compensation; a Maori Trust Board administered the payments of NZ \$ 5,000 per annum (i.e., US \$3,500) in perpetuity, a surprisingly small amount.

In 1972, Dr. Hohepa, a Maori chief, summed up the way in which the treaty of Waitangi had been demolished, stating, "After 131 years, the score is 66 million acres to the Pakeha (i.e., the Europeans), 4 million to the Maori."<sup>6</sup> During the 1970s and 1980s, about 150 claims involving land and fishing rights were brought before a tribunal which had been set up to investigate breaches of the treaty of Waitangi. The tribunal, however, could only make recommendations to the government.<sup>7</sup> In February, 1990, the 150th anniversary of the treaty of Waitangi was disturbed by several hundred Maori demonstrators. In the presence of Queen Elizabeth, they demanded the return of their lands. In 1994, the government offered 416 million pounds in "full and final settlement" for all land and other assets seized wrongfully since 1840. The year 2000 was set up as the deadline for completion of the negotiations. Maoris were outraged because the plan did not recognize what they saw as their rights and because the sum had been fixed somewhat arbitrarily at a level which represented \$1,800 per Maori.<sup>8</sup>

## Israel

The Palestinian problem remains one of the burning questions of the twenty-first century. We have brought this question up to show that the mechanisms discussed in the preceding paragraphs are as valid today as they are for times past. Given the sensitiveness of this topic, it might be useful to make some remarks about the sources we have used. We have deliberately consulted works written largely by Israeli jurists, in particular a study by D. Kretzmer, a professor of law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This will allow us to see that an honest vision is to a certain extent independent of the observer; failing that, any historical study would become truly impossible. It should also be added that with respect to the previous cases there is an additional psychological and religious factor in the sense that Palestine is considered

by the Jews as their historical homeland.

In 1919, shortly after the Balfour Declaration (2 November 1917) by which the British government recognized the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, there were 58,000 Jews in Palestine, or 8.3 percent of the total population. Beginning in May 1921, Arabs rioted in objection to the acquisition of lands by Jewish interests. Between 1933 and 1936, some 135,000 Jews entered Palestine; in April 1936, the Arabs mounted a general strike to stop both Jewish immigration and the purchase of land by Jews. We may better understand how this disagreement came about by looking at the situation before the massive arrival of Jewish immigrants. According to Ottoman law, a person who cultivated “*miri* land” (the most common form of rural land) for a period of ten years was permitted to take title to that land. In the 1920s and 1930s the Jewish National Fund made great efforts to purchase land in Palestine. Nevertheless, the territory acquired during that period was modest: about 8 percent of the total area of Israel (20,255 sq. km) within the frontiers established by the 1948 armistice. Published estimates of the proportion of lands owned by Arabs before the armistice vary considerably. According to a source close to the Israeli government, the totality of Arab lands, including the arid territories of the northern Negev, occupied 5,793 sq. km, or 29 percent of the total area. The UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine, on the other hand, estimated that more than 80 percent of the land in Israel had belonged to Arab refugees; nevertheless, only 28 percent of these lands were considered to be tillable. In brief, if we limit ourselves to cultivable lands, the differences between these two numbers are not as great as they would at first appear.<sup>9</sup>

In 1948, the state of Israel found itself in a paradoxical situation: it had achieved sovereignty over the land but did not have ownership of it. If one remembers that between 1948 and December 1952 more than 700,000 immigrants arrived in Israel one cannot be surprised that the Israeli leaders felt the need to implement a drastic policy regarding the control of land; in short, the political leadership of the fledgling state decided that those Arabs who had left their land during the war would not be allowed to return.

The 1948 war caused some 725,000 Arabs to abandon their homes and flee either to neighboring countries or to other parts of Israel. Two laws, the Absentees’ Property Law (1950) and the Land Acquisition Law (1953) defined the judicial form of the expropriation process. In order to be considered an “absentee” and to have one’s land confiscated, it was sufficient to have left at any time between 29 November 1947 and the date when the law was passed. Thus, one could be considered an “absentee” if one had only changed regions without even having left Israel; this was the case with 75,000 “present-absentees.” What is the extent of the land expropriated under these



two laws? The official figure is 3,250 square kilometers, or 16 percent of the total area of Israel. After 1953, lands were transferred to the Development Authority; the effect of this was to make reappropriation impossible, even on legal grounds. As in New Zealand, former occupants could henceforth obtain only financial compensation. Until 1988, only 14,364 persons had claimed compensation.<sup>10</sup>

Land expropriation has remained the most painful issue in the relationship between the Arabs in Israel and the Jewish state, and it is an issue that has galvanized Arabs into political action. Arab protests reached a peak in 1976 when the government decided to expropriate 2,000 hectares, 600 of which belonged to Arabs. There was a general strike on 30 March 1976, during which six Arabs were killed by the police. March 30, known as “Land Day” has since become a national day of protest and commemoration in the Arab community in Israel. Pressure continued to be put on Arabs residing in enclaves within certain sensitive zones, as at Jaffa in a quarter located close to the sea, with the aim of bringing Arabs to accept relocation to other zones.<sup>11</sup>

## Language

Language is both a means of communication within a group and a sign of belonging to that group. A person speaking a language with a strong foreign accent may not be considered to be part of the group, even if the accent does not impede communication. Our goal here is not to examine this phenomenon from an individual and linguistic point of view, but from a collective and social perspective. To study the link between a community and its language, we will proceed fundamentally as we have done for the ties between the land and a community, that is, we will analyze certain episodes in which these ties were imperiled by outside intervention. The speed with which a tongue can wither, indeed die, gives a measure of the degree of attachment of a community to its language. The inverse process, namely, linguistic renewal, can also give us useful indications in this regard. Finally, in a later section, we will study the mechanisms by which languages are diffused in space.

From the point of view of languages, the nineteenth century was a paradoxical era. On the one hand, we witnessed the accelerated withering away of minority languages: Breton (Brittany), Basque (Basque provinces in France and Spain), Gaelic (Scotland), Hawaiian, Irish, Navajo (western United States), Romantsch (Switzerland), Welsh (Wales). During the same period, there was a revival of a certain number of languages which graduated from the status of a relatively confined form of popular speech to that of a national language. This happened in Albania, Belorussia, Flanders, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. In all these cases, the



linguistic revival was part of a national renaissance in that these communities made up national entities which claimed independence or at least a wide autonomy. These two opposing movements extended into the twentieth century. The withering of minority languages continued, although in certain cases at a slower rate after 1970. In parallel and thanks to the process of decolonization, a number of languages have acquired (or returned to) the status of national language. It should be noted that this process has gone on also independently of the process of decolonization, as in Catalonia (Catalan), Israel (Hebrew) and Luxembourg (Letzeburgesch). In sum, there was a double movement of diversification and unification.

Before going deeper into these topics let us look at an objection that would naturally occur during a discussion of the role of languages in the formation of national identities. When one considers the 193 sovereign states existing in the world in 1995, one may wonder why a sizeable number of these countries do not have their own language? Indeed only 92 of these 193 countries, that is to say, 48 percent have their own national language.<sup>12</sup> Among the 101 remaining countries a large number have kept the language of a former colonizer: Arabic has been adopted by 17 countries, English by 30, French by 20 and Spanish by 15. Incidentally, it should be noted that in recent years there was a tendency in former colonies to substitute genuine national languages to languages inherited from colonization. That is, for instance, true in Kenya where Kiswahili became the official language in 1974 or in the Seychelles where Creole became the official language in 1981; in India, although it is used for many purposes, English is no longer an official language but has the status of an associate language.

In short one can see that the natural tendency is for each state to have its own official language although the colonial phenomenon has had a substantial influence on the choice of languages in former colonies.

### **Minority Languages**

The expression “minority language” used without further definition has a rather ambiguous meaning. Every language is, in fact, both “minority” and “majority.” French is a majority language in France, but a minority language in Europe and in the world; likewise, Welsh is a minority language in Great Britain and even in Wales, but it is the majority language in the county of Gwynedd in northwestern Wales: the proportion of inhabitants speaking Welsh is 61 percent.<sup>13</sup> In what follows, we will use the expression “minority language” in reference to the national ensemble on which the region under consideration depends.

*Spoken language and written language* Schematically, we can distinguish two successive periods for minority languages, namely the periods before and after the

generalization of public schooling. The pre-nineteenth-century rural world undoubtedly had little recourse to writing in daily exchanges. Oral exchange adapts better than writing to relatively flexible and changing forms of expression. For example, the mixture of two different languages, as in the various forms of creole or pidgin, is not unusual for oral exchanges. The reason is simple: when one of two interlocutors has difficulty understanding, he can always ask for additional explanations, something which is not possible when one reads a book or a newspaper. Furthermore, the oral message is accompanied by a complex of auxiliary messages (tone, gestures) which facilitate understanding and help to avoid gross misunderstandings. In the nineteenth century, with the spread of education and with the increasing complexity of exchanges due to economic development, the question of minority languages received renewed attention. In the late twentieth century many African societies function with essentially oral communication modes and are therefore in a situation which parallels European countries in the first half of the nineteenth century. The use of two or even three oral languages together does not seem to pose real problems in many African countries as was documented for the countries of East Africa by D. Laitin in his book *Language repertoires and state construction in Africa*.

The situation is drastically different when one leaves the level of oral exchanges in daily life for the realm of more complex and specialized messages; each word then becomes important, and an imprecise multilingualism becomes unsuitable. This is the case, for example, in the writing of a commercial contract, the reading of an insurance policy or the pleading of a legal case in court.

*Linguistic statistics* This section will essentially deal with Western Europe and the United States for two main reasons. First, there are only few data about the evolution of minority languages in African or Asian multilingualistic countries. Furthermore, linguistic phenomena, as we shall see, have great inertia, and a minimum period of one or even two centuries is required to observe noteworthy changes. Second, even though the Balkans or the Arab countries make interesting cases for the study of minority languages, these countries have been the object of relatively few detailed statistical studies and, in addition, only a small fraction of existing studies have been translated into English.

Even in Western European countries, linguistic statistics are imprecise, in the first place because the knowledge of a language is a relative notion that is very imprecisely described by a “yes” or “no” answer. These difficulties in measurement were discussed in detail by Kirk.<sup>14</sup> In some all-too-rare cases, detailed statistics do permit a better definition of the problem. For the Basque Country and Catalonia, we have the following figures.<sup>15</sup>

	Basque Basque provinces, Spain	Catalan Catalonia, Spain
Persons understanding the language	50%	90%
Persons speaking the language	46%	77%
Persons reading the language	25%	62%
Persons writing the language	11%	38%

In certain countries, censuses contain questions relating to the languages spoken by the population. In countries where this is not the case, linguistic data are obtained through surveys taken among representative samples of the total population. In either of these cases, the answer to the question, “Do you speak such-and-such a language?” is dependent on a subjective judgment by the person asked. The current political situation undoubtedly plays a role in the answers. In the Republic of Ireland, where a certain knowledge of Irish is required for employment in the public sector, we can certainly expect an exaggerated number of positive answers. This conjecture is confirmed by the opinion of Irish experts who consider that the figure of 30 percent of the total population reporting an ability to speak Irish in the 1981 census is a substantial overestimate.<sup>16</sup> Conversely, a survey on the knowledge of Alsatian, a Germanic dialect spoken in the east of France, taken just after the Second World War, would undoubtedly have resulted in an underestimate, because the population had very bad memories of the wartime years when the region was annexed to the German Reich and subjected to a brutal germanization program.

We may gain an idea of the margin of uncertainty which affects statistical data relative to language by directly comparing figures from different sources. This comparison is given in Table 4.2a for Basque. The estimates vary by as much as a factor of two. This remark should not arouse a general skepticism with regard to linguistic statistics; it is possible to explain why certain estimates are better than others. The province of Navarre gives us an example. Traditionally and historically, Navarre is considered to be part of the Spanish Basque country. Nevertheless, outside of the foothills of the Pyrenees few people speak Basque; in 1975, the number of Basque speakers was estimated at 53,000 out of a total population of 407,000 inhabitants, that is, 13 percent. It is clear that the inclusion of this province in the Basque Country will make a notable change in the proportion of speakers of the language (this is shown in Table 4.2a). Independently of this purely arithmetical aspect, we must take into consideration the fact that the points of view of various organizations may be quite different. Thus, for example, the linguistic statistics emanating from organizations defending the rights of minorities have a tendency to include speakers who

**Table 4.2a Comparison of the Numbers of Basque Speakers in the 1970s according to Different Sources**

Region	Number of speakers	Percentage	Reference
<hr/>			
French and Spanish provinces	610,000		La Croix (16 June 1970)
	630,000		Basque Academy (cited in Letamendia)
	1,000,000		Bright
<hr/>			
Spanish provinces			
without further specification		50%	<i>World Directory of Minorities</i> (p. 68)
excluding Navarra		42%	Census 1981 (cited in Letamendia)
including Navarra		34%	Census 1981 (cited in Letamendia)
excluding Navarra		30%	Basque Academy (cited in Letamendia)
including Navarra		24%	Basque Academy (cited in Letamendia)

*Note:* To some extent these differences can be accounted for by different viewpoints; thus minority right groups will take into account even those speakers with poor fluency, while the Basque Academy (for instance) will be more selective.

have only the most rudimentary knowledge and use the language infrequently. The Basque Academy, on the other hand, gives much more importance to the quality of language usage and therefore has more restrictive criteria.

We have deliberately chosen Basque to make the comparison in Table 4.2a. Because of its radical difference from other European languages, the definition of its zone-of-extension is unambiguous. The situation is more confused for minority languages which are related to the majority languages which surround them. The region of Alsace in eastern France, illustrates this situation. The Germanic dialect which is spoken there is as different from standard German (Hochdeutsch) as is, for example, Swiss German. Nevertheless, as one travels northward in Alsace, the dialect tends to become closer to standard German. Should the inhabitants of northern Alsace be included in the same linguistic group as those in the South? Such uncertainties contribute to the error margin of linguistic statistics.

Another illustration of these statistical uncertainties is provided by the case of the Hawaiian minority (Table 4.2b).

*The phases of linguistic equilibrium and decline* In the life of a minority language, two phases can be distinguished, one of equilibrium and one of contraction. These


**Table 4.2b Comparison of the Numbers of Hawaiian Speakers in the 1970s according to Different Sources**

Number of speakers with respect to Hawaiian population	Reference
9.0% (1987)	Bright, Moseley et al.
6.0% (1978)	Dorais
2.4% (1970)	Kreisel

*Note:* Dorais remarks that if there are about 6 percent occasional speakers there are no more than 1 percent habitual speakers.

two phases are shown schematically in Figure 4.1a.

Note that in general each of these phases stretches over several centuries. In principle, one should also consider the possibility of a linguistic renaissance, although these cases are extremely rare; the rebirth of Hebrew in Israel is one of the only examples that we can observe. The examples of Irish and Welsh show that once the number of speakers drops below 20 percent, it is difficult to go back up the slope,



**Figure 4.1a Schematic Representation of the Two Phases in the Life of a Language.** The equilibrium phase corresponds to average stability in the number of speakers. The assimilation rate is represented by the slope of the curve. In the equilibrium phase the assimilation rate is almost equal to zero. During the transition to the fall-off phase, the assimilation rate gradually increases until the largest part of the population has been assimilated.

especially when another language spoken by most of the population is available for communication (see Table 4.3a). Only a melting pot of immigrants of various origins permits this sort of miracle. Note also that the rebirth of languages like Flemish, Ukrainian or Finnish are more properly literary than linguistic renaissances, in the sense that these languages have not ceased to be spoken by a majority of the population, but have been eclipsed in their cultural role as written languages.

The equilibrium phase can be illustrated by the following examples: German for the population of the southern Tyrol in Italy, French in Quebec or in the French-speaking cantons of Switzerland, Catalan in Catalonia. The contraction phase can be illustrated by a number of examples cited in Table 4.3. As a first approximation, it is quite natural to describe the contraction phase of a minority language by an exponential decline of the form:

$$p = p_0 \exp(-at) = p_0 \exp(-t/T) \quad T = 1/a$$

where  $p$  represents the percentage of persons speaking the minority language at the moment  $t$ ;  $p_0$  represents this same percentage at a moment preceding the contraction phase;  $a$  represents what can be called an assimilation rate. An exponential function is a natural choice insofar as it is the simplest function which furnishes a decline limited to positive values of the variable  $p$ . Thus, for example, a linear decline would result in passing through negative values of  $p$ . The parameter  $T$  was introduced because it possesses a more intuitive meaning than the parameter  $a$ : it represents a duration which has the simple interpretation that during time  $T$ , the number  $p$  is divided by a factor of 2.7. For a language in a withdrawal phase,  $T$  is generally less than one century; when  $T$  is greater than several centuries, the decline is so slow that the language can be considered to be in a state of equilibrium. Estimates of the assimilation rate  $a$  are given in Table 4.4 and in Figures 4.1d and 4.1e.

Note that from a long-term perspective, the decline of minority languages like Basque, Breton or Welsh is a sudden phenomenon; after a relative equilibrium lasting several centuries, these languages have lost most of their speakers in the space of one century, essentially between 1870 and 1970. The renewal of regionalist movements in the 1970s can be explained as a sudden burst of energy coming from languages confronted with the perspective of a rapid and complete disappearance.

*The phases of linguistic contraction* One of the major characteristics which can be seen in Figures 4.1b to 4.1e and in Tables 4.3a to 4.3b is the relative slowness of changes.

This observation agrees with one of the conclusions obtained in 1975 by S. Lieber-son and his collaborators in an article analyzing the evolution of linguistic diversity in several countries. This diversity is quantified by an index ranging from 0 (com-

**Table 4.3a Evolution in the Number of Minority-Language Speakers: Europe**

Region Language	Census (C) or survey (S) or estimate (E) (observations)	Year							
		<i>Number of speakers in percentage of homeland population</i>							
<b>Britain</b>									
Scotland ( <i>Gaelic</i> )	C (after 1900)	1500 52	1700 26	1765 22	1820 14	1860 11	1890 7	1901 5.6	1921 3.5
						1931 3.0	1951 2.0	1981 1.5	1991 1.3
Wales ( <i>Welsh</i> )	C (can speak)	1891 52	1901 50	1911 43	1921 37	1931 37	1951 29	1971 21	1991 19
Data by county			1921	1931	1951	1961	1971	1981	
Clwyd	C (can speak)		41.7	41.3	30.2	27.3	21.4	18.7	
Dyfed	C (can speak)		67.8	69.1	63.3	60.1	52.5	46.3	
Gwent	C (can speak)		5.0	4.7	2.8	2.9	1.9	2.5	
Gwynedd	C (can speak)		78.7	82.5	74.2	71.4	64.7	61.2	
Mid Glamorgan	C (can speak)		38.4	37.1	22.8	18.5	10.5	8.4	
Powys	C (can speak)		35.1	34.6	29.6	27.8	23.7	20.2	
South Glamorgan	C (can speak)		6.3	6.1	4.7	5.2	5.0	5.8	
West Glamorgan	C (can speak)		41.3	40.5	31.6	27.5	20.3	16.4	
Clwyd	C (Welsh only)		5.8	3.4	1.3	0.8	1.4	0.8	
Dyfed	C (Welsh only)		15.3	9.6	4.1	2.4	2.4	1.6	
Gwent	C (Welsh only)		0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	
Gwynedd	C (Welsh only)		28.1	22.1	9.1	5.2	4.9	2.6	
Mid Glamorgan	C (Welsh only)		2.3	0.8	0.3	0.4	0.8	0.5	
Powys	C (Welsh only)		6.1	3.9	1.6	0.9	1.0	0.9	
South Glamorgan	C (Welsh only)		0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.2	
West Glamorgan	C (Welsh only)		3.6	1.3	0.5	0.5	1.0	0.8	
<b>Finland</b>									
South <i>Swedish</i>	C	1750 17	1865 13.9	1880 14.3	1890 13.6	1900 12.9	1910 11.6	1930 10.1	1940 9.6
						1950 8.6	1960 7.4	1970 6.6	1990 5.8

(Continued on next page)



Table 4.3a (continuation)

Region Language	Census (C) or survey (S) or estimate (E) (observations)	Year Number of speakers in percentage of homeland population							
<b>France</b>									
Alsace ( <i>Alsatian</i> )	S (can speak)					1962	1979		
	S (speak at home)					87	75		
Basque Count. ( <i>Basque</i> )	S	1876	1936	1970	1990				
		88	66	38	20-33				
Brittany ( <i>Breton</i> )	S (can speak)	1886	1974	1997					
		48	15	8.4					
<b>Ireland</b>									
Rep. of Ireland ( <i>Irish</i> )	C	1800	1851	1901	1911	1926	1936	1961	1971
		51	23	19	17.6	19.3	23.6	27.2	28.3
<b>Italy</b>									
South Tyrol ( <i>German</i> )						1919	1943	1981	
						97	64	65	
<b>Spain</b>									
Basque Prov. ( <i>Basque</i> )	E, C for 1991 (can speak)		1860	1930	1970	1981	1986	1991	
			53	42	20	21	24	23.5	
Catalonia ( <i>Catalan</i> )	C (can speak)						1977	1993	
	C (speak at home)						77	68	
Galicia ( <i>Galician</i> )	C (can speak)							1991	
	C (speak at home)							91	
								1994	
								56	
<b>Switzerland (by canton)</b>									
Graubunden ( <i>Romansh</i> )	C (can speak)	1920	1930	1941	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990
		32.6	30.9	31.3	29.2	26.1	23.4	21.6	17.1
Ticino ( <i>Italian</i> )	C (can speak)	1920	1930	1941	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990
		93.3	91.3	90.3	88.8	88.2	85.7	83.9	82.8

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Table 4.3a (continuation)


Region <i>Language</i>	Census (C) or survey (S) or estimate (E) (observations)	Year							
		<i>Number of speakers in percentage of homeland population</i>							
Vaud ( <i>French</i> )	C (can speak)	1920 84.9	1930 83.3	1941 86.1	1950 84.5	1960 79.2	1970 73.6	1980 75.1	1990 77.1
Valais ( <i>French</i> )	C (can speak)	1920 65.8	1930 64.9	1941 65.5	1950 65.0	1960 61.7	1970 59.4	1980 60.0	1990 59.7
Zurich ( <i>German</i> )	C (can speak)	1920 95.1	1930 94.8	1941 95.1	1950 93.4	1960 88.1	1970 83.0	1980 82.9	1990 82.5

*Note:* The table does not intend to give a systematic coverage; rather it focuses on those regions for which fairly reliable data are available. In the case of Finland the data give the number of Swedish-speakers as a percentage of the total population (there is no clear way to define ethnic Swedes apart from the language). The language diffusion effect (for which a model is put forward in chapter 5) is apparent on several of the data sets; in Switzerland for instance it affects minority languages like Romansh, but also majority languages such as Italian in Ticino, French in Vaud or German in the canton of Zurich; in all those cases there is a decrease in the percentage of the people speaking the majority language.

*Sources:* **Britain.** Gaelic: Withers, Flora (Vol. 1, p. 64); Welsh: Williams (1994), *Economist* (Aug. 6, 1983), *Statesman's Yearbook*. **Finland.** Swedish: Deutsch (1979) Flora (Vol. 1, p. 65), *Quid* (p. 1214). **France.** Alsatian: Hérand (1993); Basque: *La Croix* (June 16, 1970), Letamendia; Breton: *La Croix* (Nov. 29, 1975 and May 29, 1993), *Quid* (p. 940), *Télégramme de Brest* (11 April 1997). **Ireland:** Guiffan (p. 36), Flora (p. 64), *Quid* (p. 1252). **Italy.** German: *The Guardian* (Oct. 5, 1984). **Spain.** Basque: Letamendia, *La Croix* (June 16, 1970), Clark (1981), *Statesman's Yearbook* (1997–1998), Alen Garabato (1997); Catalan: *Statesman's Yearbook* (1997–1998); Galician: *Statesman's Yearbook* (1997–1998). **Switzerland.** Romansh, French, German: *Statistische Jahrbuch des Schweiz* (1930, 1932, 1947, 1953, 1965, 1975, 1982, 1995), *Gazette de Lausanne* (Aug. 1954), Terra (1993).

plete homogeneity) to 1 in the hypothetical situation where each person in a nation would have a unique mother tongue. Based on evolutions observed in a sample of 35 countries, Lieberman concluded that it would take 500 years for the index of diversity to go down from 0.62 to 0.04.

One of the only exceptions to this general rule relating to a slow decline in the number of speakers is seen in Hawaii. In a period of a mere 40 years, the number of Hawaiian speakers in the indigenous population dropped from 60 percent to 9 percent, and even less according to other estimates (cf. Table 4.2b). This relatively exceptional case is explainable in particular because of a substantial immigration. Note that there are certain small and remote islands, like Niihau (247 inhabitants in 1977), where a restriction on immigration resulted in the preservation of the Hawaiian language (the island is private property and access is forbidden to nonresidents). In the following paragraph we look at the role of both social and geographic isolation in the retention of minority languages.




**Figure 4.1b** Decrease in the Percentage of Minority-Language Speakers in Britain. Gaelic corresponds to Scotland and Welsh to Wales.

*Interpretation of the graphics* Most of the curves in Figure 4.1d and e show a decline in minority languages that has accelerated in the twentieth century. It is important to have some yardsticks to which the assimilation rates given in these graphs can be compared.

As a first simplified case one can consider a population where initially there are only twenty-year-old parents and that they all speak the minority language. Assume further that all parents have three children and that two of them speak the minority language. Under that assumption the number of minority language speakers remains constant in the course of time. After fifty years it can be assumed that all parents are dead, the population  $P$  will then be multiplied by  $3/2$ . The percentage of speakers was initially  $p_0 = 100$  percent and after fifty years it will be reduced to  $P/[(3/2)P] = 0.66$ . From the equation  $0.66 = e^{-50a}$  one gets  $a = 0.8$  percent. In other words in that hypothetical situation  $T$  would be equal to 120 years. This corresponds to a fairly slow decrease.

It should be noted that our calculation underestimates the population increase and therefore underestimates  $a$ ; indeed we reasoned on only one generation whereas after fifty years the parents would have not only children but also grandchildren. If one assumes that the fifty-year interval corresponds to two generations the population will become  $P(3/2)^2$  and this will result in an assimilation rate which is the double than before, i.e.,  $a = 1.6$ .



**Figure 4.1c** Decrease in the Percentage of Regional-Language Speakers in Switzerland. French concerns the canton of Vaud and Romansh the canton of Graubunden (Grisons). As the canton of Vaud is a French-speaking canton the percentage of French-speakers is fairly stable (a similar slight decrease was observed in the proportion of German-speaking people in the cantons where they are in majority). In contrast for Romansh the decrease rate is far more substantial. *Sources:* See Table 4.3a and b

In real cases the picture is made more complicated because of emigration and immigration phenomena.

*Isolation, a key variable in the retention of minority languages* The rates of assimilation indicated in Table 4.4 are eminently variable from one region to another. Can these discrepancies be connected to differences in intensity in linguistic exchanges? To test this intuition in a more precise manner, it would first be necessary to define an index which would permit a quantification of the degree of isolation of a region. The index we have in mind would take into account both geographical conditions and the state of communications.

Geographic conditions are important because it is obvious that a region like Scotland, surrounded as it is by the ocean, would be more isolated from the rest of England than a region like Berkshire, in the heart of the country. The same remark can be made about Brittany in comparison with Picardy in France. Secondly, it is natural to admit that exchanges are all the more intense and numerous as the means of communication (roads, railways, telephone) are more developed. With these two elements taken into account, we are led to define a geographic index of interaction which varies from 0 for complete isolation to 1 for a region completely embedded in





Figure 4.1d Evolution in the Number of Minority Speakers. (Continued on next page).



**Figure 4.1d Evolution in the Number of Minority Speakers** (continuation). Assimilation rates (abridged as a. r.) are expressed in percent. In the twentieth century Gaelic (Scotland) had the fastest decrease rate followed by Romansh (Graubunden, Switzerland) and by Welsh (Wales). In order to get a yardstick for assimilation rates one can consider an idealized situation where initially all parents speak the minority language; assume further that they have three children and that only two of them speak the minority language. In such a case the assimilation rate would be approximately equal to 2 percent. If initially the minority language is spoken only by elderly persons (as is for instance the case in Scotland) the decrease rate can be faster. *Sources:* See Tables 4.3a and b.

the rest of the country. The precise definition of this index will be given in the next chapter, but Figure 4.2a provides illustrations which give an intuitive interpretation. The two cases envisaged in Figure 4.2a are especially simple because the regions under consideration have contact only with the sea and the rest of the country. Often, however, the region also has a frontier with a foreign country. This is the case, for example, of the Spanish Basque Country, which has an Atlantic coastline, a frontier with Spain and a frontier with France. In such a case, the definition of the index of interaction is more complicated and recourse to a more general definition, to be given further on, is required. If we graph the values for rates of assimilation as a function of indices of interaction, we see a noteworthy correlation between these two variables; the correlation is 0.84. Thus, the spatial degree of isolation takes into account an appreciable part of the diversity of assimilation rates observed in Table 4.4. The expected relationship between geographical index is schematized in Figure 4.2b.

Graphics based on evidence for Welsh counties are given in Figures 4.2c and d; they reveal indeed a close relationship between the geographical index and the assimilation rate.

Another test of the spatial diffusion of languages is provided in Figure 4.2e; it concerns the number of Canadian people who shifted from French to English, considered as a function of geographical distance to Quebec. Once again there is a close rela-





Figure 4.1e Evolution in the Number of Welsh Speakers by County. (Continued on next page).





**Figure 4.1e Evolution in the Number of Welsh Speakers by County** (continuation). In the 1970s the decrease continued at a fast rate in the counties where there were more than 20 percent speakers. On the contrary there has been a change in the trend in the two southern counties where the number of Welsh speakers has fallen below 5 percent. Whether this is due to population movements or to a revival of Welsh still remains unclear. *Sources:* See Tables 4.3a and b.

tionship which shows that the number of French-speakers is eroded in the course of time far from Quebec (as a consequence of standard melting pot mechanisms) but remains fairly constant near (or in) Quebec.

In addition to the geographic factor, it is obvious that other variables can play a role. For example, the interest in a language that is conveyed by the total number of its speakers probably influences the commonly agreed upon efforts made to learn it. But this mechanism undoubtedly is of more concern for the acquisition of a second language than it is for learning the mother tongue.

We must admit here that, lacking adequate linguistic data, we were not able to include in our analysis a certain number of especially interesting cases, such as the American Indian tribes (now referred to in the United States as “Native Americans”) or the Amish community. The Amish are an Anabaptist community which emigrated from Switzerland to the United States in the nineteenth century; they seem to have conserved their original German language. A certain number of Indian tribes, like the Navajos, have also been able to preserve their language. These are two notable anomalies in the mechanism of the American melting pot. Recently, the U.S. Senate gave several Indian tribes the right to construct and profit from casinos; Pequots, Sioux, and Apaches have taken advantage of this opportunity.<sup>17</sup> If this policy continues, it is not unreasonable to suppose that these tribes will also become integrated into the American economy.

*Qualitative tests for the case of islands* For an island the value of the index of interaction depends to some extent on the distance between the island and the continent. Nevertheless we will see in the next chapter that in practice it is almost always

**Table 4.3b Evolution in the Number of Minority Language Speakers: Americas and Australasia**

Region <i>Language</i>	Census (C) or survey (S) or estimate (E) (observations)	Year <i>Number of speakers in percentage of homeland population</i>							
<b>North America: Canada</b>									
Quebec <i>(French)</i>	C	1871	1921	1951	1961	1971	1976	1981	1986
	(only French) (mother tongue) (speak at home) (can speak)		79.3	62.5	61.9	60.9	80.0	82.5	82.8
		78		88.1	87.4	88.5			
New Brunswick <i>(French)</i>	C	1921	1951	1961	1971	1976	1981	1986	
	(only French) (mother tongue) (can speak)		28.7	19.5	18.7	15.9	33.0		12.1
				38.1	37.7	37.4			41.2
<b>North America: United States</b>									
Hawaiians <i>(Hawaiian)</i>	E					1930	1978		
						60	9		
Navajos <i>(Navajo)</i>							1986	1994	
							74	78	
New Mexico <i>(Spanish)</i>	E					1850	1940	1990	
						97	45	28	
Puerto Rico <i>(English)</i>	C (can speak; 1980,1990: easily)	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950	1969	1970	1980
		3.6	9.9	19.4	27.8	26.1	37.7	24	26
									1990
									23
<b>North America: Mexico</b>									
Nahuas <i>(Aztec)</i>	(mother tongue)							1985	
								66	
<b>South America: Bolivia</b>									
Percentage of total population having <i>Spanish</i> as mother tongue								1985	
								45	
<b>South America: Paraguay</b>									
Percentage of total population having <i>Spanish</i> as mother tongue								1985	
								8	
<b>Australia</b>									
Aborigines <i>(Aborigine languages)</i>									1994
									17

(Continued on next page)

Table 4.3b (continuation)

Region <i>Language</i>	Census (C) or survey (S) or estimate (E) (observations)	<i>Number of speakers in percentage of homeland population</i>		Year
<b>New Zealand</b>				
Maoris ( <i>Maori</i> )		1987	1995	
		30	34	

*Sources:* **Canada.** French: *Grande Encyclopédie Larousse* (20 vols), *Annuaire du Canada* (1926, 1934–1935, 1980–1981, 1990, 1995). **United States.** New Mexico: Crawford (1992), Lieberson et al. (1975), *Worldmark Encyclopedia of the States* (1995); Hawaiians: Dorais (1983), Kreisel (1980); Navajo: Moseley et al. (1994), *Quid* (p. 1192), *Britannica Book of the Year* (1994); Puerto Rico: *Census of the Population* 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990. *World Directory*. **Mexico:** *Quid* (p. 1305), Wilkie (1996). **Bolivia:** Wilkie (1996), *Quid* (1997, p. 1123), Mitchell (1983, p. 51). **Paraguay:** *Britannica Book of the Year* (1994). **Australia:** *Britannica Book of the Year* (1994), *Quid* (p. 1107). **New Zealand.** Maori: *World Directory*, Bright (1992), *Britannica Book of the Year* (1994), *Quid* (p. 1319).

less than 0.2, that is to say, not much different from zero. This statement correlates well with the observation made by naturalists according to which an island is different from nearby land in numerous specific ways. On this basis one can expect that island populations will keep their culture, language, and sense of identity longer than the inhabitants of continental regions. This paragraph proposes two tests of this conjecture.

The first comes from the case of the Swedish minority in Finland. This minority lives for the most part in the south of Finland; there is also a Swedish community of 21,000 people living in the Aaland islands. The comparison of these two groups sets up nearly ideal conditions for a study of the role of insularity. The linguistic evolution of the Swedish minority in Finland is given in Table 4.3a which shows a slow but regular reduction in the number of Swedish speakers. The situation in the Aaland islands is quite different. There, Swedish is still spoken by 95 percent of the inhabitants.

The two related factors of insularity and history explain this situation. The Aalands were ceded to Russia in 1809, but returned to Finland in 1921 on the recommendation of the League of Nations (despite the pleas of the inhabitants to be placed under Swedish sovereignty). In exchange for a guarantee of linguistic freedom by the Finnish government, Sweden renounced all claims of sovereignty over these islands. The inhabitants of the Aalands have certainly been loyal to Finland, but they have made little progress toward integration into the Finnish nation.


Our second test concerns island-states and is based on the following line of reason-

**Table 4.4 Relationship between the Geographical Index of Interaction (*g*) and the Assimilation Rate (*a*)**


Case	Geographical index	Assimilation rate [1/century]	Consistent with the diffusion model of chapter 5 Yes/No
<b>1) Britain (before 1900)</b>			Yes
Scotland (Gaelic)	0.17	0.53	
Wales (Welsh)	0.52	1.06	
<b>2) Britain (1900–1990)</b>			
Scotland (Gaelic)	0.17	1.74	No
Wales (Welsh)	0.52	1.06	
<b>3) Wales (1920–1980)</b>			Yes (coeff. of corr.: 0.71)
Gwynedd (Welsh)	0.55	0.30	
Clwyd (Welsh)	0.60	1.16	
Dyfed (Welsh)	0.60	0.32	
South Glamorgan (Welsh)	0.73	1.02	
West Glamorgan (Welsh)	0.76	1.06	
Powys (Welsh)	0.90	0.62	
Gwent (Welsh)	0.92	1.87	
Mid Glamorgan (Welsh)	0.95	1.94	
<b>4) Switzerland (1950–1990)</b>			Yes
Vaud (French)	0.14	0.18	
Graubunden (Romansh)	0.83	1.13	
<b>5) United States (1900–1990)</b>			Yes
Puerto Rico (Spanish)	-0.22	<0.1	
New Mexico (Spanish)	0.78	1.38	

*Note:* According to the diffusion model (fully developed in chapter 5) assimilation rates should be low when the geographical index is small and high when the geographical index becomes close to 1. In order to make the test meaningful one has to consider two (or several) regions within the *same* country; otherwise the “*ceteris paribus*” condition will be violated (influence of national history, of political structure, etc.). As can be seen the prediction is consistent with the evidence in the great majority of the cases. Another exception that we did not mention for lack of adequate data would be the maintenance of the Navajo language in the Reserve of the Navajos (the geographical index would be equal to 1); that exception can be explained away considering that the Reserve is located in a desertsic region and has a special administrative status. The case of the eight counties in Wales is illustrated in Figure 4.2b

*Sources:* The detailed formulas for the geographical index are given in chapter 5; assimilation rates are taken from Figure 4.1c.




**Figure 4.2a** Values of the Geographical Index of Interaction. The index of interaction ( $g$ ) is illustrated on the examples of two peripheral regions, namely Scotland and Andalusia. The line of contact of Scotland with England is much shorter than the line of contact of Andalusia with the rest of Spain, which results in a lower index for Scotland.



**Figure 4.2b** Expected Relationship between the Geographical Index ( $g$ ) and the Assimilation Rate ( $a$ ). The geographical index is close to 1 when the region of the minority speakers is surrounded on all sides by majority speakers; it is close to -1 when that region is better connected to (alien) minority speakers than to majority speakers. In the first case assimilation occurs fairly quickly (that is to say within two or three generations); in the second, on the contrary, assimilation is a very problematic outcome.

ing. If islands favor the development and retention of identifying roots we would expect that demands for independence would come more frequently from small states




**Figure 4.2c** Observed Correlation between the Geographical Index ( $g$ ) and the Assimilation Rate ( $a$ ) in Wales. The geographical index has been computed on the following basis: counties with a number of speakers over 50 percent were considered Welsh (only Gwynedd fell in this category), whereas the other counties were considered as English. The correlation is equal to 0.71 (confidence interval at probability 0.95 is: 0.01 to 0.94). Signification of the symbols for the counties in Wales: Clw: Clwyd; Dyf: Dyfed; Gwe: Gwent; Cwy: Gwynedd; MGI: Mid Glamorgan; Pow: Powis; SGL: South Glamorgan; WGI: West Glamorgan. *Source:* Table 4.4.

when these states are islands as opposed to continental regions. What should be our threshold for labelling these “small” states? We have chosen a threshold of 14,000 square kilometers. This somewhat arbitrary choice corresponds to nations the size of Belgium or Lebanon (respectively 11,778 and 10,452 square kilometers). We will then ask if island-states are a majority among the small states. If we limit ourselves to Europe our conjecture could at first seem incorrect. In Europe there are indeed a considerable number of small states which are not islands: Andorra, Belgium, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Vatican. However, if we extend our field of observation to the world our conjecture is confirmed: there are 47 states of less than 14,000 square kilometers and 35 of them (74 percent) are islands.<sup>18</sup>

### Linguistic Resurgences

An overall conclusion which can be drawn from Tables 4.3a and b is that in the long run the decline of minority languages hardly depends on whether the state has a federal or a centralized structure; neither does it seem to depend on the particular linguistic policies followed by them. The fact that Romansch was made a national




**Figure 4.2d** Observed Correlation between the Geographical Index ( $g$ ) and the Percentage of Welsh Speakers in 1921. The latter can be considered as providing an estimate for the assimilation rate in the century before 1921. The correlation is equal to  $-0.65$  (confidence interval at probability 0.95 is:  $-0.92$ . Signification of symbols: see previous figure to 0.10). *Source:* See previous figure.

language (but not an official language) in Switzerland in 1938 does not seem to have stopped its decline. And the fact that Switzerland is a highly decentralized state did not stop its decline either. Of course that decentralized structure was important in maintaining the three other languages spoken in Switzerland, namely, French, German and Italian.

In this section, we will look more closely at what historical observation can teach us about the possibilities of governmental intervention into the linguistic structure of a country. The most radical transition that can be imagined is that of a language which had become a minority tongue, with a percentage of speakers on the order of 20 percent to 30 percent, but which had become (almost overnight) the single official language after the country had gained independence; knowledge of this language would then be indispensable for access to civil-service employment and the administration, and it would be the only language used in schools and universities. To our knowledge, history gives us no examples of such a transition. There are, however, certain situations which come close, and which can serve to illustrate the kind of resistance which brutal transitions in the linguistic arena can provoke. This aspect





**Figure 4.2e Percentage of Canadians of French Mother Tongue Who Have Shifted to English as a Function of Distance to Quebec (1971–1981).** There is a clear relationship between the shift from French to English and the geographical distance to Quebec; the correlation is equal to 0.81 (confidence interval at probability 0.95 is: 0.41 to 0.95); the regression equation is:  $y = 15 \ln x - 61$ . Signification of the symbols: British Columbia: BCo; Alberta: Alb; Saskatchewan: Sas; Manitoba: Man; Ontario: Ont; New Brunswick: NBr; Nova Scotia: NSc; Prince Edward Island: PEd; Newfoundland: New; Yukon: Yuk; Northwest Territories: NTe. The almost overlapping circles are (Alb, Nte) and (BC, Yuk). *Sources:* Connor (1994), Edwards (1994). We express our gratitude to Professor Walker Connor for bringing this example to our attention.

will be illustrated by the examples of Norway and Sri Lanka.

**Norway** The example of the linguistic reforms put in place in Norway illustrates the extreme difficulty of attempting to modify a language. It shows that a language is an organic whole whose elements are strongly interdependent; the modification of one aspect invites a cascading series of repercussions. An illustration of this is the reform of numbers.

In Norwegian, as in Danish and German, it had been traditional to read numbers above 20 with the digits before the decades (e.g., *drei und dreizig* for 33); in Swedish and Icelandic, on the contrary, the order is reversed. In English, both forms have existed (e.g., “four and twenty” and “twenty-four”) but the form “twenty-four” finally became the only one used. It is easy to imagine the extremely annoying consequences arising from errors in reading numbers, whether in the use of the telephone or in industrial applications. In Norway, a committee was established, and after a detailed study, published its findings early in 1950. The recommendations were

adopted by the cabinet on 31 March 1950.<sup>19</sup> This reform had obvious repercussions on the reading of the ordinal numbers (e.g., 24th) or of fractions (e.g., 1/24). A Gallup poll held in November 1951 found 48 percent in favor, 21 percent opposed and 31 percent undecided. E. Haugen states that when the reform was adopted, a number of people made a deliberate effort to use the new system, but that in spite of energetic teaching in the public schools, the “new” usage was still confined almost entirely to those who were obliged to use it, for example, public radio broadcasters and schoolchildren. Practically no adults were using it, including the operators in the telephone exchange. If the modification of such a relatively minor linguistic trait is met with such inertia and resistance, it is not difficult to imagine what might be the reaction to a much more widespread change. This is, in fact, what happened at the time of the reform which was undertaken at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Norway, it should be recalled, was part of Denmark until 1814, after which it was attached to Sweden until 1905, although in a rather decentralized way. Around 1840 the Norwegian Ivan Aasen developed a language which had its roots in Old Norwegian, whose use as far back as the fourteenth century is attested to by manuscripts. Basing his work on these ancient texts and on the dialects spoken in Western Norway (i.e., in the area least contaminated by Danish and Swedish influences) Aasen created a modernized form of Norwegian which he christened *Landsmaal*. This type of linguistic renewal was quite in vogue in the nineteenth century. Two other examples are the renewal of the written Greek language by Adamantios Korais (1748–1833), and the Serbian written language by Vuk Karadzic (1787–1864).

Unfortunately for the ultimate success of Aasen’s norm, the Western counties were the least populous and became relatively even less so as other parts of the country gradually became industrialized. The number of persons who had adopted the reform remained stable at around 20 percent from 1930 to 1990. In the twentieth century, there have been a number of reforms in 1909, 1917, 1939, 1942, 1959, all aimed at either a better definition of the “new” language (now called *Nynorsk*) or at closer ties with the language of the south called *Bokmaal*, which is closer to Danish. Certain of these attempts met violent opposition, like the attempt in 1930 to change the name of Trondheim to its *Nynorsk* form of *Nidaros*. In this case, resistance won out over change, even though this city is on the west coast where *Nynorsk* is the most widespread. On the spoken level, this “diglossia” does not seem to pose too many serious problems. To better situate the question of cross-national mutual comprehension in Scandinavia one can observe that according to a survey made in 1946, 85 percent of Swedes replied that they understood Norwegian; and 58 percent replied that they understood Danish.<sup>20</sup> Nonetheless, it is clear that where teaching, publishing and the press are concerned, the existence of two distinct languages can

only complicate things.

*Ireland* If Ireland's independence did indeed slow down the decline of the Irish language, Table 4.3 shows that it has contributed little to its resurgence. This evolution can be interpreted in two ways, one complementary to the other.

First it can be seen as a consequence of a shift which took place in Irish linguistic policy in the 1940s. Indeed, in the 1940s, the number of Irish-medium schools peaked, but then declined significantly due to a change in state policy away from the promotion of bilingual education. The absence of an Irish requirement in third-level institutions outside of the National University of Ireland contributed to a decline in the perceived utility of Irish. A second way to interpret this evolution consists of seeing in it the application of the general principle of least effort introduced into the domain of social linguistics by G. Zipf. At the moment of independence, Irish was no longer spoken by more than 20 percent of the population. A substantial effort would have been necessary to increase this figure to 60–70 percent in the space of two generations. From the strict point of view of communication, there were few incentives to such efforts, since Ireland already had an adequate exchange medium for internal use, a medium which also had a number of decisive advantages for international exchange.

*Flanders* The resurgence of Flemish in Flanders gives us an illustration of one of the numerous linguistic renewals which took place during the nineteenth century. In broad outline, the process is almost always the same. In the beginning, there is the rediscovery by poets and philologists of a rural speech which had been considered a mere dialect up until that time. This rediscovery is often accompanied by the publication of literary works belonging to a cultural heritage which had gradually fallen into near-oblivion.

When this linguistic renewal can emerge into the formation of a new state, the former popular speech becomes the official language. This process occurred in particular in Albania, Belorussia, Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Serbia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. When the new national entity includes a large proportion of the population which speaks another language as was the case in Belgium there is a problem of linguistic cohabitation whose solution is generally quite delicate. Let us look at this process as it applies to Flanders.

After 1815, the Austrian province of the Netherlands (modern-day Belgium) was attached to the Netherlands to create a state strong enough to oppose French expansionism. The Flemish then in use in the north of this province was a language similar to Dutch. As early as 1817, state universities were established in Flanders on the model of Dutch institutions. Latin was used almost exclusively in the classroom and for examinations, with three exceptions: the national language was employed in

Netherlandish literature and in practical work in law and political science. This last faculty was a breeding-ground for politicians who would later take up the defense of Flemish. Another important center for the diffusion of Flemish culture were the schools created in 1817 for the education of professors.

The imposition of Netherlandish monolingualism in Flanders was one of the causes of the secession of 1830. After 1823, Dutch became the sole official language in the Flemish-speaking provinces of Limburg, East Flanders, West Flanders and Antwerp. A great hue and cry was raised among lawyers because the generation then practicing at the bar had been trained in French. Not a single lawyer used Flemish at the court of appeals in Brussels before that language was made obligatory. Subsequently, many prominent lawyers, such as Gendelieu, Rogier or Van de Weyer, were to play a great role in the revolution of 1830 which was marked by the creation of Belgium as an sovereign state.

But the independence of Belgium did not solve the problem of the cleavage between French and Flemish. The bourgeois were mainly French-speaking which explains why the linguistic struggle soon became also a class struggle.

We find it interesting to cite extracts from claims made in 1856 by the so-called Grievance Commission because they foreshadow by a century the linguistic problems which were to become so acute in Belgium after 1960. In fact, these claims extend beyond Belgium's case and are found in most linguistic conflicts.<sup>21</sup>

- (1) Translation of official publications into Flemish, especially the *Annales parlementaires* and the *Moniteur*.
- (2) Officials of the diplomatic corps are required to know Flemish in order to be able to serve Flemings as well as Walloons in foreign countries.
- (3) All relations between the central government and the Flemish-speaking provinces should be in Flemish.
- (4) The army should be divided into Walloon and Flemish regiments.
- (5) Judges and lawyers should be able to use Flemish and French and the defendant should be allowed to choose the language he prefers.

We have ranked these five propositions in order of increasing difficulty of execution. The first proposition poses no problem, requiring only an additional translation bureau. The second is fairly easy to put into practice, since helping Flemish speakers requires only the presence of embassy personal who have a rudimentary knowledge of Flemish. The third proposition is more difficult because the number of people concerned is larger, but especially because the financial or juridical questions which will be part of these exchanges will require a profound knowledge of Flemish. The fourth proposition has few practical difficulties, but rather brings up a question of principle, for the creation of unilingual regiments is an open door to a divided army,

and eventually to a divided nation. The difficulty of putting the last proposition into practice is more easily understood if we remember that the bar requires considerable mastery of the language (subtleties of juridical language, excellent diction, a sense of repartee, etc.); it is unlikely that many persons possess such a mastery of two languages as different as French and Flemish.

In his famous “Letter to the King” (*Lettre au roi*) written in 1912, the socialist leader Jules Destrée maintained that there are no Belgians, only Walloons and Flemings. He wrote: “No Sire, the fusion of Flemings and Walloons is not to be desired, and if one were to desire it, one would have to admit that it is impossible.”

**Sri Lanka** Sri Lanka gives us a tragic illustration of the rivalries and even the bloody violence which linguistic disagreements can lead to. Throughout the period of British colonization, from 1815 to 1948, the English language gave a semblance of unity which was fractured shortly after independence by the revival of the Sinhalese language. Sri Lanka has a Tamil minority of about 25 percent of the population. This minority is part of a Tamil group that is approximately twenty times more numerous living in the Indian state of Tamil-Nadu, off the island of Sri Lanka on the southeast coast of India. From this perspective, the Tamil community is situated similarly to the Chinese minority in Malaysia. After independence, Sinhalese became the sole official language, but the status of national language (in reality that of a regional language) was proposed for Tamil. The Tamil minority was not prepared to accept anything less than a recognition of equality between Tamil and Sinhalese. Their claim was favored by two circumstances: on the one hand, there was the high level of education among the Tamil population, given that in 1947 there was only 25 percent illiteracy among men;<sup>22</sup> on the other hand, there was the status of official language for Tamil in the neighboring state of Tamil-Nadu.

The linguistic problem was one of the important issues of the general elections of 1956, but in 1957 Sinhalese was still the only official language; Tamil did not become the second official language until December 1988. In the interval between these two dates, a wide gulf was created between the two communities. The question of maintaining Sinhalese as the sole official language was a major cause of the riots of 1958, in which an official count listed 158 deaths. In 1972, the Tamil party decided to boycott the ceremonies celebrating the passage from the status of dominion to that of republic, in order to protest the insufficient importance given to the Tamil language. The riots of 1958 were followed by numerous others. Even the concessions in 1988 did not restore peace. The linguistic question obviously has economic implications; for example, the fact that a good knowledge of Sinhalese is required for access to universities makes it possible to some extent to prevent the Tamil elite from acceding to positions that it had traditionally occupied during the colonial period.

**Israel** In only fifty years, between 1910 and 1960, thanks to the Jewish colonization of a part of Palestine, Hebrew experienced an extraordinary revival. The language was adapted to the twentieth century, and allowed Jewish immigrants from various countries to understand one another. Around 1950 their mother tongues were Yiddish (13 percent), Arabic (4.2 percent), Bulgarian (3.4 percent), German (3.2 percent).<sup>23</sup> Fifty years is a very short time in the life of a language. Let us briefly look at some of the steps in this process.

On 29 September 1923, English, Hebrew and Arabic became the official languages of Palestine under the British mandate. Hebrew had been taught in certain schools since before the First World War. The Language Council, which later would become the Academy of the Hebrew Language, had begun to function in 1918. The activities of this organization were critical because it was necessary to create numerous new words to designate objects in modern life. The range of required neologisms went from cinematography to the tools of the garage mechanic. More than 10,000 words were coined up to 1940. At the same time, newspapers in Hebrew began to be published, like the trade union newspaper *Worker's Union*. This newspaper had first appeared in Yiddish under the title *Anfang* (Beginning), but after 1910 it was published in Hebrew.<sup>24</sup>

### **The Mechanisms of Spatial Diffusion**

Language usages are modified by contacts among speakers. This is particularly easy to verify in the case of oral usage: intonation, accentuation, pronunciation are subject to mutual influences among speakers. The pronunciation of English is not the same in Scotland as it is in the South of England; the pronunciation of French in Paris differs from that in Toulouse, 700 kilometers to the South. In writing, spatial differences are “regulated” by a certain number of institutions, such as the press and the publishing industry. Even here, spatial differences exist. In certain words, English spelling differs somewhat from the American norm as for instance behavior/behaviour; defense/defence; to analyze/to analyse; dove/dived, and in the meanings of certain words such as German Shepherd/Alsatian; truck/lorry; elevator/lift. The same can be said of Australian English. In certain cases, these variations are noticeable at even shorter distances: traveling in Norway from the west coast to the Oslo region (near the Swedish border), one leaves the area of predominance of Nynorsk for that of Bokmaal.

The question of the relationship of oral usage to the rules of writing belongs to linguistics. Without getting into this question, we can note from the preceding examples that oral usage is the base on which more elaborate forms of cultural life are built (literature, law, etc.). Without this base, it is nearly impossible for a language to establish itself and prosper. The difficulties encountered by Esperanto and other



artificial languages confirm this statement.


*Linguistic diffusion and means of transportation* In order for linguistic contacts to exist, there must be means of transportation which permit encounters between people, and there must be occasions for meeting. A mountainous region will provide fewer possibilities for exchanges than a region of plains crisscrossed by roads. Thus it should not be surprising that remote regions keep their linguistic traditions longer than more accessible regions. This is the case with northwest Wales, the Highlands of Scotland, and the west of Norway. This trait is also accentuated by the fact that remote regions are also neglected by commercial currents and therefore give their inhabitants few occasions to interact with the outside world.

If the absence of roads is undeniably an obstacle to personal exchange, what of the sea? Schematically, it could be said that it is both an obstacle and a link. Of course, the sea becomes a commercial link only if there are ports which permit loading and unloading; data on commercial traffic and transportation costs clearly show that maritime and river transport were historically less costly than overland transport.<sup>25</sup> This is illustrated by the fact that Portugal was commercially much closer to Great Britain than were two continental cities separated by a comparable distance, Paris and Warsaw or Berlin and Rome, for example.

Nevertheless, for the inhabitants themselves, the sea is an undeniable obstacle. Before the twentieth century, it prohibited the use of the most widespread transportation medium of all, namely, walking. In our own times, when the bicycle or the automobile have replaced walking, the sea remains a barrier. Note that in certain civilizations, for instance, among the peoples of Oceania, maritime transport is so common that contacts are frequent between small islands within the same archipelago. It is from such a context that the study in the next paragraph has been taken.

*Quantitative study of linguistic variations over distance* For unwritten languages, the absence of unifying rules brings about the existence of multiple local variants. Alsatian, a Germanic dialect spoken in Alsace and in the German state of Baden, illustrates this situation. Between northern and southern Alsace separated by a distance of some hundred kilometers the difference in accent is so strong that mutual comprehension is difficult. There are even notable variations between a city like Strasbourg and the surrounding countryside, or even between the different suburbs of Strasbourg. Thus, in the 1950s it was possible to determine by the peculiarities of pronunciation if an inhabitant of Strasbourg came from the northern (Schiltigheim, Hoenheim) or southern districts. Unfortunately statistical studies of the phenomenon of spatial differentiation are rare.<sup>26</sup> For this reason, the following example of linguistic variations in the Carolines Archipelago is all the more valuable. More precisely, the study concerns 6 small islands extending through an arc of about 1,400 km. The





**Figure 4.3 Dialectal Linguistic Variations as a Function of Distance.** The study refers to a group of islands of the Carolinas archipelago. *Source:* Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1986).

study made by Cavalli-Sforza and Wang focuses on 571 words. By defining an index of “linguistic distance” for the entire set of words, it is possible to study the relationship between linguistic variation and distance in a spatial sense. This relationship is graphically depicted in Figure 4.3. The correlation between linguistic variation and distance is  $-0.85$ . In Figures 4.4a through 4.4d are summarized the displacement of the linguistic border for a number of languages; once again one must emphasize the slowness of these changes.

**Dialectal variations and communalism** In *Language conflict and language planning*, a book on the language problems of Norway, E. Haugen reproduces and subscribes to the following quotation taken from Leach’s *Political systems of highland Burma*: “To speak the same language as one’s neighbors expresses solidarity with those neighbors; to speak a different language from one’s neighbors expresses social distance or even hostility.” In accordance with such a mechanism, we might expect that the dialectal variations previously mentioned would create distrust, hostility and unrest between neighboring communities within the same region. Is this conjecture confirmed by historical observation?

What we know of rural societies before the Industrial Revolution shows that the small-town mentality, the feeling of belonging to a village or to a region, in short what sociologists designate as “communalism” was a dominant trait in these soci-




Figure 4.4a Displacement of the Linguistic Border in Scotland. Source: Withers (1984).




Figure 4.4b Displacement of the Linguistic Border in Eastern France. Source: Witte (1894).




Figure 4.4c Displacement of the Linguistic Border in Brittany. *Source:* Sérand (1971).




Figure 4.4d Displacement of the Linguistic Border in the Basque Provinces. *Source:* Davant (1975).

eties. An illustration can be found in popular wisdom as it is transmitted by proverbs. “Change village, change language” [Different village means different language] according to a proverb from the Limousin, a region in central France, cited by Weber in his book of 1976. “Who goes far to marry is either foolish or fooled” says a Basque proverb. In the same work Weber also describes a typical clash between youthful gangs of rival villages in March 1866 in Plogastel-Saint-Germain (Brittany). The occasion was the meeting of the canton draft board for the annual drawing to determine who would perform military service and who would escape duty. When the contingent of draft-age youths from the nearby village of Plozévet arrived, everyone

fell on them and the village became the scene of a frightful struggle involving more than 300 participants. Archives of French departments contain innumerable similar examples of pitched battles between different villages. In Brittany, for example, there was permanent hostility between Lower Brittany (Basse Bretagne) in the West, where Breton was spoken, and Upper Brittany (Haute Bretagne) in the East, where dialects of French were spoken.

These inter-village rivalries have been, until recently, neglected by historiography insofar as their repercussions on national life were negligible or nonexistent. Even departmental or municipal archives ignore these disturbances unless they affected an official function, such as conscription.

Community feelings were organized in concentric circles. If locals felt fidelity to their village, the provincial uprooted to Paris or London felt allegiance to his province. This is why at the end of the nineteenth century provincials who had emigrated to Paris gravitated toward others from their original regions: Bretons moved near the Montparnasse Railway Station, the final destination of trains from the West; Auvergnats (provincials from Auvergne) had a monopoly on wood and charcoal fuels; those from the Creuse were often masons; and the image of the chimney sweep from Savoy remains in popular imagery to this very day. Capitals and large cities were melting pots in which, little by little, the feeling of provincial and national adherence was formed. When they returned to their own regions, provincials contributed to spreading these feelings in their own villages. Table 4.5 summarizes the role of languages as a social cement at regional, national and international levels.

*International communication: The cosmopolitan world of the aristocracy* At the other extreme of the social spectrum, and contrasting with the “communalism” of the rural world, the upper aristocracy offered an example bringing together multilingualism and cosmopolitanism. In the royal courts, this trait may be explained by the custom of intermarriage between reigning families. For example: Henriette-Marie, wife of King Charles I of England (1625–1649) was French; the French kings Louis XIII (1610–1643), Louis XIV (1643–1715), Louis XV (1715–1774), and Louis XVI (1774–1791) married Anne of Austria, Maria-Theresa of Spain, Marie Leszcynska, daughter of the king of Poland, and Marie-Antoinette of Austria, respectively. In addition, it was not uncommon for a young, future sovereign to spend his youth in a foreign court: Mary Stuart, Queen of Scotland, had spent her entire youth in the court of France.

To facilitate communication in this cosmopolitan milieu, multilingualism was an unsatisfying solution, because it is virtually impossible for one person to master all the necessary languages. Thus, the mother tongue of William III (king of England from 1689 to 1702) was Dutch, and although he also spoke and wrote fluent French, he

**Table 4.5 Respective Roles of the Mother Tongue and of the Language of Communication in Europe (sixteenth–twentieth centuries)**

Regional level (country side)		National level (cities)			International level			
Regional language	National language	Regional language	National language	Latin	National language	Latin	French	English
<b>16th century</b>								
Mother tongue	95%	5%	60%	20%				
Lingua franca	60%	10%		30%	20%	40%	50%	5%
								5%
<b>18th century</b>								
Mother tongue	90%	10%	50%	35%				
Lingua franca	60%	20%		55%	10%	30%	30%	30%
								10%
<b>20th century</b>								
Mother tongue	10%	90%	5%	93%				
Lingua franca		95%		98%	2%	28%	2%	10%
								60%

*Note:* On the regional level, the lingua franca permits communication between different zones of the same province; on the national level, it permits communication between different provinces; on the international level, it permits communication between different countries. Included within the percentages of persons using a language as a lingua franca are those for whom this is their maternal language. The percentages shown in the table are orders of magnitude meant to show the general direction of changes. They are based on the cases of France, Germany, and Great Britain. If more precise figures were needed, it would be essential to distinguish between a great number of individual cases: villages versus cities, oral versus written usage, area under consideration (religion, law, commerce, etc.).

was never at ease in English, as shown in the texts of his speeches before Parliament: he wrote them in his own hand in French before having them translated into English by his counselors.<sup>27</sup> The use of a lingua franca is obviously a surer and more effective solution to this sort of communication problem. French played this role in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Swedish aristocrat spoke French all the better because the use of this language allowed him to cut a good figure at court in his own country. In the Viennese court, French was on an equal footing with German, and the Russian prince won the admiration of the Parisian aristocracy through the elegance of his style. In Tolstoy's *War and Peace* (1869), the dialogues between members of the Russian nobility are written in (excellent) French. Even Bismarck (1815–1888), the German chancellor, was fluent in French.<sup>28</sup> Having a foreign tutor from a very early age was obviously an ideal method for learning a foreign language.

A similar communication problem is evident today among international authorities

(United Nations, NATO, the Commission of the European Union). Since 1945, English has served as a lingua franca among peoples who speak different languages. In the following paragraph, we look more closely at the relationship between mother tongue and lingua franca.

**Mother tongue and lingua franca** The usefulness of a lingua franca becomes apparent whenever several languages are used within a society. The national languages (English, French, German, Spanish) which gained wider acceptance from the sixteenth century on played precisely this role with respect to the diverse regional languages. The example of Germany shows clearly that the development of these national languages was largely independent of any unified state structure.

The period between 1520 and 1540 saw the translation of the Bible into German and English (1525 and 1530), as well as into Hungarian, Swedish and a number of other languages. In France, article 3 of the Edict of Villers-Cotterêts imposed the use of French in preference to Latin in judicial documents. Note that until now no charter written in French and dated earlier than 1204 has been found;<sup>29</sup> this shows that previous to this date, Latin was almost exclusively the language used in official documents. The need for a lingua franca on the international level became apparent in the various institutions which maintained international contacts, in particular the Catholic Church, the scientific world, and the aristocracy mentioned above. On this topic, we should remember that Isaac Newton's work on gravitation *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica* (1687) was written in Latin, as was Leonhard Euler's book on infinitesimal calculus, *Institutiones calculi integralis* published nearly a century later (1768). This appears to have been one of the last major works to have been written in Latin. Let us note in passing that between 1800 and 1914, that is to say during the era which witnessed the triumph of the nation-state, the scientific world had no lingua franca at its disposal, yet there was an extraordinary flourishing of science during this period.

It is interesting to point out that the hyperspecialization which is so prevalent today in scientific research was made possible only through the use of a lingua franca; this is an obvious consequence of an observation regarding the readership of a scientific journal. Between 1850 and 1990, the number of journals has multiplied by a factor of about 1,000, but this was only possible because of the use of a lingua franca.<sup>30</sup> Indeed, in order to be commercially viable a journal must sell at least 1,000 copies; but on the other hand if a given English-language journal distributed worldwide sells 1,000 copies the same journal written in French, German or Italian would sell only a dozen copies; not only would such a journal not be commercially viable but it would also be completely useless scientifically.

**The displacement of linguistic frontiers** If within a region belonging to the same

linguistic area (i.e., with languages belonging to the same family) phonetic variations are gradual and progressive, as we have noted above, zones of contact between different linguistic families give rise to relatively well-defined frontiers. In eastern France, for example, there is a clear demarcation between the Germanic dialects and the dialects of French. This line of demarcation follows for the most part the ridge of the Vosges mountains. East of this north-south line, the German dialects are spoken; to the West the French dialects are in use. This dichotomy is reflected, for example, in place names: in the East, names like Munster and Hohneck; in the West, names like Gérardmer or Retournemer. To arrive at a more detailed analysis of frontiers and their variations over time, historians refer to local documents which have been preserved in municipal archives: rental contracts for houses or fields, marriage contracts, wills, and so forth.

Figure 4.4 gives a summary evolution of the linguistic frontiers in a certain number of examples. What is most striking is the extreme slowness of change. Before 1900, linguistic frontiers moved at an average speed of 8 to 15 km per century. In the twentieth century, minority languages like Scots, Welsh or Breton have lost the majority of their speakers and the very definition of their linguistic frontier has become somewhat meaningless.

## Religion, Language and Nationality

As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, the glue of social cohesion can take diverse forms. History shows that a common religion is a powerful social cement, which has a number of specific properties. While attachment to one's region and to the oral use of a language give a strong basis for a feeling of community, belonging to a great religion rather enlarges the circle of identity. In addition, while the passage from one language to another occurs with great inertia, the change from one religion to another can occur very rapidly under certain conditions. The spread of Islam or the Reformation over vast territories occurred in less than a century, a very short time in comparison with the time constants of linguistic evolutions.

It is not our intention in this section to examine the general problem of religious minorities, but to underline the close relationships which exist, or have existed, between religion and language and between religion and nationality. The linguistic integration of countries around the perimeter of the Mediterranean, for example, owes much to the spread of Islam and the Koran. Similarly, the use of characters derived from Arabic in the Urdu form of Hindi is related to the influence of the Muslim dynasties of India. If the link between religion and nationality is particularly strong today in countries where there is a state religion, we shall see that this was also the case in the countries of Western Europe where there is now a separation of church and state.



We will first proceed to show that before the nineteenth century, religion embraced the quasitotality of the social field; in the second section we will see in what ways religion has served as a substitute for a definition of nationality. Finally, we will examine in greater detail the modern connections between religion and minority languages.

### **The Omnipresence of Religion before the Nineteenth Century**

The influence of religion and control by the church have been felt in numerous areas of social life. (1) In most countries the civil registries (births, marriages and death) were in the hands of the parish priest. The result was that people belonging to an unrecognized religion were condemned to a sort of civil limbo. In particular, it was impossible for them to marry officially. (2) Up until the eighteenth century, there were ecclesiastical tribunals whose authority extended well beyond strictly religious offenses; over the centuries, these tribunals have progressively been disposed of their authority which was transferred to civil courts. (3) In Catholic and Islamic countries, the clergy constituted an important propertied class, since it held between 10 percent and 20 percent of agricultural land (varying according to region or country). This was not the case in the Protestant countries: between 1520 and 1550, the Reformation brought about a vast movement to secularize the property of the clergy.

The influence of religion was most obvious in three domains to which we turn now, namely education, culture and politics.

**Religion and education** To show to what degree religion was an integral part of education, it may be interesting to quote from a contract established in 1772 between a municipality and a teacher who was *not* a member of the clergy:<sup>31</sup> “He shall be required to educate children in the Catholic faith, to give catechism lessons two times per week, to watch his students when he takes them to mass, to pray with the students in the church after having announced prayers with the church bell every evening according to the established custom.” An edict of April 1695 stipulates that the nomination of teachers was to be approved by the bishop or the priest. In Paris around 1710, more than half of the secondary schools were in the hands of the Jesuits, and a majority of the remaining schools were in the hands of other congregations (doctrinairians, oratorians, etc.). We know that most of the oldest universities were, in the beginning, primarily schools of theology. Around 1680, when Newton held a chair in physics at Cambridge, Oxford and Cambridge remained well-established centers of religious conservatism.

**Religion and cultural life** One of the ways to gauge the weight of religion in intellectual life is to estimate the percentage of published books which deal with religion. Table 4.6 gives some information on this topic. These percentages of the

**Table 4.6 Percentage of Books Published Relating to Religion**

1645	1700	1720	1740	1760	1780	1800	1813	1907	Source
44%							10%	4%	D'Avenel
	44%	38%	33%	22%	15%	6%			Bendix

*Note:* The first series concerns books about religion published in France, the second concerns books on theology listed in the catalogue of the Leipzig book fair. As a matter of comparison the percentage of medical books remained more or less stable between 1700 and 1900 at a level comprised between 5 and 8 percent.

order of 30 to 40 percent are considerable: in a modern classification of the branches of knowledge, theology is only one domain among some twenty others ranging from astronomy to zoology and passing through medicine, philosophy and poetry; thus a “normal” percentage for books on religion would be  $100/20=5$  percent. In 1700 it was almost ten times higher.

**Religion and politics** In England, France, Portugal and Spain, religious questions have played a considerable role in political events. We need only remember that both English revolutions, in 1642 and 1688, had their beginnings in religious questions. James II was ousted because of his attachment to Catholicism. In 1642, the link was less direct: because he tried to impose a uniform liturgy on the Scots, Charles I ran up against the fierce resistance of that people. The two Bishops’ Wars which resulted from this (1639, 1640) brought on the financial woes which put Charles at the mercy of Parliament and brought on the crisis of 1642.

At a more microhistorical level, is it not characteristic that most of the insurrections experienced by London were antipapal riots? Two of these movements grew out of government plans to issue edicts of tolerance toward Catholics. One of these movements took place on 8 June 1688, following the publication on 27 April of a declaration of leniency by James II. Several thousand people demonstrated in support of seven bishops who had been arrested for having opposed this declaration. London then saw a major riot on 11, 12 and 13 December after James II had fled. The populace sacked Catholic chapels, the royal press where the pro-Catholic pamphlets had been printed, and the embassies of Catholic nations like Spain, the Palatinate and Tuscany; these events are described with great detail in Macaulay’s “History of England.”

Another demonstration, the so-called Gordon Riots, took place between 2 and 9 June 1780; this was a protest against Catholic emancipation which left London in the hands of the mob for three days. Subsequently, in 1801, Pitt’s attempt to introduce a

bill of Catholic emancipation was opposed by George III; upheld by public opinion, the king's position easily prevailed and Pitt was forced to resign.

The British Parliament retained certain prerogatives in religious matters until as recently as 1927, as can be seen in the attempt to revise the Prayer Book of 1662. Although the House of Lords approved the revision by 241 votes against 88, the House of Commons rejected it, first on 15 December 1927 and for a second time in June 1928 by a vote of 226 to 220.

If we now look at France, we need only mention the several religious wars of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries; the Edict of Nantes which granted tolerance to Protestants in 1598 and its abrogation one century later; the resistance of the clergy to the Revolution of 1789, a resistance which continued throughout a large part of the nineteenth century.

In a sense the religious monolithism of Spain and Portugal resulted in less conflictive relationships between church and state than was the case in England or in France, at least until 1815. After this date and for more than a century, attempts to separate church and state provoked repeated crises punctuated by civil wars.

### **The Link between Nationality and Religion**

First of all, we must emphasize that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the rule was to have a single religion within each state. In the multiple states which made up the Germanic Holy Roman Empire, this rule was expressed in the Latin adage, *Cujus regio, ejus religio* (the religion of the ruler is the religion of the country). Before looking at this notion more in detail, we should point out that in certain cases, this rule operated the other way round. For example, Henry IV of France was obliged to convert to Catholicism under the pressure of his subjects, and James II of England was forced to cede the throne to a Protestant sovereign. Nevertheless, the object of these episodes was the same, to make the religion of the king the same as that of his subjects.

*Cujus regio, ejus religio* Looking at a table which gives the percentage of people per religion for different European countries around 1820, we see that in most countries religious minorities represented less than 5 percent of the populations.<sup>32</sup> This is the case in Denmark, France, Great Britain, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Exceptions to this rule are Prussia, Hungary, the Netherlands and Switzerland.

Among the latter four countries, three were weakly centralized federations of states. The case of Prussia is somewhat special because this country had enlarged itself rather late by adding regions like the Rhineland, which had a substantial Catholic population.

In the six single-religion countries, this unity did not occur spontaneously, but was rather the result of discriminatory measures. In the following discussion, we concentrate our attention on the Protestant states, because the situation in the Catholic countries is better known.

In Denmark-Norway, the civil rights of the Catholic minority had been severely curtailed by laws enacted successively in 1613, 1624 and 1643. These laws were confirmed and strengthened by Christian V after his accession to the throne in 1660.

In Sweden-Finland, the discrimination against Catholics introduced by Charles X (1654–1660) was extended by Charles XI (1660–1697): conversion to Catholicism was forbidden under pain of deprivation of all possessions.<sup>33</sup> As late as 1810, it was forbidden for the heir to the throne to be Catholic. Thus Marshal Bernadotte was received into the Lutheran faith on 19 October 1810 before setting foot for the first time on the soil of Sweden; three days later he was proclaimed Karl XIII's adopted son.<sup>34</sup>

In England, harsh penal laws against Catholics were in force under the reign of Elizabeth I (1558–1603). By the Test Act of 1673, every civil servant and every military officer had to declare against the doctrine of transubstantiation. The various Acts of Uniformity approved in 1549, 1552, 1559, and 1662 required every person not having a lawful excuse to be present at church services Sunday after Sunday or to incur a penalty which was first modest but become heavier subsequently; according to Lingard in his *History of England* (Vol. 4) it represented 20 pounds per month in 1581. We already noticed that various attempts to emancipate Catholics in 1688, 1780, and 1801 met with strong popular opposition. Catholics did not experience a gradual emancipation until after the passage of the Catholic Emancipation Bill of 1829.

**Definition of nationality through religion** Naturalization procedures which make explicit reference to religious criteria were the rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as shown by the following examples.

- In 1709, the English Parliament passed an act that provided a procedure for the naturalization of foreigners. Aliens had to swear allegiance to the Crown, prove that they had received a Protestant sacrament in the preceding three months, and declare in open court against the doctrine of transubstantiation.<sup>35</sup> We know that the king or queen is always the formal head of the Anglican Church. It follows logically from this that the heir to the throne must marry someone of the Protestant persuasion.

- All Jews who want to immigrate to Israel are entitled to citizenship by way of return. Arabs, on the contrary, cannot acquire citizenship by way of return and must do so by way of residence or naturalization. However, a law approved in 1980 has essentially ended the difficulties created by the Nationality Act of 1952.<sup>36</sup>

**Table 4.7** Decrease in the Number of Protestants in the Republic of Ireland

County	Percentage of total population		
	1911	1926	1981
Connacht [West]	3.7%	2.5%	1.6%
Leinster [East]	13.4%	9.3%	3.5%
Munster [South]	5.7%	3.3%	2.0%
Ulster [North]	20.9%	17.8%	10.1%

Sources: *Statesman's Yearbook* (1924, 1831, 1994–1995).

- The third example is different from the first two; here we see that even when the definition of nationality does not refer explicitly to religion, similar effects can still be seen. In Ireland, article 44 of the first constitution of the independent state specifies that the Catholic Church has a special position in the state as a guardian of the faith of the great majority of citizens. However, there is little or no economic discrimination against Protestants. Nevertheless, the Protestant population has experienced a noteworthy decline, from 800,000 around 1840 to 115,000 around 1965.<sup>37</sup> Table 4.7 gives a more detailed study by county.

- Even in the twenty-first century the existence of a state religion is written in the constitutions of countries as different as Egypt, Greece, Malaysia, Norway or Sweden.

**Religion and regionalism** Adherence to a religion with universal claims such as Christianity or Islam creates a bond among the faithful which transcends the narrow limits of a country; furthermore, the practice of pilgrimages leads to a mixing of populations. These mechanisms were in full vigor during the Middle Ages, and contributed to a certain unity throughout Christianity despite the disruption of communications. On the other hand, one should not forget that Christianity had not planted itself in barren soil; in each region, it took on certain forms which manifested themselves in the cult of local saints, in the form taken by processions, or in the architecture of the churches. From Ireland to Catalonia to Greece, the forms of religious life are not the same. This regionalist aspect became even more accentuated in the Reformation, partly because national languages replaced Latin and partly because of the creation of different denominations. Some regions became Lutheran, while others became Calvinist or Presbyterian (Scotland). In Wales, the disaffection from the Anglican Church and the success of nonconformist denominations is partially explained by a language question: the Anglican clergy used the English

Prayer Book, while nonconformist ministers adopted Welsh. This brings us to an examination of the links between languages and religion.

## Language and Religion

There are spectacular examples of synergy and coupling between language and religion. The previously mentioned Amish Anabaptist community continues to use German both for worship and in daily life. This community has around 80,000 members who live primarily in Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania. The Amish are distinguished also by their strong attachment to a rural way of life, which dates back to the nineteenth century. They still use horses for farming and wear clothing reminiscent of European styles of two centuries ago. We have already mentioned the attachment of the Welsh to their language via their nonconformist churches. In the nineteenth century, thanks to the efforts of Griffith Jones, an original system of popular education was established. A champion of the Welsh language, Griffith conceived the idea of shifting schools from village to village and the project proved an astonishing success. Within ten years, a hundred traveling schools had been set up. On Sunday, the whole country was turned into a religious school. The textbook was the Bible, in Welsh. Hour after hour, these Welsh folk sat listening to the reading of the Bible; the geography of Palestine became more familiar to them than that of Wales itself.<sup>38</sup> In 1906, there were about 3.4 million Sunday scholars.<sup>39</sup>

In France, there was a more political reason for the clergy to preserve its attachment to regional languages. We know that the French Revolution was accompanied by an important movement toward a rational reorganization and a centralization of the government, law and education which had the effect of abolishing many local idiosyncrasies. In education, this movement was accompanied by a trend toward both secularization and the promotion of French. At the same time, the Revolution took energetic anticlerical measures; consequently, a large number of priests came to link the use of French with anticlericalism. In Alsace, Brittany and the Basque Country, French became the “language of the Devil.”

The support given by priests to regional movements for autonomy continued into the second half of the twentieth century. Here are a few examples from the French Basque Country and from Brittany.

- In October 1970, Father Larzabal was accused of having hidden for two days a German consul who had been kidnaped in the Spanish Basque Provinces by the separatist organization ETA.<sup>40</sup> In September 1987, the police searched the Abbey of Belboc while looking for fleeing separatists.<sup>41</sup> The parish priest of Espelette, F. Garat, was arrested in January 1997 for the support he gave to separatists. He was to spend 56 days in prison.<sup>42</sup>



- In January 1969, four priests were arrested in Brittany: Fathers Antoine and Arthur Le Bars (the police found a wash boiler filled with explosives at their home), Guillaume Le Came, parish priest at Ploumagoar, and Father Joseph Lec'hvien; thirty kilograms of explosives were found under the floor of a school directed by the later.<sup>43</sup>

- In May 1972, and again in 1975, Father Aimé Lebreton, parish priest of Grommenec'h was arrested after slow fuses were found hidden in his sacristy.<sup>44</sup> Among the 12 separatists charged at the end of October 1975 were four priests.

Moreover, we can see that three of the French regions where there were strong separatist movements were distinguished by a rate of religious observance considerably higher than the national average: 84 percent in Alsace, 79 percent in the Basque country, 67 percent in Brittany while the national average is 35 percent. Corsica is the only counterexample: although there are strong separatist feelings the rate of religious observance is only 25 percent.<sup>45</sup>

## The Social Cement: Conclusion

In this section, we will sum up some of the conclusions from this chapter and try to give an overview of the identifying roots which assure social cohesion.

### The Lessons of This Chapter

*Time, history and collective memory* Up to this point, we have only indirectly referred to one of the elements mentioned in the title of this chapter, namely, time even though its role is essential. Time is the factor that allows a link to be formed between a community and its environment; time allows as well the establishment of the linguistic forms which give a community its medium of communication, and it is time, in the end, which shapes the history of a community. It is through its history that a community recognizes itself. What would Ireland be without the long history of its tenacious struggle for liberation? History has shaped the character of the Irish, both individually and collectively. This psychological process is nevertheless difficult to describe and to quantify, and this is the reason why this important topic has not been treated more fully in this chapter. In a following chapter, we will try to approach this reality more precisely; we will in particular show that consciously or not, communities have a perception of their history for at least two or three centuries back; this perception shapes their attitude about the present and the future.

In the case of Ireland, that perception was very conscious. We will give three examples taken from among numerous similar examples.<sup>46</sup> The first example relates to a particularly crucial moment in Irish history, the Easter Sunday uprising of 23 April



1916. After the occupation of the General Post Office in Dublin, Patrick Pearse appeared on the steps and read a proclamation of the “Provisional Government.” The proclamation spoke of the long usurpation of Ireland’s right to control her own freedom; it stated that in every generation, the Irish people had asserted their rights to national freedom and had taken arms six times during the past three hundred years. The second example relates to the election of de Valera in July 1917, in the East Clare district on the west coast. After his triumphant election, de Valera appeared on the steps of the courthouse at Ennis and told the huge crowd waving Republican flags: “You are worthy descendants of the Claremen who fought under Brian Boru, with the same spirit in your hearts today that your fathers had a thousand years ago.” I may be recalled that Brian Boru (also called Brian Boroimbe) defeated the Danes in April 1014; the evocation of a thousand-year old precedent shows to what extent the leaders in Ireland were imbued with the history of their long struggle.

*Empirical observations* In this paragraph, we sum up the main empirical observations made in this chapter.

(1) The appropriation of the land by immigrants generally provokes considerable resistance from the indigenous population.

(2) Linguistic processes are characterized by great inertia; for that matter time is counted in centuries rather than in decades. Linguistic changes are proportionally slower in the more isolated regions. Historical observation shows that there is a strong correlation between the speed of linguistic change and the degree of interaction of a region with the world around it.

(3) The only case in which linguistic assimilation can be rapid is in a melting-pot situation, that is, in the coming together of immigrants from many different places and for whom the acquisition of a common language is an absolute necessity. Under these conditions, the acquisition of another mother tongue can take place within two or three generations.

(4) The possibilities for intervention by the state in the linguistic domain are limited. Often, ancient usages prevail over reforms (cf. the case of the language reform in Norway), and any overly brutal policy can provoke considerable resistance (cf. the case of Flanders from 1823–1830, and the case of Sri Lanka in the late twentieth century).

(5) The use of a lingua franca can facilitate communication in a certain number of situations in which people from different countries must communicate. Bilingualism is possible in daily life but there are a large number of areas, from the bar to advertising to literature, in which true bilingualism seems very difficult to acquire.

(6) From the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, as Western societies became more and more secularized, there has been a shift in the roots of identity. Religions,

**Table 4.8 Social Cement at Regional, National and International Levels (Toward the End of the Twentieth Century)**

	Regional level	National level	International level
<i>Fundamental factors</i>			
Land	Attachment to the land		
Language	Regional language / dialect	National language	International lingua franca
History	History of the community	National history	World history
<i>Associated factors</i>			
Religion	Worship of local saints	State religion	Supranational religion
The media	Regional media	National media	International media

*Note:* By national religions we understand national variants such as Anglicanism in England or Presbyterianism in Scotland; by supranational religions we mean universal religions such as Christianity or Islam. The expression social cement is used in the sense it has in the title of Elster’s book, *The Cement of Society*.

especially national religions, have slowly given way to identification through language or culture.

### An Overview

In Table 4.8 we have summed up the elements which we discussed in this chapter, and we have added a line relative to the media. From the point of view of languages, we are still in a phase dominated by national languages. In antiquity, Latin and Greek were widely known among the elite. In the Middle Ages, and until the eighteenth century, Latin had been the tool for international communication. The emergence of English as the language of international communications goes back only to the end of World War II but its use is more and more widespread. By “local religion” we mean the forms of religion proper to a region, like the Mormon faith in the American state of Utah, or the Amish in the American Middle West. The term “national religion” includes forms like Anglicanism or the Russian Orthodox Church. Hosbawm’s thesis (as expounded by Peter Flora in his data handbook) according to which nationalism can be seen as a civil religion, is best upheld by reference to national religions. The term “universal religion” finally, refers to the universal character of several great religions, like Christianity or Islam. The influence of the modern media seems in many ways similar to the influence that religions had in Western societies a century or two ago. The media shape public opinion as the clergy did in previous centuries. One can observe the links at the international level are still fairly weak, whether on the world level or on the more modest level of the European continent. In some areas

the movement toward internationalism is negligible. What percentage of people in the Western countries knows the history of Iraq in the past hundred years or, outside the Scandinavian countries, how many people know the stormy history of a country like Denmark, which has played a major role in the history of Europe between 1550 and 1850?

# Chapter 5

## Spatial Determinants of Separatism

In the previous chapter, we looked at the role of land and language as wellsprings of ethnic identity. A rural society deprived of its land will put up a fierce and often violent resistance; independence or military defeat are practically the only outcomes. In this case, we will therefore speak of a liberation struggle. A people which has been dispossessed of its language and culture also puts up much resistance, but the forms of the struggle will be less violent and a compromise can generally be found in a form of autonomy. In this case, we will speak of a struggle for autonomy.

The priority given to the struggle for land is attested by examples in which a nation is deprived of both its land and its language. Ireland, for instance, was dispossessed of its land, religion and language. Through successive struggles, it first recovered its religion in the early nineteenth century, then its land in the early twentieth century, then it won its independence, but the return to the Irish language was only partial. As a matter of fact the Irish language was but one element in a wider Celtic cultural ensemble which comprised specific forms of law, popular beliefs and mythology, specific forms of rural organization, etc. Of all these elements, the language is indeed the most visible, and might even be seen as the most important in that it pervades all the other elements. However, the Irish experience has shown that a national culture can be revitalized via the language of the colonizer.

In this chapter we show that spatial and geographical factors play an essential role in these conflicts. This can seem both natural and surprising, depending on the point of the view of the observer. It is natural insofar as geographical factors play a crucial role in the preservation of minority languages, as we have seen in the preceding chapter. On the other hand that observation will appear surprising in the short- or medium-term perspective commonly adopted by historians. Historians analyzing the roots of separatism will be led to cite economic, political or social causes (e.g., unequal access to public-sector employment). Geographical factors are rarely mentioned in the studies which we cite in appendix A. A notable exception is the work which John Jenkins devotes to autonomist claims in the Bernese Jura region of Switzerland. In his conclusion, the author superbly underlines the specific nature of geographical factors: “This work [...] concludes that two geographical variables,

the physical geography of the Bernese Jura and distance were fundamental during the period of approximately 19 centuries following the birth of Christ in developing a distinctive identity for the region which became the Bernese Jura in 1815” (Jenkins, 1986, p.164). This quotation makes especially clear that geographical factors are important only in a long-term perspective.

Two circumstances help to hide the effect of these factors in the short term. First, the fact that the influence of political and social factors is so obvious that one tends to neglect the structural causes which may lie in the background. Furthermore, geographical factors do not give rise to spectacular effects; their action is more hidden than obvious, their influence is exerted on the microhistorical level of daily life rather than on the level we might call “macrohistorical,” that of governing circles. Even a lifetime may be too short a period to observe any significant effect from geographical factors; it is their stability which makes them important: an island remains an island, a peninsula remains a peninsula. In contrast, political and economic factors are fairly variable. In the nineteenth century, for example, the French-speaking part of Belgium was economically the leading region; unemployment was on average much higher in Flanders. But by the end of the twentieth century that situation has been reversed. The same observation applies to Ulster and the rest of Ireland.

By confining ourselves to geographical factors, we certainly do not deny that other causes are present; they are not left aside because they are thought to be unimportant, but because it would be difficult to include them in a comparative analysis based on quantitative data. Furthermore, in this chapter we are not looking for factors to explain specific episodes, but rather general factors which are applicable to an ensemble of cases. Note also that in the importance which we give to language, our approach is similar to that of Stanley Lieberson.<sup>1</sup>

This chapter is organized as follows. To begin with we illustrate the importance of spatial factors by considering the cases of the United States and Switzerland. Then we show that these two cases are, in fact, the two extremes of a wide spectrum of situations which we will illustrate by other typical examples. In the second section, we will focus on the microsocial phenomena through which spatial factors exercise their influence. In the third section, we will introduce a geographical index which will permit quantitative tests. We will then proceed to see how linguistic and cultural claims can lead to political demands. Finally, we shall look at the role of spatial structural factors in a medium-term perspective, for example, residential mobility and the number of marriages outside the minority group.

## Typical Cases

To introduce the central idea of this chapter, we will begin with the examination of a specific case.

### **An Illustrative Comparison: The United States and Switzerland**

Both Switzerland and the United States have a federal constitution, but with respect to linguistic communities the situation in the two countries is very different.

*Comparison of integration processes* Within less than a century, the American melting pot assimilated and integrated whole populations of diverse origins into a linguistically homogeneous nation (with the exception of a few rare enclaves which we will return to later). In Switzerland, on the other hand, the linguistic frontier between French-speaking and German-speaking Switzerland has not moved for centuries. We will see that this linguistic division extends to other domains.

Before we look for an answer to this paradox, we should perhaps insist on the fact that in the United States, immigrants did not give up their national roots as easily as is sometimes supposed. Between the time when a child begins to speak and the moment when, as a young man, he can read a newspaper, there needs to be a linguistic “apprenticeship” of a dozen or more years; one does not lightly abandon such a fund of knowledge. This resistance can be illustrated through the observations of contemporaries. Speaking of Germans who immigrated to Pennsylvania in a letter addressed to a British member of parliament in 1753, Benjamin Franklin wrote: “Few of the children learn English. Of the six printing houses in the province [Pennsylvania], two are entirely German, two half-German, half-English. They have one German newspaper. The signs on the street have inscriptions in both languages” (in 1787, German Americans represented about 9 percent of the total population).<sup>2</sup>

A century later, the same attitude prevailed: “In 1840, parents in Cincinnati demanded and obtained bilingual education for their children. Not only in Cincinnati, but in many communities education using the native tongue of the non-English-speaking immigrants flourished.”<sup>3</sup> Fifty years later, Americans of German origin were still preserving numerous ties to their country-of-origin, as the following remarks attest: “By 1914, the National German-American Alliance had an impressive membership of approximately two million people. At that time, the German-American press included over 500 German-language publications. In 1918, over 7,000 enemy aliens were arrested by the Justice Department, many of them German Americans. Of the 200 German-language publications that survived World War I, only 24 remained in 1976.”<sup>4</sup>

These facts remind us that the attachment of the German community to its language and its *Vaterland* did not easily disappear. At the same time, they emphasize the strength of the integration process that was able to overcome nationalist feelings not

only of the Germans but also of other immigrants who were no less attached to their language and their homeland.

In Switzerland, on the other hand, there was practically no rapprochement between the German- and French-speaking groups. This assertion can be illustrated and supported by several observations. Two important elements are shown in Figure 5.1. The first shows that there is a very low rate of residential mobility between French-speaking and German-speaking Switzerland; most of the migration takes place within each of the two regions. The second figure on the right-hand side shows that there is a deep gulf between the two regions on the question of whether Switzerland should join the European Union, despite the crucial nature of this issue for the future of the country. It would be surprising if such a lack of interaction had not created tensions between these two communities when certain choices were made in the past. The federal policy of neutrality has certainly contributed to the lessening of these tensions, yet these have long existed, as can be shown by an examination of the periods preceding the two world wars (see appendix B). Swiss federal organization is often presented as a model for the treatment of minorities.

If this is indeed true for the overall picture, the reality is more complex. The following figures show that the French- and Italian-speaking minorities are greatly under-represented in the upper levels of federal administration:<sup>5</sup>


	Percentage of minority in total population	Percentage in high federal administration	Ratio
	$p_1$	$p_2$	$p_2/p_1$
French-speaking minority	20%	12.5%	0.62
Italian-speaking minority	6%	2.7%	0.46

One of the reasons for this under-representation is of linguistic origin. For high-level civil servants from the Italian-speaking canton of Tessin, it is not enough to be bilingual in Italian and German; informal meetings (and these are often the most important) are held in Swiss-German, a German dialect language which is hardly ever written and is therefore difficult for a nonresident to learn. Furthermore, since English has become indispensable in the modern world, any civil servant would have to know fluently four languages: Italian, German, Swiss-German and English, a task within the reach of only a few rare and gifted polyglots.

Today, several centuries after the formation of the Swiss confederacy, there remain linguistic divisions which bilingualism has not been able to bridge and which conceal profound differences in political orientation.

In this section, we have emphasized the profound contrast between the United States






**Figure 5.1 Linguistic Compartmentalization versus Migration and Political Choices.** The map on the left-hand side shows the linguistic zones in Switzerland (1980). The map in the upper right corner shows the net migration between different so-called employment regions 1975–1980. The conclusion which can be drawn is that there are no substantial migration flows across linguistic frontiers. The map in the lower right corner shows the results by canton of the referendum of 6 December 1992 on the project of European Union membership. A majority of voters in the hatched zone voted yes; the results closely followed linguistic subdivisions. A more precise analysis would require electoral results at the communal rather than at the cantonal level, especially for Valais (which is French-speaking in the proportion of 60 percent). *Sources:* Bassand et al. (1985), Jenkins (1986), Racine (1994).

and Switzerland. Instead of Switzerland, we could have chosen Canada. Just as the historical regions of Switzerland have kept their individuality, Quebec has retained its individuality within Canada. We have used Switzerland for our demonstration because it permits a longer historical perspective.

We must now ask the question: Why did the melting-pot work in America, but not in the Swiss or Canadian case? This brings us to an examination of the respective spatial configurations.

***Spatial configuration and contacts between communities*** In Figure 5.2, we sum up schematically the spatial configurations of minorities in the United States and Switzerland. In the latter country, the francophone population is concentrated in the southwestern part of the country, in the cantons of Neuchâtel, Vaud, Geneva and the western part of Valais. Contact between this French-speaking region and the rest



**Figure 5.2 Schematic Comparison between the Lines of Contact of a Minority with the Rest of the Country** The figure on the left-hand side refers to the United States while the figure on the right-hand side refers to Switzerland. In the American case the thin-lined circles represent cities comprising a substantial proportion of German-speaking people. The hatched thick-lined circles represent either the cities comprising only German-speaking people or the districts they occupy in larger cities. For Switzerland, the French-speaking areas are in the western part of the country. The idea illustrated in this figure is that the line of contact (shown by heavy lines) is considerably longer in the American case than it is for Switzerland, which means that the interaction is greater in the American case.

of the country occurs along a line which is about 200 km long. In proportion to the population of the French-speaking population in 1900 (0.83 million people) the length of the contact zone is  $200/0.83$ , or 242 km per million inhabitants. In the case of the United States, it is more difficult to make such a calculation because the distribution of German speakers around 1900 is not exactly known. Nonetheless, the essential point to remember is that German speakers were not confined to a certain region. They were found nearly everywhere, even if their presence was more massive in certain regions (e.g., near Philadelphia). One can make the following approximate calculation: around 1900, the German-American community numbered approximately 14 million, a figure that has been extrapolated from the proportion of people of German ancestry given in subsequent censuses.<sup>6</sup> Considering that German speakers were an essentially urban population, it can be admitted that it was distributed among cities or sectors of cities whose populations were between 1,000 and 50,000 individuals. Through the calculations detailed in appendix C, we can conclude that the line of contact between German speakers and the rest of the country

was 130,000 km in length, i.e., a value of 930 km per million inhabitants. The comments in appendix C suggest that if not completely accurate this figure is rather an underestimate. We arrive at the conclusion that German-speaking Americans had a zone of contact at least four times greater than that of the French speakers in Switzerland. A similar calculation can be made for Quebec:


Length of the line of contact with the rest of the country	950 km
Population of Quebec in 1911	2.0 million
Relative length of the line of contact	475 km per million inhabitants

The last figure is undoubtedly an overestimate, because the entire northern part of the frontier between Quebec and the rest of Canada passes through sparsely populated territories and thus contributes only marginally to contacts between the two communities. Nevertheless, even if the preceding value is admitted, it can be seen that it is only one-half of the figure for the United States. We do not claim that the spatial factor is the only factor of importance; as a matter of fact in the following chapter, we will also emphasize the importance of the historical factor. Nevertheless, it can be seen that on the spatial level alone, the discrepancy between the cases of Switzerland and Canada and that of the United States is considerable.

### **Examples of Regions Marked by Separatism**

Figure 5.3 shows a certain number of regions where separatism cropped up in the 1970s. These examples will allow us to confirm the conclusions arrived at in our comparison of Switzerland and the United States. First, note that none of these regions is in the heart of the countries mentioned; they are all located on the periphery. A fair number of these regions are islands or peninsulas, for example, Corsica, Brittany, Scotland and Ulster. In all these cases, the line of contact between the region and the rest of the country is at a minimum.

Moreover, in a certain number of cases, we see the appearance of a new characteristic. Take Alsace, for example; this region is situated in the extreme East of France, but the important point is that the eastern Alsatian frontier is a line of contact with Baden, a German province in which the local Germanic dialect is the same as the Alsatian popular speech; in short Alsace adjoins a German province with which it has a number of linguistic and historical connections. The same argument can be applied to the French Basque country, the South of Thailand, or the western part of New Brunswick. In the first case, this province is back-to-back with the Basque province of Spain, which is much larger in land area and has a greater population. In the second case, this Moslem province in Thailand adjoins Malaysia, a country which is 80 percent Moslem (the local language reflects this relationship). Finally, the French-speaking regions of western New Brunswick adjoin the province of Que-



**Figure 5.3 Areas of Struggle for Autonomy in Six Countries.** As a rule these areas are remote from the core of the country and have minimal spatial contact with it. Very often they are part of a linguistic entity straddling the national borderline. For the Canadian Province of New Brunswick, the map shows the zones where the proportion of French-speaking people is higher than 75 percent. *Source:* For New Brunswick, Verneix (1979).

bec. In all three of these regions a kind of “diffusion effect” counterbalances to some extent the influence of the majority language in the country. In the following section, we will analyze this diffusion effect more closely.

## Coupland’s Diffusion Effect

In a book written in 1954 Reginald Coupland was, to our knowledge, one of the first to describe the diffusion effect which can lead to the progressive assimilation of a peripheral region. He describes the influence of England on Wales in the following terms: “Few Englishmen want to anglicize Wales, but the pressure exerted by the mighty neighborhood to absorb the Welsh into the English way of life is no less powerful because it is unconscious. The age-long invasion never ceases; more and more English tourists are haunting the mountains and the coasts of Wales. Aided by the motor-car they penetrate to those districts where Welsh life has hitherto been least affected by English contact.”

In this section, we will distinguish two cases depending on whether a region undergoes the influence of a single country or of two countries with different cultural traditions. In the second case, there is a competitive phenomenon between two distinct influences.

### One Country Cases

The process of diffusion due to proximity does not affect languages alone, but as Coupland emphasizes, it influences a whole range of values which make up a way of life: architecture, various forms of agriculture, popular beliefs, culinary traditions, etc. Further on, in an effort to be concise, we will refer to this multifaceted diffusion effect as the “Coupland diffusion effect.” As there are few statistical data available for architecture, popular beliefs or culinary traditions, the linguistic aspect will play a central role in our discussion. Still, we should keep in mind that language is only one element in a much broader ensemble.

National influence on a minority region is exerted through various channels, such as the the judicial and educational systems, the administration or the workplace.

### Two Country Cases

We now come to the case in which national influence, which we will refer to as *A*, is partially counterbalanced by the influence of a foreign country, *B*. As we have already pointed out, the first influence is exerted through numerous official channels, but how is the second exerted? The most important factors are (1) historical and familial bonds, (2) the influence of workers and tourists in the border zone, and (3) the influence of radio and television.



These mechanisms can be illustrated by looking at the French province of Alsace, which we already mentioned above. Alsace did not become a part of France until 1681; before this, Alsace and the neighboring province of Baden were part of an entity dependent on the Holy Roman Empire. Alsace was again annexed to the German Empire between 1871 and 1918 and once again during the Second World War. We need only open the telephone directory for Strasbourg, the Alsatian capital, to note the great number of German-sounding family names, for example, Eberhard, Kohler, Schwander, Westphal.

A substantial proportion of Alsatians also maintain relationships with uncles or cousins who live in Baden or in the rest of Germany. The phenomenon of frontier workers reinforces these connections; because of the economic dynamism of the Baden region, a large number of Alsatians cross the Rhine daily to work in Germany. The influence of tourism from Baden has a similar effect: on any Sunday in May or June, the streets in the historical quarters of Strasbourg are invaded by numerous tourists from across the Rhine. This naturally supposes that the business community and hotel-keepers have adapted themselves to the needs of German tourists, thus reinforcing the role of the Alsatian dialect. It should be noted finally that television sets sold in Alsace are equipped to receive both French and German programming; the relative bilingualism of a large number of Alsatians allows them to divide their viewing time between German and French stations. Everything we have said so far about Alsace could be transposed to other similar cases, such as the French Basque country or the western districts of New Brunswick.

### **The Mobility Theory of Karl Deutsch**

In the 1960s and 1970s Karl Deutsch and his collaborators developed the idea that social contacts resulting from urbanization and modern life should bring about a greater integration on both the national and international levels. Increasing mobility of populations would contribute to this phenomenon. In Bavaria, for instance, the proportion of residents born elsewhere was 6 percent in 1880 and 20 percent in 1950.<sup>7</sup> The influence of the schools and of modern means of communication has also been subjected to a deep comparative study. Karl Deutsch himself was born in Czechoslovakia in 1912, and he became an American citizen in 1936. The efficiency of the American melting pot has had an undeniably profound influence on his ideas about integration.

In the 1970s and 1980s there was a resurgence of autonomist movements in industrialized countries. A number of researchers hastened to see in this phenomenon a means to disprove the theories of Deutsch and his school. The preceding paragraphs show that the diffusion processes at work in these regions are completely compatible with the hypothesis of K. Deutsch, according to which increases in contact and

integration go hand-in-hand.

Deutsch, undoubtedly under the influence of the rapidity of integration in the United States, has tended to omit the historical dimension of integration phenomena. Deutsch's theory was not wrong but needed to be completed. As integration processes are generally very slow and stretch out over several centuries it is hardly surprising that historical memory should play an important role, a theme treated in the following chapter.

### **The Role of New Technologies**

One may think that the technologies which have appeared near the end of the twentieth century, such as networks of computers or digital television via satellite, will fundamentally change the processes of diffusion which we have described above. We can certainly not predict what the future will bring, but it seems to us highly improbable that these technologies will greatly accelerate integration processes for two reasons.

- These new means of communication must pass through the medium of a language and are therefore hampered by linguistic compartmentalization.
- Satellite television may seem to represent great progress compared to conventional ground-based television, which is limited by the horizon line. Nevertheless, the first half of the twentieth century had already seen long-wave (amplitude modulated) broadcasting, which (by contrast with frequency modulated radio) achieved transmission over great distances by successively bouncing radio waves off the upper levels of the atmosphere.

As a matter of fact the contents of programming rather than the techniques of transmission seems to be the determining element. Production of programs is considerably more expensive than the technical infrastructure, and it is the former which matters in terms of integration. In small countries, for example, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, because of the high cost of dubbing programs purchased abroad (essentially American) subtitling is used as a convenient solution. The fact that programs in English are heard every day contributes to the high level of familiarity with that language enjoyed by the Scandinavians. The other favorable factor is of course the relative linguistic "proximity" of the Scandinavian languages to English. A confirmation of this last effect is provided by the case of Finland, whose language belongs to another linguistic group and where familiarity with English is less widespread.

## **The Geographical Index of Interaction**



In this section, we will formalize the ideas that we have presented qualitatively in the preceding paragraphs by defining a geographical index of interaction. This will permit us to estimate the degree of interaction of one region with the rest of the country. This index was used previously in the study of maintenance of minority languages. In a later chapter, we will examine the correlation between the values of this index and the intensity of separatist struggles.

### Definition

Rather than present the most general form of the definition of the index of interaction, we will proceed by stages.

**One country cases** When a region is in contact with only one country, there are only two kinds of geographical limits: the coasts and the frontier with the country in question. For our analysis of minority languages, we have already insisted on the fact that the sea constitutes an obstacle for the mobility of populations. This leads us to introduce the the following definition; note that the index that we introduce here has the interesting property of being independent of the size of the region considered.

**Definition 1a:** For a region  $M$  in which a minority language is spoken, we introduce the following notations:

$l_0$ : length of the coastline of  $M$

$l_+$ : length of the contact-line of  $M$  with the rest of country.







The geographical interaction index between region  $M$  and the rest of the country is then defined as

$$g = l_+ w_+ / (l_+ w_+ + l_0)$$

$w_+$  is a parameter characterizing the intensity and frequency of the contacts between region  $M$  and the rest of the country.

Note that  $g$  is normalized in the sense that its value is between 0 and 1;  $g = 1$  corresponds to a high level of interaction,  $g = 0$  corresponds to an isolated region. Illustrative examples are given in Figure 5.4.  $w_+$  will be assigned the following values: 1 for “traditional” societies; 2 for rural societies; 3 for industrialized societies. The three values of the parameter  $w_+$  correspond to three levels of mobilization in the terminology of K. Deutsch. What we call a traditional society is, for example, a twentieth-century African society; a rural society is one in which the majority of the population is rural, as in mid-twentieth-century China.

By way of illustration, let us apply this definition to Wales and Brittany:

Configuration	$g$	Examples
	1	Navajo
	0.72	Wales
	0.50	Alsace
	0.33	Sicily
	-0.23	Irian Jaya
	-0.30	Kashmir

**Figure 5.4 Examples of Regions with Minorities.** The homelands of the minorities are represented without cross-hatching; the regions where the official language of the state is spoken are represented by ascending cross-hatching; the regions where the minority language is spoken are represented by descending cross-hatching. The maps in the left-hand column correspond to the cases mentioned in the right-hand column; the middle column gives the corresponding values of the geographical index of interaction; the above cases have been classified by decreasing order of the index (remember that the values of this index are comprised between -1 and 1).

	$l_+$	$l_0$	$w_+$	$g$
	[km]	[km]		
Brittany	160	620	3	0.44
Wales	200	550	3	0.52

Remark: It is well known that certain jagged coastlines, like those of Brittany and Wales, have a fractal character which makes a rigorous definition of their length difficult. This difficulty is not very serious here; we need only measure the length of the coast as it appears in any atlas.

Let us now move on to the case of a minority region adjoining a country B where a language related to the minority tongue is spoken.

**Two country cases** Besides the length of the seacoast and the line of contact with the rest of the country, there is an additional important factor, namely the line of contact of  $M$  with a country  $B$  speaking the same language. This brings us to the following definition:

**Definition 1b:** We consider a region  $M$  where a minority language  $m$  is spoken. In addition to the definitions already introduced in definition 1a, we consider the length  $l_-$  of the borderline of  $M$  with a country  $B$  where the same language,  $m$ , is spoken. Then the geographical index of interaction of region  $M$  with the rest of the country ( $A$ ) is defined as:

$$g = (l_+w_+ - l_-w_-)/(l_+w_+ + l_0 + l_-w_-)$$

$w_+$  and  $w_-$  are two parameters characterizing the intensity and frequency of contacts between  $M$  and  $A$  or  $B$  respectively.  $g$  is normalized in the sense that it is comprised between -1 and 1.

What is the *raison d'être* of the subtractive term  $-l_-w_-$ ? This can be illustrated via the previously mentioned example of Alsace. Undoubtedly, the influence of neighboring Baden will reinforce the use of the Alsatian dialect and oppose the use of French; the time that Alsatians spend in contact with their neighbors in Baden will therefore reduce by as much the time spent in contact with the rest of France. It is this reduction that is described by the subtractive term  $-l_-w_-$ . But what value should we attribute to  $w_-$ ? Despite the numerous channels through which the influence of Baden might pass, this influence will be considerably less than that of France because of the use of the French language in public and private education, professional life, and so on. If, for the sake of simplicity, we agree as a first approximation to attribute to  $w_-$  a value defined by an integer, the value  $w_- = 1$  would not be unreasonable. This value can of course be refined. It is clear, for example, that  $w_-$  slowly

varies over time: according to economic conditions, the number of frontier-crossing workers will vary; moreover, the audience for German television programs will vary according to their attractiveness. Given the long-term perspective in which we are working, the value  $w_-$  should be considered as an average value over a period of several decades.

As an illustration, let us apply the definition given above to the case of Alsace:

	$l_+$	$l_-$	$l_0$	$w_+$	$w_-$	$g$
	[km]	[km]	[km]			
Alsace	260	260	0	3	1	0.50

Figure 5.4 provides several illustrations. One of the most extreme cases is that of Kashmir. Although attached to India since October 1947, this region shares a considerably longer frontier with Pakistan and China. Calculations give:  $g = -0.30$ . This negative value means that the influence of foreign countries is (at least geographically) more important than that of India.

*The case of islands* Until now, we have not looked at islands. Conceptually, they do not confront us with a new phenomenon. Technically, there is a difficulty insofar as  $l_+ = l_- = 0$  would give the value  $g = 0$  for any island, no matter where it is located. In a sense this is not unreasonable for even if an island is located near the coast, the need for maritime transportation give to island inhabitants a feeling of relative isolation. As long as there is no bridge across the Strait of Messina, Sicily will keep its insular character.

Nevertheless, the attribution of the same value of the index of interaction to an island near the coast as, for example, the Isle of Wight off the English coast and to a much more distant island as, for instance, the Bahamas or Falklands is certainly too crude an approximation. The following definition is given in answer to this difficulty.

**Definition 2:** For an island  $M$  where a minority language  $m$  is spoken, we introduce the following definitions:

$d_+$ : average distance between the ports of  $M$  and those of the mainland  $A$

$d_-$ : average distance between the ports of  $M$  and those of region  $B$ ,

Then the geographical interaction index of region  $M$  with the rest of the country is defined as:

$$g = (1/D)(w_+/d_+ - w_-/d_-)/(w_+/d_+ + w_-/d_-)$$

$D$  is the following distance:  $D = \text{Max} [\text{Inf} (d_+, d_-), 3]$  where  $d_+$  and  $d_-$  are expressed in hundreds of kilometers.

$g$  is normalized in the sense that it is comprised between -0.33 and 0.33.

The constant 3 present in the definition of  $D$  was chosen to insure a gradual transition between the case of a peninsula and that of an island situated quite near a coastline: loading and onloading operations are represented by a virtual travel distance of 300 km by road.

For illustrative purposes, let us apply this definition to the French Caribbean island of Guadeloupe; in this case:  $d_+ = 7,000$  km. The nearest territory having Creole as a language is Haiti, which gives:  $d_- = 500$  km; with  $w_+ = 3$  and  $w_- = 1$ ; we obtain:  $D = d_- = 5$  and:

$$g = (1/5)[(3/7 - 1/0.5)/(3/7 - 1/0.5)] = -0.13$$


Let us conclude with the interesting and paradoxical case of Irian Jaya. Although Irian Jaya is a province of Indonesia, it has only maritime relations with that country. At the same time it has a common frontier of 770 km with the eastern part of New Guinea, a nominally independent state since 1975. In other words the province of Irian Jaya has much closer contacts with a state, with which it has ethnic ties, than with the country to which it belongs. In passing, we might note that Alaska presents the same anomaly, but in this case the common frontier is with a province of Canada, which is also English speaking. To return to the case of Irian Jaya, our calculations give the following geographical index:  $d_+ = 2,300$  km (distance from Irian Jaya to Jakarta),  $d_- = 300$  km,  $D = \text{Max} [\text{Inf} (23, 3), 3] = 3$ ;  $w_+ = 2$ ,  $w_- = 1$ , giving:  $g = -0.23$ .

## Spatial Separation and Autonomist Claims

The results given in chapter 4 show a clear correlation between geographical isolation and the maintenance of minority languages. Furthermore, Figures 5.3 and 5.4 suggest a link between geographical isolation and separatist disturbances, a link which we will study more closely in a following chapter. In this section, we will limit our remarks to electoral and political demonstrations related to autonomist claims.

### The Autonomist Vote

Measuring the intensity of separatist or autonomist feeling through electoral results has both advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, elections are spatially circumscribed and can be translated into data that lend themselves to quantitative analysis. Still, this approach presents numerous difficulties. First of all, openly separatist parties are often prohibited, for instance, because they do not denounce violent separatist actions; more moderate autonomous parties may be authorized but the line-of-demarcation between the two types of claims is often poorly defined. Sometimes, autonomist claims are hidden in other terms; for example, in a country



**Figure 5.5a Non-conformist Denominations, Welsh Language and Vote for an Autonomist Party.** Comparison of zones in which non-conformist denominations are strong with zones in which the Welsh language continues to be used and with zones in which the autonomist party Plaid Cymru has obtained a substantial number of votes. Hatched zones in the right-hand figure show regions where there are more than 13 ministers per 10,000 population (1971). Hatched zones in the middle figure show districts where Welsh was spoken by more than 70 percent of the population (1981). In the hatched zones of the right-hand figure, Plaid Cymru received more than 20 percent of the votes in the general elections in May 1979. These areas are on the outer periphery of Wales, which is itself peripheral to Great Britain. *Source:* Morgan et al. (1984), Williams (1994).

where Buddhism is the state religion an Islamic party will have, ipso facto, an autonomist shading.

Under such uncertainties estimating the autonomist vote becomes somewhat subjective. Furthermore, we know that in many Third World countries, fraud and various pressures sway electoral results in such a way that the vote reflects poorly the will of the voters. Because of all these problems, electoral results cannot give a reliable measure of autonomist aspirations. This is why we will develop a more reliable measuring tool in a later chapter. If, as in the following paragraphs, we restrict ourselves to Western democracies, electoral results will nevertheless permit us to study the relationship between spatial isolation, maintenance of minority languages and autonomist claims.

### The Case of Wales

The desire for autonomy has been represented in Wales for many years by the Plaid Cymru party (Cymru is the Welsh word for Wales). Figure 5.5a shows that there is a sizeable correlation between retention of the language and votes for Plaid Cymru in the general elections of May 1979.

It is also apparent that the counties in which the language is maintained and where autonomist demands remain strong are the most peripheral to England. We note in passing (table 5.1) that the autonomist vote reached a height of 12 percent in the



seventies, and has since fluctuated between 7 and 11 percent.

### The Spanish Basque Country

The Basque Nationalist Party was founded in the last decade of the nineteenth century, but did not begin to exert a leadership role in Basque politics until the 1930s. In October 1936, the Spanish Republic formally declared the autonomy of the Basque region, but in June 1937, General Franco's forces conquered the last Basque stronghold, namely, the city of Bilbao. The Basque government went into exile, to remain there until 1979. ETA (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna) was founded in 1959. After the death of Franco in 1975, democracy was gradually restored in Spain. Elections to the constituent Cortes were held in 1977, the first elections with universal suffrage in 41 years. Figure 5.5b and Table 5.2 show that there is a noticeable relationship between the districts where Basque was maintained and the percentage of votes gathered by the Basque Nationalist Party; the correlation is 0.81.

### The Swedish Minority in Finland

By 1750, the Swedish-speaking minority predominated politically, socially and economically in Finland. At that time, Finland was a Swedish province, and the Swedish minority represented 17 percent of the population. In 1809, Finland entered the Russian zone of influence, and Czar Alexander I became grand duke of Finland. The independence of Finland was finally declared in 1917. Since that time, the interests of the Swedish minority have been represented by the Swedish People's Party (Svenska Folkpartiet). Table 5.3 shows that throughout the twentieth century, votes for the SPP have diminished in parallel with the decline in the number of persons speaking Swedish.

### The Secession of the South during the American Civil War

In December 1860, eleven southern American states seceded from the Union and formed the Confederate States of America. Was this really a secessionist struggle of the kind considered in this chapter? One element, the attachment to a land that has


**Table 5.1** Votes for Plaid Cymru in General Elections (Wales)

	1951 Oct.	1955 May	1959 Oct.	1964 Oct.	1966 Mar.	1970 Jun.	1974 Feb.	1974 Oct.	1983 Jun.	1987 Jun.	1992 Apr.	1997 May
[%]	1	3	5	5	4	12	11	11	8	7	9	10

*Note:* The table gives the votes as percentages of total votes cast.

*Sources:* Birch (1977, p. 123), Williams (1994), *Quid* (1997), *The Independent* (3 May 1997)





**Figure 5.5b Language versus Vote.** Comparison of zones in which the Basque language continues to be used with zones in which the Basque autonomist party has obtained a substantial number of votes. Hatched zones show regions where the Basque language was still spoken by more than 13 percent of the population. In the same zone the Basque autonomist party received more than 35 percent of the votes in the general elections in 1977. These areas are on the outer periphery of the Basque provinces, which are themselves peripheral to Spain. *Source:* Clark (1981).

been occupied for generations, was certainly present in the South. Yet neither language nor religion was much of an issue. In other words, we have here a separatist struggle of first magnitude (600,000 deaths) that seems to fall outside the scope of our model.<sup>8</sup> Our contention is that this was not a separatist struggle of the kind analyzed in this chapter. An important point is to observe that in an ethnic conflict, defeat does not mark the end of the struggle. A comparison with other wars that occurred at about the same time will illustrate the point. In 1830, the first Polish rebellion was mercilessly suppressed (16,000 deaths); in 1848–1849, the Hungarian uprising met the same fate (it is worth noting that this was already the third Hungarian insurrection, the preceding ones having occurred in 1672–1682 and in 1704–1708). Both the Polish and the Hungarians engaged in other attempts until eventually they won their

**Table 5.2 Correlation between Percentage of Basque Speakers and Votes for the Basque Nationalist Party (1977)**

Voting district	Province	Percentage of Basque speakers [percent]	Votes for the Basque Nationalist Party [percent]
Azpeitia	Guipuzcoa	84	56.0
Tolosa	Guipuzcoa	65	35.6
Guernica	Vizcaya	56	53.5
Vergara	Guipuzcoa	49	37.0
San Sebastian	Guipuzcoa	28	22.4
Durango	Vizcaya	28	36.9
Pamplona	Navarra	14	5.5
Sanguesa-Aoiz	Navarra	4	3.0
Amurrio	Alava	<1	28.2
Bilbao	Vizcaya	<1	27.4
Valmaseda	Vizcaya	<1	22.4
Vitoria	Alava	<1	15.6
Estella	Navarra	<1	2.2
Tafalla-Olite	Navarra	<1	1.6
Tudela	Navarra	<1	0.4

*Note:* The correlation between the percentage of Basque speakers and the votes for the Basque Nationalist Party is equal to 0.81 (for the calculation the <1 figures have been taken equal to 1). The only notable exceptions are the districts of Amurrio, Bilbao, Valmaseda and Vitoria.  
*Source:* Clark (1981).

independence.

How then, if it was not a separatist struggle, should the American Civil War be categorized? It was the last fight of a minority (5.5 million against 22 million) for the defense of its way of life and its political autonomy. It was, in short, a war for political leadership rather than for ethnic survival. More or less it was of the same type as the wars of Vendée in Revolutionary France, or the war between Bavaria (allied to Austria and other German states) and Prussia (1866). The latter can be considered as the last feat of a sovereign nation before accepting its absorption into a larger entity. Incidentally, it can be noted that the sizes of the respective populations were about the same as for the American Civil War, namely 5 million for Bavaria and 20 million for Prussia. The length of the war and the number of deaths, however, were of a much smaller magnitude: the war between Bavaria and Prussia lasted only seven weeks and caused about 40,000 deaths.

## Objections

**Table 5.3 Parallel Decrease in the Vote for the Swedish People Party and Finland's Swedish-Speaking Population**

Year	Swedish-speaking minority [per cent]	Vote for the SPP [per cent]
1900	12.9	
1907		12.7
1910	11.6	
1917		10.9
1920	11.0	
1927		12.2
1930	10.1	
1936		11.2
1940	9.6	
1948		7.7
1950	8.6	
1958		6.7
1960	7.4	
1966		6.0
1970	6.6	
1979		4.6
1987		5.3
1990	5.8	

*Sources:* Swedish-speaking minority: Flora (1983, Vol. 1, p. 65); SPP: Mackie and Rose (1982).

In the preceding paragraph, we have discussed the case of a war between two parts of a country in which linguistic or geographical conditions did not justify such a war. The inverse case also occurs: certain regions have a low index of interaction, yet there is no separatist party with a substantial following. Even if we limit ourselves to Europe, we can cite multiple examples of this type: Sicily, Sardinia, the Canaries, Galicia or Alsace. All of these areas are either islands or peripheral regions, yet they are without substantial autonomist movements. Because these examples seem in contradiction with the mechanisms described in this chapter, it is worthwhile to discuss them briefly.

One element of a response is the fact that there have been at certain moments in these regions, strong autonomist demands which later subsided (perhaps only temporarily). By way of illustration one can mention the following episodes.

- In Sicily strong separatist demands were made after 1945. Crowds overturned

and burned streetcars in Messina, protesters attacked police stations, and many people made the three-fingered triangle which was the rallying sign of the separatists.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, separatism gradually moved into the direction of autonomism. A law passed on 15 May 1946 gave Sicily a parliament of 90 deputies with vast legislative powers. Still, in the following years there were brief expressions of separatist sentiments, and a short-lived junta was formed in 1958.<sup>10</sup>

- In Sardinia, there were several latent revolts against the central government. Between 1970 and 1990, hostage-taking became a well-organized activity. The Italian government sent in the army in July 1992 to put a stop to this practice. The army was resented as an army of occupation and became the target of a number of attacks. There is, in fact, a Sardinian autonomist party, but it often forms coalitions (as it did between 1984 and 1989) with the Socialist and Communist parties.

In general terms, the Mafia in southern Italy can be considered as a manifestation of separatist tendencies. These secret societies (e.g., the Sicilian Cosa Nostra) are not only criminal associations, but also constitute parallel societies.

- A separatist movement in the Canaries gained public attention in the seventies through several violent actions. On 15 March 1977, for example, eighteen policemen were wounded in a confrontation with young demonstrators in Santa Cruz. Credit for a terrorist attack on the Madrid railway station (3 November 1977) was claimed by the autonomist movement from the Canaries.<sup>11</sup> This archipelago has considerable strategic importance, and it is difficult to say to what extent this agitation was encouraged and directed from outside.

- Galicia witnessed demonstrations for autonomy in 1978; on 4 December, 500,000 people were massed throughout Galicia.<sup>12</sup>

- Strong autonomist demands were made in Alsace in 1920, after the return of the province to France. In the 1970s, there were several bombings which were claimed by an autonomist movement. Nevertheless, autonomist groups generally receive only a few percentage points in elections.

We will conclude by looking at a case which shows the fluctuations to which separatist desires may be subject when they are grounded in economic motivations and do not have deep cultural or linguistic roots. Western Australia represents 8 percent of the national population. Furthermore, this region is separated from eastern Australia by a distance of more than 3,000 kilometers. Since there is no federal policy of making internal airline fares more attractive, a substantial percentage of the 1.7 million inhabitants of Western Australia has never traveled to the east coast. Furthermore, the mining industry is the primary resource of this region. This industry is subject to considerable risk at times of fluctuations in international currency. The first separatist demonstration occurred in 1933 when the return on raw materials was

**Table 5.4 Internal Migration in the United States (U.S.-born population)**

Year	Born in state of residence [percent]	Born in a state contiguous to state of residence [percent]	Born in a state noncontiguous to state of residence [percent]
1850	76		
1870	77	9.6	13.6
1890	78	8.7	12.1
1910	78	10.1	11.4
1930	76	11.2	12.1
1950	73	10.4	14.8
1970	68	9.3	17.4

*Note:* Overall, there is a notable stability in the numbers; the single exception is the increase in migration toward noncontiguous states between 1950 and 1970, undoubtedly a consequence of more widespread use of the automobile.

*Source:* *Historical Statistics of the United States* (1975, p. 89); Long (1988, p. 89).

at its lowest; a referendum organized by the government of the state resulted in a favorable vote for secession with a majority of 65 percent. The petition for secession was, however, dismissed by the British government. Another movement of this sort cropped up in 1974 when a prosperous mining prospector created the Westralian Secession Movement, but this party garnered only 1 percent of the vote in the elections of May 1974.<sup>13</sup>

## Spatial-Demographic Factors

The phenomena of residential mobility and of exogamy, by which we understand marriages of members of a minority with inhabitants from the rest of the country, are important mechanisms of integration. They certainly deserve a detailed study, but our perspective here is more modest; we only wish to emphasize the relationship to the geographical interaction factor introduced earlier, and to illustrate it with a few examples.

The simplest definition of residential mobility is the number of persons having in a given census a different address from that shown in the previous census. However, such a definition is of no interest here, for observation shows (see Table 5.4) that most residential moves occur over short distances. For our purpose only movements between the homeland region of the minority group and the rest of the country are pertinent. In France and Great Britain, migrations to the capital have been a powerful means of integration from the eighteenth through the twentieth centuries. It can be

**Table 5.5 Rates of Moving between Administrative Areas of Varying Sizes in One-Year Intervals (1970 or 1971)**

Country	Administrative area	Average radius [km]	Persons moving between the specific areas per 1,000 base population
Belgium	Province	33	9
Britain	Region	88	16
Bulgaria	Region	71	4
Denmark	County	30	44
France	Region	89	19
Hungary	Region	70	29
Japan	Prefecture	51	37
Netherlands	Province	31	18
Sweden	Lan	77	21
United States	State	242	36

*Source:* Long (1988, p. 274).

said that London and Paris were the crucibles in which was forged the national unity of each of these countries. By coming to the capital in search of work, provincials assimilated themselves linguistically, and they often married a person who had come from the provinces for the same reason. In 1861, 58 percent of the inhabitants of Paris had been born in the provinces (this percentage would slowly drop in the following decades: in 1954, it was 44 percent). In 1954, 300,000 people from Brittany and Vendée were living in Paris.<sup>14</sup>

It would be interesting to be able to compare residential mobility from one country to another. Unfortunately, few directly comparable statistics are available due to the diversity of administrative divisions. H. Long tried to get around this difficulty by calculating the average radius of different administrative divisions.<sup>15</sup> Some of his results are shown in Table 5.5. This Table allows us to compare the mobility of two countries in which the average radius of administrative divisions is the same. This is but a first approximation because the distribution of units of varying sizes also enters into the value of the average. For example, if a country has a large number of small regions and a few very large regions, the average size of the regions will be “abnormally” large. We believe that it would be better to consider the median radius rather than the average radius because the latter would be less influenced by large regions. As a way of estimating the degree of exogamy, it would be interesting to know the average distance between the birthplaces of the spouses, as well as changes in this average over time. Unfortunately, no data of this type seem to have been

compiled and published.

## Appendix A: Short Survey of the Literature

Although there is a vast literature on national integration and separatist movements, studies focusing on the bond between mother tongue and homeland are not so numerous. We do not intend to make an extensive survey here. Comprehensive and very readable reviews are found in the works by W. Connor and R. Premdas.<sup>16</sup> In this appendix, we first give a short account of the pioneering study of S. Lieberman, the works of S. Rokkan, D. Laitin, M. Hechter, concluding with a brief review of the contributions of E. Allardt and T. Gurr.<sup>17</sup> The pioneering work of W. Connor will be discussed in the next chapter. The highly innovative approach of R. Jenkins has already been discussed.

Lieberman's study examines the determinants of mother-tongue diversity. It analyzes the evolution of language diversity in 35 states and over periods ranging from a few years to a century, depending on the availability of data. Various national characteristics are considered in relation to changes in language diversity. Two factors, the spatial isolation of language groups and official educational policies, turn out to have a significant influence on language diversity. Spatial isolation is estimated through an index proposed by Bell in 1954. In a sense, given the reliance placed on indexes and aggregated figures, it can be said that Lieberman's analysis considered the problem in a macrosociological perspective; in contrast, through its emphasis on basic mechanisms, the present study presents a microsociological view.

Stein Rokkan's work laid conceptual foundations for the development of comparative studies of the process of nation-forming. In particular, he devoted much attention to the study of relationships between nation-building and languages; in this respect see also the review of Rokkan's work published in 1997 by Peter Flora and his colleagues.

Allardt's short book (1979) analyzes 46 linguistic minorities in Western Europe, ranging from large subgroups like the Catalans (5.7 million) to small minorities like the Faro Islanders (46,000). As many as 18 variables are considered in describing various aspects of the minorities: demography, education, welfare, politics, etc., but little attention is given to the historical background. Cross-correlations for all variables are systematically computed; most correlations turn out to be too small to be significant. Yet what is more troublesome is that no clear pattern seems to emerge from the few cross-correlations which are high enough to be significant. In short, this work is an illustration of both the ambitions and weaknesses of the approach based on econometric methods.



David Laitin has initiated a radically new approach in sociology which is based on extensive field studies. He conducted inquiries in regions as different as South-East Africa, Catalonia or the countries of the former U.S.S.R. His inquiries are based on detailed data sets, interviews, and theoretical analyses. However, as in Allardt's approach, only little attention is given to the long-term historical background. This is probably a deliberate methodological option.

Michael Hechter's groundbreaking contribution about colonialism will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent chapter. In a more recent book (2000) he made a sweeping evaluation of the ways, means and prospects of nationalist movements. The analysis is brilliant but based on only few quantitative data and systematic comparisons.

Ted Gurr's analysis of communal mobilization relies on an impressive and unique statistical data base. Basic characteristics (population, ethnic classification, etc.) are provided for 227 communal groups. The analysis covers the period from the Second World War to the present. The statistical inquiry which we develop in a subsequent chapter follows Gurr's approach in many respects. One marked difference is that Gurr does not restrict his study to minorities with a definite status: religious minorities (Jews in Argentina, for instance) or ethnic minorities (such as foreign workers in Switzerland) are considered along with regional minorities. The task of modeling such a large class of minorities is probably even more complex than the one we have undertaken in this book.

Besides the above-mentioned contributions, the works listed in the following table should be cited:

Author	Year	Approach	Author	Year	Approach
Connor	1972	L	Connor	1994	L
Deutsch	1979	L-T	Deutsch	1984	L
Fishman	1986	L	Gottlieb	1993	L
Henderson	1968	L	Horowitz	1985	L-T
Laitin	1992	L	Laitin	1994	L
Lieberson	1970	T	Lieberson	1988	T
McGarry	1993	L	Milne	1988	L
Olzak	1986	T	Olzak	1992	T
Premdas	1990	L	Shibutani	1965	L
Snyder	1972	T	Snyder	1976	L
Svalastoga	1982	T			

In this list, the index L or T besides the year of publication indicates whether the

approach in the study is mainly qualitative (L) or quantitative (T).

## Appendix B: Tensions in Switzerland

As a general rule, during both Franco-German conflicts in the twentieth century, the sympathies of the German-speaking areas of Switzerland lay with Germany, while French speakers sided with France. It was inevitable that tensions would come to light. In both cases, the federal government managed to keep them under control, although as we shall see, this was accomplished by curtailing public liberties, through control of the press and by giving discretionary power to the government.

### 1900–1918

Franco-German antagonism was latent from the end of the nineteenth century through the beginning of war in 1914. There were repercussions in Switzerland, in particular with respect to commercial negotiations in what was called the Gothard Crisis, from the name of the railway that passes through the tunnel of that name. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Switzerland began a program of nationalization of its railway system; to do so, it had to negotiate with the neighboring countries which had cooperated in the construction of the Gothard and Simplon tunnels: Germany and Austria for the Gothard tunnel, France and Italy for the Simplon. Negotiations with France and Italy were completed with the signing of agreements in 1903 and 1908, and an agreement was reached with Germany and Austria in 1909. In exchange for giving up their rights, Germany and Austria had received compensations that were seen by many as exorbitant.

Such compensations were not part of the treaties signed with France and Italy, and the French-speaking region of Switzerland sent out a petition asking the parliament not to ratify the treaty. After many delays and incidents, the treaty was nonetheless approved on 4 April 1913 by a vote of 108 to 77. The opposing votes were cast by deputies from the French-speaking regions and from the Catholic cantons.<sup>18</sup>

With the beginning of war in August 1914, a special assembly granted full powers to the Federal Council on 3 August 1914. With the exception of the socialist papers, the Swiss-German press justified the military violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany. Such positions were potentially dangerous both for internal order and for external security. It was for this reason that during the war the press was subjected to military justice; disproportionate sanctions were often the result of this measure. The Federal Council, on which French-speaking Switzerland had only one seat in seven, leaned toward Germany. Its most striking pro-German initiative was a secret attempt at mediation in 1917, with the goal of establishing a separate peace between Germany and Russia. When the affair was made public, the federal councillor who

had led the negotiations was obliged to resign and his seat was given to a French-speaking Swiss.

In the economic area, the Franco-English alliance had imposed on Switzerland in 1915 the formation of the Swiss Society for Economic Surveillance (Société Suisse de Surveillance Economique or SSS) The acronym was soon translated as “Souveraineté Suisse Suspendue,” that is, Suspended Swiss Sovereignty. On the German side there was a similar organism called the Germano-Swiss Fiduciary Office which oversaw German importations.

### 1933–1945

In 1934, the Federal Council decided to restrict freedom of the press. After the outbreak of war, the overall control of the press was once again handed over to the army. Sanctions, particularly prohibitions on publication, led to de facto self-censure of the press. While the Swiss economy had worked to the benefit of both sides during the First World War, it functioned almost exclusively to the benefit of Germany during the Second World War. It is estimated that in 1941–1942, 60 percent of the armaments industry, 40 percent of the machine industry and 50 percent of the optical industry worked for Germany.<sup>19</sup>

### Conclusion

Clearly, the Swiss government showed great skill in allowing the country to pass through both wars without major mishaps. Switzerland emerged from these conflicts better off than a country like Belgium, which had the same problem of internal cohesion and also tried to play the neutrality card. That difference can probably be explained by the fact that Belgium was invaded twice while Switzerland was not; the occupation of the country stirred up the conflict between Walloons and Flemings.

## Appendix C: Line of Contact in the United States

We assume that German Americans were distributed in towns and districts of cities ranging in population between  $x_1 = 1,000$  and  $x_2 = 50,000$ . Moreover, we suppose that these towns and districts had the same statistical distribution as other American cities, that is, a truncated Pareto distribution with an exponent  $\alpha = 0.9$ .<sup>20</sup>

This means that the number of cities with a population between  $x$  and  $x + dx$  was equal to:  $f(x)dx = C/x^{\alpha+1}$  where  $C$  is a normalization constant. As a consequence,  $\int_{x_1}^{x_2} x f(x) dx$  represents the total number  $P$  of the German-American population; knowing that  $P \simeq 14$  million allows us to determine the constant  $C$ , namely  $C = 1.48 \times 10^6$ . Denoting urban density by  $d$ , and considering cities as disks for the sake of simplicity, the radius  $r$  of a city of population  $x$  will be determined by

the relation:  $\pi r^2 d = x$ . The line of contact of a city of radius  $r$  with the rest of the country will be given by:  $l(x) = 2\pi r$ . Finally, the line of contact of German-American regions has a total length given by:  $L = \int_{x_1}^{x_2} l(x) f(x) dx$ . We thus obtain:  $L = 13,000$  km, or a length of 919 km per million German Americans.

**Comments** The figure obtained is about four times larger than the figure for Switzerland, which indicates that German-speaking Americans had four times more contact with the rest of the country than French-speaking Swiss. In fact the ratio was probably even larger than 4:1 for two reasons:

- The line of contact between French speakers and the rest of Switzerland passes through a zone that is essentially rural and mountainous. In America, on the other hand, the line of contact is, in most cases, a boundary between a city neighborhood and the rest of the city, an area where contacts are infinitely more numerous than they would be the case in rural districts.

- We have compared lines of contact per million inhabitants, but we can ask if this way of proceeding does not becloud a part of the phenomenon. Contacts are not solely a question of geometry, they depend also on the number of inhabitants. In geographical studies, it is generally admitted that the number of contacts between two populations of sizes  $N_1$  and  $N_2$  is proportional to  $(N_1 N_2)^\alpha$  where  $\alpha$  represents a number which is comprised between 0.5 and 1.5. If  $\alpha$  is larger than one, the number of contacts per capita will grow as  $N^{1-\alpha}$ , thus leading to a larger number of contacts for the United States than for Switzerland.

## Appendix D: Geographical Index for an Island

In this appendix, we give several empirical data leading to the definition of the geographical index for an island adopted in this chapter. To be specific we consider the example of the island of Corsica located in the Mediterranean about 250 km south-east of the French coast and about 100 km to the southwest of the Italian coast. We will estimate the contacts of this island with France and Italy, respectively, via the frequency of shipping between these two countries. Let us look first at port-to-port distances.

### France-Corsica

There are three main ports on the French coast: Marseilles, Nice and Toulon and two main ports in Corsica: Ajaccio and Bastia. Distances to Corsica are as follows:

Bastia-Nice	220 km	Ajaccio-Nice	220 km
Bastia-Toulon	320 km	Ajaccio-Toulon	260 km
Bastia-Marseilles	340 km	Ajaccio-Marseilles	300 km

Average distance: 276 km

### Italy-Corsica

There are three main ports on the Italian coast: Genoa, Livorno and Piombino (facing the island of Elba). Distances to Corsican ports are as follows:

Bastia-Genoa	200 km	Ajaccio-Genoa	300 km
Bastia-Livorno	130 km	Ajaccio-Livorno	300 km
Bastia-Piombino	70 km	Ajaccio-Piombino	280 km

Average distance: 216 km

Although the average distance to Italian ports is shorter than it is to French ports, there are approximately three times more trips to France than to Italy, or roughly 700 trips per year against 200. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that  $w_+ = 3w_-$ . To summarize, the relevant parameters are:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{Contacts with France} & d_+ = 276, \quad w_+ = 3 \quad w_+/d_+ = 11 \times 10^{-3} \\ \text{Contacts with Italy} & d_- = 216, \quad w_- = 1 \quad w_-/d_- = 4.6 \times 10^{-3} \end{array}$$

To conclude, note that the variable  $D$  represents the cost expressed in “effective kilometers” of the connection between the island and the continent. Expressed in hundreds of kilometers, this variable here has the value:

$$D = \text{Max} [\text{Inf} (d_+, d_-), 3] = \text{Max} [\text{Inf} (2.76, 2.16), 3] = \text{Max}(2.16, 3) = 3$$

The fact that  $D$  is greater than the actual distance emphasizes that an important part of the cost is represented by loading and unloading operations. As  $\text{Inf} (d_+, d_-)$  becomes greater, the cost of these operations becomes more and more negligible in relation to the cost of the voyage itself.

# Chapter 6

## Historical Determinants of Separatism

“A thing has to have a root before it can grow.”

—Creek Indian Chief Chitto Harjo (1906), cited in Debo (1970)

It is easier to revive a language than to create a new one from whole cloth. In just a few decades, the Nynorsk form of Norwegian spread throughout a substantial part of the Norwegian population; in the same way, a few decades would be sufficient for modern Hebrew to become the language of the State of Israel. In both cases, there was a true re-creation of ancient tongues which had lost their status as everyday languages. These successes are in marked contrast to the failure of Esperanto. First created in 1887 in Warsaw, this language proved seductive in intellectual circles but never really “got off the ground.” If we ask what was lacking, the most obvious answer is that the language lacked historical roots. These examples illustrate the epigraphic quotation at the head of this chapter. In the same way, the most tenacious struggles for liberation have been waged by peoples who had formerly known long periods in which they were their own masters: Egypt, Hungary and Ireland are particularly eloquent examples which we will revisit. In all three of these cases, liberation was accomplished only after a series of attempts. What Ariadne’s thread guided these peoples through a multitude of fruitless episodes stretching over centuries?

The argument that we develop in this chapter attributes a central role to collective memory. It is collective memory that makes a people choose one form of struggle or another. It is collective memory that provides the spark for a new burst of energy when discouragement or even despair overwhelm the hearts of people after an uprising ended in disaster. It is collective memory which allows a seemingly definitive failure to serve as the springboard for a new surge forward. Nothing is more likely to close the ranks of an oppressed minority than the memory of the tragic hours of a defeat and the reverence given to the memory of so many sacrifices to the common cause. The history of such failed attempts will enrich the historical “soil” of this people; and it is in this soil that the flower of recovered freedom may flourish at last.

In the study of spatial determinants in the previous chapter, we produced maps and

measured lines of separation. In short, it was a domain where quantitative indicators could be set up fairly easily. This is seemingly not the case here. The historical soul of a people is tucked away in the memories of a multitude of individuals, often unbeknown to them. Must we then limit ourselves to subjective statements? The main objective of this chapter will be to show how this impalpable reality can be gauged and measured

Because memory and psychology play such an important role in these questions, some writers have argued that they rest on a completely mythical basis. The arguments of R. Premdas, for example, reflect this attitude. In the introduction to a collective work devoted to a comparative study of several separatist movements, Premdas writes: “Secession may originate from nothingness in a fabricated and mythical claim built around an invented and self-differentiating group [. . .]. The scholar who seeks to question the legitimacy of a movement on the basis of the objectivity of the primordial and secondary causes will misunderstand what separatist movements are all about.”<sup>1</sup>

It is true that if we restrict ourselves to a retrospective analysis bearing on only a few decades we can indeed get the impression that separatist movements arise from nowhere. However, if the analysis is extended over a sufficiently distant past, we will see that these movements are based on a perfectly identifiable and objective historical heritage. Accordingly, we would rather subscribe to Swinburne’s famous verse, quoted in Connor: “Not with dreams but with blood and iron shall a nation be molded at last.”<sup>2</sup> In short, without denying that dreams and myths indeed play a role we will argue in this chapter that separatist movements are firmly rooted in shared historical episodes. In other terms, if memory, dreams and the imaginary do truly play a role, they are supported by the most dramatic aspects of a common history.

In the first section, we will show to what extent the historical heritage of a people is present in the souls of the men and women who make it up. Then, by way of illustration, we will examine the historical roots of three autonomist movements. We will emphasize the revealing role played by certain critical periods, wars in particular. In the second section, we will introduce the concept of primal ownership whose role was brought to light by Walker Connor and which seems of capital importance in the collective psychology of a people. We will see how the mechanism of the melting pot derives naturally from this privilege. In the third section, we introduce statistical tools which will allow us to grasp the present and the past of a separatist movement in measurable form.

## Historical Roots and the Identity of a People

In the preceding chapters, we were often guided by the linguistic aspect. Even if



language is only the tip of the iceberg, this parallel can once again be useful here. Let us ask how a language which is no longer in daily use can be put into hibernation to await a possible revival. The examples of Norwegian and Hebrew mentioned earlier can be our guides here. What allowed Ivan Aasen to revive Norwegian toward the middle of the nineteenth century after an eclipse of four centuries during which Norwegian had been supplanted by Danish? Three elements seem to have played a crucial role: the existence of an important Norwegian literature dating from before the fifteenth century; folk songs and legends; and the existence in western Norway of a dialect that was relatively close to old Norwegian.<sup>3</sup> Hebrew, on the other hand, was preserved because of its role in the Jewish religion. This case is fairly frequent: for Basque, Breton, French (in Quebec) or Welsh, religion and the liturgy have also played a predominant role in the preservation of these languages. The historical roots of a people are preserved in similar forms, namely in folk songs and ballads, oral tradition and in the accounts of historians. The following analysis provides various illustrations.

### **The Collective Memory of a People**

“Je me souviens” [I remember]

Motto of the province of Quebec

In May 2001 Pope John Paul II visited Greece; it was the first time since the schism between Rome and Constantinople that a pope was visiting the cradle of the Orthodox Church. On that occasion the press and radio reported that the Greek people was still bitter about the role played by the papacy in the sack of Constantinople by the Crusaders, an event which took place 800 years ago in April 1204. That news item suggests right away that the collective memory of a people may cover a very long stretch of time.

We now consider in more detail different functions of collective popular memory.

**Popular memory** We easily accept the idea that popular memory plays a vital role in traditional societies in which oral transmission predominates, yet as is shown by the following illustrations it is equally important in more-developed societies.

- Let us begin with a quotation from Alexis de Tocqueville during his trip to Ireland in 1835.

This morning, 1 August, I was on the roof of a stagecoach, seated next to an old Catholic. As we passed through Ennis, the county seat of Clare, he told me that the entire surrounding countryside had belonged to the O’Connells. After they were defeated at the Battle of the Boyne (1690), they were dispossessed. It was the heir of that family who was the first Catholic admitted to Parliament

in 1828. My companion went on to explain to me the lot of a number of families and a multitude of proprietors, from the time of Cromwell through the era of William III, all this with astounding precision.”<sup>4</sup>

That excerpt graphically suggests that historical memory can be kept alive by ordinary people with a precision matching that of true historical accounts.

- Before it became a French province around 1680, Alsace had been a German territory. Alsace was thus caught up in the convulsions of the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) which ravaged and ruined Germany. There are undoubtedly few school children or even adults in Alsace today who have any memory of this episode as a result of their schooling. Nevertheless, talks with farmers reveal that the memory of this event remains alive in the countryside. Three centuries after the facts, the ravages and massacres caused by the Swedish troops have left a strong imprint on the minds of local people. For an Alsatian peasant, the word “Swedish” evokes the same reaction as does “Cromwell” among the Irish.

- After the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, Acadia, the Canadian region comprising Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, was ceded to Great Britain. Around 1755, as tension was building up between France and Great Britain over Canada which led to the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) the Acadians were asked to swear fidelity to the Crown. This oath could eventually oblige them to take up arms against France. Because they refused to take this oath, six to eight thousand Acadians were forced at bayonet point to abandon their homes. They were transported by sea to other parts of British America, and they were persecuted because of their Roman Catholicism.<sup>5</sup> Even today, the memory of what the Acadians call “Le Grand Dérangement” (The Great Upheaval) remains alive in their minds and hearts. In spite of the great distances between them, an annual festival brings Acadians together to celebrate the memory of this 250-year-old episode.

- In 1836, 17,000 Creek Indians were transported to Oklahoma. A century later, Creeks in Oklahoma who were entirely unfamiliar with the written record remembered incidents of the journey which agreed perfectly with the scholarly accounts of historians.<sup>6</sup> One woman recalled the story related many years previously by her grandmother: the crudely built stockade where the soldiers brought the people; the awful silence that showed the heartaches and sorrow at being taken from their homes; the little children who cried day after day.

As these examples show, tragic moments strongly mark the collective memory. We will have further confirmation of this through examining poetry, folk songs and commemorations.

**Commemorations** One of the most impressive examples of collective memory is

provided by the Jewish religion. Independently of its religious significance the Bible is one of the most ancient chronicle of the life of a people. As a matter of fact events of 3,000 years ago which are recorded in the Bible are still commemorated. Four of the seven great yearly holidays are connected with episodes of exile or exodus. (1) Passover commemorates both the passage of the Angel who killed the first-born in Egypt while sparing the Hebrew children, and the departure from Egypt (approximately 1504 B.C.). (2) The Feast of the Tabernacles (Sukkoth) celebrates the passage through the desert after the departure from Egypt. (3) Pentecost (Shavuot) recalls the gift of the Torah to Moses on Mount Sinai after the trek through the dessert. (4) Purim celebrates the deliverance of the Jews from Persia, where some of their number had been taken into captivity by Nebuchadnezzar in 587 B.C. A lesser holiday, Tisha B'av, commemorates the destruction of the Temple of Jerusalem by the Romans in 70 A.D.

**Songs** The role of songs and ballads is equally important, as shown by the following illustrations.

- In Crete, people still sing an old song which recalls numerous revolts against the Turks: “Every Easter, every Christmas, Dascalos Jannis took up his rifle. He said, I will call the Russians [an allusion to the support of the Russians in the Greek revolts]. Master Jean Sphakia, silence! You must not speak this way. If the sultan hears [an allusion to the network of informers maintained by the Turks] he will send the Turks. Let him send his army and his fleet, Sphakia has as many courageous men as the doves in the forests.”<sup>7</sup>

- There is a haunting set of Irish folk songs and ballads about the many unsuccessful Irish rebellions. Here are two examples from Birch.<sup>8</sup>

Our foes were united and we were divided  
We met and they scattered our ranks to the wind.

This is a sober allusion to the clans of Ireland, whose divisions long impeded any effective struggle against the English colonizers, who could rely upon the support of a powerful centralized state.

We knelt at Mass with sobbing heart  
Cold in the dawn of day  
The dawn for us, for him the night  
Who was so young and gay  
Then from the Altar spoke the priest  
His voice rang thin with pain  
Bidding us pray, a boy must die  
At England's hands again.

This poem celebrates in a simple and moving way the sacrifice of the youth of Ireland to their cause. It also shows the role played by the Catholic Church as a unifying element for the Irish people.

Songs also played an important role; remember that in the early twentieth century the following songs were still considered seditious: “Wrap the Green Flag round me, boys,” “God save Ireland,” “The Soldier’s Song.”<sup>9</sup>

*The historians’ history* When a people struggles for its freedom, all its energy is put forth in this cause: historians then abandon treatises and monographs to engage in political action. It would probably be difficult to find a better illustration than that shown in Figure 6.1. This election poster was displayed by Sinn Fein in Ireland at the elections of 14 December 1918 in which this party carried off a huge victory over the Home Rulers. What interests us here is the content of the poster rather than the results of the election. While elsewhere electoral proclamations are generally full of short-term promises, is it not extraordinary to see that this poster refers to Irish history as far back as the victory of Brian Boru over the Danish on 23 April 1014? Is it not equally remarkable to see to what extent this poster presumes a knowledge of their history among the Irish? As a matter of fact four out of these seventeen names, namely, Archbishop O’Hurley, Ashe, Coleman and Father Sheehy, do not even appear in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (edition of 1997).

The political argument underling this poster consists of an entreaty to the Irish to be faithful to the memory of their ancestors; this argument is in fact quite similar to the one which we will develop further on when we emphasize the parallelism between successive revolt movements.

Here is a another example taken from the struggle of the people of the Bernese Jura (this struggle is taken up in more detail further in this chapter). In July 1965, autonomists sent a memorandum to the signatory powers of the 1815 Treaty of Vienna, asking that they intervene in their capacity as guarantors of the application of the treaty. The Swiss government considered this move as inadmissible.<sup>10</sup> Although the Jurassian autonomists did not look back as far as did Sinn Fein, 150 years is still a substantial period of time. Note that while pretending to lend a deaf ear to the memorandum, certain of the signatory powers nevertheless gave discreet support to the autonomists. The French government, for example, refused to extradite an autonomist sentenced in Switzerland to six years in prison for terrorist attacks with explosives.

Further on in this chapter, for obvious reasons of accessibility, we will have recourse to history as reconstructed by historians, rather than to the history contained in popular memory. Nevertheless, the preceding examples show that there are strong links

<b>WHY DID THEY DIE?</b>			
BRIAN BORU	1014	<b>NOT</b>	to give a colourable sanction to the
EARL OF DESMOND	1467		slavery of Ireland
SHANE O'NEIL	1567		
HUGH ROE O'DONNELL	1605		
OWEN ROE	1649	<b>NOT</b>	to secure the partition of Ireland
BISHOP McMAHON	1650		
FATHER SHEEHY	1766		
ARCHBISHOP O'HURLEY	1798	<b>NOT</b>	to pledge to a foreign government
FR. JOHN MURPHY	1798		the treasure and the manhood of
LORD FITZGERALD	1798		Ireland
WOLFE TONE	1798		
EMMET	1803	<b>NOT</b>	to enable out-of-date political hacks
O'NEILL CROWLEY	1867		to bargain over Ireland
PEARSE	1916		
CONNOLLY	1916		
ASHE	1917		
COLEMAN	1918		

**THEY DIED TO SECURE THE LIBERATION OF THE OLDEST  
POLITICAL PRISONER IN THE WORLD  
IRELAND!  
RELEASE THE PRISONERS!  
RELEASE IRELAND!**

**Figure 6.1 Example of Collective Historical Memory: Excerpt from an Election Poster used by Sinn Fein in Ireland.** Sinn Fein, the party which claimed independence, won the elections of 14 December 1918. The poster stresses the more than one thousand year long struggle for independence of the Irish people. *Source:* Kee (1972, p. 625).

between the history written by historians and the collective memory of peoples.

### **Historical Roots of Separatist Struggles: Three Examples**

Our objective in this section is to show through three examples that the roots of autonomist demands revert to a distant past that is rarely shorter than a century and sometimes reaches three or four centuries. When this historical depth is disregarded, the phenomenon seems unintelligible. In this section, we will confine ourselves to a description of these roots; later, we will see what keys they can provide for an understanding of the present. First of all, however, we must identify the various

forms of action which characterize separatist movements.

*Separatist forms of action* By definition, a separatist action is directed against the central government and its local representatives: police, army, tax officials, judges. Needless to say, not every action aimed at police or the tax services can be automatically listed as separatist. When taxation becomes too onerous, for example, antitax action can be led by groups of citizens who have absolutely no autonomist goals. In the majority of cases, however, the “context” permits an easy distinction between what is due to separatism and what is not.

Over the centuries, there has been a swing in the panoply of means used by separatist groups. This evolution is due to technical progress as well as, in some cases, changes in the balance of power. The invention of low-volume, easily used explosives has made bombings more common. Conversely, progress in armament (rapid-fire canon, tanks, aircraft) have made obsolete, at least in developed countries, pitched battles between separatists and the army; at the present time, it is difficult to conceive of a battle between the Sioux and the U.S. Army, or between the Uighurs and the Chinese Army. This kind of confrontation endures only in regions where access is made difficult whether by tropical conditions or by mountains as in Chechnya or Kashmir. This implies that in industrialized countries all groups which had previously borne arms against the invader have had to create new fighting traditions, a process which may take one or two centuries.

A more detailed analysis of the forms of separatist struggles will be presented later on in this chapter.

*Scotland* The question of autonomist demands in Scotland came to the forefront in 1974 when the Scottish National Party (SNP) gathered 22 percent, then 33 percent, in the two parliamentary elections which were held that year. These results were in spectacular contrast to the percentages obtained in previous years: 0.55 percent in 1959, 0.8 percent in 1959, 5 percent in 1966. After the flare-up in 1974, the percentage of votes gathered by the SNP fell to levels around 10 percent in the 1980s and reached 22 percent in both 1992 and 1997.

Scottish autonomist claims have a long history. These claims have flared up briefly on numerous occasions in the past. Nevertheless, among several works devoted to the Scottish nationalist movement in the 1970s and 1980s rarely do the authors go back beyond 1945.<sup>11</sup> How far should one go back? Insofar as history is a continuity, this question has no definitive answer. It would be natural to choose 1707, the date of the parliamentary union with England, but it could as easily be maintained that the crucial date is the union of the two crowns in 1603. This choice would be all the more justified by the fact that between 1603 and 1707, Scottish independence was more formal than real, for several reasons. (1) Even before 1707, several of the main



attributes of a sovereign nation were lacking in Scotland: it had no navy, maintained no ambassadors in foreign capitals, and its signature appeared on few international treaties. (2) In 1700, the population of Scotland was on the order of one million, a feeble minority indeed alongside its powerful neighbors, England and Wales, with their six million inhabitants. In terms of revenue, the disproportion was even more evident. Exact numbers for the fiscal revenues of Scotland are poorly known, but a ratio of more than 50 between the revenues of the two crowns can be estimated.<sup>12</sup> This imbalance between the two nations had direct consequences in the military sphere. Scotland could carry off isolated victories, as it did from time to time, but it could never emerge as the victor in either a campaign or a prolonged war. (3) Like the parliament in Dublin, the Edinburgh parliament enjoyed only an illusory independence. In the first place, the parliament represented primarily the Scottish aristocracy; even in 1822, the total number of county voters was less than 3,000, many of them the instruments of a handful of great landowners.<sup>13</sup> These great Scottish families were all more or less dependent on the king of Scotland who, beginning with James I, was also king of England.

Chronology 6.1 recapitulates a certain number of events which have punctuated Scottish struggles for autonomy. It is of course impossible to give all of them in detail, and we have chosen to comment on three which are relatively unknown: the Glencoe massacre of 1692, the Scottish rising of 1745–1746, and the story of the Royal Stone.

- Considering only the number of victims, the Glencoe massacre seems insignificant by comparison with the repressions carried out in Ireland. Nonetheless, this event has gained symbolic value, and may still be invoked in newspaper articles about the Scottish question. In what follows, we have primarily used the detailed account given by Macaulay.<sup>14</sup> A superficial examination might lead us to conclude that the event was a settling of scores between two rival clans. In fact, it was a concerted attempt by the English government to bring the Scottish clans to heel. The clans had to declare their allegiance by signing an act of submission before a certain date. The Mclan clan signed this act late. To punish the clan, Sir John Dalrymple, acting as prime minister in Scotland, formulated a plan which was signed by King William III. On 1 February 1692, 120 soldiers went to one of the villages of the clan. For two weeks, they lived off the hospitality of the clan. On 13 February, the day on which the punitive action was planned, an auxiliary squadron of 400 men was to arrive in the valley to intercept fugitives. This squadron was late, and a part of the clan escaped. Thirty people were killed by the soldiers and some thirty of those who escaped died of hunger and cold in the mountains.

- The Scots accepted the replacement of James II by William III of Nassau with



### Chronology 6.1 Scotland's Claims for Self-Government (1600–1997)

Year	Number of deaths	Comment	Source
1639–1640		Scottish rebellion: the two Bishop's wars	Tilly (1993)
1686	20	Argyle's expedition	Macaulay
1692	Feb. 60	Glencoe massacre	Macaulay
1707		Popular discontent after the Act of Union	Lecky
1715–1716		Jacobite rebellion	Vincent, Lecky
1719		Avorted Jacobite rising	Lecky
1736	Apr. 5	Porteous affair	Lee, Vincent
1745–1746	>1500	Scottish rising	Bodart, Lee
1886–1929		14 separate bill proposals to establish a Scottish Parliament were introduced in the House of Commons	Leruez
1949		Signature campaign in favor of Home Rule: 1.5 million signatures	<i>Daily Mail</i> (20 Dec. 1949)
1950	Dec.	Royal Stone spirited away by nationalists	<i>Le Monde</i> (4 Jan. 1951)
1953		Destruction of mail boxes with the inscription EIRR	<i>Gazette de Lausanne</i> (7 Jul. 1953)
1963	Oct.	Pirate broadcast by Scottish nationalists interrupted the BBC program	<i>Le Monde</i> (29 Oct. 1963)
1974	Sep.	Bid to steal Royal Stone failed	<i>Intern. Herald Tribune</i> (6 Sep. 1974)
1975	Sep.	The BP oil pipeline running through Scotland was bombed for the fourth time in two years	<i>Guardian</i> (24 Sep. 1974)
1977	Feb.	Labour government's first devolution bill falls in committee	<i>Times</i> (24 Feb. 1977)
1979	Mar.	Scotland votes narrowly (52%) in favor of an assembly but vote is too small to qualify	
1982–1984		Letter bomb campaign against government ministers	<i>Times</i> (15 May 1989)
1988	Sep.	The Scottish National Party called for a boycott of the poll tax	<i>Figaro</i> (19 Sep. 1988)
1996	Jul.	The Royal Stone to be returned to Scotland	<i>Times</i> (4 Jul. 1996)
1997	Sep.	Creation of a Scottish Parliament approved by 74 percent of the voters	<i>Le Monde</i> (13 Sep. 1997)

*Note:* In order to explain the destruction of the mail boxes in 1953 one must recall that Elizabeth I (1558–1603) was not queen of Scotland; in fact she was rather Scotland's enemy; thus for the Scots Elizabeth II is in fact Elizabeth I. This episode clearly shows the importance of historical symbols in Scottish nationalism.

great reluctance for since James I, English kings had first been kings of Scotland. From the moment when the line of succession was broken, there was no further union of the two crowns; nothing impelled the Scots to recognize William. Religious prejudice was added to these dynastic problems. The majority of the Presbyterian episcopate of Scotland were non-swearers, which means that they had not taken the oath of allegiance to William III.

When the crown passed to George I of Hanover these frictions led (with Spanish help) to the Scottish insurrection of 1715. There were, in fact, four Jacobite uprisings, in 1708, 1715, 1719 and 1745. The last of these was the most serious. The strictly military period lasted from September 1745 to 16 April 1746 (battle of Culloden). Immediately after the defeat at Culloden, 125 leaders of the rebellion were hanged or decapitated, and there were 1,200 deportations.<sup>15</sup> In the weeks that followed, a severe repression took place in Scotland, which was a repetition of the episodes of 1708 and 1715–1716. Scottish nationalists even without direct connections to the rebellion were arrested; all in all, nearly a hundred people were tried by English courts in these two episodes.<sup>16</sup>

In 1746 severe measures aimed at the non-swearing clergy were taken which constituted a reinforcement of measures taken previously and not always applied. In 1718, a law had been enacted rendering all Episcopal clergymen who did not take the prescribed oaths liable to six months imprisonment. A law of 1746 reinforced the previous one by introducing deportation to the colonies for recidivists. Furthermore, all judges and magistrates convicted of negligence in enforcing the law were liable to a fine of 50 pounds. There were also measures directed against certain particularities of Scottish culture: the bagpipe and the kilt were forbidden, and the schools were brought into line with the English model.

- The episode of the Stone of Scone is of minor importance in itself, but is a spectacular demonstration of the importance of historical symbols in the relationship between Scotland and England. The Stone of Scone, or Stone of Destiny as it is also called, is the most ancient symbol of Scottish kingship. K. MacAlpin, the first Scottish king, was crowned on the Stone of Scone in 839. From then on, the stone served at the coronation of all Scottish kings up to John Balliol, the English puppet monarch (1292). In 1296, Edward I of England, after having subdued the rebellion of William Wallace, took the Stone to Westminster Abbey as a symbol of the subjugation of Scotland. All English monarchs since then have been crowned sitting on the coronation chair with the Stone underneath. Note in passing that the use of sacred stones seems to be common to several peoples: the Stone of Scone had been Irish before it was moved to Scotland at the beginning of the ninth century. In this connection, we might also mention the sacred Black Stone of the Muslims. During the Carmathian revolt of 891-906, the stone was carried away from Mecca by the


insurgents.

The Stone of Scone was stolen from Westminster Abbey by Scottish nationalists on Christmas Day, 1950. It was found four months later in a disused church. In 1996, on the 700th anniversary of its removal to England, Elizabeth II, on the advice of her ministers, resolved to return the stone to the Scots. It would, however, remain the property of the Crown and be taken back to London for the coronation of future sovereigns.<sup>17</sup>

**Xinjiang (China)** The 17 million inhabitants of the autonomous region of Xinjiang are presently split into three main groups: the Uighurs (47 percent), the Chinese Hans (37 percent) and the Kazakhs (8 percent). In 1953, the Chinese Hans represented only 8 percent of the total population. A similar immigration happened in Mongolia, Tibet and in other regions on the western periphery of China. This movement of migration toward the west has many similarities with the migration of Americans toward the Pacific coast in the nineteenth century.

Xinjiang (Figure 6.2b) is also called Eastern Turkestan because its inhabitants speak a language which is related to Turkish; in addition they are Muslims, and thus have two reasons to remain apart from the Han population. In other peripheral provinces of China, there are Muslim peoples who are in similar situations (in Yunnan and Gansu, in particular). Chronology 6.2 shows that the first wave of revolts that have been recorded took place in the second half of the nineteenth century. Following the enfeebling of the central government, China experienced considerable instability in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Around 1860, the country was torn apart by four very serious revolts: (1) the revolt of the Taiping, from 1851 to 1864, (2) the Nian insurrection, lasting from 1842 to 1868, (3) the insurrection of the Miao minority from 1855 to 1872, and (4) the Red Turban revolt. In these circumstances, it should not be surprising that separatist currents crisscrossed regions like Xinjiang. Remember that Xinjiang is more than 2,500 kilometers from Peking. Nevertheless, after overcoming the Taiping revolt, and thanks to the active assistance of Great Britain and France, China was able to send its armies against Muslim insurrections in Yunnan, Gansu and Xinjiang. Yakub Beg, the leader of the revolt in Xinjiang, believed he could count on the support of Great Britain and Russia, but at the crucial moment of the Chinese reconquest, this support was not forthcoming.

**Quebec** The example of Quebec well illustrates both the profound implications of linguistic questions and the weight of history. Before we comment on the Chronology 6.3, let us look at certain microsociological aspects. In the Quebec of 1960, the French-speaking 80 percent of the population controlled only 25 percent of the economic life of the province.<sup>18</sup> In the Canadian army, the Québécois represented 26 percent of all lower rank soldiers, yet held only 8 percent of the higher ranks.<sup>19</sup> In 1962,



**Figure 6.2a Map of China.** The map shows the localization of the province of Xinjiang in the western periphery of China. The pinyin transcription was used; note that in addition to this transcription which was introduced by the People's Republic of China, other systems have been used in the past especially the Wade and Efeo systems. To illustrate the differences we give other transcriptions for the names of the Chinese provinces: Anhui: Anhouei or NganHouei; Gansu: Kansou; Guizhou: Koueitcheou; Henan: Honan; Hunan: Hounan; Xinjiang: Sinkiang or SinTchiang. *Sources:* Mackerras (1982), Pelissier (1963), Quid (1997).



**Figure 6.2b Map of Xinjiang.** *Sources:* Same as for Figure 6.2a.

**Chronology 6.2 Separatist Disturbances in Xinjiang, China (1840–1997)**

Year	Month	Number of deaths	Comment	Source
1758–1759			Kashgaria conquered from the Turkish Khoja dynasty	Langer (p. 579)
1847	6 Sep.		Moslems attack Yangi Hissar	Mackerras (p. 34)
1847	29 Nov.		Government forces relieve the siege of Yangi Hissar	Mackerras (p. 36)
1864	Jun.		Moslem uprising in Kucha and Urumchi	Mackerras
1865–1866		> 4000	The rebels take the cities of Turfan, Kashgar, Urumchi, Aksu, Kucha, Yarkand, Yili	Mackerras
1867			The rebels extend their control over Khotan and Ush	Mackerras
1870			Yakub Beg becomes supreme leader of Moslems in Xinjiang	Mackerras
1874			Yakub Beg recognized by Britain as Amir of Kashgaria	Mackerras
1876	Aug.		The Qing forces retake Urumchi and Manas	Mackerras
1877	Apr.		The Qing forces retake Turfan	Mackerras
1877	Nov.		Yakub Beg death	Mackerras
1878			The Qing reconquest of Xinjiang is complete	Mackerras
1930–1932			Uprising in Kachgaria	<i>Le Monde</i> (3 Mar. 1946)
1945	Jan.		Uighur-Kazak rebels seize Yining which becomes the capital of the East Turkestan Republic	Mackerras (p. 408)
1945		1500	Clashes between Uighurs and Hans	Agence France Presse (14 Jul. 1949)
1957		10	Separatist disturbances: execution of the leaders	<i>Le Monde</i> (30 Jun. 1958)
1992	Feb.	6	Bomb in a bus at Urumchi	<i>Libération</i> (23 Feb. 1992)
1996	Jul.	10	18000 Uighurs arrested; about 10 executed	<i>Le Monde</i> (13 Jul. 1996)
1997	11 Feb.	7	3 bombs in buses	<i>Le Monde</i> (28 Feb. 1997)
1997	Apr.	4	Execution of separatists	<i>Le Monde</i> (23 May 1997)

**Chronology 6.3 Separatist Disturbances in Quebec (1830–1997)**

Year	Month	Number of deaths	Comment	Source
1759	Sep.		Annexation of Canada by Britain	
1837	May- Dec.	200	Uprising which was put down by British forces	Vaugeois, Lemonnier
1838		>12	Failed uprising followed by severe repression	Vaugeois, Lemonnier
1918	Mar.	4	Resistance to conscription	Vaugeois <i>Round Table</i> (Jun. 1918)
1903			Street riots in Montreal between English-Canadians (pro-war) and French-Canadians (anti-war)	
1962	Dec.		Violent demonstration against the president of Canadian Railways	<i>Le Monde</i> (1 Dec. 1962)
1963	Mar.		Petrol bombs thrown into barracks	<i>Le Monde</i> (12 Mar. 1963)
1963	May	1	Several bomb incidents	<i>La Croix</i> (4 May 1963)
1963	May		Letter bomb campaign	Lisée
1965	May		Demonstration staged by 2,000 young separatists	<i>Le Monde</i> (26 May 1965)
1967	Jul.		General de Gaulle's <i>Vive le Québec libre</i>	<i>France Soir</i> (28 Jul. 1967)
1969	May		More than 50 bomb incidents in the city of Montreal in the past 10 months	<i>Financial Times</i> (11 Mar. 1969)
1970	Jul.	1	Bomb attack against Defence headquarters in Ottawa	<i>Le Monde</i> (4 Jul. 1970)
1970	Oct.	3	Kidnapping of a British diplomat and of a minister of Quebec	<i>Guardian</i> (6 Oct. 1970)
1974	Aug.		Quebec's new language law	<i>Intern. Herald Tribune.</i> (28 Aug. 1974)
1980	May		Referendum on the issue of Quebec's sovereignty; it is rejected by 60% of the voters	<i>Le Monde</i> (22 May 1980)
1990	Jun.		Gathering of 300,000 people in Montreal for Quebec's national day (Saint Jean Baptiste)	<i>Le Monde</i> (27 Jun. 1990)
1995	Oct.		Referendum on the issue of Quebec's sovereignty; it is rejected by 50.6% of the voters	<i>Quid</i> (1997)

not a single Québécois served on the governing board of the Canadian railroads.<sup>20</sup> Even the future seemed bleak as suggested by the testimony of an immigrant quoted by M. Chaput (1961).

I am of Hungarian origin and began to study sociology in my country. When I got here, I wanted to continue my sociology studies in French. But what did I see? The great majority of the textbooks used by students in the social sciences were American or English. These students were unaware of, or scorned, European French-language (i.e., Belgian, French or Swiss) textbooks. Furthermore, when I listened to them speaking French, I realized that their vocabulary was extremely elementary. So, I enrolled at McGill and continued to study sociology in English. If I hadn't done this, I would have gone to the University of Montreal to take up studies having anyway an American character but in addition conducted in poor French.

The deep dissatisfaction prevalent in Quebec in the early 1960s led to violent actions between 1963 and 1970; but in this section we rather want to understand how this French-speaking island amidst an English-speaking continent came about. For that purpose we must return to the conquest of the French colony of Quebec by Great Britain in 1759.

This conquest was part of a much larger plan, which through the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), allowed Britain to enlarge English colonies not only in North America but also in India. At this time, a small English-speaking contingent lived in Upper Canada upstream on the Saint Lawrence near the border with the United States. This contingent was considerably strengthened after the American Revolution by the arrival of 6,500 “loyalists,” that is to say, Americans who had remained loyal to Great Britain. As late as 1830, Upper and Lower Canada lived relatively separately. In the mid-1830s the Parliament in London debated a law aimed at bringing together Upper and Lower Canada. The insurrections which erupted in Quebec in 1837 and 1838 can be seen as a refusal to be assimilated. The revolt began in May 1837 with popular meetings held in the principal cities. On 15 June, these meetings were forbidden by the governor. The armed insurrection took place following the sacking of the French-language newspaper *Le Vengeur* on 6 November. The cities of St. Charles, St. Eustache and Montreal armed and entrenched themselves; yet in the face of troops armed with artillery, such resistance was hopeless. There were several hundred dead and wounded; some of the insurrectionists took refuge in the United States. A second attempted uprising was launched from the United States in November 1838 and was crushed even more severely than the first insurrection. Because he had burned so many villages in reprisals, Governor Colborne was referred to by the



Québécois as “vieux brûlot” (from the French verb *brûler*, to burn), which means old firebrand. In addition, 12 persons were condemned to death and executed, while 60 were deported to Australia.<sup>21</sup> After the failure of this insurrection, the way was open in 1840 for the vote on the law creating the union of Upper and Lower Canada.

While Québécois society remained primarily rural, it stayed relatively remote from the rest of Canada. Growing urbanization between 1950 and 1970 reopened the question of the relationship of Quebec with the rest of Canada. This urbanization gave the Québécois greater access to education; a corollary has been the progressive gain of economic control of their region, as the following figures show: in 1990, French-speaking executives owned or controlled 61 percent of the companies in Quebec, up from less than 50 percent in 1970.<sup>22</sup>

*Miscellaneous examples* Numerous other examples could be given but accounting them in some detail as we have done for the previous ones would probably tax the reader’s patience. Nevertheless it should be emphasized that almost all the contemporary separatist struggles have roots which go back a century or more. Here are a few brief examples.

(1) Since 1705, China has tried to influence the choice of the Dalai Lama. In 1751, violence against the imperial residents at Lhasa led to the invasion of Tibet and establishment of control over the succession and the temporal acts of the Dalai Lama.<sup>23</sup>

(2) In 1843, the Russians were compelled to evacuate the whole of Chechnya and many points in Dagestan; in 1845, they launched a major attack, an unmitigated disaster which cost them 4,000 men.<sup>24</sup> In the conflict in Chechnya during the period 1994–1996, Russia suffered 3,800 deaths according to figures put forth by General A. Lebed.<sup>25</sup>

(3) In 1925, there was a great insurrection in Kurdistan directed against the religious policy of the Turkish government and aiming at autonomy. Much blood was lost in the suppression of the revolt.<sup>26</sup>

On the other hand, it must be noted that some minorities which waged long and repeated struggles in the past seem to have settled down. This is the case, for example, with the Miao minority in the Chinese provinces of Hunnan and Guizhou; this group has 7.4 million members. Important revolts had taken place in 1795–1797, 1848, 1855–1872 and again in 1891.<sup>27</sup> There is no mention of revolt after this last date. We see a similar case with the Nian minority in the Chinese provinces of Anhui and Henan, where there were recurrent revolts, in 1842, 1844 and 1851–1868. The sources at our disposal show no new revolt since 1862. This does not mean, of course, that there will be none in the future. As the following section shows, sep-

aratist tendencies can remain dormant for long periods, only to reawaken at certain critical moments in the life of nations.

### **The Critical Role of Wars**

Separatist tendencies may remain latent for decades but usually they are brought to light by some critical episodes and in particular by wars. In the previous chapter, we saw how the two world wars exacerbated tensions in a multinational country like Switzerland, even though this country remained aloof from the two conflicts. In the same vein, we might recall that the uprising which began in the Vendée in 1793 was sparked by the levy en masse of 300,000 men decreed by the Convention to face the First Coalition. The war in the Vendée had also religious and international (in the form of English aid) causes, but it was conscription which brought about a move from passive opposition to armed revolt.

Table 6.1 gives examples in which attempts at conscription have resulted in riots or insurrections. Let us examine in particular the examples of Austria and Ireland. A superficial analysis might give the impression that Austria-Hungary was dismantled by the peace treaty following the First World War. In reality, Bohemia and Hungary had already virtually seceded during the war. At the beginning of the war, Czechs deserted in large numbers, sometimes by entire regiments; the example of the 28th Prague Regiment which went over to the Russians on 23 April 1915 was the most notorious.<sup>28</sup> Toward the end of 1914, Masaryk and Beněs formed an exile government in London and later in Paris; a Czech legion was set up which fought alongside the Allies in France and Italy. In Ireland, British recruiting at the beginning of the 1914–1918 war relied on voluntary enlistments. Ten thousand Irishmen, attracted by a stipend which allowed their families to live, signed up between August 1915 and April 1916. The Conscription Act which was enacted in January 1916 was not immediately applied to Ireland. Nonetheless, it required only a simple cabinet decree to extend this law to Ireland; this was a threat which hung permanently over the Irish. Then, on 9 April 1918, the War Cabinet announced its decision to extend conscription to Ireland. The effect was to unite the whole of Ireland against the measure and to strengthen Sinn Fein with all the vigor of the new protest. The Irish bishops unanimously condemned conscription: they issued a statement saying that the Irish people had the right to resist conscription by all means consonant with the laws of God.

## **How the Past Affects the Present**

In what specific ways does the past leave its imprint on the present? What is the impact of collective memory on history? Without claiming to be exhaustive, this

**Table 6.1 Wars Play a Crucial Role in Revealing Separatist Feelings**

Country	Minority	Year	
Austria	Hungarians	1866	Hungarian legions join the Prussian army during the Austro-Prussian War.
Austria	Czechs	1914	Desertions. A Czech legion was fighting for the Allies in France and Italy.
Britain	Irish	1916	The threat of conscription favored the independence movement.
Canada	French Canadians	1899	Henri Bourassa resigned seat in Parliament in protest against sending Canadian troops to South Africa. Later, as the war dragged on, ill feelings between English- and French-Canadian activists culminated in street riots in Montreal.
Egypt	Palestinians	1832	Conscription triggered armed resistance against Egyptians in the area of Nablus
Canada	French Canadians	1918	Rioting in the streets of Quebec against conscription. Four people shot by the police.
France	Vendéens	1793	Conscription triggered the war in the Vendée.
France	Algerians	1916	An insurrection followed conscription in the district of Batna.
Hungary	Croats	1848	Croats sided with Austria in the war against Hungary.
Russia	Georgians	1914	A Georgian regiment sided with the Turks.
Spain	Catalonians	1909	The Tragic Week in Catalonia began with a general strike to protest against the sending of Barcelona conscripts to Morocco.
Yugoslavia	Croatians	1941	Massive desertions in the Yougoslavian army as Germany and Italy invaded the country.

*Sources:* Austria: Keller (1972, p.271), Wiskemann (1938); Britain: Kee (1972); Canada: Keller (1972, p. 492), *The Round Table* (June 1918, 619-623), Vaugeois (1969), Young (1982); France: Zannettaci-Stephanopoli (1938); Russia: Manvelichvili (1951); Spain: Balcells (1996); Yugoslavia: *Quid* (p. 1162).

section offer some partial answers.

### Primal Ownership

The prerogatives attributed to the first occupants play an important role in relations between peoples. An example will serve to illustrate this point. Norwegian and Dan-

ish Vikings swept over Europe in two great waves, the first between 860 and 875 and the second between 980 and 1010. In England, they settled primarily along the east coast while in France they established themselves up in Normandy. The very name of this province recalls the country of origin of the immigration in so far as the term “Normands” applied to all the peoples who had come from the north. Yet, when William I of Normandy invaded England in 1066, the language of his court was French, not Danish. Within scarcely a century, the Viking conquerors had blended with the aristocracy of northwestern France to the very point of adopting their language. This could seem an extraordinarily rapid transformation if one remembers what has been said in chapter 4 about the slowness of linguistic phenomena. This rapidity is typical of the melting pot phenomena. Needless to say a similar assimilation mechanism occurred among the Danes who settled in England, as well as among the descendants of William I and his followers.

The integration mechanism illustrated by this example can be summed up in the following terms:

**The melting pot mechanism** Invaders (or immigrants) tend to assimilate themselves to the nation which they have invaded, in particular by adopting its language. But for that assimilation to occur the two peoples must be at comparable stages of technical development; otherwise, the occupation tends toward a form of colonialism.

This is what may be called the privilege of primal ownership, a term coined by Walker Connor.<sup>29</sup>

The most spectacular illustration of this mechanism is, of course, the American melting pot. Because a large majority of the first colonists were English speakers, later immigrants all adopted this language as well as the cultural traditions of the first stratum of inhabitants.

At this point an objection can be raised which shows that the melting pot mechanism is probably not the only possible assimilation mechanism at the linguistic level. Indeed, we have already mentioned that in the eighteenth century French became the language used both at many princely courts of continental Europe and among the intelligentsia. Needless to say, there was no melting point phenomenon in that case. The following examples will allow us a better understanding of the characteristics of the melting pot phenomenon. First of all, however, a comment is in order on the choice of these examples.

In a small number of cases an aboriginal population has occupied a country for thousands of years; this is for instance the case in Australia, where aborigines have lived since about 50,000 B.C. But such cases are a particularity of isolated lands and are

therefore rare. In general, there is a continual mixing of populations. It would be difficult to say for how long the Gauls had lived in Normandy before the arrival of the Vikings. For this reason, we will confine ourselves to cases in which the arrival date of the “first” inhabitants can be determined fairly precisely. Our main objective is to determine the length of occupation necessary to set up primal ownership.

*South Africa* South Africa offers an interesting example in several ways. It shows that primal ownership does not depend on the cultural prestige of a language: even a recently created language with a small number of speakers can bring about a melting pot phenomenon. In other words even a small nucleus of people can assure primal ownership.

In the late 1990s the dominant language in the European population of South Africa was Afrikaans: 5.9 million people spoke it at home as against only 3.4 million who spoke English. Afrikaans is a language which in its oral form diverged from Dutch during the nineteenth century. This divergence was made official around 1920 through the adoption of standard rules for the written form of Afrikaans. Incidentally, a translation of the Bible into Afrikaans was also published in the early 1920s.<sup>30</sup> How could a language so recently created resist the successive waves of English immigrants who came to South Africa after 1815? This fact is even more astonishing if we consider that these immigrants had the backing of the British Empire then at the peak of its power. Two words summarize the answer to this question: primal ownership. In spite of their small number and the low status of their language the Boer society managed to assimilate a substantial number of English immigrants. There are indeed today in South Africa many people with English names such as Anderson, Barry, Dalton, Davis, Robinson whose mother tongue is Afrikaans; there are also Africans whose mother tongue is Afrikaans. Let us now look more closely at the mechanisms of the melting pot phenomenon in this particular case.

The first Dutch colonists came to the Cape region around 1650. British domination of the Cape dates from 1812, roughly a century and a half later. At the end of the eighteenth century, the Boers were still few in number. They had formed an embryonic society around 1790, despite numbering fewer than 20,000 people. Immigrants then began to arrive from various countries. (1) Around 1820, for example, about 5,000 English farmers were settled in the Cape region. (2) Numerous Indians came to the region of Durban at the end of the nineteenth century. (3) Germans arrived in the late nineteenth century. The English colonial administration used all its powers to impose English as the main language. In 1822–1827, for example, English became the sole medium of communication in the courtroom and in official correspondence. This English pressure was at the root of the Great Trek, in which Boers marched north to create the Orange Free State and the South African Republic (Transvaal).

**Table 6.2 Primal Ownership Situations**

Region or country	Period of primal ownership	Origin of second-wave immigrants
Argentina	1550–1800	Italy, Wales, etc.
New Mexico	1550–1848	United States
Normandy	?–900	Denmark, Norway
Peru	1550–1850	Japan
Puerto Rico	1530–1898	United States
Québec	1540–1759	United States, Britain
South Africa	1650–1814	Britain, India, Germany
United States	1620–1800	Germany, Italy, Sweden, etc.

*Note:* Except for the case of Normandy, which is included because it is mentioned in the text, we restricted ourselves to cases for which the date of arrival of the “first” inhabitants is fairly well established. Two or three centuries seem sufficient to confere primal ownership; because of this privilege later arrivals will have to adopt the language and cultural traditions of the “first” occupants.

However, toward the end of the nineteenth century, the discovery of gold and diamonds in the Transvaal brought about such an influx of Anglo-Saxons that the Boers became again a minority.<sup>30</sup> Under these conditions, we might expect that after the defeat of the Boers in their war with Great Britain (1899–1902) they would definitively lose their identity and be assimilated. Curiously, the exact opposite occurred. This war was an extraordinary catalyst for the national identity of the Boers. Before the war, the population was fragmented into multiple clans because of the great distances over which they were spread, yet the war created a people conscious of its unity. Not surprisingly that war became one of the founding myths of the Afrikaner nation.

**Miscellaneous examples** Here are further examples which emphasize the frequency of the melting pot phenomenon (see also Table 6.2).

- Quebec is often spoken of as an example of development in isolation which permitted retention of the French language; this is, however, only partly true. After the American Revolution, for example, Quebec received a substantial number of American loyalists.<sup>31</sup> Later, there were further influxes of immigrants from various sources. The 80 percent figure for French speakers has been maintained only through the assimilation of new immigrants.

- Of all the South American countries, Argentina has accepted the largest number of European immigrants of diverse origins. The mechanism of the melting pot worked as effectively there as in the United States: within two or three generations,

**Table 6.3 California versus New Mexico in 1850**

	Population	Spanish-speaking people in percentage of total population	Males in percentage of total population
California	93,000	8.1%	92.5%
New Mexico	66,000	96.8%	53.3%

*Sources:* Population by states and by sex: *Historical Statistics of the United States*; Spanish-speaking population: Crawford (1992).

Italian, German and Welsh immigrants had adopted the Spanish language and the Argentine cultural heritage.

- For two or three centuries, Catalonia has been one of the most dynamic Spanish regions in the commercial, industrial and cultural spheres. Because of this dynamism, Catalonia has attracted a substantial number of immigrants from other regions. In the mid-1990s Catalan was currently spoken by 75 percent of the population, which means that successive waves of immigrants have melted into the Catalan cultural universe. As far as the language is concerned the situation is similar to that of South Africa in the sense that only six million people speak Catalan worldwide, while Spanish is spoken by 250 million.

The same phenomenon has been observed, to a lesser degree, in the Basque Country. The region also experienced a large immigration because of its important industrial development and to a certain extent it succeeded in assimilating new immigrants. Nevertheless, in the mid-1990s Basque was spoken by only 35 percent of the population. Should we attribute this difference to the fact that Basque is a language unrelated to Spanish, and that it is consequently more difficult for immigrants to learn than is Catalan, a language remarkably similar to Spanish?

- Another interesting example is the contrast between New Mexico and California. When these two regions were annexed to the United States in 1848, their situations were substantially different, as Table 6.3 shows. California was occupied by thousands of “frontiersmen”; the nature of this population is brought out by the enormous imbalance between men and women. New Mexico, as the male-female balance shows, had been inhabited for a long time by a largely Spanish-speaking population. Engulfed as they were in a huge English-speaking nation which was possessed of an impressive faculty for assimilation, the Spanish speakers of New Mexico found themselves in a situation that was unfavorable to the establishment of their rights of primal ownership. Yet, they succeeded in making Spanish an official language equal to English. In 1940, 45 percent of the people of New Mexico re-



ported Spanish as their mother tongue; in 1990, Spanish was still spoken at home by 28 percent of the population.<sup>32</sup>

In contrast, Spanish speakers in California could hardly invoke the privilege of primal ownership; as a result, Spanish does not have the same status in California despite an important influx of immigrants from Mexico in recent decades.

It should be noted that New Mexico differs from the other examples in that the use of Spanish hardly spread to English-speaking immigrants and remained limited to the people of Mexican origin; indeed, in 1990 this group amounted to 38 percent of the population.<sup>33</sup> In short, the language did not spread and this little efficiency of the primal ownership mechanism can probably be attributed to the technical and economic status of the English-speaking immigrants. However, the fact that Spanish more or less maintained itself in a country where integration forces are very strong should certainly be attributed to primal ownership privilege.

### **The Role of Historical Myths**

Who in the West knows Mustafa Kamil (1874–1908) or Zahran? The second was a martyr of the Denshawi affair (13 June 1906). We were unable to find any book in English on one of these Egyptian figures in the catalogue of the Harvard Library. Yet, for all Egyptians they are two well-known symbols of the liberation struggle against the British. In his biography President Anwar el-Sadat explains that the stories about Kamil and Zahran that his parents told him in his infancy have had a powerful impact on his resolution to devote his life to the liberation of his country.

That example illustrates the great importance of historical myths. As a matter of fact, the history of every human group contains a certain number of origin myths in which the members of the group recognize themselves. In most cases, these myths are based on quite real historical episodes. As a result, the term “myth” is hardly adequate; we used it nevertheless, first, because it is consecrated by usage, and, second, because it emphasizes the selection process which retains certain elements and rejects others; the representation of reality counts as much as reality itself.

Generally speaking, peoples have an entire range of origin myths. Table 6.4 summarizes several cases in which an origin myth stands out in an especially clear fashion. In every case, except for the Great Trek, the stories refer to tragic episodes in which the survival of the group was at stake. In order for the myth to have a unifying force, it must concern the entire group. This condition is often lacking in the case of peoples whose geographical area is spread over several countries; such is the case for the Kurds, whose territory extends into three countries: Iran, Iraq and Turkey. The Kurds have three parallel histories rather than a single one. Perhaps is this a key to why Kurdish resistance movements have so much difficulty in organizing a common front?

**Table 6.4** Examples of Origin Myths for National Identities

People	Historical episode	
Acadians	“Grand Dérangement” (transportation)	1755
Afrikaners	Great Trek, South African War	1835–1840 1899–1902
Cherokee, Choctaw, Creek	Trail of Tears	1830–1840
Navajos	Long Walk	1864
Palestinians	Intifada	1987–1993

*Note:* The choice of an origin myth in the history of a nation is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. To get a clearer picture we restricted ourselves to examples from small nations whose history covers a fairly short period.

### Recollection of Past Glory

The only two African countries to be independent in 1945 (except for Liberia, a nineteenth-century American creation) were Egypt and Ethiopia; both are nations with a long past as sovereign states. This is not merely a coincidence.

The unification of Upper and Lower Egypt dates from 2775 B.C.; for more than two thousand years, Egypt succeeded in repulsing foreign invaders. This situation began to change after the Persian conquest in 525 B.C. From that time on, Egypt was subject to the domination of several empires in succession: the Roman Empire, the Fatimid Empire, the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire. During these periods of foreign domination, there were numerous, recurrent revolts which foreshadowed the struggle against British domination. Let us mention a few examples. Around 110 A.D., there was a revolt of such strength that the emperor Trajan was forced to give up his war against the Parthians. In 172 A.D., there was another serious insurrection which defeated a Roman army in open battle.<sup>34</sup> In 1811, Mehemet Ali defeated the Ottomans, giving Egypt widespread autonomy.

The Kingdom of Ethiopia was founded at the beginning of the Christian era. Throughout the Middle Ages, Ethiopia, a Christian nation surrounded by Muslim states, prevailed against numerous Muslim attacks, especially in the sixteenth century. This is proof of the solidity of this nation, even though we might be tempted to think that the mountainous terrain and the difficulty of establishing communications made things somewhat easier for Ethiopia than for Egypt.

These two examples show that the memory of a prestigious past has a marked influence on the will of a people to remain free of the yoke of a foreign power. What are the most important parameters of this phenomenon? The time an independent state has existed, the extent of its former power and prestige, or the span of time during

which the country was under foreign domination? Given the great number of examples of this type, a fairly systematic study would certainly be possible but we will postpone it to a further publication.

## Measurement of Separatist Disturbances

In the first two sections of this chapter, we have tried to show how the history of a people shapes its identity and how common historical experiences cement closely connected clans into nations. In this process, language, historical myths and collective memory merge into a complex feeling of identity. This identity is by its nature relatively elusive: it is related to membership in a linguistic community, without being confused with that identity, and it is anchored in historical reality but is also much influenced by collective psychology. The qualifier “psychohistorical” used by the American writer Isaac Asimov (born in Russia, 1920–1992) in his saga *Foundation* (1951–1953), provides a good definition of this notion.

We must now see if we can submit these concepts to more precise, systematic tests. We will first describe some qualitative tests before introducing a historical index which will enable us to estimate the strength of nationalistic feelings and to study the degree of correlation between past and present struggles.


### Links between Past and Present Forms of Separatist Action

In its struggle against a central government a community has at its disposal a vast range of means. Figure 6.3 summarizes several of these means, classifying them from the middle toward the periphery in order of increasing virulence. Four sectors of autonomist activity have been selected:

- (1) Actions aimed at the central authority and its representatives.
- (2) Actions aimed against colonists, that is, immigrants who have established themselves in the homeland of the group.
- (3) Support from outside.
- (4) Affirmation of national identity.

In order to show how the grid in Figure 6.3 can be used we apply it in the following paragraph to a number of case studies.

*The case of the Bernese Jura* This case has the advantage of being particularly well documented; in particular it has been the object of an extensive historical and geographical study by John Jenkins. This region is in western Switzerland along the part of the French frontier which crosses the Jura massif (Figure 6.4). Although the region is both French speaking and Catholic, it was attached to the Protestant, German-speaking canton of Bern in 1815. The arbitrary nature of this attachment




**Figure 6.3 Classification Grid for Separatist Disturbances.** From the center outward, events are placed in order of increasing gravity and violence; each of the quadrant corresponds to a certain type of separatist action. For the inner squares the keys are as follows. (1a): lawsuit; (1b): petitions and election of nationalists; (1c): information offices abroad; (1d): publications in the vernacular.

created tensions and kept an autonomist fervor alive for more than a century and a half.

The corresponding grid is shown in Figure 6.5a. The comparison shows there are several similarities between the two periods of time. Firstly, the low level of violence: indeed all actions are confined in the three inner squares. Secondly, the actions are mainly directed against the state and only marginally against the colonists. Thirdly, the support from abroad was minimal. However, in order to understand somewhat better what happened we present a brief historical outline.

The modern-day Bernese Jura has a population of about 70,000, which makes it a small region, even in comparison with the rest of Switzerland: its people make up



**Figure 6.4 Map of Switzerland.** The Bernese Jura which is in the north of the canton of Bern is shown by closely spaced hatching. The other lines show the borders of the 23 Swiss cantons.

only 1.3 percent of the total Swiss population. Before its attachment to the canton of Bern, the Bernese Jura made up the episcopal principality of Basel-Porrentruy, whose origins can be traced back to 999. For several centuries, this bishopric was an autonomous political entity. Even after it became part of the Holy Roman Empire in 1032, it retained the right to mint coins, establish tolls, raise an army and sign treaties. Thus, in 1714, it affixed its signature to the peace treaty of Baden which Louis XIV signed with the Holy Roman Empire. It was at the Congress of Vienna that the principality of Bâle-Porrentruy was given to the canton of Bern in return for the districts of Vaud and Argovie, which were taken away and made into new Swiss cantons.<sup>35</sup>

In a way, the attachment of the Bernese Jura to the canton of Bern resembled the joining of Bavaria to the German Empire. In both cases, an autonomous region with a Catholic majority was annexed to a much larger entity with a Protestant majority. We know that in 1866 Bavaria waged war against Prussia to oppose the growing hegemony of the latter nation. In 1870, Bavaria finally agreed to annexation to the German Empire, but kept certain privileges until 1918, in particular, the right to have its own armed forces. Between the cases of Bavaria and the Bernese Jura, there is nevertheless a major difference: Bavaria, like the rest of Germany, was German speaking, while the population of the Bernese Jura spoke French. During the nineteenth century religious questions progressively lost much of their importance while on the

other hand language questions became more and more acute. It must be pointed out, however, that the linguistic factor is not alone the origin of the problem. Indeed there are other Swiss cantons which are not linguistically homogeneous without for that reason having the same problems as the Bernese Jura. For instance, the cantons of Fribourg and Valais both have a mixed French- (60 percent) and German-speaking population; in the canton of Grisons, German-speakers make up 60 percent of the population as opposed to 13 percent who speak Italian. The origin of the separatist problem in the Bernese Jura is essentially historical: the shock of 1815, followed by a succession of religious disagreements, fanned separatist flames throughout the entire nineteenth century.

The first jolt occurred in 1834. The government of Bern, along with some anticlerical Jurassians, adopted a declaration which proposed to nationalize the Catholic Church and subordinate it to the state, in clear violation of the religious guarantees given by the Treaty of 1815. In 1836, 8,000 Catholics in the Jura petitioned the government not to ratify the agreement. After the petition was disregarded, several towns rose in open rebellion. In response, the Bernese government deposed three prefects and ordered the military occupation of the Catholic districts. The Jurassian rebels asked for help from France, in the latter's capacity as one of the guarantor powers of the Treaty of 1815. The French reacted sharply and sent an ultimatum to Bern which made the Bernese government back down and agree to renegotiate the question.<sup>36</sup>

This first crisis was the prototype of crises that occurred over the next 150 years. Basically, these crises recurrently displayed the same sequence of events: popular protest, especially by petition; the refusal of the Bernese government; growing tension, along with occupation of the French-speaking districts by Bernese grenadiers; an appeal to the signatory powers of the Treaty of 1815; renegotiations and resolution of the crisis, at least temporarily. Here are two examples to illustrate this scenario. In 1870, the Vatican Council (the first general council since that of Trent three centuries earlier) proclaimed the dogma of papal infallibility. This doctrine which, as one knows, was rejected by Bismarck was also refused by the canton of Bern. The latter forbade Catholic priests to preach in favor of the doctrine, whereupon the clergy of the Jura refused to accept this decision. The reaction of the Bernese government was fierce: troops occupied the Jura, Catholic priests were proscribed, and processions were forbidden. A petition with 9,100 signatures was then sent to the federal assembly. In April 1874, at the very height of the crisis, the people of the Jura elected 31 Catholic deputies out of a total of 47. An amnesty passed in 1878 finally brought about a truce.<sup>37</sup>

There was a renewed heightening of tension in 1893, when the people of the Jura rejected the new Bernese constitution, and another during the 1914–1918 war, when

further resentment was aroused between French- and German-speakers. A separatist party was formed in the Bernese Jura in 1917 but the most important crisis did not occur until the 1960s. During the autumn of 1957, a “popular initiative,” that is, a petition in favor of a referendum, collected more than the 12,000 required signatures. In July 1959, the electors of the canton of Bern refused to grant the Bernese Jura the possibility of claiming autonomy through constitutional means. On 28 April 1963, a farm belonging to the federal military department was torched, with the Jura Liberation Front (Front de Libération du Jura: FLJ) claiming credit for this act. A sawmill belonging to an anti-autonomist was blown up on 23 December 1963, and on 12 March 1964, there was an attack on a branch of the Bernese Cantonal Bank. The district was placed under police control in February 1964, in expectation of further attacks. In July 1965, the people of the Jura sent a memorandum to the signatory countries of the 1815 Treaty of Vienna. In November 1966, France refused to extradite Jean-Baptiste Hennin, a separatist who was sought by the Bernese police. Every year in mid-September, the Day of the Bernese People brought together a substantial number of protesters, on average about 35,000 persons, almost half the population. One of the high points of the tension was reached during this festival in 1968, when armored troops were deployed in the district. Finally, a constitutional process beginning in 1972 culminated in the birth of the new canton in 1978. Despite this, all the problems have not been resolved, for a portion of Bernese French speakers were not included in the canton; in 1993, there were both bombings and arsons. Table 6.5 sums up the main elements of the preceding discussion; Figure 6.5a shows them schematically via a diagram.

*The case of the Aceh province in Indonesia* In the Indonesian province of Aceh, in northern Sumatra, there has been episodic open warfare against the occupier for more than a century. As in the Bernese Jura case we observe recurrent and paronymous events, but in a completely different register. The sources at our disposal, primarily Cribb and Zainu'ddin, do not really permit an analysis as detailed as the one we made earlier for the Bernese Jura. Warfare and guerilla tactics have been the main forms of separatist struggles in Aceh. According to official estimates, the thirty-year war waged by the Acehnese against the Dutch (1873–1908) resulted in 100,000 Acehnese deaths and 12,000 among the Dutch. The war has been labeled “ferocious” although no detailed historical record seems to be available. A similar pattern occurred once again under Indonesian (Javanese) occupation. In September 1953, there was an uprising led by the former military governor, Daud Bereuh. Until 1959, the region remained almost completely independent from Djakarta. A new separatist uprising broke out in 1990; the death toll for that single year has been estimated at about 2,300.



**Table 6.5 Forms of Separatist Struggles in the Bernese Jura before and after 1945**


1815–1945		1945–1995	
<b>Petitions</b>			
1834	8,000 Catholic Jurassians petitioned Cantonal government not to ratify the nationalization of the Catholic Church.	1957	Sep. “Popular initiative”: more than 12,000 signatures.
1836	Appeal to the French government.	1965	Jul. A memorandum is addressed to the signatory countries of the Treaty of Vienna (1815).
1874	Petition: 9,100 signatures.		
<b>Separatist protest in elections</b>			
1874	Apr. 31 Catholics elected in a total of 47 representatives.	1959	7 Jul. Electoral clash between Jura and the rest of the canton.
1893	Jun. The new Bernese Constitution is rejected by 9,984 against 2,189 votes.	1970	Mar. Modification of the Bernese constitution.
		1972	6 Jun. First referendum.
		1975	3 Mar. Second referendum.
<b>Civil unrest</b>			
1834	The population of several towns rose up in rebellion. Military occupation of the Catholic districts ordered by the Bernese Government.	1964	Feb. The district is under close police control.
		1968	Oct. An armored battalion deployed in the district.
1873	As the Catholic communities actively supported their clergy, the Bernese government ordered military occupation and ruthlessly expelled the deposed priests.	1963-1964	Bomb attacks and arson
		1975	Sep. Violent confrontation between separatists, anti-separatists and the police at Moutier.

*Note:* We can see the recurrent nature of these episodes and the persistence of the kinds of struggles.

*Sources:* Jenkins (1986), Rennwald (1984).


*The Basque Provinces versus Catalonia* This case is of great interest from the perspective of comparative analysis. Here we have two provinces which are not too distant from each other and within the same country. Basque separatist claims led to terrorism, while negotiation was the norm in Catalonia. To explain this contrast, several mechanisms have been proposed which are reviewed in a paper by D. Laitin published in 1995. Nevertheless, as Laitin quite rightly says, it would not be

## Bernese Jura: 1815 to 1945 versus 1945 to 1995



**Figure 6.5a** Grid of Separatist Troubles in the Bernese Jura for the Periods 1815–1945 and 1945–1995. Cross-hatching show the type of actions as defined in Figure 6.3. These (as well as following) graphs illustrate in a semi-quantitative way both the permanencies and shifts over a period of two centuries. It should be noted that since available information is less detailed for the nineteenth century peaceful actions are certainly underrepresented in the graph for the first period; the same remark also applies to the three following grids.

## Scotland: 1815 to 1945 versus 1945 to 1995



**Figure 6.5b** Grid of Separatist Troubles in Scotland for the Periods 1815–1945 and 1945–1995. The first period is essentially marked by the Jacobite insurrections which continue the numerous armed confrontations between England and Scotland in previous centuries.

### Quebec: 1815 to 1945 versus 1945 to 1995




Figure 6.5c Grid of Separatist Troubles in Quebec for the Periods 1815–1945 and 1945–1995. The first period (left-hand side) was marked by the insurrections in 1837 and 1838.

### Xinjiang: 1815 to 1945 versus 1945 to 1995




Figure 6.5d Grid of Separatist Troubles in Xinjiang for the Periods 1815–1945 and 1945–1995. The first period (left-hand side) was essentially marked by the great uprising of 1864–1878.

fruitful to look for an explanation applicable only to the cases of Catalonia and the Basque Provinces. There are numerous geographical and historical differences between these two regions; it would be only too easy and completely arbitrary to pick up one of these factors and to claim that it is the “real” cause. Only an explanation having a sufficiently general character as to be applicable to other cases as well could be anything other than a tautology. This is the case with the explanation we propose below, which is based on the general hypothesis of historical paronymy. This is also the case with the mechanism proposed by Laitin. Only the observation of other examples can help us opt for one or the other of these explanations. In Laitin’s words, the theories should be put to a “robustness” test in other countries (1995, p. 19).

Laitin has constructed a carefully developed model which rests on both the phenomena of language-learning and the interaction of two different populations: first, the people who received instruction through the medium of the central language, and second, those who received instruction in the regional language. Some of the latter are termed “language vigilantes.” By terrorizing prominent regional actors who have not switched to the regional language, the vigilantes raised the status costs of not switching. By terrorizing the police forces of the political center, the vigilantes sought to create greater regional solidarity and thereby enhance the benefits of switching. The determining factor in this mechanism is thus the level of practice of the minority language; we know that this level is at least twice as high in Catalonia as it is in the Basque Country. Laitin does not restrict himself to the application of this method to the Basque Country and Catalonia; he also compares Ukraine and Georgia after 1990, which is a similar case with Ukraine remaining fairly calm and Georgia rocked by recurrent troubles. It should perhaps be noted that in this case the unrest in Georgia may be partly due to a contagion from neighboring Chechnya.

Our contention is that throughout their recent history, Basques have been more prone than Catalans to resort to political violence and military solutions. Obviously, a thorough analysis would require much more space than we can devote to it here. We will limit ourselves to discussing how both peoples reacted to and took part in the many internal conflicts that have affected Spain during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There have been five main wars: the four so-called Carlist wars of 1833–1839, June 1848–April 1849, 1860, 1872–1874, and the Spanish Civil War (1937–1939). We will examine them in turn.

- Barrès du Molard, chief of staff to Charles V, gave a detailed account of the battles that were fought in the First Carlist War (1833–1839). Out of 63 battles, 59 took place in the Basque provinces, including Navarre, while four took place in Castille. In spite of a substantial amount of social agitation in Catalonia, no battle was fought there.

- The Carlist attempts which took place in 1848–1849 and in 1860 were not very serious. In 1848, Alzola took command of the Carlists in the Basque provinces; he was captured and shot.<sup>38</sup> At the same time, Cabrera entered Catalonia through French Cerdagne (June 1848). Although he spent almost a year there, no significant fighting took place; in April 1849, he abandoned hope and went back across the frontier. In April 1860, Don Carlos Luis landed with 3,500 troops near Tortosa in the south of Catalonia; as the expected uprising did not occur, he surrendered without putting up any resistance.

- The protracted war of 1872–1874 was marked by the following major battles: Orioquieta (Navarre, May 1872), Estella (Basque provinces, August 1873), Tolosa (Basque provinces, November 1873), Vich and Olot (Catalonia, January and March 1874), Teruel and Cuenca (Castille, July 1874), and the sieges of Bilbao and Irun (Basque provinces, 1874). Out of nine battles, four took place in the Basque provinces, while there were only two in Catalonia.

- During the Spanish Civil War, the Nationalists first subdued the Basque provinces. From September 1936 to August 1937, Nationalist forces proceeded westward from San Sebastian to Santander. The campaign in Catalonia (December 1938–February 1939) was one of the last phases of the war and was much shorter than the struggle in the Basque provinces. The latter is said to have cost 50,000 deaths;<sup>39</sup> we were unable to find a corresponding figure for the war in Catalonia.

Broadly speaking, on the basis of the previous historical record, we may say that although the repertoire of the Catalan people included different varieties of general strikes, urban uprisings or self-promulgated proclamations of autonomy, it was rather poorly endowed in terms of stubborn fighting or military upheavals. This may account for the difference between Basque and Catalan autonomist movements after 1960.

In closing, let us note a historical peculiarity of the Spanish Basque Country. According to data gleaned from the work of the historian J. Vives (presented again by Meyer), the nobility in the Basque Country in the eighteenth century made up more than 10 percent of the population;<sup>40</sup> this is a considerably higher proportion than the 5 percent average for all of Spain. In France, the nobility made up only 1.1 percent of the population. In Europe, only Poland had such a large number of nobles, and the problems that it caused are well known. Aristocratic psychology, with its insistence on genealogy and honor, may have contributed to defining the Basque identity in a fairly exclusive and nationalistic sense.

*Brittany versus Scotland*     Brittany and Scotland are both regions with roots in a distant Celtic past. The forms taken by their separatist movements are distinguished

from other struggles by the importance given to historical symbols. Yet, each region has his own style as illustrated by the following examples.

In Breton separatist struggles, bombings of French historical memorials have become a well-established tradition. During the last sixty years, there have been at least four incidents of this kind: (1) 7 August 1932, the destruction in Rennes of the memorial commemorating the reunion of Brittany and France in 1532;<sup>41</sup> (2) 10 October 1973: destruction of the memorial commemorating the last public speech of General de Gaulle before his resignation in 1969; (3) 26 June 1978: destruction by fire bombs of an aisle in the Château of Versailles; (4) November 1993: destruction of the ancient House of Parliament in Rennes, set on fire by demonstrators.

Scotland, too, has shown great interest in historical symbols, but has availed itself of a different repertoire. In general terms, we can say that actions taken by the Scots were directed less at the English state as such and more at a long history of subordination to England. We have seen an illustration in the theft of the Stone of Destiny.

*Celebration of the national day* In most nations, whether small or large, there is a special day for celebrating the foundation of the nation-state; in the United States it is Independence Day, in France Bastille Day. Most minorities also picked up a special time to celebrate their nations. In Wales, for example, the National Eisteddfod (Eisteddfod means “session” in Welsh) attracts thousands of Welshmen during a week in August. Founded in 1450, this festival is a famous national institution. During the festival, great importance is given to choral singing and to Welsh poetry. Similar instances are the Diada Nacional (11 September) in Catalonia, the Day of the Basque Nation (12 April), the Day of the Jurassian People (8 September), and the feast of St. Jean-Baptiste (24 June) in Quebec. These national days become national holidays only when the nations become nation-states.

*The downward trend in the level of violence* Comparing the graphics in Figure 6.5 for the periods 1815–1945 and 1945–1995 shows that, especially in industrialized regions, there are on average more hatched regions near the center of the graphics (and less on the periphery) in the second period than in the first, which corresponds to an overall decrease in the level of violence. That statistical observation is consistent with intuition if one realizes that for the period 1945–1994, it has obviously been impossible for minority groups in industrialized countries to wage war against the state. Nowadays, open warfare can only be used in tropical or mountainous regions and against rather weak states. The military defeat of the Sikhs in Punjab (1983–1992), their audacity and courage notwithstanding, was an illustration of this observation. In industrialized countries, the last confrontations involving minority groups were the wars against the Maoris (Fourth Maori War, 1867–1872), and those against the

Indians in the western American states: the battle of Wounded Knee Creek (29 December 1890) and the Navajo uprising in southern Colorado in April 1893.<sup>42</sup> These traditional forms of resistance being ineffective, new ones have had to be invented; not surprisingly, this is a lengthy process whose completion may take well over a century.

### Assessing the Level of Separatist Disturbances

If qualitative comparisons like those made above are possible for two or three regions, they would become unmanageable if they had to be extended to ten or twenty regions. Nevertheless, this is a minimum number of cases for testing a theory. From this point of view, the most comfortable approach is to pass from a qualitative to a quantitative description. In short, this approach is based on the fact that a statistical figure constitutes a remarkably effective means of summing up a complex situation. In so doing, certain qualitative aspects will certainly be eliminated. This is, however, an inevitable stage for, in the words of M. Allais (1988 Nobel prize winner in economics) “Every science is a compromise between the wish for simplicity and the wish for resemblance” [Toute science est un compromis entre le souci de simplicité et le souci de ressemblance].<sup>43</sup>

*An index of intensity for separatist disturbances* To construct such an index, we follow in its general outlines the choices made by Richardson for the definition of the intensity of wars. The criterion used by Richardson is the number of deaths on both sides; furthermore, in order to have a scale between 0 and 10, and not an inconvenient scale between 1 and several millions, Richardson used not the numbers themselves but their logarithms.

Using logarithms has the added advantage of greatly reducing the relative error, as the following example will show. Suppose that, for a separatist struggle, we only know that there are between 5,000 and 10,000 victims; this is a relative uncertainty of  $(10,000 - 5,000)/5,000 = 100$  percent. Note that uncertainties of such magnitude are common currency in practice. By contrast a logarithmic index will be comprised between  $\log 5000 = 3.70$  and  $\log 10,000 = 4$ ; the relative uncertainty is thus no more than  $(4.3 - 3.70)/3.70 = 8$  percent.

In what follows we are mainly interested in cross-national comparisons. In order to have figures which are comparable from one country to another, irrespective of population size, it is preferable to use the ratio of the the number of deaths to the total population of the minority.

In conclusion the index  $d$  that we will use in order to characterize the intensity of a separatist struggle will be defined by the following formula:

$$d = \log \left[ \frac{\text{number of deaths in separatist struggle}}{\text{population of the minority expressed in millions}} \right]$$



In this form, the index is appropriate for separatist struggles which have turned into open warfare, such as the insurrections in Xinjiang or the province of Aceh. However, for more peaceful separatist struggles like those in Scotland or the Bernese Jura for which there are only few deaths, that index is inappropriate. This difficulty can be overcome by converting separatist actions into the number of “equivalent deaths,” henceforth noted ED. The following factors have been used as equivalents for one death:

- A demonstration with one million people
- 30 nonfatal casualties
- 30 bombings or 60 attempted arsons
- A petition signed by 100,000 people.

These conversion factors are based on realistic orders of magnitude. (1) It is rare that, given the tensions in separatist struggles, a demonstration with 1,000,000 people (or several demonstrations totalling that number) will not have confrontations with the police resulting in more or less serious casualties. (2) Statistics collected by Otto Berndt for the wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, show that the ratio of the number of wounded to the number of deaths is on the order of 4 to 1. In the case of separatist struggles, which are not open warfare, that ratio is higher however. For example, in the repression and dispersion of a demonstration by police, it is not unusual to have several dozen wounded, but no deaths. The factor of 30 given above is, all in all, an average for struggles ranging from open war to street demonstrations. (3) In cases of bombings or arson, it is quite unusual that several dozen attacks do not produce one victim, even if accidentally or unintentionally. Note that in a fair number of cases, especially in movements which have only marginal recourse to violence, it is often the bomber himself who is killed through his own inexperience.

*Examples of calculation of an index of intensity* Before calculating the index of intensity, we must choose the interval of time to be considered. An essential condition is that this interval must cover several decades; separatist agitation, in effect, occurs in intermittent “spurts” interspersed within a number of tranquil years. It is essential that the interval under study cover several of these “spurts” if the average is not to be biased. In short, this interval should cover a minimum of 30 to 40 years.

Let us take for example the Bernese Jura between 1945 and 1995. From 1960 to 1995, there was every year a large separatist gathering on the occasion of the Day of the Jurassian People; if we estimate an average of 30,000 individuals attending these rallies, we have a total of 1,050,000 persons. Outside these festivals, there have been a dozen or so more militant demonstrations, bringing together each time between a few hundred and a maximum of 2,000 people (23 February 1971, 16 May 1977); all

together, we can estimate  $10 \times 1000 = 10,000$  demonstrators which gives a total of 1,150,000 demonstrators, or 1.15 ED. In addition, there were two bombings and one act of arson, or:  $2/30 + 1/60 = 0.09$  ED.

On 8 September 1975, there were violent confrontations in Moutier between police and 1,500 young demonstrators.<sup>44</sup> There were a small number of minor casualties (their exact number is not given in this source) and 226 arrests. If we count a dozen or so wounded, the result is 0.3 ED. Finally, there was a petition with 12,000 signatures, or 0.12 ED. Thus we have a total “equivalent death” of 1.7. With a minority population of 80,000 persons the index  $d$  will be equal to:

$$d = \log(1.7/0.08) = \log(21.2) = 1.33$$

There is a last difficulty. During a bombing attack on 24 April 1993, the bomber was blown up by his own device. Because of the essentially peaceable nature of the movement the inclusion of this death will substantially change our preceding result: the number of “equivalent-deaths” will go up from 1.7 to 2.7 and the index itself will rise from 1.33 to 1.53. Should the death of the bomber be included or not? Whatever the response, it can be justified. If we decide to exclude it, we can say that this death was accidental and not directly related to the separatist movement; by deciding to include it, we can claim that the death was related to the separatist activity. The wisest decision will undoubtedly be not to decide, that is, to calculate correlations from both hypotheses and then look at the results.

This example illustrates the difficulties posed by the estimation of the index of intensity. (1) We can never be sure that an important event has not been omitted. (2) At certain times, we are forced to make somewhat subjective choices to decide if such and such an event should be included or not. A situation that occurs frequently is that economic claims are sometimes subjoined to separatist disturbances; the distinction between the two components is then a question of judgment.

It would nevertheless be wrong to think that these difficulties irreparably compromise the comparison between various separatist movements. The preceding uncertainties are, in fact, relatively unimportant because of the large disparities between different movements. This is shown by comparing the Bernese Jura with the province of Aceh in Indonesia.

This province is located in the least populous part of the island of Sumatra and in 1970 its population was estimated at 3 million. As we noted earlier, there have been two important revolts since 1945, namely, in 1953–1959 and 1991–1993. The total number of deaths can be estimated as at least 5,600.<sup>45</sup> We thus arrive at an index of intensity of:

$$d = \log(5600/3) = \log(1866) = 3.27$$

For Switzerland we have obtained:

$$d = 1.43 \pm 0.10$$

The figure for Aceh is two times larger and the  $\pm 0.10$  uncertainty makes little difference. This circumstance guarantees the pertinence of the comparisons.

*The index of intensity before and after 1945* One of the primary objectives of the index of intensity is to verify whether or not there is a correlation between the intensities of separatist struggles for two intervals in successive periods, for example between 1845–1945 and 1945–1995. In a later chapter we will see that there is indeed a fairly high correlation between the separatist activity of these two periods. This is a result which corroborates and systematizes the observations of particular examples given in this chapter. Furthermore, it will be seen that in this relationship, the coefficient of regression is less than 1, which means that the violence of separatist movements is diminishing, armed conflict giving way in many cases to more peaceful forms of struggle.

## Conclusion

The conclusions to be drawn from this chapter can be summarized as follows.

- Even though numerous writers have recognized that a common history is an essential element in the affirmation of a national identity, they have usually insisted more on the mythical aspect of a common history than on the close connections with the nation's real history. Observation shows that collective memory is much more trustworthy and precise than one might suppose a priori, even for events that took place several centuries ago. Observation also shows that it is the most tragic events which stand out in collective memory.
- Often conflicts are exacerbated in certain critical circumstances such as episodes of mobilization for war or attempts by the state to absorb a minority group through a policy of acculturation and immigration.
- When successive groups establish themselves in a region, observation shows that the privilege of primal ownership is tacitly recognized for the people who arrived first. This provides an explanation for the melting pot phenomenon. The minimum interval for the affirmation of this privilege is on the order of one or two centuries, which is, in fact, a fairly short time from the perspective of linguistic changes.
- Fighting methods used by separatist movements are chosen from their socio-cultural repertoire. The means resorted to by the Swiss in the Bernese Jura are not the same as those of the Scots; these, in turn, differ from the actions of the Basques or the Catalans. On the other hand, there is a great similarity over time (even on

a scale of one or two centuries) in the forms of actions taken by a given group. In a later chapter, we shall see how these observations can be systematized in a more quantitative form.

# Chapter 7

## Anticolonial Resistance

To begin with let us turn our attention to the Irish society in the first half of the nineteenth century. We see a rural society mired in chronic economic depression, a situation all the more surprising as the rest of Western Europe was experiencing rapid economic development during this period. The majority of the population was young because both birth and death rates were high. The absence of a future had already impelled a large number of Irish people to emigrate (as witnessed by the large Irish diaspora in the United States). These three factors, namely, the youth of the population, economic stagnation, and serious emigration are often found in colonial-type situations. The Irish, in short, faced a more than somber future. Nevertheless, within one century they would shake off the English yoke; the success of the Irish liberation struggle was all the more surprising because England enjoyed at that time undisputed world leadership. In a general way, through their liberation struggles, determined peoples were often able to prevail over countries which surpassed them greatly in population, economic power and military force. Even if foreign support usually played a key role, these David-versus-Goliath victories demonstrate the power of the collective will of a people.

At the beginning of this book, we introduced a distinction between cases in which the occupying power appropriated the soil (type A situations) and those in which this power exercised a primarily cultural domination (type B situations). This distinction resides in the fact that soil and language are the two principal pillars on which the identity of a people rests. Nevertheless, alongside these two major classes we also see situations in which control is exercised in the political and economic spheres. A typical example was the seizure of political power in Egypt by Great Britain at the end of the nineteenth century. Britain controlled in particular the Egyptian finances and army, and for this reason, British domination was particularly resented by the ruling elite of the country. We will reserve the term “type C dominations” for situations of this ilk. Table 7.1 proposes a classification which schematizes different types of struggle with reference to the kind of domination. Certain situations can combine several forms of domination; thus, in Ireland or in Algeria, there were simultaneously political control and seizure of the land; in general, it was rare that

**Table 7.1 Different Types of Revolts according to the Society and the Kind of Domination**

Type of society	Type of revolt	Examples
<b>A. Appropriation of territory</b>		
1) Rural society of feudal type	Aristocratic revolt	Georgia (17th–18th c.) Hungary (17th–18th c.)
2) Rural society in which the peasants are freeholders	Revolt of the mass of the peasants	Ireland (17th–18th c.)
<b>B. Cultural domination</b>		
1) Rural society before the generalization of public instruction	Revolt of urban, educated people	Bohemia (19th c.)
2) Semi-urbanized society after the generalization of public instruction	Revolt of the mass of the people	Quebec (20th c.)
<b>C. Political takeover</b>		
1) Low tax pressure	Revolt of the nation's elite	Egypt (20th c.)
2) High tax pressure	Local sporadic revolts of the mass of the people	India (20th c.)

seizure of the land was not accompanied by a certain form of political control. Still, observation shows that in mixed A-C situations, it was the occupation of the territory that was most resented. The present chapter is devoted essentially to type A situations, while in the following chapter we examine type B situations. Nevertheless, we will occasionally evoke type C situations, if only to uncover and underline differences and contrasts with types A and B. We begin in this chapter by examining the historical development of several anticolonial struggles. We will see in particular that these episodes follow the same basic pattern, which can be described in four successive phases. Then, to bring the differences into relief, we examine a few cases in which domination was confined to the political and financial spheres. In the third part, we make a more systematic inventory of recurrent traits and of qualitative regularities. In the last part, we look at several liberation struggles which were in progress at the end of the twentieth century. Readers who have a particular interest in the comparative approach can go directly to the third and fourth parts, especially if they are already familiar with the chronology of the examples discussed in the first

two parts.

Before delving into this subject, a word is in order on the vocabulary which we use. At the beginning of the twentieth century, it was not common to speak of Ireland or Bulgaria as “colonial-type situations.” Colonies were traditionally outside Europe and were inhabited by “people of color.” It was only after the decolonization period in the mid-twentieth century that parallels with European situations became apparent. Michael Hechter, who introduced the notion of “internal colonialism” played a pioneering role in the new awareness. In so doing, he followed and extended an approach developed a century earlier by K. Marx and F. Engels, who emphasized the strong parallel between the situation in India and Ireland.<sup>1</sup> M. Hechter’s book *Internal colonialism* caused a considerable stir and led to serious debate. Throughout this chapter, we will use the unifying nomenclature he introduced; to a certain extent, we will push the parallel even further by including cases like Burundi, Kashmir or Guatemala. An important step in scientific research consists in realizing that two things that were believed different are in fact variants of the same basic phenomenon. That was exactly Newton’s approach when he realized that the movement of the moon and that of an apple are controlled by the same law of universal gravitation.

## Examples of Anticolonial Struggles

In the development of a colonization process, the following four phases can be distinguished:

- Military conquest and the resistance that it brings about. The term “primary resistance” is often reserved for this phase, to distinguish it from the later phases of resistance.<sup>2</sup>
- The arrival of colonists, the appropriation of land and the implementation of domination; in this phase, the reactions against the colonists result in recurrent uprisings, which are quickly put down, and by a latent underground resistance.
- A reform period during which the colonizer tries to remove the most glaring forms of repression.
- The war of liberation which brings about the independence of the country; at this point, a more or less large number of colonists leaves the former colony.

These different phases are common to the majority of colonization episodes. We will begin with an examination of the case of Ireland.

### Ireland

The history of this country constitutes an ideal laboratory for the study of the mech-



anisms of colonization and liberation struggles, for several reasons. (1) The overall process extended over a particularly long period: there were more than six centuries between the first English incursions and independence. (2) The struggle of the Irish people for liberation was brought to a head while Great Britain was the leading world power. In this it is different from the cases of nations which took advantage of the fragility of declining empires, as for instance the Spanish Empire in Latin America or the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. (3) For the historian, an important aspect is the fact that the history of Ireland is well documented by English, Irish, French and Americans historians. In the case of the Balkans, for example, the situation is considerably less favorable because the Turkish point of view is notably underrepresented in the documentation available in Europe and the United States; it is therefore difficult to compare the version of the colonized and the point of view of the colonizer.

The election in 1960 of John F. Kennedy, a Catholic of Irish origin, to the presidency of the United States was an eloquent testimony to the success experienced by a great number of Irish immigrants. In the eighteenth century, British opinion of the Irish was completely different. This opinion was nourished particularly by observations made in the economic sphere. Since the 1960s, the economic development that has taken place in Ireland contrasts strongly with the stagnation of Northern Ireland; a century or two ago, the situation was diametrically the opposite. Ireland was then a very backward country compared to the other countries of Western Europe; Ulster was the only prosperous region. From the very fact of this underdevelopment, the Irish were considered incapable of taking responsibility for themselves. If one overlooks the turn of mind which was prevalent at that time the events which we are about to recount become incomprehensible. Furthermore, the comparisons between the case of Ireland and those of Algeria, Bulgaria or Kenya would seem incongruous.

To illustrate the situation at the beginning of the nineteenth century, let us recall the testimony of Alexis de Tocqueville on his visit to Ireland in 1835. Here are his impressions upon arriving in a village in Connaught:

The bed of this torrent seemed to be the only street in the village. I could not help remarking by the way what I had seen so many times in Ireland: all the houses were of sun-baked mud made into walls to the height of a man. The roofs of these dwellings were made of thatch that was so old that the grass which covered them could not be distinguished from the grass on the neighboring hillsides. These houses generally had neither windows nor fireplaces; light came in and smoke went out through the door. Inside, a tiny peat fire burned slowly between four flat stones.

This description reminds us of an African village, and comments on the Irish character made by Tocqueville's interlocutors was not unlike remarks made a century later by European colonists about Africans: "They have the divine virtues, but they are ignorant, violent, intemperate and, like savages, incapable of resisting the least impulse." According to Tocqueville this judgment seemed to reflect a fairly general opinion.

*The conquest phase* In the Irish case, the conquest phase was spread over more than three centuries. The invasion of Edward Bruce took place in 1315; although he was crowned king, the fact that he was defeated and killed at the battle of Foughart in 1318 shows that his intrusion had provoked a strong rejection among certain Irish clans. The conquest phase can be considered over with Cromwell's campaign in 1649. The plan of this campaign sums up the general movement of the English penetration, which proceeded from the east coast toward the interior of the island; Dublin was the bridgehead for the landings. Cromwell's army took the two forts at Drogheda and Wexford on the east coast (respectively, north and south of Dublin) before proceeding inland, but the forts at Limerick in the west and Waterford in the south put up a long resistance and were not captured for two or three years. The same scenario would be repeated in 1690 when the army of William III would be incapable of taking Limerick after the victory of the Boyne (near Drogheda); the siege had to be postponed until the summer of 1691. The distinction between the conquest phase and later revolts is undoubtedly not clear-cut; nonetheless, we see that as late as 1646, the Irish showed the ability to carry off isolated victories against the British army, even if, as in 1646, they were unable to exploit their victory (cf. Chronology 7.1). After Cromwell's campaign, the military position of the Irish was to be irremediably degraded.

*The appropriation and domination phase* This phase had in fact begun in 1609. In consequence of repeated rebellions, 2,000 square kilometers in the north of Ireland, that is, 2 percent of the total area of Ireland (83,000 sq. km), were vested in the crown. After having evicted the Irish occupants, James I entrusted the colonization of these lands to a society called the "Honorable Irish Society" in exchange for a financial compensation. In 1613, this company received a charter, which means a privilege permitting it to rent or sell concessions to English or Scotch colonists who wished to live on these lands.<sup>3</sup> The activities of this company continued almost unchanged in this way until the beginning of the twentieth century. James I was a precursor in introducing this kind of financial organization. This procedure was to be repeated throughout later colonizations in America, Algeria or Kenya. The interposition of a financial company between the government and the colonists had the double advantage of assuring immediate fiscal revenues while absolving the govern-

## Chronology 7.1 Ireland

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<i>Year</i>	<i>Event</i>
461	Death of St Patrick. Christianity established. Contrary to England, Ireland had never been conquered by the Romans.
1014	Brian Boru totally defeats the Danes at Clontarf (County of Clare).
1315	Invasion of Edward Bruce. In 1318 he is defeated and slain near Dundalk.
1367	Passage of Statute of Kilkenny passed, establishing segregation of the Irish and English.
1571–1606	First Penal laws against Catholics.
1580	700 Italians land in Kerry before being defeated.
1598	The Earl of Tyrone, O’Neil, defeats the English at Blackwater. Pope Clement VIII grants to his followers the same indulgence as to crusaders.
1601	Landing of 3,500 Spaniards who are defeated at Kinsdale.
1609–1612	2,044 square kilometers of land in the province of Ulster become vested in the Crown, and are divided among protestant subjects.
1641	More and Maguire’s rebellion. Massacre of a number of Protestant settlers in Ulster.
1646	O’Neill defeats the English at Benburb.
1649	Cromwell’s campaign; cost about 7,000 lives.
1690	Campaign under William III.
1760	French landing; 1,000 men; defeated on the Isle of Man.
1799	Irish rebellion; gradually suppressed; cost about 120,000 lives.
1803	Emmet’s rebellion.
1840–1920	Between 1840 and 1920 about 4 million Irish people emigrated to the United States.
1852	Fierce religious riots in Belfast.
1862	An Orange demonstration at Belfast leads to destructive riots.
1865	Fenians (after the name of ancient Irish national heroes) arrested at Manchester. Fenians in the United States said to have raised £200,000.
1867	<i>Mar.</i> Fenian rising near Dublin. Attack on the police station at Tallaght repelled; several shot. At Drogheda, about 1,000 Fenians hold the marketplace. <i>Apr.</i> Special commission to try 230 Fenians. <i>Nov.</i> Execution of three Fenians at Manchester.
1883	Assassination of Lord Cavendish at Phoenix Park (Dublin).
1887	About 10 Irish members of Parliament sentenced to prison.
1902	Several Irish members of Parliament imprisoned.
1906	Monster demonstration against Home Rule at Ulster Hall, Belfast.
1908	200 head of cattle and 400 sheep driven from 5 farms in County Clare. Serious conflict between police and people follows.
1911	Agrarian unrest continues: cattle driving, boycotting, incendiarism.
1913	<i>Aug.-Dec.</i> Great strike of transport workers. <i>Nov.</i> Creation of the Irish Volunteers paramilitary movement.

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(Continued on next page)

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 Chronology 7.1 (continuation)
 

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<i>Year</i>	<i>Event</i>
1916	<i>Apr. 24</i> Sinn Fein and Irish Volunteers seize the Post Office in Dublin. P.H. Pearse proclaims the Irish Republic. <i>May</i> Leaders of the rebellion executed after trials by court martial.
1917	<i>Jul.</i> De Valera released from prison by amnesty, elected to Parliament; becomes leader of Sinn Fein. <i>Sep.</i> Death of Thomas Ashe in prison.
1918	<i>Mar.</i> 600 Sinn Feiners seized in Kiltomagh (county Mayo). <i>May</i> De Valera and other Sinn Fein leaders arrested. <i>Jul.</i> The entire western seacoast of Ireland declared a military area.
1919	<i>Jan.–Apr.</i> Tipperary, Westport, Limerick proclaimed military area.
1920–1921	War of independence. About 1,300 deaths.

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
*Sources:* Coolen (1932), Garnier (1939), Gwynn (1928), Doherty and Hickey (1989), Hickey and Doherty (1980), Keller (1934), Vincent (1898).

ment of the responsibility for direct management.

The same tactic was repeated during Cromwell's campaign, which was financed by a loan backed up by 10,000 square kilometers of Irish land.<sup>4</sup> Cromwell also set in motion a methodical plan to change the numerical ratio of the Catholic and Protestant populations in Ireland. He allowed the leaders to expatriate themselves with some of their countrymen by entering into the service of foreign powers. Many went to Spain, France or Austria, and some went to the Republic of Venice. As a result of this policy, the population was reduced by some 30,000 to 40,000 able-bodied men. It soon became a question of how to dispose of their wives and families. At different times, several thousand of these were rounded up and conveyed to the West Indies or to Virginia. After the conquest of Jamaica in 1655, 2,000 boys and girls between 12 and 14 were sent to this island. At the same time, Cromwell tried without great success to convince the Puritans who had fled England for America during the "Great Migration" of the 1630s to come back and settle in Ireland.<sup>5</sup>

The same scenario was replayed in 1690–1692 during the repression of the revolt which had taken place during the reign of James II: 6,800 square kilometers, or 8 percent of Irish territory, were confiscated. Dutch nobles from the court of William III were given substantial domains. Fourteen thousand Irish soldiers exiled themselves to France where they enlisted in the army.<sup>6</sup>

***Irish underground resistance*** After the defeats of 1649 and 1690, armed resistance in pitched battles against the British army was no longer possible. From this moment on, there developed a form of silent, stubborn, and nocturnal struggle which



**Figure 7.1 Map of Ireland.** In the eighteenth century Irish people could not live in or travel to the region east of the Shannon River without a special authorization.

lasted with occasional lulls until 1921. In Cromwell's plan, the eastern part of the island was to be reserved for colonization; native inhabitants were to be pushed into county Connaught, west of the Shannon (see Figure 7.1). Given the attachment of the Irish to their land, it could be predicted that this measure would be met with

strong resistance. Many people retired into bogs and fastnesses; they formed bodies of armed men who supported themselves by depredations against the occupiers of the estates. So formidable did they become to the new settlers that in certain districts the sum of 200 pounds was offered for the head of a leader. No Catholic was permitted to reside within any market town without a passport describing his person, age and occupation. Any transplanted Irishman found on the left bank of the Shannon might be put to death by anyone without the order of a magistrate. After 1691, the same drastic measures to prevent infiltrations by Irish from the west were renewed. Any Irishman discovered in Protestant sectors who had not lived there for more than three months was treated as a papist spy. Any meeting of more than five Catholics was forbidden.<sup>7</sup> These measures resemble those in effect in South Africa during the apartheid period. The two systems are, in fact, a product of the same logic: they create reservoirs of cheap labor which can be used as needed while maintaining a strict separation of inhabitants for security purposes. A priori, it would seem that such a system cannot long endure. The Irish example proves the contrary, since this system was maintained in its most severe form for at least a century until around 1780, and in a somewhat softened form during the first half of the nineteenth century.

The Treaty of Limerick which ended the war in Ireland in 1691 guaranteed freedom of religion to Catholics, but it was never ratified by the parliament in Dublin. Catholics were, in fact, subjected to widespread discrimination. Resistance to this oppression took the form of acts of revenge against the landowners (barns were burned, cattle poisoned) which were called “agrarian outrages.” These acts were committed by groups operating at night; they were therefore known as “whiteboys” or “whitefeet” in the eighteenth century, and “moonlighters” in the nineteenth. For the 1880s, Vincent gives the following numbers of agrarian outrages:

	1881	1882	1885	1888
Agrarian outrages	4,439	3,433	944	660

These figures show that even outside periods of insurrection, Ireland lived in a constant state of war. In fact, there were hardly any periods in which laws of exception were not in force in one or another part of the country. Here are a few examples.<sup>8</sup>

- March 1796: Adoption of the “Insurrection Act” giving great powers to the military; this act remained in effect until around 1815. In November of this same year, habeas corpus was suspended.
- April 1833: Adoption of the “Peace Preservation and Coercion Bill.” Inhabitants were forbidden from being away from home at night; war councils were substituted for civil tribunals; habeas corpus was suspended. This law was renewed in March 1870 and in May 1875.
- April 1881: 18 counties were proclaimed to be under the Crime Act; this



**Table 7.2 Reforms in Ireland****Abrogation by stages of discrimination against Catholics**


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1778	English Relief Act (right to open schools and to hold land)
1829	Catholic emancipation bill (right to sit in Parliament)
1836	First Roman Catholic judge
1841	Roman Catholic chaplains permitted for gaols

**Expansion by stages of the right to vote**

1872	Secret ballot introduced
1878	Bill for reducing Irish borough suffrage to £1 rejected in the Commons
1886	Reduction of qualification for both counties and boroughs

**Land reform**

1881	Irish Land Law Act
1884	Bill for amending purchase clauses of land act
1896	Bill extending the powers of the 1881 land act
1903	Wyndham Act introducing a government subsidy to induce landlords to sell

**Home rule**

1880	About 65 Home Rulers elected to Parliament
1885	About 85 Home Rulers elected to Parliament
1886	Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill rejected by the Commons
1893	Gladstone's second Home Rule Bill rejected by the House of Lords
1910	Third Home Rule Bill
1913	Home Rule passed by the Commons
1914	Royal assent to the Home Rule Bill ; application delayed until the end of the war

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*Sources:* Flora (1897), Langer (1968), Vincent (1898).

remained in effect until June 1891, and even later in certain counties, like Clare.

*The reform period (1775–1914)* The Catholic Relief Bill, adopted in 1778, marked the beginning of a series of reforms designed to lighten the leaden pall which weighed upon Ireland. Table 7.2 is a summary of the long list of laws adopted by Parliament in London. Instead of lessening tensions, why did these bills only serve to exacerbate them? A determining role was undoubtedly played by three elements. (1) Instead of anticipating problems, these reforms always came too late; we will find this characteristic in all the reforms of colonial regimes. (2) The ultimate preoccupation in London was control of the situation; most of these relief bills were riddled with clauses which limited the scope of the reform or made them partially inopera-



tive. (3) The application of the reforms was checked in Ireland by the actions of the extremist factions of the Protestant population. The emergence of groups of extremist colonists is a common characteristic of periods of decolonization. Despite their limited nature, these reforms gave new weapons to the Irish population: schooling, the possibility of organizing around the clergy, the possibility of having a voice in Parliament.

Let us look in more detail at the various factors which contributed to curb the application of the reforms and to maintain animosity between the two communities.

- Under the Penal Laws, Irish Catholics had almost no rights; they had neither freedom of religion nor the right to open schools; the right to possess land was strictly controlled, and public office was forbidden to them. Throughout the nineteenth century, these rights were progressively returned to them. To show the reticence with which legislators took this path, we will cite an episode which may seem almost caricatural.<sup>9</sup> The Relief Act of May 1778 enabled British Catholics to inherit or acquire real property. However, in Ireland this law was applied in amended form in the sense that the right to property was replaced by a 999-year lease, so that payments of rents to landlords were preserved.

- How to give the franchise to certain Irishmen while retaining Protestant domination? This was the difficult task confronting legislators. In 1829, at the time of the Catholic Emancipation Bill, the problem was resolved by disfranchising nine-tenths of the freeholders; the number of electors thus decreased from 216,000 to 26,000.<sup>10</sup> Two other measures contributed to blocking change. (1) The property qualification was raised to 10 pounds per annum. (2) Through electoral gerrymandering preponderance was given to the representation of rural districts, to the detriment of towns in which most of the population resided. Furthermore, profiting from the numerous evictions of tenants during the economic crisis in Ireland in the middle of the nineteenth century, the great landlords tried to replace their Catholic tenants with Protestants. These, in turn, were often forced to leave under pressure exerted by moonlighters.

- Real property in Ireland was characterized by an extreme concentration, with most of the land in the hands of a small number of large landowners. Any solution to the Irish problem had to involve a redistribution of land. The first Irish Land Act passed in 1881 was denounced by the Irish Land League as a sham. This law, in fact, resolved nothing; more than twenty years would pass before true agrarian reform was effected.

- Agitation in favor of Home Rule began after 1878 when secret ballot and the extension of the franchise permitted the election to Parliament of members who truly reflected Catholic interests. Resistance to Home Rule was strong especially in

the House of Lords. Until the adoption of the Parliament Act in 1911, Lords had the right of veto; after 1911, their veto was suspensive, but could be overridden if the law were adopted three times in succession by the same Parliament, and in identical terms. After a legislative battle which once again had lasted over 20 years, Home Rule was definitively adopted on 25 May 1914. Only the signature of King George V was lacking. This signature was not affixed until 18 September 1914, but by this time war had been declared and the application of the law was postponed until the end of the war.<sup>11</sup>

*The war for independence* The hundred or so Irish Volunteers who seized the central post office in Dublin on Easter Monday, 23 April 1916, had no illusions whatsoever about the immediate impact of their action, but they believed in the exemplary virtues of such a gesture. The very fact that this event took place in Dublin is revealing of the changes that had occurred in the preceding century. The uprising of 1798 essentially affected rural zones and small towns; Dublin, on the other hand, remained a fief of Protestant colonization. The Easter uprising recalled the dazzling actions of the Fenians in March 1867. The Fenian revolt took place simultaneously in several towns, in particular with an attack on the police station at Tallaght, near Dublin, and with the occupation of the market square in Drogheda. The repression of the participants in this uprising caused a great stir in Ireland.

The Easter Rising took place amid the relative indifference of the population. But the execution of 15 of its main leaders between 3 and 12 May revived atavistic reflexes (recall the “Manchester Martyrs” of 1867); As in 1867, impressive funeral processions were organized. Thanks to the resulting dynamics, the partial elections held in 1917 were a triumph for Sinn Fein, the independence party, over the Home Rulers. From the point of view of the paronymy of historical events, the civil war in 1920–1921 offers an interesting illustration. We see that, under the same circumstances, armed forces tend to adopt similar procedures no matter the time or the place. The British army was undoubtedly at that time one of the best disciplined armies; the fact that there was not a single rape in this country occupied by an army comprising 78,000 soldiers is sufficient proof.<sup>12</sup> Far from being a blind unleashing of violence, the actions of both sides were largely the result of directives from their respective headquarters.

Sinn Fein set in motion a systematic action aiming at the destruction of British intelligence services. Infiltration into Irish ranks had been used very effectively in the past. In that respect it can be recalled that in March 1798, even before the onset of insurrection, the entire Leinster Provincial Committee of the United Irishmen (comprising most members of the Supreme National Directory) was arrested. The new National Directory that was set up under the leadership of John Sheares, a young Protestant barrister, was arrested only five weeks after the arrest of the previous directory.<sup>13</sup>

**Table 7.3 Forms of Reprisals by Colonial Armies**

	Country	Period	Examples
<b>1) Reprisals against homesteads</b>			
	Palestine	66–70	Villages devastated, population enslaved
	Kenya	Jan.–Feb. 1899	Hundreds of homesteads burned
	Ireland	1920	Mallow, Cork, Galway partially burned
<b>2) Reprisals against property</b>			
	Kenya	1908	Flocks seized (5,600 cattle; 3,000 sheep)
	Ireland	1920	42 dairies destroyed
<b>3) Reprisals against persons</b>			
a) Shootings			
	India	13 Apr. 1917	Amritsar (>379 deaths)
	Ireland	21 Nov. 1920	Croke Park (14 deaths)
	Kenya	16 Mar. 1922	Nairobi (56 deaths)
	India	23 Apr. 1930	Peshawar (> 30 deaths)
	Puerto Rico	21 Mar. 1937	Ponce (23 deaths)
b) Mass arrests			
	Ireland	1916	3,000 people jailed
	Netherlands East Indies	1926 Nov.	12,000 people arrested
	India	1930	60,000 people arrested
c) Assassinations of separatist leaders			
	Ireland	1920	
	Algeria	1954–1962	

*Note:* Repressive methods (including the recourse to torture which we did not mention in the table) were common to colonial armies almost everywhere.

*Sources:* **India:** Langer (1968), *International Herald Tribune* (Oct.15, 1997); **Ireland:** Commission (1921), Kee (1972); **Kenya:** Rosberg et al. (1966); **Netherlands East Indies:** *Mémoires du XXe siècle*; Bowden (1977); **Palestine:** Horsley (1993); **Puerto Rico:** *Monde Diplomatique* (Jan. 1976).

On the British side, the methods used were of a kind that all wars of this type invariably call for, that is to say an intelligence war with reprisals at various levels as shown in Table 7.3. To emphasize that the panoply of reprisals described in this table is fundamentally inherent in any conflict of this type, we could cite a number of similar episodes such as the actions by: (1) the Turkish army in Greece (1821–1825) and Bulgaria (1841, 1876); (2) the French army in Algeria (1945, 1954–1962); (3) the Dutch army in the Netherlands Indies (1873–1908, 1926); (4) the American army in Haiti (1919, 1929); (5) the Israeli army in the West-Bank (1987–1993). In all these cases, the spiral of violence ends up in similar forms of war. If it is the duty of the jurist to judge these methods from the point of view of international conventions, it is undoubtedly not the role of the historian to “distribute praise or blame” to quote Marc Bloch.<sup>14</sup>

The Conference of London (October–December 1921) ratified the partition of Ire-

**Table 7.4 Foreign Assistance to the Irish liberation Struggle**

Year	Form of aid	Country	Reference
1580	700 troops landed	Papal States	Vincent (p. 584)
1600	3,500 troops landed	Spain	Vincent (p. 584), Edwards (1973)
1690	7,000 troops landed	France	Guiffan, Edwards (1973)
1760	1,000 troops landed	France	Vincent (p. 1094)
1798	1,000 troops landed	France	Edwards (1973), Kee
1914 (Apr.)	Landing of arms	Germany	Guiffan, Jackson (p. 379)
1914 (Jul.)	Landing of arms	Germany	Jackson (p. 383)
1916	Landing of Casement	Germany	Jackson (p. 380)
1865–1922	Financial aid	United States	Vincent (p. 411), Akenson

*Note:* The most important French support expedition (43 ships, 14,000 men) took place in December 1796. Not surprisingly for the season the fleet was scattered by storms. We show in this table only interventions by foreign governments; there were also support actions by the Irish diaspora, in particular by the Irish who had settled in the United States.

land and gave the status of dominion to the southern part of the island. This was an important step toward independence, yet it was not independence, because in addition to the required oath of allegiance to the British crown, this status implied a veto by the governor general of financial laws and a veto by the crown of laws voted by the Irish parliament. It was not until 1932, after the election of De Valera to the presidency, that these limitations on sovereignty were unilaterally denounced by Ireland. In retribution, Great Britain closed its borders to Irish agricultural products, an action which caused great difficulties in Ireland.

Given the disproportion in military forces in place in Ireland, the Irish victory would not have been possible without international support, in particular the support of the Irish community in the United States. We will look at this factor in the following paragraph.

**Foreign support** Throughout their history, the Irish received support from foreign powers which were in conflict with Great Britain and whose evident interest was to fuel any internal conflict. At the same time, following the adage, “England’s difficulty, Ireland’s opportunity” the Irish revolts often took advantage of both the internal and external difficulties of England. This was the case in 1641, 1688, 1798 and 1916. The data given in Table 7.4 emphasizes that in the military sphere, foreign aid was nevertheless marginal, a quasi-inevitable consequence of the insular character of Ireland. The Irish diaspora in Europe and the United States also provided a permanent help to the Irish cause, not only on financial grounds but also at organiza-

tional level as illustrated by the Fenian movement. After having lived in Paris, where they were influenced by the movement of Auguste Blanqui, the three founders of the movement, M. Doheny, J. O'Mahoney, and J. Stephens emigrated to New York, where they laid the foundations of their movement. In 1865 Fenians in the United States had raised 200,000 pounds and in 1866 the movement reported about 380,000 members. The so-called Fenian rising occurred on 6 March 1867 near Dublin; it was a failure (230 Fenians were tried by a special commission) but can be considered as a forerunner of the Easter Rising. After the uprising in April 1916, the Irish community in the United States began to put pressure on the American government, with the result that, in 1916 a resolution in the U.S. Senate asked for clemency for rebels condemned to death; however, this pressure could not prevent the execution of Casement in August.<sup>15</sup> At the Third Irish Race Convention (Philadelphia, 1916), a strong lobby was formed to press for placing the future of Ireland on the agenda of the peace conference: it was to no avail for President Wilson held the view that the United States had no grounds for intervening in internal affairs of the United Kingdom. This lack of success can probably be linked to the fact that in 1920, the Irish made up only 4 percent of the population of the United States (although the number of American people who claimed Irish ancestry may have been substantially larger). The case of Algeria which we examine in the next section has interesting similarities with the case of Ireland.

## Algeria

During a visit to Algeria in 1841, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote, "What is evident throughout Africa is the natural crudeness and violence of the military forces. What future can we expect for a country in the hands of such men, and what can be the outcome of this cascade of violence and injustice, other than revolt by the natives and the ruin of the Europeans?"<sup>16</sup> Tocqueville's foresight proved to be accurate: no less than seven revolts punctuated the colonial period, and after the country gained its independence in 1962 most of the colonists left the country.

This colonial experience lasted about one century which makes it two or three times shorter than the colonization of Ireland. In order to emphasize the similarities between the two episodes we will follow the same plan as in the previous section. But first of all let us give a brief look at the situation of Algeria at the moment the French took control.


In 1830 this country had already experienced a series of colonization by successive conquerors: Romans, Arabs and Turks. To each of these conquests, North Africans, and especially the Berber peoples, put up a fierce resistance. The Roman conquest took place around 100 B.C., at the time of the Carthaginian wars. Two Roman historians wrote about the Berber resistance, and it may be interesting to cite some

excerpts reported by Alleg.<sup>17</sup> Here is what Sallust (86–35 B.C.) says of the guerilla war against Roman troops: “As soon as they learned that the Romans were moving to a particular location, they destroyed crops, poisoned food and took away animals, women, children and the elderly; then the able-bodied men moved against the main force of the army, harassed it continuously, attacking first the vanguard and then the trailing ranks. At night, they unexpectedly attacked soldiers wandering through the countryside; before help could come from the Roman camp, they retreated to the neighboring mountains.” Tacitus (55–120 A.D.) gives the following account of the revolt of the Berber Tacfarinas: “Having made a formidable army out of outlaws on the run, escaped slaves and the poor, Tacfarinas ventured to send emissaries to Tiberius, threatening unceasing war if the latter did not cede lands to those who had laid claim to them. The emperor refused, and for 7 years (14 to 24), Tacfarinas harassed Roman troops.” There was a new insurrection between 42 and 45. From 253 to 259, Kabylia rose again under the Berber chieftain Faraxen.

Around 680, North Africa was partially annexed to the Omayyad dynasty; under the Abbasid Caliphate, Algeria became an independent Muslim state. During the reign of Suleiman I the Magnificent (1520–1566), Algiers passed under the control of the Ottoman Empire. After 1800, powerful centrifugal forces became apparent in Algeria, as elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. After 1805, Abd-el-Khader succeeded in mobilizing the whole of Oran province against Turkish rule.<sup>18</sup> One of the symptoms of the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire was political instability: between 1805 and 1815, no fewer than seven deys (representatives of the sultan) succeeded each other in Algiers, and all except the last met violent deaths.

*The French conquest (1830–1871)* Beginning with the conquest of Algiers, this war was immediately marked by great brutality. This characteristic seems to have been present for a long time after the conquest as attested by the judgment of Tocqueville. Pillage, summary executions and other kinds of reprisals against persons and property became tacit rules.<sup>19</sup> Although these methods were vigorously condemned by a parliamentary commission of inquiry sent to Algeria in 1833, there were no changes. For the historian, an unfortunate consequence is the absence in military sources of statistics on the number of native victims. This feature is common to nearly all colonial wars carried on in Africa by European powers. That is why the figures given by many writers are blatant underestimates. Even Richardson, whose data are in general fairly reliable, failed to give adequate figures in such cases. For the insurrection in Kabylia (see Figure 7.2) in 1871 he reports fewer than 1,000 deaths, while the losses in the French army alone were 2,700.<sup>20</sup> The main episodes of the colonization of Algeria are summarized in Chronology 7.2.

*Appropriation of the land and domination* The occupation of the land by Euro-



**Figure 7.2 Map of North Africa.** In Algeria most insurrections (as well as the war for independence after 1954) took place primarily in the triangle formed by the three mountain ranges of Kabylia, Hodna and Aurès.

peans generally took place in two phases. In the early phase, the tribes whose lands were coveted were restricted to a half or a third of the lands they had traditionally occupied; confiscated lands were turned over to financial companies which had prior agreements with the government. These companies were analogous to the English chartered companies mentioned above for Ireland. Subsequently when the lands were not directly exploited by the company itself, they were sold to colonists who often rented them to the same Algerians who had previously access to them, either freely or through a fee paid to the local chief.<sup>21</sup> To illustrate this mechanism concretely, in 1853, the Compagnie Genevoise appropriated 12,000 hectares in the Sétif region; the Société Générale Algérienne received 100,000 hectares in the Constantinois, and the Société Anonyme de l'Habra et de la Macta was granted 24,000 hectares for cotton plantations.<sup>22</sup> The appropriation of lands underwent a relative pause during the Second Empire because Napoleon III was hostile to the expansion of colonization; this attitude resulted in laws (1863, 1865) which guaranteed the protection of native property. Nevertheless, after the end of the Second Empire the expropriation process resumed; as shown by Table 7.5 there was a continual transfer of property to Europeans at least until 1921. Just as the condition of Irish Catholics was in practice quite different from that of English Catholics and, a fortiori, of English Protestants, the Muslims in Algeria were subject to a judiciary system different from the one



in force in France. In Algeria, this was known as the *code de l'indigénat* (“legal code for native people”). For instance, the code comprised a list of 33 infractions which were not illegal under the common law of France, but which were punishable in Algeria when committed by Muslims. These included traveling without a permit, avoiding obligatory work, refusing to fight forest fires, or defaming the French Republic. The maximum penalties under the *indigénat* were relatively light, namely, five days imprisonment and 15 francs fine, but the frequency of their application provided a persistently humiliating reminder of the balance of power between the two communities. In 1902, a new court system was introduced to deal with more serious offenses. Furthermore, the governor general had the power of administrative detention and the rules were sufficiently vague to allow broad applicability.

***Tentative reform movements*** After 1918, the Algerian nationalist movement, drawing a lesson from the failure of previous uprisings, took on a more political

### Chronology 7.2 Algeria

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<i>Year</i>	<i>Event</i>
1830	<i>Jul.</i> Algiers surrendered to French armament after severe battle.
1835	French defeated at Macta by the Arab Chief Abd-el-Kader.
1840	<i>Feb.</i> Total occupation of Algeria decided by the French government. <i>Nov.</i> Estates of Arab rebels confiscated.
1842	Algeria annexed to France.
1845	<i>Mar.</i> Insurrection in the region between Oran and Algiers. Several French positions are captured.
1859	<i>Oct.–Nov.</i> Arab tribes attack the French and are defeated.
1861	Disturbances in the Hodna.
1871	Insurrection in Kabylia under Mokrani and cheikh el Haddad.
1881	Insurrection headed by Bou Hamana south of Oran.
1916	Insurrection in the Aures (Batna).
1945	<i>May.</i> Insurrection in the region of Setif (Kabylia): massacre of about 100 colonists. Repression cost about 2,000 lives.
1954	<i>Nov.</i> Beginning of the war of independence.
1961	<i>Apr.</i> Four French generals seize power in Algiers. The coup aborts after a few days.
1963	<i>Mar.</i> Algeria becomes independent. The war has cost about 200,000 lives. A large number of French colonists leave the country.

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*Sources:* Alleg (1981), Julien (1964), *Quid* (1997).

**Table 7.5 European Population and Land Ownership in Algeria**

Year	European population		European land ownership
	[thousands]	[percent of total population]	[percent]
1851	131	5.3	1
1861	192	6.6	3
1872	280	10.8	7
1881	412	11.4	12
1891	531	11.5	16
1901	634	12.0	18
1921	791	12.2	25
1954	984	9.4	27

*Note:* The fraction of lands in European hands has not been related to the total surface of Algeria; this would not make sense given the enormous amount of desert areas in southern Algeria. Instead percentages in the last column are given with respect to cultivated lands, about 10 million hectares in 1954.

*Sources:* Bennoune (1988), Ruedy (1992).

form for a period of time. This paralleled the political fever that took hold of Ireland from 1830 to 1910. In what follows we examine some tentative reform movements.

- In 1936, under the Popular Front led by Léon Blum, a law proposed by Maurice Viollette, a former governor of Algeria, would have given French nationality to most Algerians while allowing them to retain their Koranic civil status. In 1938, even before the law was adopted, the Federation of Colonial Mayors went on strike in opposition to the Blum-Viollette Bill. The bill was eventually defeated in the Senate and buried in a committee of the Chamber of Deputies.

- On 12 December 1943, General de Gaulle announced in Constantine the integration of thousands of Muslims in the European electoral college, and the granting of the vote to all other Muslims in a second college. Nonetheless, these assemblies had only restricted power while the executive power remained largely in the hands of the governor general. This reform was finally adopted by the National Assembly in September 1947, but its application was sabotaged in Algeria by the power of the colonists. When it appeared that elections in 1948 would result in a substantial representation of nationalists, a third of the nationalist candidates were arrested before the voting took place. In addition, all the municipal or national elections held between 1949 and 1954 were sullied by irregularities, such as stuffed ballot boxes, pressure on voters, etc.<sup>23</sup> Through a comparative analysis of the Algerian and Irish cases Ian Lustick (1985, 1993) has shown quite convincingly how the lobbying of the colonists

permitted to defeat all attempts made by the government in order to restore some of the natives' rights; clinging to their privileges the colonists remained blind to their long-term interest.

- The overall scheme of the Constantine plan was announced by General de Gaulle in his speech on 3 October 1958. The aims of this plan were as much social as economic. Of the 19 billion francs invested, industry was to receive 15.5 billion and agriculture 3.5. This disproportion might seem surprising, given that 80 percent of Algerians lived off the land. To encourage the necessary investments, companies were given considerable advantages: subsidies for equipment and employment, exemption from taxes for ten years, guarantees for debts already contracted. Because of the accession of Algeria to independence in 1962, the original plan could be applied only in part.

### *The liberation war*

In a revolutionary war, says Major Azzedine who was military leader of Willaya 4 during the independence war, the most important weapon against a perfidious adversary is perfidy. We cannot say, "Frenchmen, you may fire first." No, we say, "Good morning, sir," and with a little knife or a small-caliber gun we kill the man with the machine gun so we can take it away from him. Give us your airplanes and your tanks, and we will happily give you the bombs hidden in our baskets.

We have used this quotation to emphasize how important it is, in the study of any war for liberation, to leave aside moral judgments. This type of war is conducted by groups which have insignificant material means in the beginning. By the force of circumstances, these wars are more closely related to terrorism than to traditional warfare. This is true for the liberation wars in Africa as well as for the wars waged by partisans against German occupation in World War II.

In its essentials, the war in Algeria took place in rural zones and particularly in the mountainous regions of Kabylia and Aures. Against the Army of National Liberation (ALN: Armée de Libération Nationale), the French army employed the methods used in all wars of this type. (1) Regrouping of populations in strategic villages. (2) Construction of fortified lines in an effort to prevent infiltrations along the frontiers with Tunisia and Morocco. (3) Use of torture when necessary to gain intelligence. (4) Erection of fortified stations in the sectors held by the ALN. Similar tactics were used, for instance, during the second phase of the Boer War (1900–1902) in South Africa, in Kenya (1952–1954), or in South Vietnam (1966–1973). It was out of the question for the ALN to carry off a military victory similar to that of the Vietnamese at Dien Bien Phu. International pressure and the help of Arab countries were essential elements in the strategy of the FLN (National Liberation Front). This point is

considered in the next paragraph.

**Foreign aid** France had benefited from the military and financial help of the United States during the war in Indochina. This was not the case in Algeria, where the communist threat was much more distant. In a general way, the fact that decolonization was inescapable in Algeria was recognized by a majority of countries, as illustrated by the following episodes. (1) In April 1955, the Bandung Conference of nonaligned nations unanimously adopted an Egyptian resolution upholding Algeria's right to independence. (2) In its 1955 fall meeting, the General Assembly of the United Nations agreed to place the Algerian question on its agenda. (3) The Sakiet incident in February 1958 made manifest the isolation of France on the international stage. It may be recalled that after Algerians based in the Tunisian border town of Sakiet had shot at French aircraft, French bombers retaliated, seemingly without governmental authorization, by leveling the town and killing some 80 people, including many Tunisian women and children. Overnight, the Sakiet raid created a major international incident and motivated Britain and America to attempt mediation between France and Tunisia.

## Comparisons

Before continuing with our study of other wars of liberation, let us see what comparisons can be made from the cases studied so far.

**Algeria versus Ireland** There are numerous analogies between the Algerian and Irish cases. As we have already noted, M. Hechter was one of the first to develop the analysis of the liberation war in Ireland in terms of colonialism.<sup>24</sup> More recently, Ian Lustick proposed a comparative analysis of the Irish and Algerian cases.<sup>25</sup> As comparative studies based on the analysis of a specific mechanism are fairly rare this study deserves special mention. In a very carefully documented work, Lustick has compared the political policies followed by the respective governments in Ireland and Algeria, and by Israel in the occupied West Bank and Gaza territories. Lustick advanced the notion of war of maneuver versus war of position in order to model in the political domain the kind of phase transition observed by physicists. The idea of phase transition is natural for colonies comprising a substantial number of colonists because decolonization requires a radical rupture with the past. Some of the conclusions of Lustick's analysis are relevant to our comparison. Thus, one may wonder why decolonization in Algeria resulted in an almost total exodus of colonists, while in Ireland colonists were able to remain in Ulster. Lustick proposes a seductive explanation in geo-demographic terms. First of all, he notes that the population of Irish Protestants was both more numerous (25 percent versus 10 percent) and spatially more concentrated than the French population of Algeria; in the six counties

making up Northern Ireland, Protestants made up 60 percent of the population. In Algeria, on the other hand, the French population was nowhere in the majority in any large region comprising several cities. In passing, we note that from the point of view of spatial distribution of population, the case of New Caledonia (a French associated territory in the Pacific) in 1995 illustrates a situation similar to that of Ireland in 1910, since Europeans make up 35 percent of the total population and are in the majority in the entire southern part of the island. A similar situation exists in the Cape Province of South Africa, where whites and half-castes (i.e., “colored” people) comprise 42 percent of the population by 1990; this is less than the Protestants in Ulster, but more than in the other provinces of South Africa, where the percentage does not exceed 24 percent. Furthermore, the geo-political environments of Ireland and Algeria were very different. Ireland is an island, and Belfast is less than 60 km from the coast of Great Britain. Algeria, on the other hand, is the center of the Maghreb, and Algiers is 800 km from the French coast. It was as difficult to imagine a European enclave in the Maghreb as a white enclave in one of the provinces of Zimbabwe.

*Other examples similar to the Algeria-Ireland case* Table 7.6 brings together several data relative to liberation struggles over the past century. These eight cases exhibit two common characteristics. The first is the appropriation of a substantial part of the land by the occupying power; the second is a difference both in religion and language between the colonists and the natives. The appropriation of the land undoubtedly sparked the initial complaints which over time were amplified and sharpened by the differences in religion and language. Most of the examples mentioned in Table 7.6 have already been brought up in previous chapters. The case of Bulgaria will be developed further on in this part. The inclusion of Kashmir on this list requires some additional explanation.

The territorial dispute between India and Pakistan is well known, but the historical roots of this conflict are less well known. Like many territories located at the juncture of several worlds, Kashmir has had a tormented history. In 1586 the region passed under the control of Muslim princes who conquered it; in 1752, control went to the Afghans; in 1819, Kashmir was conquered by the Sikhs before finally becoming a British protectorate in 1846. Still, these changes in sovereignty are probably less important than the social situation. As in other regions with Muslim majorities from the former Indian empire, the peasant class is Muslim, while landowners and lenders (often one and the same) are almost exclusively Hindus belonging to the Brahmin caste. From the linguistic, religious and social point of view, the situation in Kashmir shows several analogies to the Irish paradigm.

In the 1920s and 1930s, there were numerous revolts by Muslim peasants against Hindu landowners. Several clashes occurred between these classes. (1) In 1921 and 1924 when peasants tried to take possession of a domain belonging to the govern-

**Table 7.6 Type A Struggles for Independence**

Occupied territory	Occupying country	Percentage of land appropriated	Language difference	Difference in religion	Armed struggle	Number of deaths (1875–1997, per million inhabitants)
Algeria	France	25%	yes	yes	yes	22,000
Bulgaria	Turkey	n.a.	yes	yes	yes	16,500
Ireland (1900–1922)	Britain	75%	yes	yes	yes	350
Kashmir	India	n.a.	yes	yes	yes	7,100
Kenya	Britain	5%	yes	yes	yes	2,170
Korea (1884–1945)	Japan	40%	yes	yes	yes	n.a.
West Bank-Gaza	Israel	60%	yes	yes	yes	690
Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia)	Britain (until 1970)	50%	yes	yes	yes	5,000

Sources: Gann (1965), Buijtenhuijs (1971), *Far Eastern Economic Review* (26 March, p. 11), *Quid*; Rahmat (1933), Wasserman (1976).

ment. (2) Between June and July 1931 there was the attack of a prison (25 dead) and the sacking of a number of stores belonging to Hindus followed by harsh repression by the army (at least 21 deaths)

Obviously the antagonism between Muslims and Hindus has roots which go back long before the partition of India and Pakistan in 1948. In the following paragraph, we look at a similar case in Bulgaria.

### **Struggles for Liberation in Bulgaria**

Before we look at Bulgaria more closely, let us take an overall look at the Balkans. Countries in the Balkans acquired their independence in the nineteenth century as a result of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Table 7.7 gives some dates relative to Ottoman domination in this region. We can see that on the whole, the date of independence varies with the distance from Istanbul, the capital and heart of the Ottoman Empire. Serbia was the first to be freed, followed by Greece, Romania, northern Bulgaria and then southern Bulgaria (a region which at that time was known as “Eastern Rumelia”). Only Albania and Crete are exceptions to the rule. This is

**Table 7.7 Struggles for Liberation in Balkan Countries**

Country	Conquest by the Turks	Revolts	Autonomy or independence
Albania	1450	1760, 1910, 1911	1912
Bulgaria (North)	1396	1598, 1686, 1736, 1850, 1876	1878
Bulgaria (South)	1341	1876	1908
Crete	1669	1770, 1821, 1866, 1897	1897
Greece	1453	1473, 1585, 1611, 1659, 1770, 1821	1832
Romania	1500	1774: Russian protectorate	1859
Serbia	1389	1804, 1815	1815

*Note:* Dates of conquest are only approximate because in some cases the conquest took a number of years and in others (like Romania and Serbia) there was a flux and reflux.

*Sources:* **Albania:** Skendi (1967), *Grand Larousse Encyclopédique* (1960); **Bulgaria:** Macdermott (1962); **Crete:** Tulard (1962), Albin (1898); **Greece:** Woodhouse (1968), **Romania:** *Grand Larousse Encyclopédique* (1960); **Serbia:** Castellán (1967).

easily understood for Crete, because of its strategic importance half way between Istanbul and Alexandria. Albanians were more “Islamized” than their neighbors and were auxiliaries of the Turks; in this respect it should be recalled that the revolt of 1770 in Greece was put down by an Albanian army. The Ottoman domination of Romania and Serbia was intermittent, because these countries were peripheral to the empire and were periodically occupied by enemy armies: Russian in Romania, Austrian in Serbia.

**The conquest** The principality of southeastern Bulgaria lost its independence by 1341, while the northern principality kept its sovereignty until 1396. The conquest of Bulgaria in the fourteenth century was fraught with considerable destruction; nevertheless, until the moment when the Ottoman Empire began to decline, it seems that the peasantry profited to some extent from the order imposed by the occupying power.

**Domination and appropriation of land** An edict of Mehmet II (1451–1481) granted freedom of religion to Christians and Jews. At the time, this was a form of tolerance that was relatively inconceivable in Western Europe. The religion of the subjects was the basis of their distribution into “nations” to be ruled by religious dignitaries. The patriarch of Constantinople, for example, received important privileges which permitted him to govern a number of aspects of the lives of his Orthodox subjects. Tolerance however did not mean equality: infidels were not the equals of Muslims. The word *rayah* applied to infidels is revealing: *rayah* means cattle, yet it was not



a term implying brutal oppression. Such is not the attitude of a nomad people toward their animals, yet there is a sense of natural superiority. This was shown in a number of ways: Christians paid special taxes, could not bear arms, had to dress in dark clothes; no bells were permitted in churches, and Christians were not allowed to build houses or churches higher than those of Muslims.<sup>26</sup> It is worth noting that the levy of Christian children every five years for the Janissary corps was stopped in 1638, and did not therefore play a role in the wars of liberation of the nineteenth century.

There were several possibilities with respect to land. So-called miri lands were given to individuals by the sultan in return for services. The majority of these lands were granted to the so-called spahis on condition that in time of war they appear fully prepared and with a given number of horsemen (the number depending on the income of the fief). This was a kind of feudal system, differing from the feudal regime in the West in that the fief was granted to the individual and could not be passed on to heirs. This was the theory, but in the course of time temporary grants were often transformed into permanent attributions. Other lands were given over for the support of religious institutions.

What portion of the lands in Bulgaria were given over to spahis or dignitaries? More generally speaking, what was the proportion of Muslims in the overall population? The sources we have consulted are silent on these points. Qualitatively, we can say that the Muslim presence was more important in southeastern Bulgaria than in the north.

### *Reform attempts*

The years 1835, 1836 and 1837 saw small-scale revolts which were more or less aborted because they were discovered by the police even before their outbreak. Pressured by Western powers, the sultan promulgated reforms assuring greater equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. In 1834, an agrarian reform tried to abolish the spahi system but was hardly applied. Other uprisings occurred in the following years, most particularly in 1841 (240 villages burned), 1850 (about 3,000 dead) and especially in 1876.

*The 1876 war of liberation* This uprising occurred in April and May 1876. It was known as the April Rising, and caused some 30,000 deaths. In addition, a substantial number of cattle and sheep were stolen; figures vary between 50,000 and 300,000.<sup>27</sup> Russia was one of the few powers to exert strong pressure on Istanbul to grant greater autonomy to Bulgaria; it culminated in an armed intervention by Russia which led to the treaty of San Stefano. By the terms of this treaty, Bulgaria became a principality with considerable autonomy. Several months later, in July 1876, the Congress of Berlin ratified this statute only for the northern region of Bulgaria; the southeast

remained a province with a certain degree of autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. This region was not reunited with the northern principality until 1885, under the sovereignty of Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Cobourg-Gotha.

**Foreign support** The major powers, Great Britain in particular, were especially fearful that erosion of the Ottoman Empire would allow Russia to extend its influence over the region of the straits. We may put this problem into context by remembering that the regions bordering the Black Sea constituted one of the principal granaries of Western Europe in the nineteenth century, especially before the arrival of American wheat. In those days, the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits had a strategic importance comparable to that held today by the straits of Ormuz, at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, for the transportation of petroleum.

The desire to contain Russian expansion explains why the Great Powers were reticent to uphold separatist movements in the Balkans. This attitude can be illustrated by the position of the British government at the time of the 1876 uprising. On 19 May 1876, Foreign Secretary Lord Derby sent a dispatch to Istanbul complaining of the “weakness and apathy of the Porte in dealing with the insurrection in its earlier stages.” It was largely through the pressure of public opinion and only three months after the events that the government asked Sir Walter Baring to write a report on the “Bulgarian horrors,” to use Gladstone’s expression. This report was published on 19 September 1876. At the tripartite conference held in Berlin in May 1876, Russian propositions in favor of Bulgarian autonomy were trimmed and amended so much that they amounted to a retention of the status quo.

Guatemala, the last example from this section, appears at first glance to be different from the others for in this case the colonists and the colonized people belong to the same country which had wrenched itself away from Spanish colonial domination two centuries earlier.

## **Guatemala**

Together with Paraguay, Guatemala is one of the Latin American countries with the highest proportion of Indians; since 1950, censuses show percentages around 50 percent, and it is commonly admitted that these figures are underestimates of the Indian population. Why is the integration of Indian and Spanish populations less advanced in Guatemala than in other Latin American countries? The very mountainous character of the country (there are peaks as high as 4,000 meters) has surely played a role by making communications especially difficult. Even up until the 1970s, many villages lacked electricity and were accessible only on muleback. This situation is similar to that of the Peruvian Altiplano, where the altitude posed a barrier to Spanish penetration.

Given the difficulty of communication the Indian community remained fragmented

even from the linguistic point of view. By 1980 the four principal languages were: Quiché (24 percent), Mam (20 percent), Cakchiquel (12 percent), and Kekchi (12 percent).<sup>28</sup> In these conditions, it is hardly surprising that the development of a unified front among the Indians is still in its infancy. The situation is similar to that of Ireland in the eighteenth century, where clan loyalties were more powerful than the feeling of Irish identity. In the first part of our study, we will provide a chronology, before looking at similarities and differences with the preceding cases. Chronology 7.3a is relatively brief regarding the period before 1945 mainly for two reasons. First, because it includes only the first three stages, the others having not yet been written. The second reason is that the information available is less detailed than in the preceding examples.

*The conquest phase* Like the English conquest of Ireland, the Spanish conquest of Guatemala was met by a strong initial resistance. Unfortunately, we have little information on this period, and it is particularly difficult to gauge the breadth of this resistance or its temporary successes. One of the only revolts for which we have found detailed information is an episode which took place after independence.<sup>29</sup> Nevertheless, it is probably representative of previous episodes. On 17 July 1898, goaded by plantation labor agents, the people of San Juan (in the district of Huehuetenango along the border with the Chiapas district of Mexico) set fire to a house where the labor agents slept, and cut them down when they attempted to flee. Hoping to eliminate dangerous witnesses, the Indians then spread out through the village to kill the rest of the ladinos (non-Indians) living there. One managed to escape, however. Early the next morning, the militia rode into town, killing unknown numbers of Indians and arresting some 160 for trial. In later years, the Indians fled across the border to Mexico to escape forced labor on the plantations. Forced labor was not abolished until 1944 by President Juan Aravalo.

*Appropriation phase* In Guatemala, real property is essentially concentrated in the hands of large landowners. To illustrate this concentration, we can apply the commonly used Gini coefficient, which has a value of 0 for a perfectly equal distribution and 1 for a distribution in which all the land is in the hands of a single owner. In 1964, this coefficient was 0.82; in 1979 it was 0.85, the highest number in all Central America.<sup>30</sup> By way of comparison, we recall that in Ireland this coefficient was 0.93 in 1876. In Paraguay, it was 0.95 in 1956. The most productive land is found primarily along the Pacific coast.

In the 1970s a region in the northeast of the country, known as the Northern Traverse Strip, experienced a rapid development. This is a vast band of land stretching from the Mexican border to the port of Puerto Barrios; in this relatively virgin territory, the government created a new power base for rapid capital accumulation. Land titles

### Chronology 7.3a Guatemala

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<i>Year</i>	<i>Event</i>
1526	The Cakchiquel Indians revolt in response to Spanish demands for warriors and tribute.
1708	Revolt in the Chiapas.
1760	Uprising of Santa Lucia Utattan.
1811	A village in the region of Quiche burst into revolt against increased tribute. There was another similar revolt in 1819.
1813	Rebellion of Cuchumatanes and Ixtahuacan.
1838	The rebel forces of Rafael Carrera marched into Guatemala City.
1838	Revolt in the Pocoman.
1898	Revolt of the Canjobates at San Juan Ixoy.
1905	Insurrection at Totonicapan (Quiche).
1932	Peasant revolt in nearby El Salvador. 30,000 deaths.
1951	Guatemala has 3.8 million inhabitants of which 55% are Indians. President Arbenz elected with 75% of the votes. He raises the minimum wage for plantation workers from 26 cents to 120 cents per day, and he introduces a land reform.
1953	<i>Mar.</i> First attempt to overthrow President Arbenz.
1955	President Arbenz is overthrown by general Armas with the support of the Eisenhower administration. Within a year there is a sharp decrease in union membership (from 100,000 to 27,000).
1966–1974	About 20,000 victims of political assassinations within 8 years, i.e., 2,500 per year.
1974–1980	About 20,000 victims of political assassinations within 6 years, i.e., 3,300 per year.
1976	Indian activists form the National Integration Front; it is the beginning of an Indian-based political party.
1978	<i>Jun.</i> Clash between peasants and the army at Pancoz (Alta-Verapraz): about 100 deaths.
1981	Peak year in the civil strife: about 10,000 deaths. The massacre of the Indians more and more resembles a genocide.
1982	The Cakchiquel Indians strongly support the guerilla forces. Heavy repression by the army's special forces (about 80 kilometers north of Guatemala City).
1984	4,000 deaths.
1992	2,000 deaths. <i>Oct.</i> Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the Indian leader Rigoberta Menchu.
1996	<i>Nov.</i> A peace agreement signed between the guerillas and the government.

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*Sources:* Black et al. (1984), Handy (1984), McCreery (1990), Rudel (1981), Newspaper data base of the FNSP (National Foundation for Political Sciences, Paris).

were distributed to politicians and above all to the military to such an extent that it became known as the “Zone of the generals.” In the mid-1980s, that is, 40 years after the end of forced labor, the living conditions of seasonal agricultural workers were particularly difficult. Workers were housed in large hangars, in which several hundred persons were made to sleep on the ground in close proximity to one another. Running water and sanitary facilities were most often absent.

We see in this a common thread running through many colonial regimes: a reservoir of labor in which workers barely subsist, at minimal cost and in which they can be shifted on demand to other centers of production. In South Africa, these reservoirs of labor were institutionalized in the form of bantustans. Kenya had a similar regime for the supply of labor to the high-plateau farms held by Europeans.

The opening up of some rural zones in the 1970s and 1980s had a twofold effect in Guatemala. By eliminating the isolation, it undoubtedly contributed to favoring the emergence of an Indian identity, but it also gave easier access to the teams of recruiters representing the property owners. As in South Africa, economic oppression went hand-in-hand with the political repression practiced by a military supported by paramilitary groups. As in Ireland resistance took the form of guerrilla warfare, which recruited essentially Indians. This type of civil war lasted from 1970 to 1996, and was at its height around 1980–1981; there were an estimated 10,000 deaths in each of these two years; during the whole civil war there were about 140,000 fatalities.

*The reform phase* At the end of the twentieth century, the reform phase is still in its infancy. There was a reformist attempt from 1944 to 1954, but this was brought to an end by the military coup against President Arbenz. After 1954, presidents have been either generals or civilians pledged to the army. Elections were often pure formalities, an aspect which was shown by the regular progression of abstentions: these were at 33 percent in 1958, 46 percent in 1970, and 63 percent in 1978. In this last year, General Romeo Lucas García was elected to the presidency by the vote of only 8 percent of the electorate. Since 1992, however, the climate has changed somewhat. Has the granting of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992 to the Indian leader Rigoberta Menchú played a part in this change? Another visible sign of change was the return in 1993 of a group of Indians who had taken refuge in Mexico ten years previously. One event which is seemingly unimportant in itself can serve to illustrate both the reality and the fragility of change. In 1993, a noncommissioned officer was sentenced to 25 years in prison for the murder of the anthropologist Myrna Mack; it can be noted that a dozen judges had withdrawn for fear of reprisals.<sup>31</sup> The peace accord signed in December 1996 by the government and the guerrillas may be opening up a new era.

**Foreign support** Undoubtedly the end of Spanish domination hardly benefited the Indians. The Ladinos took the place of the Spaniards and continued, or perhaps even accentuated, economic and cultural domination. The situation is somewhat similar to that of El Salvador, Peru and certain states of Mexico (Chiapas, Guerrero). The mountainous nature of the land in Guatemala favors armed struggle, yet a liberation struggle can succeed only if there is outside support and a safe haven for retreat. Neither of these conditions was present. On the contrary, the military was the beneficiary of substantial outside support, sometimes by indirect means and sometimes official. In this regard, it is worth noting that the embargo imposed by the Carter administration on arms destined for Guatemala was easily averted by the generals. During this period, their helicopter fleet rose from 8 to 27 units, all American but undoubtedly imported from a third country.<sup>32</sup>

**Comparison with similar cases** It would be difficult to deny that in Guatemala we are dealing with a colonial type A situation, that is to say, one dealing with appropriation of land. This situation reproduces several of the traits described in the Irish case. (1) The initial expropriation and subsequent economic exploitation. (2) Language differences and cultural oppression. (3) Outside support which permits the landowners' regime to retain its hold on power. Still, there are several notable differences from the Irish paradigm. First of all, there is no real difference in religion between the Ladinos and the Indians. Catholicism among the Indians is certainly tinged with traditional elements, but it is nonetheless a form of Catholicism. In the second place, the Ladinos represent overall 50 percent of the population and they are in the majority in most cities.

Are there other cases similar to Guatemala? El Salvador immediately comes to mind. A civil war raged there from 1980 to 1992, pitting peasants against the army. The dead numbered around 80,000, a number that is proportionately larger than in Guatemala because El Salvador had only 5.9 million inhabitants in 1996, as against 11 million in Guatemala.<sup>33</sup> The cases of these two neighboring countries are in fact so similar that they can hardly be considered as separate cases.

In the following paragraph, we describe the case of an African country which is similar in several ways to Guatemala.

## **Burundi**

The Burundian (see Chronology 7.3b) case resembles both the Irish and Guatemalan archetypes in the following ways.

- The Tutsis arrived as conquerors around the thirteenth century.
- In 1959, on the eve of independence, they held 91 percent of the positions of authority while they represented only 15 percent of the population. The army was

### Chronology 7.3b Burundi

In Burundi, there are three relatively homogeneous strata of population, corresponding to three morphological types and to three forms of social organization. The Twas (or Batwas, where the prefix Ba marks the plural) are hunter pygmies; they represent only 1 percent of the population. The Hutus (Bahutus) are farmers; they make up 85 percent of the population. The tall Tutsis (Batutsis or Watutsis) are the descendants of a group who came down from the north and conquered the country around the thirteenth century; they are cousins of the Masai. The Tutsis have played a role intermediate between feudal lords and tribal chiefs; they were confirmed in this role by successive colonizers, first German, then Belgian. The army is 90 percent Tutsi.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Event</i>
1959	Autonomy
1961	<i>Oct.</i> The prime minister seeking conciliation and nondiscrimination is assassinated.
1962	After independence, the Hutu prime minister is assassinated.
1965	<i>Oct.</i> Failure of a coup d'état against the Tutsi prime minister. Installation of a military regime by King Mwanbuta IV. Ethnic massacres. <i>Dec.</i> A number of Hutu and labor leaders are executed. There are nearly 6,000 persons in overcrowded prisons.
1965–1970	Military repression against the Hutu elite.
1972	<i>Apr.</i> Failed coup d'état by Hutus. The military retaliated by executing about 100,000 Hutus. About 150,000 Hutus flee to neighboring countries.
1974	In an article published by the <i>New York Times</i> the former U.S. ambassador in Burundi regrets that the United Nations did not denounce the massacre of the Hutus.
1984	Reelection of Colonel Bagaza (with 99.63% of the vote) as president of the republic.
1988	<i>Aug.</i> Tribal rising against the Tutsi minority followed by six days of vengeance by Tutsi soldiers against the Hutus: between 5,000 and 20,000 deaths. About 60,000 Hutu refugees in Rwanda.
1992	According to Amnesty International, between November and December 1991, nearly 1,000 Hutus are executed by the army.
1993	<i>Jun.</i> Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu who took refuge in Rwanda during the 1972 massacres, is elected president with 65% of the vote. <i>Oct.</i> Troops overthrow and kill President Ndadaye. Massacres of Hutus: about 60,000 deaths; 650,000 Hutus leave the country.
1995	Hutu refugees leave Bujumbura as the city is surrounded and attacked by the army.
1996	Bujumbura is surrounded by Hutu guerrillas.

*Source:* Newspaper data base of the FNSP (National Foundation for Political Sciences, Paris).



made up of 90 percent Tutsis.<sup>34</sup>

- The Hutu majority held power for short periods before being expelled by the Tutsi military.

- There is in Burundi the same antagonism between city and countryside that existed in Ireland in the eighteenth century: cities were held by the Tutsis, whereas the countryside was inhabited by the Hutus. The latter, deprived of the resources of a state, were reduced to a kind of hit-and-run war like the one waged in Ireland.

There is certainly a difference of scale compared to Ireland: Irish landlords were backed by the power of the English state; here, there is the possibility of a tactical alliance with the Tutsis of Rwanda, but the two countries are in fact quite different, and this alliance does not seem to have worked well to date. This has an important consequence in terms of the intensity of the battles: in Ireland after 1690, the Irish became unable to fight the English army; instead there were recurrent revolts of limited duration. In Burundi, on the other hand, the Tutsi army seems incapable of eliminating the Hutu guerrillas. There is permanent civil war, which has so far left 200,000 dead between 1962 and 1996.<sup>35</sup> Related to the population of 6.5 million, the ratio is nearly four times that of Guatemala.

Is the situation in Burundi really a type A colonial situation, and can a partition of the country be envisaged? It is difficult to give a satisfactory answer to these questions. We know little, for example, of the relationship of Hutus and Tutsis before the colonization; had there been revolts, and if so, in what form? We also know little of the linguistic evolution, or about landholding: what percentage of the land belonged to the Tutsis? As to a possible partition, a proposal was made by T. Melady, the former U.S. ambassador to Burundi: the predominantly Tutsi area of Gitega (in the center of the country and about 50 kilometers east of Bujumbura) would be designated as the Tutsi part of the country, while the rest would go to the Hutus.<sup>36</sup>

## Type C Liberation Struggles

It may be enlightening to enquire whether the forms taken by the struggles for liberation were really different in the colonies where colonial control was limited to the political sphere. We will refer to these colonies by the generic term “associated territories.” We include in this term:

- (1) Protectorates like Cyprus, Egypt or Morocco
- (2) Countries administered under the framework of a mandate of the Society of Nations, like Cameroon, Iraq, Lebanon or Syria
- (3) Colonies in which only few colonists settled as in Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria or Uganda

(4) Regions like Puerto Rico which have the status of associated territory.

More specifically we will consider the following questions. (1) Were there claims for independence in these countries? (2) If so, have these demands taken a different form than in type A colonies? To attempt to answer these questions, we will look at the examples of Egypt and Ghana.

We will see that in associated territories, the rejection reaction is much less pronounced than in type A colonies. The virulence of the reaction is a function both of the degree of interference of the colonizer and the past experience of the country as an independent entity. As far as the forms of the revolts are concerned we will see that they mainly mobilize the elite (e.g., officers, professors, students); in short, these revolts are very different from the outbursts of popular violence observed in type A colonies.

## **Egypt**

Egypt has had a singular destiny. After having been the dominant power in its part of the world for more than 2,500 years (not counting a few eclipses), Egypt was annexed by a succession of empires: the empire of Alexander the Great and his Persian successors, the Roman Empire, the Turkish Empire, and finally, the British Empire. During the Roman occupation, a number of revolts took place, especially in 110, 172 and 291.<sup>37</sup> However, in this section we will limit our discussion to the episode of the British protectorate.

The occupation of Egypt by Great Britain in 1882 had a clearly defined strategic objective, namely, the control of the Suez Canal. The canal had been opened in 1869, with the United Kingdom becoming the principal stockholder by 1875, after it had repurchased the shares held by the Khedive which represented 44 percent of the company's capitalization. The geo-strategic problem faced by Great Britain was analogous to the problem posed to the United States by the construction of the Panama Canal. In the latter case, the problem was solved in a more methodical manner. On 3 November 1903 the secession of Panama from Colombia, with the support of American naval forces, followed the refusal of the Colombian senate to ratify the Hay-Herran treaty relative to the canal zone. On the eighteenth of November, the Republic of Panama signed a treaty with the United States which took up the terms of the Hay-Herran treaty. The United States thus found itself master of the Canal Zone well before the canal was put in service. In the following years, the United States took control of the access zones and, in particular, the main Caribbean islands like Cuba, Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico. In the case of the Suez Canal, things were made more difficult for Great Britain by two circumstances: the construction of the canal preceded taking control of the canal zone, and Egypt had been undergoing an important national renaissance since the early nineteenth century. From 1832 on,

Egypt had in practice, if not formally, freed itself from the authority of the Ottoman Empire.

The intervention in 1882 was preceded by the French and English taking control of Egyptian finances; it was not until Egypt tried to shake off this supervision that a direct intervention was decided upon. This is why the two principal shareholders in the canal mounted a naval expedition against Alexandria. This expedition foreshadowed the joint operation in 1956 after the nationalization of the canal by President Nasser. Although France participated in the naval operation in 1882, only Great Britain landed troops and occupied Egypt.

The first revolt of any importance occurred in 1919. This was not an isolated incident; it was, in fact, the starting point for a wave of nationalist movements which shook several countries in the region, notably Syria in 1919, Iraq in 1920 and 1922 and Lebanon in 1925. The troubles in 1919 began on 11 March with student demonstrators, who attacked public buildings and the headquarters of *Al Mokattam*, a newspaper which was subsidized by the British residency. For the first three days, the demonstrations were limited to Cairo, and they did not reach the rest of the country until after 14 March, when a crowd of Muslims who were leaving the El Azhar mosque were caught in a fusillade that left 40 dead.<sup>38</sup>

The way this insurrection began confirms what we said above: British domination of political and financial affairs was especially resented by the Egyptian elites. Despite the formal proclamation of independence in 1922, de facto control by Great Britain continued and gave rise to recurrent anti-British disturbances, primarily in Cairo and Alexandria (Chronology 7.4). In short, there is a profound difference between the disturbances in Egypt and those we have previously examined in Ireland and Algeria. In Egypt, we see disturbances caused by educated Egyptians in high social positions: students, journalists and military cadets. The disturbances occurred primarily in cities. The troubles which occurred in Morocco during the French protectorate are of the same type.

## Ghana

Among the African countries belonging to the category which we call “associated territories” Ghana offers a particularly interesting example for at least two reasons. First, before colonization this country was a kingdom with a centralized government based on a warrior class. The strong resistance opposed to conquest for nearly 70 years bears eloquent witness to this fact. Nevertheless, despite the strong initial resistance there were few important attempts to reject colonization between the beginning of the twentieth century and independence.

*Primary resistance* Before taking the name “Ghana” in 1957 this country was known by various names. The Portuguese who were the first to set up trading posts,

## Chronology 7.4 Egypt

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<i>Year</i>	<i>Event</i>
1807	<i>Mar.</i> The British occupy Alexandria but facing a vigorous opposition which cost them about 450 deaths, they evacuate in September.
1882	<i>Jun.</i> Capture of Alexandria; about 1,600 deaths.
1882–1884	Occupation of Egypt at the cost of 255 British lives.
1906	<i>Jun.</i> Dinshaway incident. A fracas between villagers and a party of British officers results in the death of Captain Butler. A special tribunal imposes exemplary and brutal sentences on the villagers (4 executions and other punishments).
1919	<i>Mar.</i> National insurrection. About 1,500 deaths.
1921	<i>May</i> Anti-European riots in Cairo and Alexandria: 19 Europeans and 68 Egyptians are killed.
1922	<i>Sep.</i> The Khedive is exiled and his property is confiscated.
1923	British martial law, in force since 1914, is abolished.
1924	<i>Aug.</i> Demonstration against British by the Cadets of the Khartoum Military school. <i>Nov.</i> After the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, the British Chief of the Egyptian army, there is a British ultimatum demanding punishment, apology, indemnity (500,000 pounds) and suppression of political demonstrations.
1925	<i>Dec.</i> Riot in Cairo: 5 killed.
1930	<i>Jul.</i> Riots at Bilbeis, Mansurah, Alexandria, Cairo and Port Said; at least 22 killed.
1933	<i>Jun.</i> Anti-missionary and anti-Christian outbreaks.
1935	<i>Nov.-Dec.</i> Violent outbreak of nationalist agitation.

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*Sources:* Keller (1934), Lambelin (1922), Langer (1968), Richardson (1960), Vincent (1898).

called it *El Mina*, which means “The (gold) Mine.” The English called it the Gold Coast or Ashanti Country. The Ashantis were a warrior nation who conquered and unified the interior states during the eighteenth century. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, they brought pressure to bear on the coast, where Europeans had established trading posts and forts. In January 1824, the Ashantis overran the British garrison which held nearly 1,000 men. Great Britain took its revenge in 1826. Overall, the campaigns of 1823–1826 resulted in at least 2,500 deaths.<sup>39</sup> A second campaign took place in 1873–1874. Richardson records 1,000 killed. A third campaign was mounted in 1900 after Ashanti attacks on several British forts.

**Secondary resistance** After this difficult conquest, the first half of the twentieth century was relatively calm. As was the case in Algeria and Morocco, claims for

independence did not resurface until after World War II. The Gold Coast was not a settlement colony and problems were of limited scope. The riot in 1948 had the same characteristics as those we saw in Egypt. At first, there was a revolt limited to the capital, Accra. This had been preceded by a boycott of British products, organized by the Council of Chiefs. The greatest number of victims (17 killed in Accra) was produced when troops opened fire on the crowd, but there were also attacks on stores owned by Europeans and Indians.

## Qualitative Regularities

In the preceding section, we looked at the chronological development of a certain number of liberation struggles. We were able to see similarities between type A colonies and differences with respect to associated territories. The examples which we looked at are far from exhausting the cases for which an acceptable documentation exists. In this section, we propose to see if the similarities observed can be found in other episodes. The search for these qualitative regularities is an intermediate step between the pure description of the previous sections and the search for quantitative regularities in the following section.

### The Compartmentalization of the Two Communities

An absence of contact, interaction and communication between colonists and colonized people is one of the most characteristic traits of colonial situations. Here are several illustrations of this fact.

*Ireland* In nineteenth-century Ireland, neither language nor religion were a priori absolute barriers between the two communities. Around 1830, the Irish language was already substantially in retreat, and English was spoken even in rural zones, as Tocqueville attests. Furthermore, the antagonism between Catholics and Protestants had lost a good deal of its bitterness. In England, there were still some anti-papist riots in the nineteenth century, like those in Birmingham in June 1867 but all in all, the country was moving toward an accommodation between Catholics and Protestants.<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless in Ireland the gulf between the two communities was not bridged, as is shown by numerous testimonies. In 1835 a lawyer in Dublin declared to Tocqueville: “There is an inconceivable distance between people of the two religions. Believe me when I say that I have dined only once in the home of a Catholic, and that was by accident. Even for Catholics who become rich, Protestants cannot bear to see them on the same footing. Almost all judges and sheriffs are Protestant.”

How can this persistent separation be explained? Obviously religion was not the critical factor by itself, it was rather the way religious feelings were rooted in history. Ostracism, scorn and the absence of contacts had strong roots in Ireland, going back

several centuries. From 1366 on, the Statutes of Kilkenny codified segregation.<sup>41</sup> (1) Marriage with the Irish was forbidden, and children could not be given to Irish families to be raised. (2) It was forbidden to sell armor or war horses to an Irishman. (3) Ecclesiastical benefices in abbeys and cathedrals were forbidden to the Irish. These statutes were reinforced several times and remained as law until 1613. After this date, they were, in a sense, replaced by the Penal Laws. At the time of Tocqueville's visit, the Penal Laws were being progressively withdrawn but prejudices seem to have an inertia and a permanence on the order of several generations, even after the disappearance of legal discrimination.

This thesis on the separation between the two communities could be objected to on the basis that the Irish could be found in fairly large numbers in the British army. In fact, in April 1916, among the troops who encircled and bombarded the General Post Office in Dublin, there was a substantial number of Irish Catholics. As a matter of fact, colonizers have always managed to enlist in their armies a substantial number of the colonized, as is attested by numerous examples, such as India, Kenya or Algeria. This is easily explained by the salaries paid and by the prestige attached to the army.

**Algeria** Between the European and Algerian communities, there were three almost insurmountable barriers: religion, language and the memory of exactions and humiliations going back to the period of the conquest and the repression of subsequent insurrections. These barriers were more rigid than in a number of other colonies. Thus in Black Africa Christian missions had succeeded in creating a nucleus of Christians among the populations; furthermore, given the number of indigenous languages, the colonizer's language served as a useful tool of communication. In Algeria language and religion were two social bases that colonization could not penetrate. In these conditions, we should not be surprised at the absence of contacts and at the irreducible opposition between the two communities.

**South Africa** We know that the primary objective of apartheid was the separation of the two communities. Whereas in previous cases the lack of contacts was more or less a consequence of the tension between the two communities (and in return contributed to widen the gap), in South Africa apartheid was written into the laws. In 1913, the "Natives' Land Act" confined the black majority of the population to 7 percent of the land. This law marked the beginning of discriminatory legislation in housing, and provoked a massive exodus of the native population. Since black labor was needed in the mines and factories the separation between the two communities could not be absolute. In consequence, the system was incredibly complex; it was put into place little by little via a law code numbering in the hundreds of pages. In 1950, the nationalist Afrikaner government approved the "Group Areas Act" which codified residential segregation in cities by reserving specific quarters to each group



within the population. Between 1960 and 1985 population relocation resulted in the displacement of 3.5 million Africans.<sup>42</sup> A similar spatial segregation existed in colonial times in Kenya and in Southern Rhodesia.

### **Economic Oppression**

At the beginning of this chapter, we noted that economic stagnation was one of the characteristics of a colonial situation. At first sight, this observation seems paradoxical. Was it not one of the principal arguments of proponents of colonial expansion that progress resulted from this expansion? In terms of infrastructure (ports, networks of roads and railways) this was undoubtedly true; in terms of human progress, this was not the case. In public schooling, the results of colonization were mediocre. We will mention only one example in illustration. Between 1900 and 1935, Cuba was virtually an American colony. However, according to Beals, American control resulted in retrogression rather than progress in education; illiteracy increased from 30 percent in 1908 to 60 percent in 1933.<sup>43</sup> Such numbers are all the more astonishing when one considers the pride of place given to education in American values. The solution to this paradox resides in the fact that production in the colony should in no way compete with production in the mother country. This was the constant concern of all colonial powers, as the following examples attest.

- An English law of 1732 stipulates: “Given that the art of hat-making has achieved a high level of perfection in England, the manufacture of hats is forbidden in America.”<sup>44</sup> This somewhat amusing example is representative of mercantilist policies.

- Between 1665 and 1680, a number of laws were enacted which absolutely prohibited the importation from Ireland into England of all cattle, sheep, swine, beef, pork, bacon, mutton, and even butter and cheese. Subsequently, a law enacted by the British Parliament in 1699 prohibited the Irish from exporting their manufactured wool to any other country whatever. Ireland was further handicapped by a permanent drain of capital in that the landlords spent most of their capital revenue in England, rather than in Ireland. Between 1700 and 1773, the annual average has been estimated at around a million pounds.<sup>45</sup>

- Customs duties between India and Great Britain discouraged Indian handicrafts and imposed low prices on agricultural exportations, primarily by devaluing the Indian rupee. Between 1861 and 1892, the value of the rupee dropped from 24 pence to 15 pence.<sup>46</sup> Because of the disparity in buying power (and despite the depreciation of the rupee), the price of wheat on the London Market was much higher than it was in the markets of Bombay or Calcutta. This explains why, even in the famine years 1876–1879, exportation of wheat and rice to Great Britain continued at a high level: 215,000 tons of wheat and a million tons of rice annually.<sup>47</sup> This was undoubtedly



**Table 7.8 Massacres of Colonists by Autochthonous Population**

Country	Date	Number of deaths (colonists)
Algeria	1945 May	98
Angola	1961 Feb.	300
Greece (Tripolitsa)	1821	
India	1857 Jul.	>211
India	1889 Jan.	>100
Ireland (Ulster)	1641 Oct.	8,000
Kenya	1952 Oct.	>35
Madagascar	1947 Mar.	140
Malawi (Nyassaland)	1915	5
Namibia	1903 Jan.	123
New Caledonia	1878	200
New Zealand	1869 Feb.	
United States	1862	200
Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia)	1896 Mar.	252

*Note:* The 1896 revolt in Southern Rhodesia consisted of two geographically distinct rebellions: the Matabele rebellion (143 deaths) and the Mashona rebellion (119 deaths). We did not in this table mention the massacres in Burundi or Guatemala although they can in a sense be classified under the same heading.

*Sources:* **Algeria:** Julien (1972); **Angola:** *Le Monde* (20 May 1961); **Greece:** Woodhouse (1968); **India:** Langer (1968:902), Vincent (1898:568); **Ireland:** Lecky (1862); **Kenya:** *Le Monde* (22 Oct.1952); **Madagascar:** Deschamps (1965); **Malawi:** James (1975); **Namibia:** Mayer (1985); **New Caledonia:** Dousset-Leenhardt (1976); **New Zealand:** Vincent (1898:773); **United States:** Andrist (1993); **Zimbabwe:** Tindall (1967).

beneficial to certain Indian merchants, yet another result was the death of 5 million Indians from famine.<sup>48</sup> A similar scenario was played out at the time of later famines, particularly in 1865–1866 and in 1900 (4.5 million deaths).

### Massacres of Colonists

It has been observed that spontaneous revolts frequently began with the massacre of colonists. Independently of any moral judgment, we can see this as a kind of transplant rejection. Colonists had taken over the lands of ancestors and broken the ancient order. Since the natives are ill-equipped to attack the colonizer's army, it is "natural" for them to attack the colonists who surround them. The geographical separation envisaged by apartheid aimed precisely at suppressing the possibility of such explosions. When dozens or even hundreds of kilometers separate colonists and natives, such massacres become impossible. Table 7.8 lists a certain number of massacres of colonists; only massacres of major proportions are shown. There

were also individual assassinations of missionaries or tax collectors. We can see that the great majority of these examples concern type A colonies where a substantial number of European farmers have settled. Wherever colonization has aimed more at the mining industry, as in Zambia (Northern Rhodesia), Namibia or South Africa, colonists have grouped themselves in separate quarters which are much easier to defend against possible violent incursions.

### **Reforms: Too Little, Too Late**

When faced with widespread uprising and external pressure, colonizing powers have a natural tendency to make concessions. This may take the form of political reforms which are made too late and whose application in the colony is often sabotaged by the ill-will of the colonists. There may also be plans for development and for the investment of capital. We have already looked at Ireland, where a long series of reforms in the nineteenth century were made too late and therefore failed. We have also seen the political reforms in Algeria, which were torpedoed by the colonists. Compare also the concessions imposed on the Ottoman empire in Bulgaria. These examples will be completed with those of Angola, Namibia and Tibet.

Following the economic stagnation prevalent for so long in Portugal, there was between 1950 and 1970 an important outflow of Portuguese (generally poor) colonists to Angola and to a lesser degree to Mozambique. In Angola, the number of colonists rose from 80,000 in 1950 to 200,000 in 1960. In 1969, they were nearly 300,000, despite the beginning of war in 1961. The war was essentially limited to the least-populous eastern part of the country. The Portuguese reacted to the war by pouring in money, particularly into new industries and into the development of education. In 1966, 381 new schools were opened.<sup>49</sup> Between 1961 and 1966, coffee production in Angola, which represented 67 percent of total exports, climbed by 50 percent. In 1973, Angola was given autonomy in internal financial affairs through a local assembly which voted on its own budget.

In Namibia, a law was passed in 1979, that is to say at the height of the war for independence, abolishing apartheid. This law prescribed fines and imprisonment for anyone found guilty of discrimination.<sup>50</sup> Namibia, it will be remembered, was virtually under South African control at that time. The passing of this law, more than ten years before the abolition of apartheid in South Africa, can be considered as a forerunner of what happened later in South Africa.

In Tibet during the 1950s there was an almost constant war of harassment waged by the nomadic tribes of the eastern part of the country against the Chinese. The decade between 1965 and 1975 saw the excesses of the Cultural Revolution in Tibet as well as in the rest of China. In 1984 the Communist Party adopted a new law on regional autonomy. In the cultural and linguistic fields, citizens of minority national-

ities were to be allowed freedom of religious belief, the possibility of setting up their own education systems, and the right to use and develop their own spoken and written languages. The Communist Party also announced 43 large construction projects to be undertaken in Tibet. Some 8,500 engineers and workers were sent to Tibet to aid in these development projects.<sup>51</sup> Whether these reforms will be more successful than in the previous cases remains an open question.

### **Foreign Help**

We have already seen that foreign help played a determinant role in the Irish liberation struggle. In a general way no liberation struggle could succeed without some support from one or several foreign countries. That support can take various forms but one of the most important is international recognition. As an illustration one can mention the case of the Miskito Indians.

In ordinary times few people care about the rights of the Miskitos, a fairly small (120,000) population of Indians who live along the border between Nicaragua and Honduras. Yet, in the early 1980s the Miskito Indians came to the forefront of the news. According to the Lexis-Nexis data base the number of yearly newspaper articles devoted to the Miskitos increased from almost zero in 1980 to about 300 in 1983–1986 and then plummeted to about 50 in the early 1990s. Why? In the mid-1980s the Miskitos had become a strategic target in the struggle between the (leftist) Nicaraguan government and the opposition represented by the so-called *contras*. The Miskito rebels received help from the Central Intelligence Agency and from “Causa,” an organization which is the political arm of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Church.<sup>52</sup> Still completely unknown by 1981 the name of the Miskito leader Steadman Fagoth was mentioned in numerous articles between 1982 and 1986 (according to the Lexis-Nexis data base the number of papers jumped from 0 to 200 before decreasing again to almost zero in 1993).

Many similar examples of foreign support to separatist movements could be mentioned. For instance, the rebellion of the Ibos in Nigeria (1967–1970) was supported by France. In Lebanon the Druzes were traditionally backed by Britain, while the Maronites received the help of France.

A closer investigation of these questions would carry us into the history of international relations and would be outside the scope of the present book.

### **Actions by Colonial Extremists**

There is almost always an extremist minority among the colonists who, considering that the repression practiced by the state is too soft, is willing to wage its own war. This usually happens during the last phase of the war of liberation, and may take several forms: blind and vicious attacks by paramilitary groups against the au-

**Table 7.9 Different Types of Action by Extremist Colonists**

Country	Attack on indigeneous population	Mutiny in part of the army	Seizing of power by the military
Algeria	X	X	X
Angola	X	X	
Guatemala	X		X
Ireland	X	X	
Morocco	X		
Mozambique	X	X	
New Caledonia	X		
South Africa	X		
Southern Rhodesia	X		X
West Bank-Gaza	X		

tochthonous population; a concerted action by a part of the army against certain decisions of the government; or an attempted coup d'état by the army itself. Episodes of this sort are encountered in Ireland, North Africa, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Guatemala, and to a lesser degree in Angola and Mozambique. Table 7.9 gives an overview of these cases. The following paragraphs describe the principal phases of these episodes. We will not deal with Rhodesia, whose break with the government in London is well known; we give here some additional, and perhaps less known, examples.

**Ireland** It is not surprising that the bastion of Protestant Resistance was centered on Ulster. Here were concentrated the largest groups of Protestants: in 1912 there were 900,00 Protestants in Ulster, as against 300,000 in the South. Beginning in 1912, a campaign in favor of resistance to Home Rule gathered 500,000 signatures. Then, through the impetus given by Sir Edward Carson, a paramilitary troop called the “Ulster Volunteers” was organized; nearly 70,000 men signed up. To this point, everything remained within the confines of the law, but in 1913, when Home Rule was being debated for the third time in the House of Commons, Edward Carson named a Provisional Government for the six counties of Northern Ireland and announced that it would begin to function on the day that Home Rule was to come into force. On 24–25 April 1913, the Ulster Volunteers seized the ports at Larne and Donaghadee and landed a large cargo of German Mauser rifles and ammunition. The introduction of these arms could have been done only with the tacit complicity of the army. This complicity became apparent in 1914, when 57 officers of the camp at Curragh offered to resign rather than be involved in disarming the Ulster Volunteer

Force and in forcing Ulster to accept Home Rule. The government found it prudent to back off, announcing that it had no intention of coercing Ulster. The extent to which the fracture had penetrated to the very heart of the state is shown by the fact that Edward Carson would become a member of the War Cabinet in 1916.

The collusion of the army and Protestant groups became apparent again at the time of the pogroms in Belfast in July 1920. Attacks against Catholics by Protestants, backed up by “special constables” cost the lives of 22 persons. Only after four days did the military interfere.<sup>53</sup>

Collusion between the army and the Orangemen, the most militant Protestants in Ulster, was also evident during the general strike of 1974 in Ulster. This strike began as a protest against the establishment of a Council of Ireland which was to bring together northern and southern Ireland as a prelude to possible unification. Faced by the army’s refusal to break the strike by operating the electric power plants the government of Harold Wilson was forced to give in.

**Algeria** The designation “ultras” was given to extremists among the colonists. The action of these ultras during the two years before independence was in fact the amplification of a long tradition of insurrections against the central government, a tradition that Algerian colonists had cultivated since the nineteenth century, as shown by the following episodes.

- The revolt of 1870–1871. The French in Algeria were resolute opponents of the Second Empire, less out of republican sentiments than because Napoleon III did not allow them to satisfy their thirst for land. The proclamation of the Republic in Paris on 4 September 1870 liberated instincts long repressed in Algeria. Busts of Napoleon III were destroyed and, as they were to do again in 1958, mobs invaded public buildings to serve warning notices on the authorities. The confrontation with Paris took a sharper turn on 24 October 1870, when the minister of war appointed General Walsin-Esterhazy as the new governor. The military forces were the embodiment of Second Empire politics and under no circumstances did Algeria want a general in the governor’s chair. Once again, the mob invaded the governor’s palace. The army did not resist, and the general was forced to resign and leave on the next boat.

- Counterterrorist attacks in Tunisia and Morocco. The first attacks by ultras against Muslims occurred in Tunisia and Morocco. This was to be expected, since these two countries were the most advanced on the road to independence. Counterterrorist attacks were in answer to attacks on the French presence, and were aimed at the Arab population. In Tunisia in January 1953, a bomb in a Moorish café killed two people; another explosion in the Bab-el-Kadra quarter of Tunis also killed two people. Shortly afterward, a former member of the nationalist party Néo-destour

was killed near Sousse. In July 1954, people at a café were machine-gunned and four were killed.<sup>54</sup> On 13 June 1955, a newspaper publisher who had been close to nationalists was killed at Casablanca, in Morocco. On 24 June 1955, two policemen were arrested; they confessed to their participation in counterterrorist attacks.

- The revolt in February 1956. The nomination of Admiral Catroux to the post of governor general caused a repetition of the 1870 scenario. Colonists expressed their extreme discontent in violent demonstrations when the prime minister, Guy Mollet, visited Algeria. The demonstrators won out and Admiral Catroux was replaced by a civilian, Robert Lacoste.

- Counterterrorist attacks in Algeria. One of the first of these actions took place on 20 August 1956, with the dynamiting of a building in the Muslim quarter in Algiers. Fifty people were killed.

- The week of the barricades. An attempt by ultras to force the government to yield was mounted from 25 January to 1 February 1960. This was called the “week of the barricades” because certain quarters of Algiers were transformed into fortified camps by the barricades which blocked off the main streets. A year later, an even more serious attempt was made by military ultras.

- The generals’ putsch, April 1961. Using the First Foreign Legion Regiment as their main instrument, the leaders of the so-called OAS (*Organisation de l’Armée Secrète*) took over governmental communications and security facilities in Algiers. On the morning of 22 April General Challe announced over the radio that he and his colleagues had assumed full power in Algeria and the Sahara. Unfortunately for the conspirators, the commander of the Oran region rejected the appeal and the commander of the Constantine (now Anaba) region temporized. On the evening of 23 April President de Gaulle made yet another of his stirring pleas to the nation and to the troops. On 24 April, a one-hour symbolic general strike was staged in France to show opposition by mainland French to the generals’ putsch. The movement began to unravel, and General Challe surrendered on 25 April.

- In the days following the proclamation of a cease-fire (19 March 1962), the OAS in Algiers sent its last forces into a street battle with the regular army of General Ailleret.

- The assassination attempt on President de Gaulle on 22 August 1962 in a southern suburb of Paris followed from the same relentless logic; the car was riddled with bullets, but the assassins missed their target.

**Guatemala** The history of this country displays typical examples of actions arising from what we called in this section colonial extremists (or ultras): (1) A series of military putsches in 1954, 1962, 1982, 1992. (2) Assassinations of civilians by paramilitary groups operating with the active or passive complicity of the army.



These assassinations were directed at Indians as well as some of their ladino sympathizers, in particular priests, labor organizers, or defenders of human rights. Between 1979 and 1990, there were 100,000 deaths and 40,000 people “disappeared.”<sup>55</sup> The same observations can be made, with few differences, about Burundi.

**South Africa** Whites in South Africa were among the most militarized populations in the world. During the 1980s, military service lasted for two years, and after active service, reserve obligations averaged 60 days per year. After the reserve period came an assignment to the “Citizen Force” which covers the white neighborhoods and rural zones; this obligation remained until age 55. It is hardly surprising that such an environment favored the development of paramilitary groups. Groups like Aksie Eie Toekoms (Action for our Future), Wit-Kommando or AWB (Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging: Afrikaner Resistance Movement) come forward openly as possible recourses should white power capitulate. White civilians have taken it upon themselves on several occasions to take revenge for attacks or riots. For two weeks in 1986, groups of whites terrorized the inhabitants of the African ghetto of Kasigo east of Johannesburg by opening fire at night on any black people they met.

Besides this “spontaneous” terrorism there is the terrorism practiced by the secret services, like the assassination in Paris of Madam D. September in April 1988; she was the representative of the ANC in France. This kind of operations was studied in a book by J. Marchand.<sup>56</sup>

Actions by ultras were especially vicious in the electoral campaigns leading to the abolition of apartheid. Between 20 February and 17 March 1992 (election day), 270 people were killed in the Natal and Pretoria regions of the Transvaal, most probably by vigilantes.<sup>57</sup> In the months leading up to the elections of 26 April 1994, at least 19 Africans were killed in bombing attacks.<sup>58</sup>

As a general rule, the ultras in South Africa benefited (as was also the case in Algeria and Morocco) from the indulgence of the white police. One of the few occasions on which the white police fired on a group from the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) was in August 1991. Two people were killed, but 4,000 people attended their funerals. Given the existence of numerous paramilitary groups and the abundance of arms among the white population, it is astonishing to see the relative passivity of the ultras. This may be due to the fact that, as late as 1996, the white police and army remained essentially in place. Let us recall in this regard that in Algeria the main resistance came from the army itself after it became apparent that it could no longer protect the Europeans. A massive africanization of the police and the army could bring about the same reaction.

**Angola** In Angola, the cease-fire agreement between the Portuguese government and the liberation movements was signed on 15 January 1975, with independence



planned for 11 November 1975. Beginning in July 1974, the Unified Angolan Resistance organized demonstrations sparked by colonists. On 15 July, 23 persons were killed when the army attempted to disperse the demonstrators; five others were killed on 7 August. On 23 October, a group took over Angolese radio after the kidnaping of Europeans. On 27 October, Admiral Coutinho revealed that an attack planned by extreme right-wing elements had been foiled.

**Mozambique** Between 17 and 19 January 1974, European demonstrators attacked the homes of Portuguese officials in Beira, Mozambique; these actions were in protest against what was perceived as concessions to the Mozambique Liberation Front, the so-called Frelimo.<sup>59</sup> On 20 and 21 July 1974, four bombs attributed to “counterterrorist” groups were set off in Lourenço Marquês and in Inhaminga. On 15 August, a bomb destroyed the presses of *Noticias* the country’s most important newspaper, which favored movement toward independence. After the coup d’état of April 1974 in Portugal, talks were begun with the liberation movements. A cease-fire agreement was signed at Lusaka (Zambia) on 6 September 1974 between the Portuguese government and Frelimo. At this time, there were approximately 100,000 Europeans in the country. Official independence was planned for 25 June 1975. As was the case in Algeria, Frelimo left no doubt as to its socialist leanings and its preference for a one-party regime; it should not be surprising that certain elements of the European population were tempted by last-ditch operations. Shortly after the signing of the cease-fire agreements, a group of Europeans claiming to be adherents of a counterterrorist organization, the “Dragons of Death” tried to establish a government which would decree the independence of the country, as in Southern Rhodesia. On 7 September, this group occupied Radio Clube, the primary station in Mozambique, as well as the airport at Lourenço Marquês. The insurgents claimed to have 30,000 armed men at their disposal, including a certain number of elements of the Portuguese army and the secret services. Two representatives of the Lisbon government, Lieutenant Colonel Dias de Lima and Commander Duarte Costa, undertook talks with the rebels, who suspended operations on 10 September. The number of deaths during these confrontations in September 1974 is estimated by hospital sources as more than a hundred.

**New Caledonia** During the years of unrest in 1984–1985, anti-independence movements grew up, similar to those which had been seen in Algeria twenty years earlier. These groups attacked natives and Europeans who were in favor of independence; they almost certainly benefited from the complicity of some of the police. In 1982, a European militant partisan of independence, Pierre Declercq, was assassinated. In December 1984, another militant for independence was killed at a roadblock set up by anti-independence groups.<sup>60</sup> On 1 January 1985, three bombs

exploded in Noumea; the attacks were claimed by the National Committee against Independence (*Comité National contre l'Indépendance*). Finally, in March 1994, large caches of arms were discovered in Noumea in the homes of Europeans who were close to the anti-independence movements.<sup>61</sup>

### **Instability in the Years Following Independence**

In the second half of the twentieth century a large number of new countries gained their independence, a phenomenon which provides the interesting opportunity to observe the processes leading to the establishment of a state and the formation of a nation. A state is more than the conjunction of an administration, a government and a parliament. It is an institutionalized network of links and relationships which regulates cooperation, competition and conflicts. When this web does not exist, there is a strong temptation for the different actors in the political arena to resort to force of arms to solve possible conflicts.

The data in Table 7.10 provide an insight into this phenomenon. We see that at least 13 out of 44 African countries have seen civil war in the 30 years following independence; the probability for a “young” country to be affected by this phenomenon is thus on the order of 30 percent. This probability is at least two or three times greater than it is for an “old” nation. This observation should not be surprising, for several reasons. (1) Achieving independence through a war of liberation, a nation learns violent methods which may be perpetuated in the future. (2) At the beginning, the institutions of a young nation pass through a trial period during which they are not yet capable of settling the conflicts which may occur. In a way, these civil wars can be viewed as childhood diseases in an organism whose immune defense system against violence is not yet fully established. The rule which seems to emerge from Table 7.10 can be stated as follows.

*There is a higher probability that a young country will experience a civil war in the first decades after independence than in the subsequent period.*

The criterion which we have used to sum up civil wars in Table 7.10 is the number of deaths above 1 percent of the population. It should be noted that this criterion is difficult to apply in certain cases due to the uncertainty of the data. For example, the figures for the conflict in Burundi in 1972 vary from 30,000 to 200,000;<sup>62</sup> the lower number is below the 1 percent threshold. We use the number 90,000 given by the American ambassador to Burundi; he was one of the first to attract world attention to this forgotten conflict.

In the thirty years following independence, approximately one African country out of three fell victim to civil war. If we set the “childhood illness” factor aside, Table 7.10 reveals no obvious “cause” that all cases have in common. In certain cases,

**Table 7.10 Nations That Have Experienced Civil War in the Thirty years Following Their Accession to Independence**

	Independence	Civil war	Population [millions]	Number of deaths [thousands]	[per thousand]	
<b>A. Africa</b>						
1	Algeria	1962	1992–1996+	28.6 (1995)	50	12
2	Angola	1975	1975–1991	11.5 (1990)	300	26
3	Burundi	1961	1972	3.7 (1975)	90	24
4	Chad	1960	1968–1990	4.5 (1985)	53	12
5	Equatorial Guinea	1968	1969–1978	0.3 (1975)	70	219
6	Liberia	1847	1989–1996+	2.7 (1995)	150	56
7	Mozambique	1975	1983–1992	16.6 (1995)	1000	60
8	Nigeria	1960	1967–1970	63.0 (1979)	1000	16
9	Rwanda	1961	1994	7.5 (1995)	500	67
10	Sierra Leone	1961	1990–1996+	4.3 (1995)	50	12
11	Somalia	1960	1990–1996+	8.9 (1995)	300	34
12	Sudan	1956	1983–1996+	23 (1990)	1000	43
13	Uganda	1962	1972–1986	15.1 (1985)	500	33
<b>B. Latin America</b>						
1	Argentina	1816	1836–1852	1.7 (1869)	25	14
2	Chile	1821	1891	2.8 (1895)	>10	>4
3	El Salvador	1821	1824–1842	0.2 (1840)	2.5	12
4	Mexico	1821	1910–1920	15.2 (1910)	251	17
5	Nicaragua	1821	1824–1842	0.2 (1840)	>1.2	>5
6	Peru	1825	1842–1845	2.0 (1850)		
7	Uruguay	1828	1836–1843	0.1 (1852)		

*Note:* The use of “1996+” in the period covered by the civil war means that the conflict continued into 1996. By way of comparison for the figures in the last column, the American Civil War (1861–1865) caused 622,000 deaths, or 20 per thousand of population. If the independence of Liberia was formally proclaimed in 1847, the country remained largely subordinate to the United States until the period of decolonization in Africa; this justifies the inclusion of Liberia in this list.

*Sources:* **Algeria:** *Quid* (1997); **Angola:** *International Herald Tribune* (1 Jun. 1991); **Burundi:** *Le Monde* (16 Dec. 1974); **Chad:** *Quid* (1997); **Equatorial Guinea:** *Monde Diplomatique* (Dec.1978); **Liberia:** *Quid* (1997); **Mozambique:** *Le Monde* (6 Oct. 1992); **Nigeria:** *Le Monde* (12 Jan. 1990); **Rwanda:** *Le Monde* (4 Oct. 1994); **Sierra Leone:** *The Independent* (1 Sep.1995); **Somalia:** *Le Monde* (19 Aug. 1996); **Sudan:** *Témoignage Chrétien* (26 Jun. 1989); **Uganda:** *International Herald Tribune* (30 Jan. 1986). **Populations:** International Monetary Fund, Mitchell (1983); **Argentina, Chile, Mexico:** Richardson (1961); **El Salvador, Nicaragua:** Karnes (1961).

there are religious antagonisms (e.g., Nigeria, Sudan), in others there are socioethnic problems (e.g., Rwanda, Burundi). One might be tempted to invoke poverty as a common denominator, but some of these countries are rich in mining resources, like the diamonds in Sierra Leone or the petroleum in Angola. In these cases, civil war has hampered exploitation of the resources. It is especially important to emphasize that the phenomenon is not unique to Africa. Asia offers similar examples in Burma, Cambodia or Laos. The history of Latin America in the nineteenth century is equally abundant in episodes of this type; examples are given in Table 7.10. The American Civil War was another illustration.

After this overall statistical study, it may be interesting to examine this phenomenon from a more qualitative point of view by investigating several examples.

**Ireland** Ireland's independence within the British Commonwealth framework in December 1921 gave rise to a civil war which caused 1,000 deaths between June 1922 and May 1923.<sup>63</sup> This conflict opposed partisans and opponents of the agreement signed with Britain. It is remarkable that the ways and means used in this conflict were essentially the same as those which had been used against the British shortly before the agreement: ambush, bombings, executions. Thus Michael Collins, who had played a key role in the struggle between 1917 and 1921, was killed in an ambush. After 1923, partisans of De Valera who were opposed to the 1921 treaty ceased hostilities, but they did not return to their seats in the Irish parliament until August 1927.

**United States** The events which punctuated U.S. history before national unity was fully inscribed in both hearts and institutions are equally revealing. Ten years passed between the confederal constitution of 1777 and the federal constitution of 1787. During these ten years, the weakness of the central government was dramatized by Shay's Rebellion (1786) in Massachusetts. The antagonism between North and South remained latent, and was especially evident in the permanent dispute over the setting of customs tariffs. While industry in the Northeast developed in the shelter of high customs tariffs, the South demanded their reduction because high tariffs hampered exportation of cotton and raised the cost of imported articles. In 1832, a customs dispute between South Carolina and the federal government took a sharp turn: a convention called by the state of South Carolina declared (136 to 26) that the federal customs laws of 1828 and 1832 were "null and void" and forbade the payment of these duties in the entire state after 1 February 1833.<sup>64</sup> This placed the state in direct opposition to the federal government in an essential domain. At the same time, 10,000 militiamen were recruited for the defense of the state. President Jackson replied that he considered the power of a state to rescind a federal law incompatible with the existence of the federal union, and proceeded to put together a

force of 40,000 men to enforce the law. Finally a compromise tariff was approved by Congress on 2 March 1833, along with a law authorizing the president to employ the army and the navy to collect taxes in South Carolina. It is undoubtedly not an accident that South Carolina was the first state to secede from the union by a unanimous vote of the 169 members of the state convention on 20 December 1860, after the election of Abraham Lincoln. The population greeted the declaration of secession with joyful demonstrations which were revealing of the depth of separatist tendencies.

## Quantitative Regularities

The sound procedure is to obtain first utmost precision and mastery in a limited field, and then to proceed to another, somewhat wider one, and so on.

—John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1953)

In this section we will limit our observations to certain aspects of liberation struggles; the choice of questions was guided primarily by the possibility of making quantitative tests. In this sense, we follow the precept of Von Neumann and Morgenstern stated above. Nevertheless, we shall see that we are still far from the objective of “utmost precision” that they call for. In many cases, the uncertainty affecting the data that we use will be on the order of 50 percent or even 100 percent.

### Definition of Variables and Their Statistical Observation

We will look essentially at the relationships between the intensity of the struggle for liberation ( $L$ ), the importance of the colonial population ( $C$ ), and the extent of their emigration after independence ( $E$ ). Through these variables, we will look at two distinct but related phenomena. (1) If the intrusion of colonists is met with rejection by the autochthonous population, it is natural to suppose that the intensity of this rejection will be proportional to the scope of the intrusion. This leads to a study of the relationship between  $L$  and  $C$ . (2) It is natural to expect that the liberation war will broaden the gulf between the two communities. This leads to a relationships between  $L$  and  $E$ . First, we must discuss how these three variables can be specified and observed statistically.

*The struggle for independence*     In order to gauge the intensity of the liberation struggle, we have used the number of deaths caused by this struggle from 1945 until independence. The year 1945 is certainly somewhat arbitrary, but it can be justified if we note that there were relatively few insurrections in the period 1918–1945. Like all the data relative to losses during a conflict, the variable  $L$  is not known with great precision. Should we, for example, include the deaths, particularly numerous in poor

**Table 7.11 Empirical Relationship between the Number of Victims in the Colonial Army and the Number of Autochthonous Victims during the Wars of Liberation**

	Period	Losses among security forces	Losses among armed autochthonous groups	Total autochthonous losses	Ratio	Ratio
		(S)	(A)	(T)	(A/S)	(T/S)
Algeria	1954–1962	16 500	145 000	162 000	8.8	9.8
Angola	1972	91	1 611		17.7	
Kenya	1952–1954	479	6 741		14.1	
Namibia	1981–1982	138	2 762		20.0	
	1966–1986	460		12 000		26.1
Southern Rhodesia	1972–1979	1 050	13 500	22 500	12.8	21.5
<b>Average</b>					<b>14.7</b>	<b>19.1</b>

*Note:* For the ratio between losses among security forces and among armed autochthonous groups, we can posit an order of magnitude around 10. The two averages in the table have been calculated without taking into account the respective sizes of the contingents. If these were accounted for one would get 9.2 instead of 14.7 for the first average.

*Sources:* **Algeria:** Clayton (1994); **Angola:** *International Herald Tribune* (13 Aug. 1973); **Kenya:** *Le Monde* (21 Oct. 1954); **Namibia:** *Le Monde* (4 Jan. 1983), *L'Humanité* (26 Aug. 1986); **Southern Rhodesia:** *Financial Times* (10 Sep. 1979).

lands, which result from famines or illnesses caused more or less directly by the war? When the inhabitants of a region are driven from their village by war and lose their flocks, this problem becomes a burning question. In general, when several sources are available, we will give preference to figures based on detailed assessments rather than on sources which give only overall results. By way of example, after the uprising in 1947 in Madagascar, the governor estimated in 1948 that overall losses had been 60,000. At this time, however, a large number of villagers who had left their villages had not returned home, making this count impossible. When a tally was made in 1950, it showed 4,200 Madagascans killed during the revolt and its repression, and 5,900 dead from hunger or disease in the forests.<sup>65</sup> We have deliberately chosen this example because it is one of those for which widely varying figures have been published; thus Richardson gives 1,000 deaths, but mentions that some sources such as *World News and Views* gave 100,000 deaths.

There is a rule of thumb which may keep us from making the grossest of errors. This rule establishes a relationship between the number of deaths in the colonial army and deaths among the indigenous victims; this is shown in Table 7.11. Despite the fragmentary nature of these data, we see that there is, *grosso modo*, a factor of 10



between the two series of numbers. It is obvious that this ratio is applicable only in well-defined conditions: hostilities between a colonial army and a lightly armed guerilla force. If the colonizing nation resorts to massive air raids or retribution against civilians, the ratio is no longer applicable. The figures in Table 7.12a are based on the estimates published in various sources; nevertheless the above rule can be useful to check their plausibility.

*The colonial population* There are two categories of colonists, permanent residents and temporary residents. The latter are engaged through short-term contracts which are widely used especially in the mining industry. Thus, the more important this industry, the larger the contingent of temporary residents as illustrated by the cases of Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The primary goal of temporary residents is to profit from the salary bonuses attached to overseas assignment. Unlike permanent residents, the temporaries will return home with little concern for the future of the country where they have worked. For our study it is the permanent resident population which is important. Unfortunately, statistics rarely differentiate between the two categories. There is a further area of uncertainty linked to the nationality of European colonists. There were, for example, 180,000 French people in Tunisia in 1956, but there were also 67,000 Italians, which is hardly surprising given the proximity of Tunisia to Italy. For the phenomenon under analysis, we will consider the French, since Italian colonists were only marginally concerned with the colonial policy of France.

*Emigration of colonists after independence* In African colonies, the upper echelons of the administration, the educational system, the police and the army were usually in the hands of colonists. After independence, it was normal for the majority of these posts to be occupied by Africans, even when the transition was made peacefully. That transition can take several years as was for instance the case in South Africa after the end of apartheid. Thus, it was almost inevitable that a segment of the colonial population would return to its country of origin. In Tunisia, for example, out of 180,000 French, civil servants and educators numbered 3,000, or about 12,000 persons if their families are counted. The case of Ghana illustrates that kind of difficulty. In 1956, there were 10,000 Europeans, but how many among this number were civil servants? In 1962, there were 8,000 Europeans, but how many were temporary residents? In order to limit these kinds of uncertainties, we will henceforth consider only populations of colonists numbering above about 20,000.

### **Relationship between the Size of the European Population and the Intensity of the Liberation Struggle**

As can be seen from Table 7.12b the proportion of Europeans varies in a ratio of 1 to



**Table 7.12a Total Population and Losses during the Struggle for Independence**

Country	Population		Number of deaths	
	[million]		in proportion to total population [per thousand]	
Algeria	9.5	(1954)	190,000	20
Angola	5.7	(1970)	13,600	2.4
Benin	2.0	(1960)	2	0.001
Cameroon	3.0	(1960)	142	0.047
Congo (Brazzaville)	0.79	(1959)	40	0.051
Ghana	6.7	(1960)	28	0.004
Kenya	7.3	(1961)	13,000	1.78
Madagascar	5.5	(1960)	5,000	0.91
Malawi	2.8	(1962)	30	0.011
Morocco	8.2	(1951)	960	0.12
Mozambique	6.6	(1960)	7,200	1.1
Namibia	1.4	(1991)	20,000	14.
South Africa	38.0	(1990)	23,500	0.62
Tunisia	3.8	(1956)	545	0.14
Uganda	6.8	(1962)	42	0.006
Zaire	13.5	(1959)	60	0.004
Zambia	4.0	(1969)	19	0.005
Zimbabwe	6.1	(1977)	30,000	4.9

*Note:* The number of deaths covers the period from 1945 to independence. The figure for the population of the country refers to a year close to the period of the war for liberation.

*Sources:* **Algeria:** Clayton (1994); **Angola:** *Encyclopaedia Universalis* (1995); **Benin:** *Le Monde* (26 Jan. 1958); **Cameroon:** *Paris-Presse* (1 Jan. 1960); **Congo (Brazzaville):** *Le Monde* (3 Dec. 1958, 29 Jul. 1959); **Ghana:** *Times* (10 Nov. 1950), *Le Monde* (31 Dec. 1949); **Kenya:** *Guardian* (11 Nov. 1959); **Madagascar:** Deschamps (1965); **Malawi:** *La Croix* (6 Mar. 1959); **Morocco:** Clayton (1993), *Figaro* (1 Sep. 1954), *Le Monde* (3 Aug. 1955); **Mozambique:** *Le Monde* (11 Dec. 1974), *Le Monde* (5 Feb. 1976), *Encyclopaedia Universalis* (1995); **Namibia:** *Quid* (1997); **South Africa:** see references in table 7.11; **Tunisia:** Clayton (1994), *Le Monde* (28 Nov. 1952); **Uganda:** *Times* (10 Nov. 1950), *Chronologie Africaine* (1960); **Zaire:** *Combat* (9 Jan. 1959), *Nation Belge* (9 Jun. 1955); **Zambia:** *Gardian* (29 Aug. 1961), *Chronologie Africaine* (1961), **Zimbabwe:** *International Herald Tribune* (20 Aug. 1984).

**Table 7.12b Populations of Colonists before and after Independence**

Country	Number of colonists		Proportion of colonists who emigrated with respect to their population before independence [per cent]
	before independence	after independence	
		in proportion to total population [per thousand]	
Algeria	984,000 (1954)	103	95
Angola	200,000 (1964)	35	90
Benin	6,000 (1960)	3.0	
Cameroon	14,000 (1959)	4.6	
Congo (Brazzaville)	10,000 (1960)	12.6	
Ghana	10,100 (1958)	1.5	8,000 (1962) 21
Kenya	66,000 (1961)	9.0	40,600 (1969) 38
Madagascar	70,000 (1960)	12.7	33,000 (1972) 53
Malawi	9,000 (1958)	1.9	7,000 (1966) 22
Morocco	360,000 (1951)	43.9	70,000 (1957) 19
Mozambique	100,000 (1960)	25.7	25,000 (1978) 75
Namibia	71,000 (1981)	50.7	
South Africa	5,500,000 (1991)	144	
Tunisia	180,000 (1956)	47.3	110,000 (1961) 44
Uganda	11,600 (1962)	1.7	
Zaire	88,000 (1959)	6.6	
Zambia	76,000 (1960)	19.0	67,000 (1966) 11
Zimbabwe	275,000 (1974)	56.1	140,000 (1983) 49

*Note:* Ideally, we would like to compare the populations of colonists after a uniform period after independence (5 years for example); these statistics are not always available for the required dates; for example, for Algeria we found no figures for the period immediately following independence, but in 1986 there were still 51,900 French in Algeria.

*Sources:* **Algeria:** Ruedy (1992), *Quid* (1997); **Angola:** *New York Times* (10 Oct. 1963), *Figaro* (21 Apr. 1967); **Benin:** *Figaro* (29 Oct. 1963); **Cameroon:** *L'Aurore* (14 Jun. 1960); **Congo (Brazzaville):** *Guardian* (16 Aug. 1960); **Ghana:** Sampson (1960), *Le Monde* (31 Aug. 1962); **Kenya:** *Statesman's Yearbook*; **Madagascar:** *Paris-Presse* (11 Aug. 1960), *Economist* (20 May 1972); **Malawi:** *New York Times* (30 Apr. 1962); Sampson (1960); **Morocco:** *France Observateur* (1 Aug. 1957); **Mozambique:** *Figaro* (21 Apr. 1967), *International Herald Tribune* (4 Jul. 1978); **Namibia:** *Le Monde* (4 Jan. 1983); **South Africa:** *Financial Times* (31 Jun. 1992); **Tunisia:** *Statesman's Yearbook*; **Uganda:** *Le Monde* (9 Oct. 1962); **Zaire:** *Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique et du Congo Belge* (1959); **Zambia:** *New York Times* (30 Apr. 1962), *Times* (1 Mar. 1977); **Zimbabwe:** *Statesman's Yearbook*, *Financial Times* (28 Sept. 1983).

100; the number of victims during the war for independence varies in a ratio of 1 to 10,000. The very range of these figures obliges us to use logarithmic scales (Figure 7.3a). Linear adjustment bearing on 18 African countries brings about a coefficient of correlation of 0.76 (the interval of confidence for a probability of 95 percent goes from 0.45 to 0.90). There is thus a significant relationship between the variables  $L$  and  $C$  which takes the form:

$$L = (1/550)C^{1.6}$$

$L$  : intensity of the liberation struggle     $C$  : ratio of colonists to total population

This relationship can be stated as follows:


*The more numerous the population of colonists, the longer is the struggle for independence and the more costly it is in human lives.*

Can this rule be tested on some cases which do not belong to the sample of countries that we have already used? Two tests of this kind have been tried, one for Egypt, the other for Ireland. The results more or less agree with the ratio given above. Nevertheless, losses in Egypt during the struggle for independence were too high in relation to what the small number of British colonists would lead us to expect. The reason is fairly clear: what mattered in this case was the strategic importance of the Suez Canal. When uprisings occurred British troops were brought in, which are of course not included in the number of colonists. One may even wonder if the figure for the number of colonists includes the troops stationed permanently in Egypt. Apart from the number of colonists the time they have spend in the colony is probably also an important parameter. According to the *Demographic Yearbook of the United Nations* published in 1956 the percentage of white population born in the country may vary greatly from one colony to another as shown by the following figures.


	South Africa	Algeria	New Caledonia
Whites born in the country	90%	85%	61%
	Morocco	Southern Rhodesia	Northern Rhodesia
Whites born in the country	37%	31%	18%

### **Relationship between the Intensity of the Liberation Struggle and Emigration of Colonists**

*The relationship*    In Figure 7.3b, we have placed on the horizontal axis the index  $L$ , showing the intensity of the struggle for independence, and on the vertical axis, the proportion  $E$  of colonists who had left the country during the two or three years



**Figure 7.3a Relationship between the Size of the Populations of Colonists and the Intensity of the War of Liberation.** The dashed line is a least-square for the countries corresponding to the circles; the meaning of the symbols is as follows: Alg: Algeria; Ben: Benin; Cam: Cameroon; Con: Congo (Brazzaville); Egi: Egypt; Gha: Ghana; Ire: Ireland; Ken: Kenya; Mad: Madagascar; Mal: Malawi; Mor: Morocco; Moz: Mozambique; S.A.: South Africa; Tun: Tunisia; Uga: Uganda; Zai: Zaire (Congo Kinshasha); Zam: Zambia; Zim: Zimbabwe. The two almost overlapping circles correspond to Mor and Tun. *Source:* Tables 7.12a and b.



**Figure 7.3b Relationship between the Intensity of the War of Liberation and the Proportion of Colonists Who Emigrated after Independence.** The symbols have the same meaning as in the previous figure. *Source:* Tables 7.12a and b.

following independence. There is a linear relationship with a correlation of 0.82 (the interval of confidence going from 0.45 to 0.95) of the form:

$$E = 9.2 \ln(L) + 60$$

$E$  : emigration of Europeans     $L$  : intensity of the liberation struggle


This regularity can be stated as follows:

*The more costly the struggle for independence in human life, the greater will be the emigration of colonists following independence.*


***The apparent exceptions of South Africa and Namibia***    There are two noteworthy exceptions to the preceding rule: South Africa and neighboring Namibia.

In South Africa, from a number of deaths around 0.62 per thousand one would expect that emigration would be of the order of 55 percent of the European population; yet the population of Europeans does not seem to have diminished in the early 1990s. From 1990 to 1994, this population remained fairly stable at 5.1 million. Two explanations come to mind. One comes from the difficulty of pinning down the date of “independence” while the other relates to the statistics themselves. Usually in the months following independence, there is a general takeover of the levers of command by the African population in police, administration and government. In South Africa, this transfer of power took place far more gradually. Unfortunately we have little information on the progress of this transfer. A second series of questions concerns the statistics. In 1996 the Australian press revealed that there was a colony of 50,000 South African whites only recently settled in Australia; for example, the “Times International Company” has been publishing since 1966 an edition specially aimed at immigrants from South Africa. Furthermore, a look at statistics for tourism shows that the number of trips abroad among South Africans multiplied by a factor of three between 1991 and 1993; this number had remained relatively constant between 1988 and 1991.<sup>66</sup> It is quite possible that South Africans wishing to leave their country preferred to do so with a tourist visa rather than an emigrant visa.

Zambia can furnish a reasonable prospective model for emigration of Europeans from South Africa. Given the importance of the mining industry in the two countries, we can expect the following stages (Figure 7.4). After the principal organisms of the government have passed into the hands of Africans, the European population will be progressively reduced at a rate of 3 percent per year. Nevertheless, this exodus may be partially or entirely compensated for by the increase in the number of Europeans working under temporary contracts. In Zambia, no more than 20 percent of the Europeans still living in the country seven years after independence are members of the old guard which has been living there for more than 20 years. Ten



**Figure 7.4 Decrease in the Number of Colonists after Independence.** In the case of Ireland the curve shows the decrease in the number of Protestants. A similar case which is not shown on the graph is the case of Indonesia; before the Second World War, the Dutch population was 300,000; in 1958 the Dutch numbered only 60,000. There are cases in which the departure of colonists was more brutal as in Algeria, Angola or Mozambique; in these cases the time interval between independence and the departure of the colonists is measured in months rather than in years. *Sources:* See the references in Table 7.12b.



**Figure 7.5 South Africa: Immigration versus Emigration.** The vertical scale shows the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants per 1,000 inhabitants. Emigration became larger than immigration during the troubled periods which followed the insurrections in 1960 (Sharpsville), 1976 (Soweto), and 1985 (Sharpsville). *Sources:* *Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa*, *Statesman's Yearbook* (1982), *Europa Year Book* (1992).

years after independence, most of the 40,000 whites still living in Zambia are British men completing short-term contracts.<sup>67</sup> A country like Zambia, which depended on copper for 95 percent of its exports in 1971, could not allow its mining operations to decline. In a similar way, the production of petroleum goes on in southern Algeria with the help of foreign technicians, and in spite of the climate of civil war in Algeria since 1992. The situation is different with agriculture, where white farmers can be replaced fairly quickly by African farmers. European farmers are, in general, much more vulnerable: in 1997, around 100 white farmers were assassinated in South Africa, in actions which were implicitly attributed to extremist groups of the ANC. In Zambia, 12 years after independence, only about a third of the 1,000 white farmers remained.

Namibia poses the same problem as South Africa. Basing an estimate on a death rate of 21 per thousand during the war for independence, we would expect 70 percent of the colonists to leave. In fact, the white population declined only 21 percent between 1970 and 1981 and remained stable thereafter.<sup>68</sup> There was even a somewhat spurious increase in 1994 when the almost exclusively European enclave at Walvis Bay (9,000 inhabitants) was returned to Namibia. Namibia, in fact, remains a divided country: Ovamboland in the north has 600,000 Ovambos (1987) and some 200,000 Africans from other ethnic groups, while the south, with its uranium and diamond mines, has a predominance of whites.

*Short-term evidence: the chicken-run* For South Africa one can study more closely the reaction of Europeans to internal situations. As figure 7.5 shows, in each troubled period (1960: Sharpeville; 1976: Soweto; 1985: Sharpeville), the balance of migration became negative. South Africans called these floods of departures the “chicken run.” The period 1965–1975 were record years for immigration, with 40,000 immigrants arriving on average annually. After 1977, the balance of migration became negative, and remained so until 1978 but the problems in Poland (state of emergency in December 1981) brought about an inrush of Polish refugees.

*Nineteenth-century evidence* The phenomenon that we have just examined is not limited to the twentieth century, as can be shown by several examples from the nineteenth century.

Our first example belongs, in fact, to the end of the eighteenth century. American independence brought about the departure of about 100,000 loyalists to Canada, Great Britain and the British Antilles;<sup>69</sup> this represented 3.6 percent of the total population, but a higher proportion of the loyalist element (the exact number is difficult to specify). Loyalist property worth some \$35 million was confiscated.<sup>70</sup> This was ten times the receipts of the federal budget for 1792. It can be noted that the total number of deaths on both sides during the war for independence was about one percent of the



total population.

The struggles for independence which took place in the Spanish Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century were accompanied by the departure of a part of the Spanish population. Unfortunately no systematic data are available. In 1829, a certain number of Spaniards living in Mexico were expelled; around 1830, Spaniards living in Peru were pressured to return to Spain, and the number residing in Lima declined from 10,000 to 1,000.<sup>71</sup>

The same phenomenon occurred when the northern part of Bulgaria was given the status of autonomous principality in 1878; around 400,000 Bulgarians (called “Pomaks”) who had converted to Islam and sided with the Turkish occupier took refuge in the western territories which remained under Turkish control. These emigrants constituted 20 percent of the population of northern Bulgaria. Unfortunately, we have no data on the size of the Turkish population before and after 1878, nor on the number of Pomaks who remained in the country.

## Liberation Struggles at the End of the Twentieth Century

In this last section, we propose to sum up the main points which have emerged from our analysis and see if similar situations still exist at the end of the twentieth century.

### Criteria

Let us first recall the characteristic features of type A colonial situations.

- At the beginning, there is a military conquest which provokes a substantial resistance by the autochthonous people.
- The second stage is the establishment of a strong minority of colonists who expropriate an important part of the land.
  - The colonizer’s language is used quasi exclusively for all official purposes.
  - There is a persistent gulf between the two communities.
  - The autochthonous population suffers from economic stagnation and unemployment.
- There are recurrent uprisings and a passive resistance on the part of the population.
- Because of the economic stagnation and the disturbances, a substantial diaspora of the autochthonous population is created.

In this long, complex and multifaceted process, we have brought out several relatively permanent traits. Firstly, we have shown that the importance of the rejection reaction among the autochthonous population is a function of the number of colonists. Secondly, we have seen that a liberation struggle can succeed only with

foreign support and in a favorable international climate. Thirdly, we have observed that in the two or three years after independence, a fraction of the colonists will emigrate; this fraction is proportionally larger in cases when the liberation struggle was more costly.

### Identification of Colonial-type Situations

If we wish to bring the preceding conclusions to bear on new cases, the first step is to identify the cases that effectively spring from an examination of colonial problems. Once the diagnosis has been made with sufficient certainty, we can appeal to the rules governing this type of situation. Table 7.13a summarizes the application of these criteria to a sample of situations. Two different indices have been constructed; both are comprised between 0 and 10. The first uses a uniform weighting of seven criteria; the second takes into account that, among these criteria, the first two are the most important. These two weightings lead to rather similar results. It goes without saying that “yes” and “no” answers can provide only a fairly schematic description. In Table 7.13b, we have tried to indicate certain of the criteria in a more quantitative way. Future evolution depends on a large number of fortuitous and unforeseeable factors among which international support plays an essential role.

*Tibet* In Table 7.13b the number of deaths for the case of Tibet stands out as being much higher than in all other cases? This raises the question of whether it is reliable. It is true that the Dalai Lama repeatedly stated that Communist China had engaged in wholesale slaughter in Tibet. However, he was unable to document his accusations for a team of international jurists that visited him. (NYT 15 November 1959, p. 42). The same charges were repeated decade after decade. Were they more justified later on than in 1959? Were the fatality data more reliable? In this respect a useful source is the book written by Patrick French in 2005. Being the person in charge of the “Free Tibet” campaign in the UK, he was one of the few persons who got permission to see the primary data and read the testimonies kept by Tibetans in exile. He concluded that they relied on hearsay evidence and that duplicate (or triplicate) data for the same events were being boldly added together.

As a matter of fact, the same kind of pseudo-impartial inquiry and data collecting was already used by the British in Ireland after the Irish insurrection of 1641 in order to inflate the number of English protestants killed by the Irish (see in chapter 2 the section entitled “Nothing but the truth”).

**Table 7.13a Qualitative Features of Some (Alleged) Colonial Situations**

	(i) War of conquest	(ii) Settlers	(iii) Lan- guage differenc e	(iv) Compartmental- ization	(v) Economi c stag- nation	(vi) Insurrec- tions	(vii) Diaspora	Index 1	Index 2
Bougainville	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	7.1	7.0
Brittany	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	2.9	3.0
Corsica	Y	Y-N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	6.4	6.5
East Timor	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	10.0	10.0
Irian-Jaya	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	7.1	7.0
Kashmir	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	10.0	10.0
New Caledonia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y-N	Y	Y	9.3	9.5
Martinique	N	Y	Y	Y-N	N	N	Y	5.0	5.5
Tibet	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	7.1	7.0
West Bank-Gaza	Y	Y	Y-N	Y	Y	Y	Y	9.3	9.5
Xinjiang	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y-N	6.4	8.5

*Note:* Y means Yes, N means No. A more explicit description of the headings (i)–(vii) is to be found in the text. Both indexes are normalized to 10; the first one corresponds to a uniform weighting, the second gives greater weight to the first two criteria (the weighting factors are in this case: 2,3,1,1,1,1,1).

**Table 7.13b Quantitative Features of Some (Alleged) Colonial Situations**

	Population [thousands]	Settlers [thousands]	Separatist disturbances [per thousand]	Separatist disturbances [Number of deaths]	Separatist disturbances [per thousand]
Bougainville	50	3	60	8,000	160
Corsica	250			80	0.3
East Timor	600	>15	>25	100,000	100
Irian Jaya	1,900		62	>84	>0.04
New Caledonia	164	55	336	59	0.4
Tibet	2,300	100	43	1,200,000	500
West Bank-Gaza	2,800	110	39	1,120	0.4
Xinjiang	16,000	8,000	500	1,000	0.06

*Note:* For Irian Jaya we have used the land concession given to mining industries (0.26 million square kilometers) rather than the number of settlers. The figure 15,000 used for East Timor is for the Indonesia occupation troops; in addition there were an uncertain number of Indonesian colonists on the order of several thousands.

*Sources:* **Bougainville:** *Le Monde* (27 Mar. 1997), *Quid* (1997), *Pacific Islands* (59,2,10-18); **Corsica:** Roehner (1997); **East Timor:** *Quid* (1997), *World Directory* (1989); **New Caledonia:** Roehner (1997); **Tibet:** *Quid* (1997), Schwartz (1994:205); **West Bank-Gaza:** Lustick (1993), *Quid* (1997); **Xinjiang:** *Le Monde* (7 Dec. 1984, 23 May 1997).

## Chapter 8

### Struggles for Autonomy

Serbs and Croats confronted each other in Zagreb in August 1902. Here is a contemporary account of this event.<sup>1</sup> The impetus for the incident seems to have been an anti-Croat article published in a Serbian newspaper in Zagreb. “The Croats,” said the article, “have the nerve to fight against the Serbs, who are both stronger and more numerous than they are; we must eliminate what remains of this miserable race.” The following morning, a Croat mob sacked Serbian shops. The garrison was on maneuvers, and the moment was well chosen for this sort of disturbance.

It would be simplistic to attribute this confrontation of Serbs and Croats, which was neither the first nor the last, to a newspaper article. The antagonism between the two peoples had deep-seated historical roots. The following episode told by the same writer emphasizes the atavistic nature of the animosity. The scene takes place around 1900 in a lycée in Zagreb during a French class. The professor, seeking to have his students repeat an exercise in personal pronouns, suggests that a student repeat the following phrase: “You are French, I am a Croat.” The student has no problem with the first part of the sentence, but he then stops abruptly and says, “But I am not a Croat, I am a Serb!” Young Croats in the class stamp their feet in outrage. The visceral nature of the hostility between the two peoples helps us to better understand the violence of the confrontations between them, especially during the Second World War, following the creation of a Croat state headed by Ante Pavelic under the aegis of Germany.

In the two preceding episodes, the antagonisms are exteriorized through violence, but such moments are fairly rare. Most often, antipathy is manifested by a latent ostracism which allows cohabitation with detested neighbors without really seeing them. This attitude can be illustrated by an episode related by L. Bodard after a voyage to Xinjiang in the west of China in the mid-1950s.<sup>2</sup> The incident took place at Turfan, 150 kilometers southeast of Urumchi, the provincial capital. Bodard is accompanied by Aziz, a guide who had been assigned to him by the Chinese authorities. For this reason, the Uigurs consider the guide as a collaborator. At one in the afternoon, Aziz takes his guest to a restaurant. Two groups of people are eating in separate parts of the restaurant: Uigurs who eat their meat with hands dripping

with grease, and Chinese who pick at the daintily cut pieces of meat with chopsticks. Only one Uigur greets Aziz, while the others seem not to see him. During the meal, a beggar comes into the restaurant; he is very old and is mumbling prayers. He passes near the Chinese, who shoo him away with a sweep of the hands. Then the old man approaches the Uigurs. One after the other, they conspicuously put whole loaves of bread, fruits, and pieces of meat in his bag. Then the beggar approaches Aziz. Is he not also a Muslim? Aziz asks the waiters to send the beggar away. The latter squats in a corner and casts a reproving eye on the tourists and their guide.

In this short scene, we find all elements which may account for the gulf between Uigurs and Chinese: different culinary traditions, the linguistic obstacle (the Chinese do not speak to the beggar), the traditions of Islam which are not shared by the Chinese. The absence of contacts will only increase mutual misunderstandings; in its turn, this will block any moves toward contact. Such a mechanism can be found at work in many other places: in Zagreb at the turn of the century between Croats and Serbs, in Belfast in the 1970s between Catholics and Protestants, in Jerusalem in the 1990s between Israelis and Palestinians. These are only a few examples among many others.

One of the objectives of this chapter is to characterize the collective mechanisms which serve to erect walls of mutual misunderstanding between groups. Our approach will be similar to our method in preceding chapters; we will look for the origins of these barriers, both in history and in collective interaction mechanisms. First of all, to get an intuitive idea of these phenomena we will examine six individual cases: Hungary, the Bernese Jura, Wales, Croatia, Kosovo and Casamance (Senegal). These examples have been chosen to cover the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, in Europe and elsewhere. In the second part, we discuss the rules and regularities which emerge from the comparison of these examples. Finally, in a third section, we will examine if the spatiohistorical scheme which allowed us to explain the survival of minority languages can also furnish a key to the present problem. To achieve this aim we analyze the role of two parameters which condition the frequency and intensity of interactions between groups. The reader who is more interested in the comparative aspect than in particular examples can go directly to the second and third sections.

## Examples of Autonomist Struggles

As we have pointed out elsewhere, it is not always easy to establish a clear distinction between the separatist movements examined in the previous chapter and the struggles for autonomy that are the focus of this chapter. In principle, the criterion of possession of land should allow us to establish a distinction; when the indigenous

population of a rural society is subjected to large-scale deprivation of its land for the benefit of colonists, the wish to recover the land seems to transcend all other feelings. Such a colonial-type situation usually brings about a liberation struggle. On the other hand, when the indigenous population enjoys the use of its land, the problems arise later, when urbanization and public education bring questions of language and culture to the forefront. In practice, however, the above distinction is not always easy to make. How can we know if the great landholders of nineteenth-century Hungary were Hungarians or Austrians? They had lived in the region for several generations, but did they not spend most of their time at the court in Vienna? Did they not express themselves in Latin, German or French in preference to Hungarian? Furthermore they have perhaps settled in the region at the time of the colonization organized by Austrian sovereigns in the eighteenth century. In short, in 1820 it was difficult to know if these people were colonists or natives. It is true that in this specific case history provided an answer: by joining their compatriots in the revolution of 1848 against Austria and by progressively abandoning Latin, German or French in favor of Hungarian, the Hungarian nobility clearly showed to which side they belonged. A similar question can be asked about Wales. Were the landlords who held a large proportion of the land Welsh or English? They had been in the region for generations, but did they not spend most of their time in London in preference to Wales? Did they not profess allegiance to the Church of England, while most of the Welsh had turned their back on Anglicanism? And who could certify that they had not been installed on their lands thanks to the British monarchs, as in any conquered country? Unlike the case in Hungary, events did not give the English landlords the opportunity to join their Welsh compatriots in a spectacular action. The question of the land has lost its bite over decades, but the animosity has not disappeared; it remains as a muted feeling of discontent.

In the next section we will adopt a uniform plan to emphasize the successive steps in the process. We will examine the following phases:

- Annexation can take the form of military conquest or can result from an international treaty or a dynastic succession. The circumstances of annexation generally exert a long-lasting influence on the nature of the relations between the region and the rest of the country.

- In the decades following annexation, there is generally a period of partial assimilation coupled with a latent proto-nationalism. Even though this phase is not spectacular, it is nevertheless crucial to the evolution of events. In some cases this evolution can tend toward the pursuit of assimilation, in others it can lead to a strengthening of proto-nationalism.

- In the second hypothesis, we will see a succession of revolts, some overt, some

more or less latent.

- Foreign assistance plays an important role in the development of revolts. Several reasons can push a foreign government to back separatist movements. One of the most common motives is simply national sympathy; the struggle in the Bernese Jura quite naturally found an echo in France. Support for separatist movements can also serve as a form of political pressure. Thus, the United States encouraged separatist movements in the Aceh province of Indonesia in the 1950s in order to show its opposition to the pro-communist drift of the government.<sup>3</sup> Finally, from the point of view of armed conflict, the support for a separatist movement can be a means of weakening an adversary. The support successively given by Spain, France or Germany to Irish insurgents can be seen in this light. In certain cases, a number of motivations can be overlaid, as in the support presently being given by Pakistan to the separatist struggles in Kashmir.

- Finally, after a series of favorable circumstances, the minority accedes to independence. But it is rare that independence is the definitive solution; often new minority claims crop up in the course of time in some subregions of the region which had just gained its independence.


## Hungary

The western part of modern-day Hungary (Figure 8.1) was colonized by the Romans under Augustus (27 B.C.–14 A.D.). The monarchy that was established in the 11th century was a feeble feudal state. In the fourteenth century, this monarchy was subjected to encroachments by the Ottomans and Austrians.

**Annexation** One might think a priori that annexation to Habsburg possessions occurred under favorable conditions, since this coincided with the liberation of the southeastern part of the country from Ottoman occupation. Nevertheless, the attitude of the emperor and the behavior of imperial troops quickly antagonized the population. The quartering of troops brought the usual exactions; to pay for the costs of war, taxes were raised, and the emperor chose to give reconquered lands as fiefs to his faithful vassals rather than allow the Hungarian nobility to regain their former domains. The resulting discontent, encouraged by France (then at war with Austria) and by the Ottoman Empire, led to the revolt of 1704–1711. In short, reattachment to Austria did not occur under the best of auspices.

**Partial assimilation: the period of latent proto-nationalism** From 1723 to 1784, and especially during the reign of Maria-Theresa, a relationship of confidence seems to have established itself between the Hungarians and the court in Vienna. This might have been the beginning of a process which could have led to a kind of Austro-Hungarian fusion over the course of two or three centuries. After the death of Maria-





**Figure 8.1** Map of Hungary (1905). Since 1867, Hungary had enjoyed substantial autonomy within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It should be noted that the Magyars made up only half of the population of the kingdom of Hungary; principal minorities were Romanians (17 percent), Germans (13 percent), Slovaks (13 percent), Serbs and Croats (4 percent). *Source:* Seton-Watson (1908).

Theresa in 1780, Joseph II, who had been co-regent since 1765, found himself alone with the reins of power. Joseph allowed impatience to win out over prudence. The terms of the decree of May 1784 which made German the official language in place of Latin illustrate this haste. How could it be imagined that regional and municipal administrations would switch from Latin to German within a single year? If we keep in mind the extreme slowness of linguistic evolution (see chapter 4), it is easy to realize that a period of 20 or 30 years would have been more realistic. For an engineer, an error of a factor of 20 or 30 in his calculations inevitably leads to catastrophe. The effect is similar in the political domain even if the effect is generally less spectacular than the collapse of a bridge or the explosion of a rocket.

**Cultural awakening** The nineteenth century was marked by the development of both public schooling and the press. The evolution of both institutions carried within itself the germ of cultural awakening for a number of languages which were still being spoken but had lost the essential part of their cultural luster. The Hungarian language is a good example of this evolution. In 1825, Hungarian was introduced for the first time into the High Chamber, where Latin had previously been used. The foundation of an academy and the creation of numerous newspapers in Hungarian

completed this renaissance. It is noteworthy that Louis Kossuth, who played a crucial role in this evolution, was both a journalist and an important politician.

*Repeated revolts* It might appear that there is little connection between the revolts of 1704–1711 and 1848–1849 (Chronology 8.1). The first was a revolt of the nobility against a centralizing state; the second was, at least in the beginning, a social and democratic revolt. Nevertheless, from the regional point of view, the lines of cleavage were the same. On the Hungarian side, we find the Swabians (German colonists established in the west) and the Ruthenians, while among their adversaries we find Croats and Saxons (German colonists established in the east). Only the Romanians changed their allegiance: in 1704–1711, they were primarily on the side of the Hungarians, while in 1848–1849 they were on the Austrian side. Was the movement in 1848–1849 primarily a social revolt or a separatist struggle? The question may appear idle, because it was certainly both. But it should be noticed that it was only toward the end of 1848, when the reaction had triumphed in Vienna and the Hungarian revolutionaries found themselves isolated, that the course of events gave their struggle a national character. This evolution was, in fact, parallel to that of the French Revolution, which shifted from a struggle for the abolition of privileges to open warfare against European monarchies.

*Foreign assistance* We already mentioned the help given by France and Turkey in the insurrections of 1672–1682 and 1704–1711. During the crisis of 1848–1849, Hungary, far from benefiting from foreign help, saw the powerful armies of Russia turned against her. How can we explain this apparent paradox? First of all, Russia was a traditional ally of Austria. Between 1618 and 1905, Austria waged only one short war (of less than a year) against Russia while she was at war with France fourteen times totalling a period of 76 years;<sup>4</sup> in the same period, Austria was allied with Russia twelve times. Moreover, as we have already pointed out, the Hungarian revolution of 1848 was primarily social and antimonarchical. The intervention of Russia is thus similar to the intervention of Prussia and Austria against revolutionary France.

At the time of the 1914–1918 war, the disintegration of Austria-Hungary was already under way. The Allies nonetheless contributed to the completion of this process. In February 1920, as a preamble to the peace negotiations, the Allies proclaimed that no member of the house of Hapsburg was to reign over Hungary.

*The temporary character of the solution brought by independence* Within its borders at the end of the nineteenth century, Hungary was a largely polyglot state in which the Magyars made up only about half of the population (46 percent in 1880, 54 percent in 1910). The principal minorities were: Romanians (17 percent), Germans (13 percent), Slovaks (13 percent), Serbs and Croats (4 percent).<sup>5</sup> Figure 8.1

### Chronology 8.1 Hungary: Development of Separatism

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<i>Year</i>	<i>Event</i>
<i>1590</i>	Bible translated into Hungarian.
<i>1516</i>	Defeat of imperial troops by Turks, who occupy southern Hungary.
<i>1673</i>	The Hungarian constitution is abolished by the Hapsburgs; northern Hungary is reduced to the condition of a province of Austria.
<i>1672–1682</i>	Tökökyi, a magnate, leads an uprising against the Hapsburgs with the support of France and Turkey.
<i>1697</i>	Hungary is liberated by imperial troops. The emperor grants newly reconquered lands to imperial rather than Hungarian nobility. Even when lands are restored to the previous owners, they are required to pay an indemnity of approximately 10 percent of the value of the land. Many nobles did not have the means to pay the tax, or refused to do so.
<i>1704–1711</i>	Revolt led by Francis Rakocsy with the help of France and Turkey. Serbs, Croats and Saxons from Transylvania align themselves with the Hapsburgs. Despite the opposition of part of the insurgents, the unseating of the Hapsburgs is proclaimed in May 1707.
<i>1720–1780</i>	Arrival of settlers from Germany and Lorraine, with the support of the state, which is seeking a remedy to the depopulation that affected several regions after the wars of the preceding decades. These colonists are known as Swabians.
<i>1723</i>	Relations between Austria and Hungary are governed by the Pragmatic Sanction. Hungary is to be governed by her own laws, but Austria and Hungary are declared inseparable; the ruler of both is always to be of the Hapsburg dynasty. Under Maria Theresa (1741–1780), 80,000 Hungarian soldiers serve in the queen's armies.
<i>1784</i>	Joseph II is the first king who refuses to be crowned as king of Hungary. He even orders the crown of St. Stephen to be removed from Buda to Vienna. He decides that German will replace Latin as the official language in Austria as well as Hungary. The switch to German is to take place within one year in the administration of regions and cities, and within three years for all secular and religious tribunals. Recruitment to administrative posts will depend on a knowledge of German.
<i>1815–1848</i>	The reign of reaction and absolutism which swept Europe after 1815 extends its influence to Hungary. The constitution is ignored by the king; no diet is convened until 1825.
<i>1825</i>	On 25 October, Stephen Szechenyi, a member of the House of Magnates, is the first to make a speech in Hungarian rather than in Latin, which had previously been the official language of this assembly. Shortly afterward, Szechenyi succeeds in gathering funds to found the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

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 Chronology 8.1 (continuation)
 

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<i>Year</i>	<i>Event</i>
<i>1848–1849</i>	In March, a movement emerges which is at first a social revolution (as in the rest of Europe) but becomes nationalistic and anti-Austrian when Vienna is affected by the reaction in September. The murder of Count Lamberg, the military governor, by a mob at Pest is a clear step in that direction. By December 8, the Diet denounces as traitors all who acknowledge the emperor of Austria as king of Hungary. But Hungary declares itself a free state only in April 1849, and even then the republic is not explicitly proclaimed. During this crisis the Hungarians are supported by the Swabians and the Ruthenians, but the Croats, Saxons and Romanians turn against them. After a series of victories early in 1849, Hungarian troops are defeated by the Austro-Russian coalition. Repression is brutal. Thirteen generals are shot at Arad; wholesale massacres are committed throughout the country; it is not until 1854 that the state of siege is abolished; an amnesty is not proclaimed until 1856. In the aftermath of this reaction, German becomes the official tongue in universities and secondary schools.
<i>1852</i>	The crown of St. Stephen and other royal insignia are discovered by the Austrians and sent to Vienna.
<i>1861</i>	The emperor promulgates a new and relatively liberal constitution for the Empire. On April 6, the Hungarian Diet opens, and in July, votes a petition to the emperor for the restoration of the constitution of 1848.
<i>1866</i>	During the Austro-Prussian War, a Hungarian legion fights in the Prussian army.
<i>1867</i>	Restoration of the constitution of 1848.
<i>1890</i>	Unveiling at Arad of the national monument to the thirteen generals executed in 1849.
<i>1904</i>	The minister of war of the Austrian monarchy decrees an extension of use of the Hungarian language in the army.
<i>1905</i>	The independence party of Francis Kossuth carries the legislative elections with 163 seats, but Austria's refusal to accept a cabinet headed by Kossuth brings about a long crisis.
<i>1906</i>	New elections give 210 seats to the independence party.
<i>1918</i>	On October 17, the Hungarian parliament adopts a resolution declaring Hungary entirely independent of Austria. On November 13, a separate armistice for Hungary is signed by the Karolyi government.

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*Sources:* Frey et al. (1987), Keller (1934), Macartney (1937), Molnar (1996), Seton-Watson (1908), Szekfu (1945), Vincent (1898), Wiskemann (1938).


shows that the minorities were largely confined to the periphery of the Hungary of 1880: Romanians in the east, Germans primarily in the west, Slovaks in the north, Serbs and Croats in the southwest, and Ruthenians in the northeast. The consolidation of Hungarian autonomy within the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the late nineteenth century exacerbated the tensions between these minorities and the Hungarian element. The Hungarians were accused of fostering a policy of “Magyarization” in education, in the recruiting of officials, etc. The objective of this policy was probably not very different from those promoted by the French and English government, in Brittany and Wales, respectively; but impelled by a sense of urgency (which, as history shows, was not unjustified) the Magyars wanted to go too fast. Here are two illustrations. The first concerns the handling of elections and the second the Magyarization of family names.

The first scene takes place at the time of the elections in May 1909, at Szenicz in northern Hungary, which belongs to the region of the Slovak minority. A peasant is asked to name the candidate for whom he wants to vote “Gyula Markovics” he may reply; “Gyula? There is no candidate named Gyula, stand aside,” says an officer to the unlucky voter who ought to have said “Markovics Gyula” as required by the Magyar custom of putting the surname before the Christian name. In a more general way, a voter who did not pronounce the name of the candidate according to the Hungarian way could have his vote annulled, especially when the candidate in question was not favorable to the policy of Magyarization.<sup>6</sup> In passing, note that the secret ballot was introduced especially late in Hungary; it was not yet in place in 1912, while in Great Britain, for example, it had been introduced in 1872.<sup>7</sup>

Seton-Watson quotes a circular addressed by an inspector to school teachers to encourage them to Magyarize their names. After citing examples of officials who had Magyarized their names, the circular continues with the hope that these patriotic examples will be speedily followed, for “otherwise I should, to my regret, be forced to the conviction that the teachers in question have not the will to offer proofs of their devotion to the Magyar fatherland.” Faced with these pressures, the minorities reacted with passive opposition and by creating disturbances on numerous occasions. Helen Keller cites more than 20 incidents of this kind between 1867 and 1914; most took place in Croatia, especially in Zagreb and in the Slovak region to the north. At the time of the postwar peace negotiations, no solutions of a federal nature were envisioned. As with Austria, Hungary was reduced to its central nucleus; its population went from 18 million before the war to 8 million; 3.4 million Magyars remained outside these borders.

### **The Bernese Jura**

When we examine the case of the Bernese Jura (see Figure 8.2) the scale changes.



**Figure 8.2 Map of the Bernese Jura (1980).** The region within the solid line shows the canton of the Jura which was created in 1978. It comprises the three francophone and Catholic districts of Franches-Montagnes, Porrentruy and Delémont. The southern boundary of the canton follows closely the line of separation (dotted line) between Protestants and Catholics established by the treaty of Aarberg in 1711. South of this line are, from west to east, the three French-speaking Protestant districts of La Neuville, Courtelary, and Moutier.

Whereas the populations considered in the previous section were numbering in the millions, here we are dealing on a scale of tens of thousands. Despite these small numbers, the case of the Bernese Jura is interesting for several reasons. (1) It shows that protonationalist movements can develop even within a country as decentralized as Switzerland. (2) Swiss political institutions leave great scope for direct democracy: both cantonal and federal laws are required to pass the scrutiny of voters in referendums; furthermore, a right to initiative permits citizens to submit proposed laws to referendum on condition of having previously acquired a certain number of signatures. The examples from the Jura show that even in such an open context, only the extra-legal actions of an active minority could compel the political establishment to tackle a problem which had been left pending for 150 years.

**Annexation** At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the bishopric of Basel was joined



to the canton of Bern in compensation for the bailiwicks of Vaud and Argovie, which became new separate Swiss cantons. For more than six centuries, the bishopric of Basel had been a sovereign entity. This status carried with it the right to coin currency, assess tolls, and sign peace treaties (e.g., the peace of Baden in 1714). But this long existence as a sovereign entity does not suffice to explain the emergence of a separatist problem. After all, dozens of independent states of the Holy Roman Empire gave up their sovereignty to form the German Empire without arousing noteworthy separatist reactions.

**The period of latent proto-nationalism** Chronology 8.2 suggests that in the present case, that period was brief, since trouble broke out around 1830. We should not forget, however, that these kinds of religious disturbances were extremely frequent in the nineteenth century. They were essentially a movement of defense among the clergy against the secularization of the society; this phenomenon affected practically all European countries.

In the Bernese Jura, the emergence of proto-nationalism may have been favored by the heavy immigration of German-speaking Bernese Protestants into this Catholic and French-speaking area. Nevertheless, insofar as these newcomers were linguistically assimilated, this population shift could have contributed to facilitating the integration of the Jura into the canton of Bern. Unfortunately, religious antagonism was compounded by cultural opposition.

**The cultural awakening** The cultural resurgence began during the 1830s with the creation of newspapers in the Jura, the most notable being *L'Helvétie* and *L'Ami de la Justice* [The Friend of Justice]. In Switzerland, as in the rest of Europe, this cultural awakening coupled with the growth of education gave a new acuity to linguistic problems.

The First World War undoubtedly widened the gulf between German and French speakers; it is probably not by chance that the first official separatist party was founded in 1917. The Germanization promoted by the Bernese government was certainly more restrained than the pressure exerted by the Hungarian government toward assimilation; yet, there was a strong reaction to these encroachments, as we learn from a book published in 1947 entitled: *How the Jura is Germanized* (Gressot et al.). It is interesting to note that, among the five authors, two are of Bernese origin, as their family names show.

**Repeated revolts** In a historical overview of the Bernese Jura published in 1943 (*Histoire populaire du Jura bernois*) G. Amweg wrote: "One repercussion of the 1914–1918 conflict was the formation of a movement in the Jura which advocated the separation of the Bernese Jura from the canton of Bern. Today, these tendencies have few partisans because the people of the Jura live harmoniously with their



## Chronology 8.2 Bernese Jura: Development of Separatism

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<i>Year</i>	<i>Event</i>
1032	The territory of the bishopric of Basel, which includes the present-day Jura, becomes a sovereign state within the Holy Roman Empire.
1792	The people of the Jura form a republic, which is attached to France in 1793.
1815	At the Congress of Vienna, the Jura is returned to the canton of Bern.
1830	Petition campaign. Xavier Stockmar issues a proclamation. He is accused of treason and a price is put on his head.
1834	The Jura rises against the “Fourteen articles” adopted by the Bernese High Council. Freedom trees are planted with the inscriptions “To live as a Catholic or die.” “Separation from the canton of Bern.” Accused of fomenting disturbances, the Catholic newspaper <i>L’Ami de la Justice</i> is closed. The region is occupied by 12 battalions of Bernese grenadiers. French intervention brings about the withdrawal of the troops and Bern promises to negotiate.
1848	The population of Saignelégier opposes the closing of the Ursulines school. Soldiers occupy the town for 12 days.
1873	The government of Bern follows the policy of Bismarck and prohibits priests from proclaiming papal infallibility. The bishop of the diocese of the Jura is dismissed for having disobeyed this injunction. He is exiled to Lucerne, and the episcopal see remains vacant for 10 years. The Jura is occupied by the Bernese army. On 19 March, 97 priests send a protest to the Bernese High Council. On 21 September, 69 of them are suspended from their posts; they are expelled from the canton in January 1874. Most take refuge in France; disguised, they would repeatedly come back in the villages and take the sacraments to their parishioners.
1875	A petition with 9,100 signatures is sent to the Federal Council.
1893	The people of the Jura reject the new Bernese constitution by 9,984 to 2,189.
1917	Foundation of a separatist party.
1946	Moeckly, a citizen of the Jura and director of the department of public works, is unjustly removed by the Bernese High Council. On 20 September, an assembly of 2,000 persons decides unanimously to work toward the formation of the Jura as an independent canton.
1952	The Jurassian Separatist Movement changes its name to <i>Rassemblement Jurassien</i> (i.e., Jurassian Convention).
1957	Signature campaign for the organization of a referendum on the formation of the new canton.

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## Chronology 8.2 (continuation)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Event (continuation)</i>
1963	Four bomb attacks against army installations and against antiseparatists.
1965	The separatists send a memoire to the countries that signed the Treaty of Vienna (1815).
1966	France refuses to extradite a separatist after his escape from a Swiss prison.
1968	Separatists refuse to fulfill their military obligations.
1972	Separatists occupy the Swiss embassy in Paris.
1975	Referendum about the formation of a new canton. Clashes at Moutier between separatists and antiseparatists.
1978	The new canton of Jura comes into existence. But a French-speaking part of the ‘historical’ Jura remains attached to the canton of Bern.
1993	Bomb attacks. One of the separatists is blown up by his own bomb.

*Sources:* Amweg (1943), Gressot et al. (1947), Jenkins (1986), Rennwald (1984), *Le Temps* (21 Sep. 1873, 4 Jun. 1875), Newspaper data base of the F.N.S.P. (National Foundation for Political Science, Paris) for 1945–1998.

Bernese compatriots.” With hindsight, we can see how erroneous this judgment was and just how difficult it is to make predictions in cases like these. Amweg had taken the relative calm of the 1920s and 1930s for a definitive extinction of the volcano. The mountain was not long in awakening, however. From 1957 on, a signature campaign was organized, aiming at a referendum to create a new canton. These petition and signature campaigns are one of the most typically Swiss forms of protest. However, legal forms of action were insufficient to bring about change; the problem remained latent for more than ten years. It seems that only the spectacular and frequently illegal actions of a militant minority have been effective in moving cantonal and federal officials. There were, for example, attacks on military installations between 1963 and 1968, the occupation of the Swiss embassy in Paris in 1972 and confrontations in Moutier in 1975.

**Foreign support** In this case, foreign aid was particularly sparse. Still, the Chronology shows that France intervened several times in favor of the people of the Jura, most notably in 1834 and 1966. In 1834, France acted as a guarantor power of the 1815 agreements. Overall, these interventions were motivated by a sympathy for the Catholic and francophone cause.

**Toward autonomy** The creation of the canton of the Jura was the culmination of an institutional marathon. The first vote on the question took place on 1 March 1970, although the new canton was not created definitively until eight years later, in

September 1978.

*An incomplete solution* There remains a problem of the “Ulster” type in that certain localities, especially the city of Moutier, have not been integrated into the new canton, even though they are part of the “historical Jura” according to the people of this region. Since Moutier has only 7,400 inhabitants, this may seem like a minor problem. If this figure is compared with the population of the canton of the Jura, however, Moutier represents 11 percent; the population of Ulster, by comparison, represents 37 percent of the population of the Republic of Ireland.

## Wales

In the preceding chapter, we looked at the case of Ireland. The example of Wales is interesting because it shows that, in spite of great similarities, the destinies of these two regions were quite different. This similarity was noted by R. Coupland (1954), as well as by M. Hechter (1975), in a study which constitutes a milestone from the methodological point of view.<sup>8</sup> Among the similarities the following are particularly noteworthy.

- (1) Both Ireland and Wales are relatively poor in road and railroad infrastructures.
- (2) In both cases, the land was appropriated by a small number of landlords.
- (3) The religions of both regions differed from the religion of England.
- (4) The languages of both regions are different from the language used in England.
- (5) The history of both regions has been marked by a succession of revolts against the English conqueror.

Nevertheless, between the two cases, there is a difference of degree in almost all respects.

- (1) Being a mountainous region Wales is indeed not well connected to England; railroads go around it and do not really penetrate it; yet it is not an island.
- (2) The concentration of landholding was even more concentrated in the hands of a few great landlords than it was in Ireland.
- (3) The Welsh distanced themselves from the Anglican religion, but this happened late in the nineteenth century when religious passions had waned considerably.
- (5) There were recurrent revolts in Wales, but they were not as widespread as those in Ireland.

In short, if qualitatively the two problems resembled each other, their differing intensities explain the different destinies of the two regions. We will now examine in

more detail the successive stages in the process.

**Annexation** As with Ireland, the attachment of Wales to England took place as part of a military conquest; resistance by the Welsh was hardly less stubborn than that of the Irish. At this point, we are at the stage of a colonial conquest; the repeated revolts between 1277 and 1316 parallel the struggles that occurred in the wake of the conquest of Algeria between 1830 and 1875, as well as the resistance of the Xhosas in South Africa. The Glyndwr revolt (1400–1415) was the last insurrection on a major scale. After this date, there was a long period of integration which Ireland did not experience.

**The latency of proto-nationalism** The Acts of Union of 1536 and 1543 (see Chronology 8.3) were attempts at assimilation which were well in advance of their time. By way of comparison, the French monarchy was at that time far from envisioning a similar standardization; local peculiarities were legion and very much alive. Only in 1789 did the French language achieve the monopoly that the Acts of Union established for English. It is worth noting that the decrees of Joseph II with respect to German also date from the end of the eighteenth century. In these conditions, how can we understand that the five centuries from 1400 to 1900 were marked by a constant underground resistance? There are undoubtedly numerous answers to this question, but one of the fundamental factors is certainly the economic gulf that was brought out by M. Hechter.<sup>9</sup> In Wales around 1867, 1 percent of landholders held 60 percent of the land.<sup>10</sup> This is an extremely concentrated form of landholding. It is even more concentrated than in Ireland, where 1 percent of the landholders held 48 percent of the land around 1875. By comparison, in Brazil by 1985, the top 1 percent landholders held approximately 40 percent of the land. Here is a class of landlords completely separated from its tenants by language, religion and economic interests. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, tenants were practically at the mercy of their landlords. By way of illustration, we note that after the elections of 1855 and 1868 (the last before the introduction of the secret ballot in 1872), in which a number of liberals were elected, landlords retaliated by terminating the leases of certain tenants who had voted for the “wrong” candidate.<sup>11</sup> Under these conditions it is not surprising that the vote for the Labour Party became a tradition in Wales.

**Cultural awakening** While cultural awakening among other minorities in Europe took place in the middle of the nineteenth century, it began in Wales in the eighteenth century with the circulating schools organized by Griffith Jones and Thomas Charles. These were religious schools in which the Welsh language was used. The Welsh cultural revival is marked by the constant progress of the nonconformist denominations. From 1740 to 1780 the number of independent congregations remained at around one hundred, but after 1780 growth was spectacular: 500 in 1839, 684 in

### Chronology 8.3 Wales: Development of Separatism

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<i>Year</i>	<i>Event</i>
<i>1277</i>	Edward I invades Wales; a previous invasion under Henry III in 1257 had failed with great loss of life.
<i>1281</i>	Great insurrection suppressed.
<i>1287–1320</i>	Many insurrections suppressed and the leaders executed.
<i>1316</i>	Rebellion of Llywelyn Bren.
<i>1400–1415</i>	Great rebellion of Owain Glyndwr. On 10 May 1404 he makes a treaty with France.
<i>1536,1543</i>	First and Second Act of Union. English becomes the only language to be used in the law-courts. No one could obtain an official position unless able to speak English.
<i>1588</i>	Translation of the Bible into Welsh.
<i>1593</i>	John Penry implores Queen Elizabeth and Parliament to provide for the education of the people in their own language. He joins a body of separatists in London, is arrested and executed for treason.
<i>1737</i>	Griffith Jones, a champion of the Welsh language, introduces the circulating schools which prove an astonishing success.
<i>1797</i>	French fleet lands at Fishguard.
<i>1851</i>	Religious census shows huge majority of nonconformists in Wales.
<i>1859</i>	Evictions of tenants.
<i>1885</i>	Welsh Language Society founded by D.I. Davies.
<i>1886–1890</i>	Tithe wars against payment of tithe to Anglican Church; many injured.
<i>1886–1914</i>	Bills for the disestablishment and disendowment of the Church of England introduced in Parliament and rejected in 1886, 1889, 1891, 1892, 1894. In 1914 such a bill becomes law, but due to the war the law is not applied until 1919. The endowment of the Church is secularized and the Church is financially compensated.
<i>1936</i>	Welsh nationalists burn the RAF bombing school in Lleyn.
<i>1955</i>	Bill to give Home Rule to Wales defeated in the House of Commons.
<i>1965</i>	The all-English regime is slightly relaxed in the Welsh courts.
<i>1968</i>	Bomb explodes in the air traffic control tower of the RAF bombing school.
<i>1962–1969</i>	At least 12 bomb attacks.
<i>1971</i>	A group of 36 Welsh clergymen walk into Carmathen police headquarters and confess to an “illegal act” of superimposing a bilingual road sign on an English notice.
<i>1979</i>	Referendum on Welsh devolution. The project is rejected.


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## Chronology 8.3 (continuation)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Event (continuation)</i>
1980	In northern and western Wales during the first four months fires destroy 32 vacation cottages owned by people living in England. This marks the beginning of an arson campaign that will last more than a decade; more than 230 houses are destroyed.
1988	Welsh-language television opens. Welsh group (Sons of Glyndwr) firebombs about 10 estate agents in a single week end.
1998	A devolution project approved by referendum.

*Sources:* Birch (1977), Coupland (1954), Hechter (1975), Howell (1977), Morgan (1984), Vincent (1898), Williams (1966).



**Figure 8.3 Religious Affiliation in Wales (1971).** In the hatched zone there are more than 13 nonconformist ministers per 10,000 inhabitants. There is a close spatial correlation between nonconformist strength and the number of Welsh speakers. *Source:* Morgan et al. (1984).

1851. It has been estimated that in 1851, 87 percent of the population belonged to nonconformist churches, while only 9 percent belonged to the Church of England. The growth of nonconformism (Figure 8.3) follows rather closely along the lines of the maintenance of the Welsh language and the nationalist vote.

**Recurrent revolts** In the case of Wales, we are dealing more with latent opposition

than with open revolt. Toward the middle of the nineteenth century, there were indeed violent movements: the Rising at Merthyr Tydfil in 1831 led to 20 deaths; the Chartist attack on Newport in 1839 resulted in 20 deaths. But the roots of these movements were more social than autonomist.

In contrast, the so-called Tithe war of 1886–1890 against the payment of a tithe to the Church of England was a direct consequence of the growth of the non-conformist churches. Why pay a tax to a church which included less than one Welshman in ten? On several occasions, these tax strikes degenerated into riots, for instance, in August 1886, June 1887 and August 1890. The army was forced to intervene to guarantee the collection of the tax.<sup>12</sup> In spite of this persistent opposition and of numerous laws proposed to Parliament, the law which struck down the privileges of the Anglican Church in Wales was not approved until 1914 and did not take effect until 1919. It is difficult not to make a comparison with the Home Rule law for Ireland also voted just before the war.

After the First World War, autonomist claims took on a more political face. The Welsh Nationalist Party was founded in 1925. In 1936, there was an attack with explosives claimed by autonomists. After the Second World War, this type of protest became more frequent. This is a general trend: progress in explosives made their use easier to the point that they became a favorite means of action for minority groups. However, Welsh autonomists used a more traditional form of protest. D. Howell mentions that arson was historically an established form of protest in Wales (further research would be required for a more precise estimate of its incidence). Welsh autonomists seem to have taken up this tradition again in the 1980s. In the first four months of 1980, 32 vacation homes belonging to owners living in England were burned. In 1988, the total number of houses torched rose to 130; by 1993 it reached 230.<sup>13</sup>

**Foreign support** In the case of Wales, as in the Bernese Jura, foreign support was modest. The assistance of France, shown by the landing in 1796, had essentially a military objective. It was, in fact, a diversionary landing within the framework of a larger operation in Ireland.

As in the case of Ireland, useful but discreet help came from Welsh people living in the United States. In 1993, for example, the daily *Independent* noted that Welsh nationalists received funds sent by their cousins in America, who number about 2.5 million, that is to say, as many as the inhabitants of Wales itself.

**Towards autonomy** After the first proposal for devolution was rejected in 1979, the approval by referendum of a second proposal in September 1997 may indicate a transition toward further autonomy. In this area, the Welsh had the experience of previous examples of regional institutions without real power. This was the case with



the Welsh Department of Education, created in 1907, the Ministry for Welsh Affairs, established in 1951, and the Secretary of State for Wales created in 1964.

Hungary, the Bernese Jura and Wales are textbook cases for the study of autonomist movements. To these may be added the examples of Scotland, Xinjiang and Quebec, summarized in an earlier chapter. We will complete our palette by looking more briefly at three lesser-known examples: Croatia, Kosovo and Casamance in Senegal.

## Croatia

The question of Croatian independence began to make international headlines in 1991. The proclamation of independence in June was followed closely by the war which opposed Serbs and Croats for the control of Krajina and Slavonia. These Croatian regions had a substantial Serbian population. However, as shown by Chronology 8.4, claims of Croatian sovereignty have been recurrent since 1867. This sovereignty was realized temporarily in 1918, for less than a month, and during the German-Italian occupation from 1941 to 1945. The case of Croatia shows, incidentally, that the federal solution cannot be considered a panacea. After 1945, and again with the new constitution in 1974, Croatia, like the other Yugoslav republics, enjoyed wide autonomy within the Yugoslav federation. It had its own government, a parliament and military forces (it is this last element which explains the extent of the fighting in 1991). Despite this wide autonomy, or perhaps because of it, the federation broke up as soon as it was faced with its first serious crisis. We must undoubtedly conclude that the federal solution, like other forms of integration, can function only when the different parties making up the federation share a common historical background.

*Annexation and the latency period* After the retreat of the Turks in the 1690s, Croatia became a province of the Austrian Empire, but it was attached administratively to Hungary. Since we lack sufficiently detailed sources, it is difficult to know if separatist aspirations made themselves known during the 160 years preceding the moment when Hungary was given considerable autonomy. It will be remembered that in 1848–1849 the Croats under Jelacic contributed to the crushing of the Hungarian revolution, an episode that worsened relations between the two peoples. From 1867 on, the Croats were openly opposed to being governed by the Hungarians.

*Repeated revolts and foreign support* Between 1867 and 1914, there were repeated riots against the Hungarian government, especially in Zagreb. On 29 October 1918, the Croatian parliament proclaimed the independence of the Viceroyalty of Croatia. On 1 December, Croatia was included in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. However, this union was not ratified by the Croatian parliament for the new kingdom, in which Croats represented 27 percent of the population, was dominated by the Serbs. From this point on, opposition increased between the Croat

### Chronology 8.4 Croatia: Development of Separatism

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<i>Year</i>	<i>Event</i>
1699	Treaty of Karlowitz: after the retreat of the Turks, Croatia becomes part of Hungary.
1867	The Croats protest against incorporation into the (newly autonomous) province of Hungary.
1897	Three Magyar officials murdered. Riots in Zagreb.
1902	Riots in Zagreb.
1903	Violent disturbances between the peasantry and soldiers in Zagreb. Two dynamite explosions in Zagreb. Croatian riots at Zapresic.
1908	Anti-German riots at Laibach (Croatia, about 100 km west of Zagreb).
1912	Anti-Hungarian demonstrations in Zagreb; Croatian constitution suspended.
1918	<i>Oct.</i> The Croat Parliament proclaims the independence of Croatia. <i>Nov.</i> Creation of the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes under Peter I, King of Serbia.
1920	The elections in Croatia are a victory for Stephen Radic, a leader of the Croatian Peasant Party.
1924	The Croatian Peasant Party is outlawed and Stephan Radic is imprisoned along with 5 other leaders.
1928	Croats demand a reorganization of the Government on a Federal basis with a Parliament of their own. Creation of the “Ustashi” (which means rebels) movement by Ante Pavelic (sometimes written Amte Bavelic).
1929	<i>Jan. 4:</i> The Croat leaders Macek and Probricevic are received by King Alexander I; they present claims for full autonomy for the Croats. <i>Jan. 6:</i> Manifesto of the king establishing a dictatorship. All public assemblies are prohibited. The Croat Peasant Party is dissolved. and several of its leaders are arrested. Assassination of Toni Schlegel, a Croat who had supported the dictatorship. Ante Pavelic charged with high treason and condemned to death.
1930	Nine Croat leaders tried and found guilty of treason.
1934	King Alexander I assassinated at Marseilles by an organization controlled by the Ustashis.
1941	<i>Mar.</i> Massive desertions of Croat and Muslim troops during the German-Italian invasion of Yugoslavia. Serb reprisals. <i>Apr.</i> Ante Pavelic becomes the head of the Croatian state created after the invasion.
1941–1946	Confrontations with occasional massacres and reprisals between the Croat state and the Serb-led resistance.
1946	After the war many Croats leave Yugoslavia.

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## Chronology 8.4 (continuation)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Event (continuation)</i>
1971	The Yugoslav ambassador in Stockholm is assassinated by Croatian gunmen.
1972	A Croatian nationalist organization claims responsibility for blowing up a Yugoslav DC-9 over Czechoslovakia (29 deaths). A group of Ustashis is exterminated by the Yugoslav army (12 deaths).
1990	Croatian territorial forces are disarmed by the Yugoslav army.
1991	<i>May</i> : An (unofficial) referendum is organized on the issue of independence, a choice approved by 95 percent of the voters. Siege of Vukovar from September to November (5,000 deaths).
1991	Independence of Croatia recognized by the European Union and the United States.
1991–1995	War between Croatia and Serbia for the control of the regions of Krajina and Slavonia (southern border of Croatia).

*Sources*: Keller (1934), *Quid* (1997), Newspaper data base of the F.N.S.P. (National Foundation for Political Science, Paris) for 1945–1998.

element and the government. In 1928–1929, this opposition led to an open crisis between the Croats and King Alexander. The king tried to deal with the crisis by setting up a dictatorial regime which forced the Croatian opposition to go underground. Out of this grew the Ustashi movement, which resorted to terrorism: one of its most spectacular actions was the assassination of King Alexander in Marseilles on 9 October 1934.

The Croatian opposition had the support of Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary and Italy.<sup>14</sup> Under these conditions, it should not be astonishing that in 1941, when Yugoslavia was invaded by German-Italian forces, Croats deserted the Yugoslav army en masse. These desertions brought about reprisals by Serb troops and started a tragic train of violence between Serbs and Croats, which lasted until 1945 and caused the death of hundreds of thousands.

In 1967 occurred what has been called the “Croatian spring” by analogy with the “Prague spring” of 1968. It was marked by a cultural revival facilitated by the fact that the new Yugoslav constitution granted wide powers to the six republics. As we will see in more detail further on, the question of Kosovo unleashed the crisis of 1990, which in turn resulted in the fragmentation of Yugoslavia.

***An incomplete solution*** The war of 1990–1995 gave rise to numerous migrations within the population. During the occupation of Slavonia and a part of Krajina by Serb troops, Croats were forced to leave; in 1995, when these regions were recon-

quered by the Croats, the Serbs in their turn were forced to take refuge in Serbia. In a number of zones, however, hostile populations continue to face off in a fragile form of coexistence.

## Kosovo

Should we treat Kosovo as a colonial-type situation or one of political-cultural domination? The question is not easy to answer, particularly because precise statistics on the occupation of farm lands are lacking. Still, there is no doubt that the Kosovar Albanians were under the heavy hand of the Serb authorities. Even if the question of the land is left aside, the situation is of the colonial type in several aspects: the youth of the Albanian population (the birthrate in 1987 was 3.5 percent); economic stagnation; the exile of a large part of the population (about 350,000 people between 1981 and 1998); repression of Albanian cultural life.

How did things get to this stage? Kosovo is a textbook example of the upsetting role of recurrent historical confrontations in the sense that a *series* of conflicts has brought about an accumulation of rancor and misunderstandings, as we will see in the next paragraph.

**Annexation** The attachment of Kosovo to Serbia took place after the Balkan wars of 1877–1878 and the war against Turkey in 1912. From the point of view of later integration, it could not have taken place under worse conditions. Before we discuss this issue, we will take a brief look at the five centuries of Ottoman domination.

In the government and administration of the Turkish Empire, three non-Turkish peoples seem to have been favored: Albanians, Greeks and Jews.<sup>15</sup> Thus, an Albanian, Mehmet Qyprili, became prime minister in 1656. For more than five centuries, the Qyprili family gave to the empire ministers, governors and generals. The Albanians provided the Turks with the troops which put down liberation movements. For instance there was a brutal repression of Greek villages by Albanian clans after the aborted revolt in the Peloponnesus in 1769. Over the centuries, a wall of enmity and even hatred has grown up between Albanians and certain other Balkan peoples. When Serb troops liberated the Kosovo region in 1877–1879 and again in 1912–1913, the Albanians were harshly treated as collaborators.

To better understand how this phenomenon fits into the order of things, we can compare it with what happened in New York when the city was evacuated by English troops in 1783. Colonists favorable to England had taken refuge there in large numbers during the war. Over 29,000 refugees left the city in 1782; a similar exodus had taken place in Boston when that city was occupied by American troops in 1776. There were similar events in other states: forfeited loyalist estates were sold and in nearly every state the loyalists were disenfranchised (this situation lasted until as late as 1801 in Pennsylvania).<sup>16</sup>

The same phenomenon occurred in Kosovo, but in a much harsher and more implacable form. In America collaboration had lasted a few dozen years; in the Ottoman Empire, it had lasted for four centuries. A large number of Albanians left their country, either immediately or in the following years, to take refuge in Turkey. In 1928, an agreement was signed between Turkey and Yugoslavia, providing for the transfer of 400,000 Albanians from Yugoslavia to Turkey. The actual number of those who left Kosovo and Macedonia in the 1930s never reached this figure; it has been estimated that 120,000 went to Turkey and 120,000 others to Albania.<sup>17</sup> While the wounds of war were healed in about a quarter of a century in the United States, in Kosovo these wounds were periodically reopened by new conflicts. The Balkan wars were succeeded, in fact, by two world wars, which in this region took on the form of partisan fighting of a particularly brutal and merciless nature. In sum, we can say that the attachment of Kosovo to Serbia carried the germ of future conflicts.

*The period of latent proto-nationalism* The period from 1918 to 1967 was not marked by major revolts, yet it is a very troubled period during which integration made hardly any progress. The departure of a part of the Albanian population provoked a void that the Yugoslav government tried to fill by a policy of colonization. In 1920, a decree granted colonists free transportation for themselves, their furniture and their animals. They were also exempt from taxation for three years. In 1931, this exemption was extended for ten years. Between 1931 and 1940, approximately 380,000 hectares were given to colonists, something on the order of one-third the land area of Kosovo.<sup>18</sup> It would be interesting to know what percentage of these lands were really unoccupied at the time of their colonization. During the 1941–1945 war, the Albanians were once again on the wrong side. Under the Italian boot, Kosovo was reunited with Albania to create a “Greater Albania.” After the war, the Albanians of Kosovo were accused of collaboration with the enemy and subjected to repressive policies: the Albanian language was not recognized either by the government or by the schools, while the important positions in government and the Communist Party were in the hands of Serbs or Montenegrins. This policy came to an end only in 1967 after the deposition of Vice President Rankovic, who had also been the chief of the political police.

*Cultural awakening* The cultural awakening occurred after 1967, in particular with the creation of the University of Pristina, where instruction was in Albanian. In addition, the new Yugoslav constitution of 1973 gave wide autonomy not only to the republics but also to the two autonomous regions of Kosovo and Voivodine. From this date forward, and especially after 1981, the Albanians in Kosovo were largely “masters in their own homes,” to use Walker Connor’s expression.<sup>19</sup> Is it astonishing that the Serbian minority should be mistreated by an Albanian population which had

been under the Serb yoke for so long?

**Repeated revolts** Chronology 8.5 shows that there were indeed recurrent revolts in 1968, 1981, 1989 and 1998, yet the major turning point was in 1989. Around 1987, Milosevic tried to repeat in Kosovo the scenario that Hitler had played out in 1938 and 1939 regarding the Germans living in the Sudetenland and the Polish corridor. He exhorted the Serbian public to go to the aid of “oppressed brothers in Kosovo” and promised that once in power he would solve the problem of Kosovo within two months.<sup>20</sup> Numerous demonstrations of support for the Serbs in Kosovo were organized throughout Serbia. Based on Serb sources about 20,000 Serbs may have left Kosovo between 1981 and 1987, i.e., more than 13 percent of the Serbian population of Kosovo (Table 8.1). By unleashing nationalist feelings, Milosevic not only consolidated his power but also stirred up a storm which led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and to the war of 1991–1995.

**Foreign support** During the two world wars, the Serbs had aligned themselves with the Allies, while the Croats and Albanians had played the German card in 1941. This explains that at the beginning of the conflict the Serbs benefited from the sympathy of the former Allies of World War II, a sympathy which was slowly eroded by the nationalistic policy of Milosevic. Progressively the Albanians in Kosovo became the beneficiaries of the support of the Western media. This can be illustrated by two episodes.

- On 27 January 1990, the police opened fire on a meeting in Kosovo; among the dead was a twenty-eight-year old Albanian. A photograph showing the sorrow of his family at his wake was widely disseminated through the news agencies. This scene, which resembled a painting by a Dutch master, was broadcast around the world.
- On the political front, the fact that the leader of the Albanian Kosovars, Y. Rugova, was received by President Clinton in May 1998 demonstrated the support of the United States.

Finally, the Albanian diaspora representing nearly 300,000 persons in Europe supported Albanians in Kosovo as the Irish diaspora had supported the Irish liberation struggle.

**Toward autonomy** It is too soon to predict the outcome of this conflict. There is no doubt, however, that an agreement authorizing the autonomy of this province will be negotiated sooner or later, for example, by returning to the formula established by the Yugoslav constitution of 1974. It is difficult to see how Serbs could “recolonize” Kosovo; their birth rate is 50 percent lower than that of the Albanians: 1.9 percent against 2.8 percent.<sup>21</sup>

**An incomplete solution** Any solution to the Kosovo problem carries within it-

### Chronology 8.5 Kosovo: Development of Separatism

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<i>Year</i>	<i>Event</i>
<i>1389–1912</i>	During the entire period in which Kosovo was part of the Ottoman Empire Albanians enjoy a privileged status in comparison with other peoples like the Bulgars or the Serbs.
<i>1877–1878</i>	Occupation of part of Kosovo by Serbian forces.
<i>1912</i>	Occupation of the rest of Kosovo by Serbian forces.
<i>1921</i>	A report is sent by Albanians from Kosovo to the League of Nations denouncing the oppression exercised by the government.
<i>1920–1940</i>	Serb colonists are encouraged to settle in Kosovo.
<i>1941–1945</i>	During the German-Italian occupation Kosovo is attached to Albania.
<i>1945</i>	Mutiny of officers of Albanian origin serving in the Yugoslav resistance when they realize that Kosovo will not be granted independence after the war; repression results in several thousand deaths.
<i>1968</i>	Demonstration against Serb oppression (one death).
<i>1974</i>	Self-government is granted to Kosovo under the new Yugoslav constitution.
<i>1981</i>	Demonstrations in Kosovo which are suppressed by the Yugoslav army: 11 deaths according to official sources.
<i>1987</i>	Official statistics show that 20,000 Serbs and Montenegrins have left the province since 1981.
<i>1989</i>	<i>Feb.–Mar.:</i> Kosovo put under curfew. Albanian leaders seized in police round up. Hundreds of demonstrators arrested; 29 deaths.
<i>1991</i>	During the last year about 75,000 ethnic Albanians lose their jobs in schools and public administration.
<i>1992</i>	The Serbian parliament votes a colonization bill based on a 3 percent levy on Kosovo's agricultural and commercial revenue.
<i>1993</i>	Serbian authorities encourage the emigration of ethnic Albanians.
<i>1997</i>	Since 1991 at least 30 persons (mainly Albanians) have been killed in clashes with the police.
<i>1998</i>	<i>May:</i> The leader of the Kosovo Albanians, I. Rugova, meets President Clinton at the White House. <i>Jun.</i> Confrontations between the Serbian army and separatists near the frontier with Albania. A number of villagers take refuge in Albania.

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*Sources:* Heppel et al. (1961), Institut (1983), Qosja (1995), Rugova (1994), Newspaper data base of the F.N.S.P. (National Foundation for Political Science, Paris) for 1945–1998.



**Table 8.1 Population of Kosovo**

	1921	1931	1941	1945	1971	1991
Population [million]	0.46	0.55	0.66	0.91	1.5	1.9
Percentage of ethnic Albanians				60%–79%	80%	82%
Percentage of Serbs				18%		10%

*Note:* Not surprisingly there are some variations in the figures according to the sources. *Quid* gives 60 percent Albanians in 1945 while Qosja gives 79 percent. In disputed territories censuses always are a controversial matter.

*Sources:* 1921–1941: *Institut* (1983); 1945: *Quid*, Qosja; 1980: *La Croix* (2 Jul. 1980); 1991: *Quid*.

self the seeds of new difficulties. (1) Kosovo contains only part of the Albanians in Yugoslavia; there are strong Albanian minorities in northern Macedonia and in southern Serbia (Figure 8.4), which suggests an “Ulster-type” problem. (2) It would seem natural enough that the Hungarian and Slovak minorities in Voivodine (Figure 8.4) would want the same rights as the Albanians in Kosovo. This problem would be less acute, since these minorities make up only 20 percent of the population of Voivodine.

### **Casamance (Senegal)**

Since the 1980s, Lower Casamance (Figure 8.5) has been the theater for confrontations between separatist groups and the Senegalese army; around 1,300 deaths have resulted from these face-offs. To better appreciate this figure, it should be related to the population of Lower Casamance (around 300,000 people) which gives a percentage of 0.4 percent. For the sake of comparison it can be noted that the civil war in Algeria caused around 70,000 deaths between 1990 and March 1998, or about 0.3 percent of the Algerian population. This comparison underlines the intensity and bitterness of the struggle in Casamance which has gained so far only little attention in the international media.


While the first serious incidents go back to 1983, the conflict has much longer roots. As the map in Figure 8.5 shows, Lower Casamance is a peripheral region of Senegal, separated from the rest of the country by the long, narrow tongue of Gambia. In 1984, there were no television relays allowing the reception of Senegalese programs in Casamance. Wolof, the language commonly spoken in Senegal, is the mother tongue of only 35 percent of the population of Casamance (although 80 percent understand it).<sup>22</sup>

Casamance put up a much stiffer resistance to French colonization than did the rest of Senegal, a point that we consider in more detail in the following paragraph.



**Figure 8.4** Map of the Federation of Yugoslavia before Its Disintegration in 1991. There were six republics: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia; and within Serbia two autonomous regions: Kosovo and Voivodine. Krajina and Slavonia are two regions of Croatia where there were substantial Serb minorities.

**Annexation** Father Diamankoun Senghor (no relation to the first president of Senegal), one of the first separatist militants in Casamance, declared before his judges in December 1983: “Our grandfathers always told us that Casamance was not part of Senegal.” This remark shows once more the importance of the feelings of ancestral relationship that we have emphasized in previous chapters. The attachment of Casamance to Senegal was accomplished through colonization and occurred in



**Figure 8.5** Map of Senegal and Casamance. Casamance is separated from the rest of Senegal by Gambia, a narrow country on the banks of the river of the same name.

steps. The interior of Senegal was colonized between 1854 and 1865. Casamance at this time was a Portuguese colony which was not ceded to France until 1888 and effective control over the region was not established until 1893. Sporadic incidents took place long after this date (see Chronology 8.6).

In 1943, a movement opposing conscription grew up in Casamance which was supported by the animist priestess Alinsitoe Diatta.

*The Period of latent proto-nationalism* During the colonial period, Casamance could have been assimilated into the rest of the country, but this did not happen. It is possible that if Senegal had had to fight to regain its independence, the struggle would have brought the country together. The anticolonial struggles had, in fact,

## Chronology 8.6 Casamance: Development of Separatism

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<i>Year</i>	<i>Event</i>
1664	The French take possession of St Louis
1657	The French take possession of Dakar.
1888	Zinghinchor (Casamance) is ceded to the French by the Portuguese.
1891	The governor of Casamance is assassinated.
1893	One of the main Casamance chiefs accepts French protectorate for his lands.
1943	Opposition to conscription led by “Queen” Alinsitoe Diatta.
1960	Senegal becomes independent.
1980	Disturbances caused by students: one death.
1983	<i>Dec.</i> After the murder of three police officers, clashes between the police and separatists: about 20 deaths.
1987	Separatists are released from prison.
1990	Clashes between the army and separatists: about 60 deaths.
1991	Amnesty and liberation of all imprisoned separatists.
1991–1995	Ambushes and reprisals cause about 1,100 deaths.
1997	One of the leaders of the rebellion is assassinated.

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*Sources:* Keller (1934), Quid (1997), *Tables du Journal Le Temps* (1966), Newspaper data base of the FNSP (National Foundation for Political Science, Paris) for 1945–1998.

quite the opposite effect: from 1963 to 1974, Lower Casamance served as a rear base for fighters from Guinée-Bissau, and was thus more inclined to look toward the south rather than toward Senegal.

Unlike the rest of Senegal, which is Muslim, Casamance is animist and Catholic. The Islamic revival that occurred in most Muslim countries at the beginning of the 1990s probably exacerbated the problem.

**Repeated revolt** What factors have stirred up the separatist feelings which had been latent for decades? Undoubtedly the influx of northern Senegalese into Casamance brought about a rejection reaction. During the second half of the twentieth century, Senegal underwent rapid demographic development; its population grew from 3.1 million in 1960 to 7 million in 1988 and 8.5 million in 1996. Demographic pressure along with serious drought in the north impelled tens of thousands to leave northern Senegal for Casamance in the 1970s. If we add that as late as 1984, most important positions in Casamance were held by Wolofs and that no Casamancian has ever

**Table 8.2 Summary of Key Data for the Six Examples Considered in the Text**

	Date of incorporation	Latency period [years]	Difference in religion	Difference in language	Foreign support	Number of deaths [per million inhabitants]	Independence or self-government
Hungary	1697	150	no	yes	Prussia	900	1867
Bernese Jura	1815	15	yes	yes	France	10	1978
Wales	1300	550	yes-no	yes	American Welshmen	1	
Croatia	1918	20	yes	no	Germany, Italy	1000	1991
Kosovo	1912	50	yes	yes	Western countries	70	
Casamance	1890	90	yes	yes	?	4000	

*Note:* During what, in a parallel with medicine, we call the “latency period” the desire for independence remains hidden. The number of deaths for Hungary refers to the 1848–1849 war; for the Bernese Jura it refers to 1815–1996; for Wales to 1945–1996; for Croatia to 1945–1995; for Kosovo to 1968–1997; for Casamance to 1970–1997.

been governor of the region, we can understand that hostile feelings could have been aroused. From 1980 onward, there were at least three waves of revolt, interrupted by cease-fires and amnesties. These revolts have become more intense, as the following figures show.

	<i>1980–1984</i>	<i>1985–1990</i>	<i>1991–1995</i>
Number of deaths	25	62	1,160

Since 1990 the actions of separatists have often taken the form of deadly ambushes set for army units which presuppose provisioning with weapons and ammunition. It is probable that the separatists receive exterior aid, but we have been unable to find reliable sources on this topic.

Before closing this chronological introduction, we will try to give an overview of the six examples we have just examined.

### **Synoptic Résumé of the Six Cases Examined**

Table 8.2 sums up some of the principal factors in the six cases that we have just looked at. What regular features emerge from them? In every case, the minority shows a difference of religion or a difference of language, and in four cases out of six, both at the same time. There is another regular feature which is not shown in Table 8.2, but which can be seen from the maps of the various regions. All six cases corre-



spond to peripheral regions and in three cases out of six (Jura, Kosovo, Casamance), these peripheral regions in addition share a border with a country speaking the same language as the minority.

Table 8.2 also shows a number of major differences, both in the length of the period of latency and in the intensity of the separatist struggle. Measured by the number of deaths the numbers vary enormously: between 1 and 4,000 deaths per million inhabitants. To a certain extent, these disparities should not surprise us because the examples have been chosen not because they resemble each other, which would have been of little interest, but because they are representative of different types of episodes. Table 8.3 mentions a number of other examples in each of the classes defined by the six case studies. In the following section, we analyze more closely the similarities for a larger sample of cases.

## Qualitative Similarities

In order to convince the reader that the classification proposed in Table 8.2 is supported by facts one should give a close look at all the cases mentioned in the table. However to treat in detail about 30 cases would require an entire volume and would probably tax the patience of the reader.

In what follows some common features will be discussed but we do not go into the detail of each case.

### Failure of Too Rapid Attempts at Assimilation

One of the most-obvious common features can be summed up by the following rule:

**Table 8.3 A classification of Separatist Episodes**

Hungary (19th century)	Bernese Jura	Wales	Croatia	Kosovo	Casamance
Bohemia	Catalonia	Hawaiians	Corsica	West Bank-	Basque
Silesia	Navajos	Brittany	Martinique	Gaza	Provinces
Slovakia	Quebec		Scotland	Tibet	Chechenya
	South Tyrol		Sicily	Xinjiang	Chiapas
					Sikhs
					Tamils

*Note:* The table lists a number of other cases which more or less follow the same lines as the six examples analyzed in this chapter. The classification is mainly based on two criteria (i) languages and (ii) means used in the struggle for self-government. Since it is based on qualitative criteria, this classification should be considered only as a working framework.

*In the repression-resistance cycle, resistance grows fastest. In other words, increasingly repressive pressure on a minority has no effect; it will, in fact, unite the minority and reinforce its resistance.*

Another way to state this is to say that in matters of integration, haste and impatience never give good results (in this paragraph we exclude the case where the colonizer has recourse to physical elimination). We have seen several examples of this in the previous section: (1) The forced assimilation that the Austrians tried to impose on the Hungarians after 1848–1849 only weakened the links between the two nations and led to the results which we have already seen. (2) The rapid assimilation that the Hungarians tried to impose on their minorities between 1867 and 1914 only reinforced their separatist aspirations. (3) The use of force by the canton of Bern in the nineteenth century, for instance, bringing in the army and expelling priests, only served to reinforce separatist aspirations. There are cantons in Switzerland (Grisons, for example) which are not homogeneous from the linguistic or religious point of view and yet did not experience separatist movements. (4) Maintaining the privileges of the Anglican Church in Wales at the end of the nineteenth century worsened the problem; having to pay a tax to a church perceived as foreign only served to deepen resentment among the Welsh. (5) The anti-Croat repression policy instituted by King Alexander in Yugoslavia led this people to distance themselves from their country and to refuse to defend it when it was attacked in 1941. (6) The repression of Kosovo by Belgrade has led to an aggravation of confrontations.

In addition to the above examples, which are drawn from the six cases considered in the first section, we will mention three other cases.

**Alsace** The first example is taken from the history of Alsace. This French province was annexed by Germany on two occasions; it is therefore an interesting laboratory for the study of identity reflexes. According to a survey taken in 1864, German was the most widely used language in Alsace; one-third of the children did not speak French.<sup>23</sup> Under these conditions, it may be supposed that attachment to Germany after the war of 1870–1871 would be widely accepted. Was this the case? In 1872, 70 percent of the young men called to military service preferred to leave their region and emigrate to France; as late as 1887, opposition deputies received 78 percent of the vote.<sup>24</sup> How can this reaction be explained?

First, it should be recalled that language is not the only determining factor; the past history is equally important, if not more so. The destiny of France and Alsace had been intertwined for two hundred years; for instance, in the revolutionary and Napoleonic armies several hundred officers including some of the most famous generals were Alsatians. Another important factor is that Alsace was not treated as the equal of other German provinces but was rather considered as a conquered region.




The garrison of Alsace-Lorraine was composed almost exclusively of Germans: in 1910, there were 75,500 Germans against 6,800 natives. There were frequent incidents between this occupying army and the population. A large amount of German money was spent on improving the university, yet almost all the professors were German.<sup>25</sup> Although the other German provinces enjoyed a wide autonomy, Alsace was administered directly by the government. It did not receive its own constitution until 1911 and even this was more restrictive than the constitutions of other German provinces.

Nevertheless, as pressure for assimilation relaxed, Alsatian resistance also weakened. The number of opposition deputies plummeted to the point that after 1902 only one remained. Likewise, the number of young men refusing military service diminished, as the following figures show.<sup>26</sup>

	1872	1878	1884	1890	1899
Refusing military service	26,000	9,500	4,100	3,800	2,900

When Alsace was returned to France in 1918, an almost exactly symmetrical problem arose. In its haste to make Alsace a province like all the others, the French government instituted an accelerated assimilation policy. Alsatian government officials were supposed to switch from German to French practically overnight; in competition with civil servants coming from other French departments, they lost all hope of promotion. In June 1924, the head of the Radical-Socialist Party, E. Herriot proposed to erase the last legislative differences between the returned departments and the rest of the Republic. The effects of such an unrealistic policy were not long in coming. Large demonstrations took place; on 20 July 1924, for example, 50,000 people demonstrated in downtown Strasbourg. Out of 24 Alsatian deputies, 21 protested strongly; the Bishop of Strasbourg called for resistance. At the beginning of 1928, a certain number of autonomist leaders were arrested, and in April 1928, during the general elections, some of the imprisoned leaders were elected, most notably Ricklin and Rossé.<sup>27</sup> The situation began to resemble an Irish-type quandary. Fortunately, realism won out and the idiosyncrasies of Alsace were recognized. Eighty years later, Alsace still retains a number of juridical peculiarities which are the legacy of a half-century of German administration; two examples are the law on commercial bankruptcy and the organization of religious instruction in public schools.

**Bohemia** The present-day Czech Republic has two provinces: Bohemia in the west and Moravia in the east. Bohemia has a long frontier in common with Germany. This region has been a zone of confrontation and competition between Germans and Czechs since the fourteenth century. Before 1918, Czech nationalism opposed the



**Figure 8.6 Map of Bohemia and Moravia (1936).** The hatched zones correspond to the Sudeten region, where there were more than 50 percent German-speaking people before World War II; after 1945 most of these people took refuge in Germany. When Czechoslovakia was divided in two in 1993, Bohemia and Moravia formed the Czech Republic.

Austro-Hungarian Empire. What we said in the first section about the awakening of Hungarian nationalism can be carried almost word-for-word to the case of Bohemia. A blatant symptom of this problem is the fact that from 1914 onward, entire Czech regiments deserted to fight on the side of the Allies.

After 1918, Czechoslovakia had a strong German minority of between 3.2 and 3.7 million, or about 24 percent of the population. This minority lived primarily in the Sudetenland in western Bohemia (Figure 8.6). The Great Powers had imposed respect for minorities, and the Czech constitution provided that “adequate facilities shall be given to citizens of non-Czech speech for the use of their language, either orally, in writing or before the courts.” But as was the case in Hungary, an ardent assimilationist policy was carried out as illustrated by the following examples.<sup>28</sup>

In his first message to the nation, Masaryk declared: “We have created our state and that will determine the political status of our Germans who originally came into the

country as emigrants and colonists.” This was a bad beginning for cohabitation with the German minority. In protest the German deputies refused to participate in the election of the president.

Between 1918 and 1928, the government closed 293 out of 3,376 German elementary schools, and there were constant German demonstrations against the closing of schools. Of the 1,004 Czech kindergartens in Bohemia, 538 were supported by the state, while only one of the 482 German kindergartens received support.

After 1918, the lord mayor of Prague, Dr. Baxa, prevented shop signs from being displayed in German although no objection was made to other foreign languages. On the new Czechoslovak paper money, the four languages of the republic correctly appeared, but German came third after Czech and Ruthenian, even though there were only 500,000 Ruthenians.

This policy exacerbated the tensions between the two communities and created a situation which was exploited by the German National-Socialists and brought Europe to the brink of war in 1938.

Along the same lines, one should mention the failure of the Germanization policy conducted by Germany in Poland between 1850 and 1918; the failure of the colonization policy of Japan in Korea, and the failure of the anglicization policy of the United States in Puerto Rico between 1900 and 1950. In spite of such an accumulation of failures, a similar policy was applied in Kosovo by the Serbs in the 1990s; it was a political mistake.

Does that mean that no assimilation policy can possibly work? Certainly not. According to our analysis in previous chapters one can make the following suggestions.

- First of all, the question should be considered in a long term perspective (several decades); haste is the worst approach.
- Communication by road, railroad or plane with the rest of the country should be improved; in the case of an island there must be frequent, convenient and inexpensive ship connections.
- The common historical heritage should be emphasized in any possible way.
- If some form of repression is required it must be very selective and not affect the entire minority population: every teacher who has faced a difficult class knows that the most turbulent elements must be isolated and that collective sanctions inevitably bring the entire class together in resistance.
- The best integration factor is a threat from outside. The Pacific War certainly was instrumental in that respect for the cohesion of the United States as was the Ottoman threat for the regions composing the Austrian Empire. In the same way the fact that revolutionary France had to face the hostility of all European monarchies was certainly a powerful factor in favor of integration which prevented other Vendée-

type secessions.

## The Russian Doll Mechanism

When the Soviet Union broke up at the beginning of the 1990s, many commentators saw in this event the disappearance of the last empire. It is true that the USSR was the heir to the Russian Empire, which in a number of ways resembled both the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires. Like them, the USSR was a multiethnic empire, and like them, it had been built on successive conquests. Still, as will be explained below, this analysis is incorrect both for the past and the future. Regarding the future, we will see that in a Russian doll fragmentation the fragments resulting from a first dismemberment are not necessarily more stable and contain the germ of subdivision into smaller and smaller elements.


*Gradual fragmentation of Austria* When we think of the disintegration of the Austrian Empire, the 1918–1919 episode comes immediately to mind. Figure 8.7a shows, however, that this was only one stage in a process which comprised many others.

*Gradual fragmentation of the empire of Denmark* In the case of Denmark the disintegration also took place in successive stages (Figure 8.7b). In 1550 Denmark and Sweden were united by a common religion. It should be remembered that religion played at that time a key role in social life. As the cohesion forces resulting from a common religion progressively weakened while linguistic and cultural factors took more importance, Denmark and Sweden disintegrated into smaller states; Figure 8.7b certainly is not the final picture as attested by claims for independence by the inhabitants of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, which are currently parts of Denmark.

*Gradual fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire* The decomposition of the Ottoman Empire followed a similar pattern. If one excludes Christian countries such as Greece or Serbia it was held together by Islam and fell into pieces when language and historical roots gained an increased importance (not surprisingly the Christian parts seceded first).

*Gradual fragmentation of the Spanish colonial empire* Although the case of colonial empires is a somewhat different variant, we can also see in them a process of gradual decomposition. The disintegration of the Spanish Empire stretched from 1816 (independence of Argentina) to 1976 (autonomy of the Spanish Sahara); another landmark was the loss of Cuba and the Philippines in 1898.

In this respect it is important to remember that in the eighteenth century both Germany and India were composed of several hundred sovereign principalities and kingdoms. This shows that there is no “natural” limit to the process of disintegration. The



**Fig.8.7a Successive Stages in the Disintegration of the Austrian Empire.** Given the separatist aspirations in several countries (Belgium, Bosnia, Macedonia, Yugoslavia) it is probably safe to assume that the situation at time of writing (1996) is not the last stage in the disintegration process.




Fig.8.7b Successive Stages in the disintegration of the Kingdom of Denmark. Furthermore, in 1864 the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein (one million people) separated from Denmark before being incorporated in the German Empire.

above observations can be summarized in the following statement.

*As a general rule, the disintegration of multilingual ensembles occurs gradually over a period of several decades; furthermore there is no “natural” bound to such a process of disintegration.*

### **Was there really a disintegration of the USSR?**

Seen in this light the sudden disintegration of the Soviet bloc in 1990–1991 was rather an atypical historical event for at least two reasons.

- It was not gradual but sudden.
- Rather than a disintegration, it was rather a controlled process.

The second statement may at first sight seem surprising and it certainly requires some additional explanations.

*A crucial distinction* Why did Russia wage a bitter war in Chechnya in an attempt to prevent its secession? At first sight, one may think that after much bigger parts of the USSR such as Ukraine (with a population of 45 millions) or Belarus (with a population of 10 millions) had broken apart, the secession of Chechnya with a population slightly over one million would not make a big difference.

There was a crucial difference, however.

Ukraine and more generally all 15 Soviet Republics<sup>2</sup> had an institutional status which was already close to independence. As a matter of fact, under international law, as founding members of the United Nations, Belarus and Ukraine had the status of independent countries. In other words, the disintegration of the USSR was not at all similar to the chaotic decomposition of Yugoslavia. It was a controlled process.

On the contrary, Chechnya was an “Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic” (ASSR) and did not have the same right to secede<sup>3</sup>. Thus, the secession of a territory like Chechnya would have started an uncontrolled Yugoslavia-like disintegration.

In short, what happened in 1991 was not really a “wild” disintegration. Post-1991 Russia is simply what was formerly called the “Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic” (RSFSR).

*Institutionally, the USSR was a loose mosaic of countries* As a matter of fact, what is surprising is not so much the disintegration but rather the fact that after emerging victoriously from World War II, Russia did not try to establish stronger links between the 15 republics constituting the USSR. There are certainly very few

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<sup>2</sup>Namely: 1: Armenia, 2: Azerbaijan, 3: Belarus, 4: Estonia, 5: Georgia, 6: Kazakhstan, 7: Kyrgyzstan, 8: Latvia, 9: Lithuania, 10: Moldova, 11: Russia, 12: Tajikistan, 13: Turkmenistan, 14: Ukraine, 15: Uzbekistan.

<sup>3</sup>One must recognize that the word “republic” which is used in both cases contributes to make the distinction rather unclear.



federal countries which recognize a right to secede to their members. In this respect, one can remember the long and costly American Civil War which resulted from the secession of the Southern states. The European Union allows secession as shown by the separation of the UK in 2016-2017. However the European Union is not a federal country but rather a free trade area whose main purpose is to serve the interests of European as well as foreign corporations. As such, it brought disappointment even to people who, initially, had supported this project.

Actually, instead of trying to build a closer association, the leadership of the USSR rather loosened existing ties by transferring to the Soviet Republics territories which were initially part of the RSFSR. This is illustrated by the following episodes.

- With the adoption of the 1936 Soviet Constitution on December 5, 1936, the size of the RSFSR was significantly reduced. The Kazakh ASSR and the Kirghiz ASSR were transformed into the Kazakh and Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republics. Why? There is no clear answer.
- In 1944, amendments to the All-Union Constitution allowed for separate branches of the Red Army for each Soviet Republic. Moreover, each republic could set up a commissariat for foreign affairs and defense, thus allowing the Republics to be recognized as *de jure* independent states in international law.
- In February 1954, at the initiative of President Khrushchev, Crimea was transferred from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. It seems that the decision taken by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Russian Republic was in fact too hasty and unconstitutional because a referendum should have been conducted to find out the opinion of the residents of the two republics. Given that Sevastopol in Crimea was the site of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, this decision was certainly short-sighted<sup>4</sup>.

It is difficult to understand what were the motivations behind such decisions. In the institutional history of nations one sees rather a trend toward greater integration. Most often disintegration occurs as a result of a weakening of the central government. On the contrary, the institutional changes mentioned above occurred in 1936, 1944 and 1954 that is to say in a time period which was an expansion phase of the USSR.

Some microhistorical reasons which may help us to understand why there are no bounded limits to the disintegration process are analyzed in the next paragraph.

### **Is there a limit to the process of disintegration?**

One may think that the process of disintegration stops spontaneously when the fragments are “ethnically homogeneous.” Throughout this work, we have preferred to

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<sup>4</sup>None of the reasons given for this move in a Wikipedia article entitled “1954 transfer of Crimea” seems really compelling.

avoid the notion of ethnic diversity, which is generally difficult to define; instead, we substituted the notion of linguistic diversity. Putting the preceding statement into these terms one may expect that the disintegration process will stop when the fragments are “linguistically homogeneous.” Nevertheless, history shows us that the notion of a linguistically homogeneous territory has only a subjective meaning which may change in the course of time. A region considered linguistically homogeneous today may not be fifty years later.

A few examples will illustrate this apparent paradox. (1) Until the nineteenth century, the language of Norway was Danish; but the progressive introduction of Nynorsk (based on medieval Norwegian) slowly distanced the two languages from each other. (2) While Serbs and Croats speak identical languages, Serbian is written with Cyrillic characters while Croat is written with Latin characters. This is strictly a historical accident. In March 1929, a decree from King Alexander I of Yugoslavia ordered the use of the Latin alphabet in place of the Cyrillic. His assassination in 1934 may have impeded the implementation of this plan. (3) It is obvious that the French of Quebec is not the same as the French of Touraine (a province in France comprising the Loire valley), but are they two different languages? If tomorrow Montenegro were to separate from Serbia, a fairly plausible possibility, will we see the birth of a Montenegrin variant of Serbian?

These examples suggest that there is no objective limit to the fragmentation process. As we already mentioned it can progress to truly minuscule pieces. In 1806 the Holy Roman Empire comprised 347 states and 1,740 semi-independent territories.<sup>29</sup> By comparison to these tiny states the smallest states in contemporary Europe, Luxembourg (0.4 million inhabitants) or Slovenia (2 million inhabitants) would seem quite large.

We will end this paragraph with a question to which we have no answer. The process of recurrent fragmentation that we have just described seems peculiar to Europe. Why? Indeed similar phenomena have not been observed in America or in Asia. In Latin America, to be sure, the number of states has increased from around 10 in 1828 to over 20 in 1910, but their number has hardly changed since. China, so far, has weathered the upheavals of the twentieth century without major losses if one excludes Outer Mongolia and Taiwan. In the rest of Asia outside the USSR, only three cases of fragmentation occurred: Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965, Bangladesh separated from Pakistan in 1971 and East Timor separated from Indonesia in the late 1990s (that annexation had never been accepted by the international community). This is all the more surprising if one remembers that countries like Burma, India or Indonesia exhibit great linguistic diversity.

## **The Melting Pots**

The expression “melting pot” was coined to describe the extraordinary alchemy which has created the American nation within two centuries. This mechanism, in a sense, counterbalances the fragmentation mechanism discussed above. We have already briefly considered that question in a previous chapter. In the present paragraph we want to emphasize that the melting pot mechanism works in well-defined conditions, which can be summed up as follows:

*Consider a region which has been inhabited for more than a century by a population whose language (A) is used in government and education. Suppose the arrival of a certain number of immigrants from various countries; all immigrants will then adopt language A after one or two generations, almost without regard to their number or the cultural prestige of the language.*

That statement is demonstrated by the examples given in Table 8.4a. In what follows it will be illustrated by four a more detailed analysis of four cases, namely, the Bernese Jura and Catalonia where the melting pot mechanism worked, and Wales and the Spanish Basque country where it did not.

The Bernese Jura in the nineteenth century represented only a small part (about 10 percent) of the population and land area of the canton of Bern. It would seem that such a small enclave would soon be assimilated by its larger neighbor, especially since after 1860 there was an important migration from the rest of the canton to the Bernese Jura. Figure 8.8 shows that in the case of the district of Moutier, the influx of immigrants brought the proportion of German speakers up to 40 percent in 1888. The same figure shows that after two generations, the percentage of German speakers had returned to its 1860 level. The melting pot mechanism had done its work. It is noteworthy that assimilation affected only the language, as was also the case in the United States: the immigrants kept their Protestant religion in the same way that Irish or Italian immigrants kept their Catholic religion in the United States. As we have seen in another chapter, the phenomena of religious changes obey very different mechanisms from those affecting languages.

**Catalonia** After the end of the Franco regime in 1975 Catalonia was able to reestablish the use of the Catalan language in education and government. Between 1951 and 1981, Catalonia received 1.5 million immigrants representing 26 percent of its population in 1970. In the same time interval the number of people understanding Catalan increased from 74 percent in 1975 to 90 percent in 1986, while the number of people who could speak Catalan went from 74 percent in 1975 to 59 percent in 1986 and 68 percent in 1993.<sup>30</sup> In relative terms this influx of immigrants was of the same order of magnitude as the immigration to the United States at its height in the

**Table 8.4a Conditions Required for the Good Working of the Melting Pot Mechanism**


	Country settled for more than one century by indigenous population	Native language is spoken by at least two thirds of the indigenous population	The native language is the language of administration and education	Gradual (as opposed to sudden) arrival of immigrants	Melting pot worked (or not)
<b>Examples</b>					
United States	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Bernese Jura	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Quebec	yes	yes	yes-no	yes	yes
Catalonia	yes	yes	yes-no	yes	yes
<b>Counter-examples</b>					
Basque Country	yes	no	no	yes	no
Indonesia	yes	no	no	yes	yes-no
Kenya	yes	yes	no	no	no
Uganda	yes	yes	no	no	no
Wales	yes	no	no	yes	no

*Note:* The case of Indonesia refers to the Chinese minority; the Chinese immigrants who arrived in the early nineteenth century were fairly well integrated; however, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Chinese were granted special privileges by the Dutch colonizer, a circumstance which brought about a rift between them and the natives. The cases of Kenya and Uganda refer to the population of Indian origin which arrived in relatively large groups at the end of the nineteenth century. The failure of the melting pot to function brought about tensions between the native population and the immigrants. In Uganda, these tensions led to the expulsion of almost all of the Indian population and in Kenya to the departure of about half of the Indian population. The case of Wales refers to the integration of English-speaking people into Welsh culture.

This table relies on the assumption that integration is mainly based on cultural and linguistic criteria. In an earlier period (before the nineteenth century), when the definition of national identity was based rather on religion, the melting pot mechanism did not work in the same way; remember that the diffusion effect (see in this respect chapter 5) is far less effective for religions than it is for languages. This can explain why certain religious minorities have survived for centuries without being integrated.

late nineteenth century.

**The Spanish Basque Country** Thanks to industrialization, the Spanish Basque Country experienced a very rapid growth of population between 1860 and 1970, which was largely due to immigration. Table 8.4b shows that in spite of this growth, the percentage of Basque speakers has remained almost static: new arrivals were not absorbed into the Basque melting pot. As a result, there has been a serious drop in the percentage of Basque speakers. These data are confirmed by spot checks.



**Figure 8.8 Melting Pot Phenomenon in Three Districts of the (Historical) Bernese Jura.** The vertical scale shows figures which are proportional to the the percentage of German speakers: in 1860 in Delémont, Moutier and Courtelary these percentages were equal to 14, 25 and 26 percent respectively; on the graph these data have been normalized to 22 percent in order to facilitate the comparison. The district of Delémont is located in the Catholic part of the Bernese Jura whereas the districts of Moutier and Courtelary are located in the Protestant part. The decrease in the number of German speakers was particularly strong in the Delémont district. Of the three districts only the Delémont district was included in the Jura canton created in 1978. *Source:* Jenkins (1986).

In a locality near San Sebastian, only 1.3 percent of the children of immigrants had learned Basque.<sup>31</sup> That difference with Catalonia is certainly due to the small number of people speaking Basque around 1860; only 50 percent of the population was able

**Table 8.4b Evolution in the Number of Basque Speakers in the Spanish Basque Provinces**

	Population of Basque Provinces [thousand]	Estimated Basque-speaking population [thousand]	Percentage
1860	750	400	53
1930	1200	500	42
1970	2300	455	20

*Source:* Clark (1981).

**Table 8.4c Evolution in the Number of Welsh Speakers in Wales**

	Population of Wales	Estimated Welsh-speaking population	Percentage
	[thousand]	[thousand]	
1871	1,220	634	52
1931	2,160	799	37
1986	2,820	620	22

Sources: *Quid* (1997), Flora (1983).

to speak Basque (and even fewer could write it). This is insufficient to create a “Basque bath” and in the absence of such a “bath” new immigrants had no reason to make the effort to learn a new language, since Spanish provides an adequate means of communication.

**Wales** As Table 8.4c shows, the case of Wales resembles that of the Basque country. While the population figure has risen 2.3 times because of the industrialization of southern Wales, the number of people who speak Welsh has hardly changed. Put another way, the new arrivals have not been absorbed into the Welsh melting pot. There has been a reduction in the Welsh-speaking population, of about the same order of magnitude as in the Basque Country. This failure of the melting pot can be explained by the same factors as in the Basque Country, namely, the fact that there was a relatively small number of speakers at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the fact that the language was not recognized in education or the government.

**The consequences of nonrecognition of the local language** In the preceding examples, two factors were intertwined, namely, the small number of speakers and the lack of official status of the language. It would be interesting to know their respective roles. In this section, we analyze the consequences of a lack of official status. In the majority of the cases in which the locally spoken languages did not receive official recognition, the melting pot phenomenon did not work. This factor can help to explain the lack of integration of Indian immigrants in Kenya, Uganda or Fiji. In all these cases, the immigrants arrived at the beginning of the twentieth century in a society where the language of education and administration was English. Their contacts with the local population would have pushed them toward the local language but these contacts were fairly rare (for a more precise analysis one would need to know the changes in percentages of Indians who spoke the local language).

Because of this lack of integration, independence in these countries brought about a degradation of relations between the local population and those of Indian origin.



This led numerous Indians to return to their country, either voluntarily, as in Fiji or involuntarily under the constraints of local authority, as in Uganda, and to a lesser extent, in Kenya.

*The cases of Canada, Australia and New Zealand* In many respects, the United States offered ideal conditions for the working of the melting pot mechanism. Because independence occurred early, the waves of immigrants who arrived in the nineteenth century already found a well-established society with its language and its own history and traditions. In other cases, as, for example, Canada, Australia or New Zealand, the scenario evolved in a way that was less favorable for integration because the connection with Great Britain was not severed. The wars in which these countries participated were primarily British or American wars. For instance, the most celebrated Australian military feat was the (failed) landing in the Dardanelles along with British and French troops during the First World War, a war in which Australia's national interests were only marginally involved. This created a dearth of real historical roots. It is still too soon to say whether this circumstance will affect the strength of these societies in the face of possible future disturbances.

### **Recurrent Disputes**

In the cultural competition between a minority and the rest of the country the sticking points are almost always the same. In this section we will consider the issues around censuses, place names, and public education. But first of all we devote a few words to a factor which often triggers separatist flare-ups, namely, the arrival of a wave of immigrants

*Arrival of immigrants* After the independence of Algeria in 1962, a large number of colonists went to settle in Corsica. For those who were originally from Corsica this was merely a return. But they returned to the home place of their ancestors with different traditions and with financial resources greater than those of most Corsicans. These resources came either from the sale of their property in Algeria or from indemnizations by the government. These means allowed them to buy a number of large farms like those they had owned in Algeria. In a country of small farms, these purchases crystallized discontent. It is symptomatic that one of the most bloody operations (two police officers were killed) led by separatists was the occupation of a vineyard belonging to a repatriated Algerian (Aléria, August 1975). This episode is characteristic of the rejection that is generally provoked by the mass arrival of immigrants; it is noteworthy to observe that there was neither a religious nor an ethnic difference; even language undoubtedly played only a minor role because the Corsican language enjoyed only marginal use in the 1970s. On the economic level, however, the new arrivals acted objectively like colonizers. Table 8.5 gives similar



**Table 8.5 Massive Immigration as a Triggering Factor of Separatist Disturbances**

Territory		Percentage of inhabitants not born in the territory
Casamance	1970–1983	A large number of people from the north of Senegal (Toutcouleurs, Wolofs) migrated to Casamance
Corsica	1954	10%
	1975	45%
Kosovo	1920–1939	About 30,000 people (i.e., 8% of Kosovo's population) from Serbia migrated to Kosovo
	1945–1967	Serbs encouraged to migrate to Kosovo
	1990–1997	Serbs encouraged to migrate to Kosovo
Xinjiang	1950	4% Hans
	1997	37% Hans

*Note:* Note the huge increase within twenty years in the percentate of immigrants both in Corsica and in Xinjiang.

*Sources:* **Casamance:** *Le Monde* (4 Jan.1983); **Corsica:** Williams (1994); **Kosovo:** *Institut* (1983); **Xinjiang:** *Le Monde* (23 May 1997)

examples.

**Censuses** It might be thought that a census is an operation involving only statistical techniques. However, every census involves eminently political choices, and can lead to serious quarrels. The first problem is to select the questions; furthermore, it can be tempting to influence the answers. We give four examples showing what problems may occur.

- The first example concerns Czechoslovakia between the two world wars. An underlying objective of the government was to reduce the size of the formidable German minority without resorting to procedures that might incur criticism from the powers which guaranteed the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye. First of all, Jews (who represented 1.3 percent of the population in 1918) were allowed to report themselves as a separate nationality; since a large number of them were German speakers, this procedure reduced the effective numbers of the German minority. Further, language tests were used in litigious cases; the interpretation of such tests is, of course, a subjective question. As for officials, they were given to understand that their career would be favored if they declared themselves Czech speakers.<sup>32</sup>

- After having been part of the Ottoman Empire for 530 years, Macedonia was divided between three countries in 1913, namely, Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. In 1956, the Bulgarian census revealed 170,000 ethnic Macedonians; in 1965, their number was given as 1,500; in 1975, a census failed to produce any Macedonians at

all. With good reason when it reported that episode the *Financial Times* called it a “statistical genocide.”

- Sometimes, on the contrary, a country will “inflate” the figures for a foreign minority to facilitate its emigration. The Yugoslav census of 1948, for example, reported 98,000 inhabitants of Turkish nationality, while in 1953 the census counted 260,000, despite the fact that there had been no substantial movements of populations between the two countries.<sup>33</sup> It is more likely that a large percentage of the 162,000 additional “Turks” were Muslims of Albanian origin, whose emigration to Turkey was seen as desirable in continuation of a policy that Yugoslavia had already practiced between the world wars.

- Belgium is split between the northern Flemish-speaking area and francophone Wallonia in the south. In July 1932, a new law established a census to be made every ten years to determine which of the two languages would be used in local administration. This was known as the principle of “floating territoriality.” The Flemings opposed the publication of the results of the 1947 census, which they considered unfavorable to them; the results were finally published in 1954. Later, in 1961, questions regarding language adherence were removed from the census: “Floating territoriality” gave way to what is now called “fixed territoriality.”

*The organization of public education* Children are the future of a country; all governments and all minority groups are more than aware of this fact. In this respect, linguistic choices are crucial. On an unconscious level, the question affects the symbolic link between the generations, whose importance we emphasized in a preceding chapter. It is not surprising that educational issues often bring about passionate disputes. We will examine a few examples to show the form that such disputes can take.

- In Belgium, linguistic choices are made on a territorial basis, as in Switzerland. The University of Louvain, created in 1426 and thus one of the oldest in Europe, was in Flemish territory but was partially French speaking. In January 1966, Flemish students demanded that the French-speaking part leave. Demonstrations became more and more unruly, to the point that classes were suspended on May 20. Similar demonstrations began again in January 1968. In February, the Louvain crisis became the crisis of Belgian unity: the government resigned and the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved. In March 1969, it was decided to move the French-speaking section to Ottignies in Walloon territory. It was to be called Louvain-la-Neuve (New Louvain). Still, the conflict was not entirely over, for the Flemish wing of the Social Christian Party disputed the money that was indispensable for the establishment of the new university.

- When Serbia tried to take control of Kosovo after 1989, the most important

part of the reconquest related to the schools. First-year enrollment at the University of Pristina was cut by more than two-thirds, with half of those places reserved for Serbo-Croat speakers. In 1991, 500 Albanian university professors were dismissed, while there was an influx of Serb professors.<sup>34</sup> The schools were separated into two parts, one for Serb-speaking students and one for those speaking Albanian. This division was carried out in an inequitable manner, as in the school described in the French newspaper *Le Monde*, in which 70 percent of the school was reserved for 400 Serb students and 30 percent for 2,300 ethnic Albanians.<sup>35</sup>

- When the linguistic rights of minorities are finally recognized, there is often a kind of reverse linguistic problem. In a Welsh-speaking area, for example, parents have campaigned for five years to overturn the town council's bilingual policy, for the children had to wait until the age of seven to learn English.

The three examples given above are different in nature. Probably the last one displays a primarily economic concern, namely, the disadvantage incurred in professional competition by children who had learned English late. The other two examples, on the other hand, have nothing to do with economics. There is no logical rationale for relocating the University of Louvain a few kilometers to the south. It is rather a manifestation of the old "Masters in their own homes" reflex which W. Connor has shown to be an essential wellspring of separatist claims.<sup>36</sup>

*Disputes over place names* The issue regarding place names often produce vigorous disputes between linguistic communities. These disputes reveal the strong bond which exists between a people, its land, and its language and the identification with the resting place of ancestors. It would be most interesting to analyze this phenomenon in detail; the subject would warrant an entire book. Here we will be content with a few illustrations

- After 1918, the French authorities in Alsace tried to eradicate the most visible signs of the forty plus years of German occupation. As the German word "Knoblauch" means "garlic" the "Knoblauch Street" became "Garlic Street" (Rue de l'ail). All the while, the zealous bureaucrats did not realize that Mr. Knoblauch was a former mayor of Strasbourg. This story still brings smiles in Strasbourg.

- At the beginning of the 1970s, a long dispute raged in Wales over the placing of bilingual road signs. The Welsh regionalists finally won out. The sign "Swansea 27 miles" was replaced by a double sign: "Abertawe 27 - Swansea 27 miles."<sup>37</sup>

- In the rush to "reconquer" Kosovo, 14 street names in Pristina were "Serbianized": "Lenin Street" became "Peter I the Liberator Street" in honor of the king who took Kosovo from the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century.

- Certain towns had up to three successive names as they changed hands. Present-

day Zagreb was called “Agram” (German form) until 1867, that is, until Hungary gained autonomy within the Austrian Empire. Then it was called “Zagrab” (Hungarian form) during the Magyarization period. Finally, it was given the Serbo-Croat form “Zagreb” after the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918.

These examples might lead us to think that changing place names according to political affiliation is a universal and constant practice. A few examples of the contrary will be useful here. We have seen an example of translating street names in Strasbourg but this was an exception rather than the rule; in fact most place names have kept their traditional Germanic character. Thus, one finds a lot of very un-French sounding names such as Oberhausbergen, Mittelhausbergen, Pfulgriesheim or Bishheim. The same thing is true in the southwestern United States, where Hispanic names were preserved after the territories were taken from Mexico. Among a multitude of examples, we find such names as San Diego, Los Alamos, Los Angeles, Colorado. What could account for this more tolerant attitude? Whether in Alsace in 1648 or in California in 1850, new arrivals could hardly claim to be “coming home.” On the contrary, Welsh people feel “at home” in Wales; in the same way, the Serbs feel, rightly or wrongly, that they are “at home” in the Kosovo that they consider to be the cradle of their country.

The previous attitudes obviously present a recurrent character. There is another area which follows recurrent rules, namely, the manifestation of ancestral fears.

*The reemergence of ancestral fears* We know that one of the traditional accusations against minority groups was that they poisoned wells. Jews were accused of this on numerous occasions in the Middle Ages and even in following centuries. During an epidemic, such accusations provided both an explanation and a scapegoat. This fear is still present, as the following examples will show.

(1) In March 1990, shortly after the repression in Kosovo, the population of Albanian stock in Podujevo accused the Serbs of trying to poison their children in the schools. The origin of the rumor seems to have been some troubles arising from rotten food served in a high school.<sup>38</sup>

(2) In Montreal, French Canadians rioted on 2 October 1885 against the vaccination campaign launched by the English authorities following a smallpox epidemic. Demonstrators hurled stones at the central office of the health services. The daily *Le Temps* (2 October 1885) reported that one of the demonstrators climbed onto the pedestal of the statue of Queen Victoria and asked the crowd if it wished to be governed by the French or the English. The crowd shouted, “By the French!” The second example is revealing: disturbances begin with a reactivation of an ancestral fear, but discontent is rapidly channeled toward a clearly defined political objective.

## Quantitative Regularities


The analysis in this section is different in several ways from the qualitative analysis of the preceding section. Although the most apparent difference is in the use of quantitative estimators, this is not the only difference, nor is it the most important. Another essential difference is the requirement for “exhaustivity”: in the previous section, a few illustrative examples sufficed to show the reality of a phenomenon. Twenty examples instead of three would not have added much to the strength of the argument. In a quantitative analysis, we must use *all* cases for which there exist sufficient data. This, however, leads to another difficulty.

Most of the cases discussed in the preceding chapter related to the period of decolonization in Africa between 1945 and 1975; we thus had reasonable homogeneity of period and place. On the contrary, in the present chapter we will have to compare phenomena which occurred on different continents and in societies quite unlike one another. How then can one guarantee the *ceteris paribus* condition, that is to say, the fact that, putting aside the factor under study, all other factors are identical? In fact, it is obvious that they are not. Yet, the *ceteris paribus* condition is *never* exactly fulfilled even in the best-controlled physical experiments. In other words, between the social and natural sciences there exists only a difference of degree, not of nature. In the following sections, we will try to estimate the influence of two factors: the geographical factor presented in chapter 5, and the historical factor presented in chapter 6.

### Influence of the Geographical Factor

Let us recall that the geographical variable  $g$  introduced in chapter 5 is meant to bring out two effects: (1) The relative isolation of a region from the socio-political center of the country, with the corollary of a low level of interaction, both in frequency and in intensity, between this region and the rest of the country. (2) The support received by a minority language, and in a more general sense by a separatist movement, from an adjoining country in which the same language is spoken. From a qualitative point of view, the influence of the geographical factor has already been shown in chapter 5. Nevertheless, from a quantitative point of view, this is more difficult to prove, for the influence of local historical traditions is so strong that it completely overwhelms the geographical factor. The fact that the historical factor is much stronger than the geographical factor is easy to understand for the former encompasses a *whole range* of national traditions and factors which remain relatively unchanged in the course of time. In other words, we cannot study the influence of the geographical factor unless one restricts oneself to a well-determined national framework.

We made such a test for the case of France. Besides the autonomist movements that



**Figure 8.9 Relationship between the Geographical Index and the Level of Separatist Disturbances for French Provinces and Associated Territories.** The geographical index is an estimate of the frequency and intensity of the interactions between the core of the country and its peripheral regions. The curve is a least-square fit; the correlation is equal to -0.79. The symbols have the following significations: Als: Alsace; Bas: Basque Country; Bri: Brittany; Cor: Corsica; Gua: Guadeloupe; Mar: Martinique; NCa: New Caledonia; Occ: Occitania; Tah: Tahiti. The two almost overlapping circles are Mar and Gua.

have taken place in metropolitan France, there are cases worthy of study in associated territories: Martinique (population 375,000), New Caledonia (170,000) and Tahiti (100,000). The last two are interesting from a spatial point of view because they are very loosely connected with metropolitan France. Other countries do indeed have associated territories. Great Britain, for example, has Anguilla (population 9,000), the Bermudas (60,000), Gibraltar (32,000), the Cayman Islands (33,000), while the United States has Puerto Rico (population 3.7 million), the Marianas (53,000), Guam (150,000), the Samoas (55,000) and the Virgin Islands (97,000). Among these three cases, the choice of France was motivated by the ease of access to sources of information. Figure 8.9 shows the relationship between the spatial index  $g$  and the intensity of separatist disturbances. This last variable has been estimated using the method described in chapter 6. The decreasing curve shows that separatist disturbances are all the more important as the region is geographically more distant from the “center.”

The adjustment shown by the dotted curve in Figure 8.9 corresponds to the equation:

$$d = \tan(-ag + b) \quad a = 2.0, \quad b = 1.1$$



where:

$d$ : level of separatist disturbances for the period 1945–1994

$d = \log(\text{number of deaths/population})$  (defined in chapter 6)

$g$ : geographical index characterizing the intensity of the interactions between the minority and the rest of the country (defined in chapter 5);

the coefficient of linear correlation between  $\arctan(d)$  and  $g$  is equal to -0.79, with a confidence interval at 95 percent of (-0.95, -0.25).

*Remark* One may wonder why the relationship between  $d$  and  $g$  is not merely a regression line. The reason is rather technical: since  $d$  is an unbounded index, while  $g$  is restricted to the interval (-1,1) their regression would be biased. In order to work with two similar variables, one would either replace  $d$  by a bounded auxiliary variable, or replace  $g$  by an unbounded one. Both procedures have been tried: the first turns out to provide the best fit. Notice, however, that a linear regression between  $g$  and  $d$  would be only slightly less effective, leading to a correlation of -0.75 instead of -0.79. This is understandable in so far as  $g$  being a logarithm it is “almost” bounded.

### **The Influence of the Historical Factor**

In this section, we will see that the intensity of separatist struggles in the second half of the twentieth century is essentially determined by their intensity in the preceding century, that is, from 1845 to 1945. In other words, separatist struggles are characterized by a strong historical continuity. On the level of principles, there is no particular reason to limit the historical retrospective to one century, but the difficulty of finding sufficiently precise sources for the earlier periods imposes this limitation. Even the period 1845–1945 remains full of uncertainties for a number of non-European nations.

In order to estimate the intensity of separatist struggles, we will use the number of equivalent deaths defined in chapter 6. As we will use that index in two different time periods we need two different notations: the number of equivalent deaths in the period 1845–1945 will be called the *historical index* and denoted by  $h$  in order to distinguish it from the same index in the period 1945–1995 for which we keep the notation  $d$ .

For this study, we will distinguish European and non-European nations, for at least two reasons. First of all, in the non-European countries, there was often a conquest phase in the nineteenth century, frequently accompanied by open warfare between the central power and the autochthonous nations. These wars involved armed conflict on a grand scale. This characteristic is relatively rare in Europe in the same period. In addition, in the majority of the countries where there were such wars of conquest, the numbers of the autochthonous population is rarely known with any accuracy. The



dearth of statistical sources leads us to use an index in which the number of deaths during separatist disturbances is used straight out and is not related to the overall population. In order to distinguish these two types of historical indexes, we will call them  $h$  when the deaths are related to the population and  $h'$  when they are not. For European nations, we then use  $h$ , while for the non-European nations we will use  $h'$ .

### *European nations*

Figure 8.10a shows how postwar separatist troubles are determined by the level of separatist disturbances during the preceding century. The coefficient of correlation between the two variables is equal to 0.56 (with a confidence interval at 95 percent given by -0.11, 0.89). The regression equation reads:

$$d = ah + b \quad a = 0.39, b = 0.32$$

where:

$d$ : level of separatist disturbances in the period 1945–1994;


$h$ : level of separatist disturbances in the period 1845–1945;

$h = \log(\text{number of deaths/population})$


We note that since  $a$  is smaller than one the intensity of the disturbances has on average decreased. More specifically the intensity of disturbances has obviously gone up in Corsica and the Jura, while it has gone down in Catalonia and Quebec.

We can see in Figure 8.10a that two minorities stand out with respect to the regression line: Catalonia, where past disturbances were too important and Corsica, there they were too limited. These two cases illustrate the difficulty of tracing a clear line between separatist disturbances and other kinds of problems. In the statistics on Catalonia, we included the Carlist wars as well as the 1936–1939 Civil War; in these conflicts, there was indeed a defense of regional autonomy, but this was not the only aspect. The conflicts between monarchists and republicans or between socialists and conservatives were intertwined with separatist struggles to the point where a clear separation between them becomes impossible. In the case of Corsica, the period 1845–1945 was marked by very few openly separatist acts; nevertheless, Corsica underwent chronic banditry during this period (on this topic, see the book by X. Versini); insofar as this banditry was in opposition to the established order represented by customs agents and other officers, it can be considered as an form of separatist struggle. However, it was not included in the statistics that we used.

*Non-European nations* Figure 8.10b shows the link between postwar separatist disturbances and those that occurred during the preceding century. The coefficient of correlation between the two variables is 0.68 (a 95 percent confidence interval is



**Figure 8.10a Relationship between the Historical Index and the Level of Separatist Disturbances for European Nations in the Period 1945–1994.** The historical index  $h$  refers to the period 1845–1945 and is given by:  $h = \log(\text{number of deaths}/\text{population of the minority})$ . The coefficient of correlation is equal to 0.56. The labels have the following significations: Als: Alsace; Bas: Basque Country; Bri: Brittany; Cat: Catalonia; Cor: Corsica; Jur: Bernese Jura; Que: Quebec; Sco: Scotland; Wal: Wales; Xin: Xinjian.



**Figure 8.10b Relationship between the Historical Index and the Level of Separatist Disturbances for Non-European Nations in the Period 1945–1994.** The historical index  $h'$  refers to the period 1845–1945 and is given by:  $h' = \log(\text{number of deaths})$ . The coefficient of correlation is equal to 0.68. The labels have the following signification: Abo: Australian Aborigenes; Ace: Aceh; Haw: Hawaii; Mao: Maoris; Mex: Mexican Americans in New Mexico and Arizona; Mor: Moros in Mindanao and Jolo (Philippines); Nav: Navajos; Sik: Siks in Punjab (India); Sio: Sioux.

0.02, 0.92). The regression equation reads:

$$d = ah' + b \quad a = 0.78, b = -0.55$$

where:

$d$ : level of separatist disturbances in the period 1945–1994;

$h'$ : level of separatist disturbances in the period 1845–1945.

In order to determine if there has been an increase or decrease in the rate of disturbances, we can not directly compare  $d$  and  $h'$  because these two variables are no longer defined in the same way. Qualitatively, it is nonetheless clear that the intensity of disturbances has greatly lessened for Aborigines, Maoris, Mexicans, Navajos and Sioux.

### *Is it possible to define a combined geohistorical index?*

Now that we know that separatist disturbances increase with  $h$  and decrease with  $g$ , is it possible to combine both results and to build a geohistorical index? The answer is “yes” and this can in fact be done in different ways. We could, for instance, adopt the variable  $h/(1 + g)$  as a global variable; we must use  $1 + g$  rather than  $g$  in the denominator, because  $g$  can become less than zero but always remains comprised between -1 and 1. Naturally, other forms exhibiting an increase with  $h$  and a decrease with  $g$  can be used as well; for instance:  $h^\alpha/(1 + g)^\beta$  (where  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are two positive numbers) would generalize our previous form. The form  $h/(1 + g)$  has a special appeal because of its simplicity. Taking that variable as the new independent variable leads to the following estimate for European nations (Figure 8.11):

$$d = a \frac{h}{1 + g} + b \quad a = 0.63, b = 0.28$$


The coefficient of correlation is equal to 0.59, with a confidence interval at 95 percent equal to -0.07, 0.89. Using the geohistorical index has slightly improved our previous fit.

## The Data Base

In this section we will bring together relevant information on the makeup of the data base which led to Table 8.6 and to Figures 8.9, 8.10 and 8.11. First, we present the rules which governed our selection of samples and secondly, we summarize the sources we have used.

### Selection of the Minority Groups

The forty minority groups documented in this chapter should be seen as a sample of a larger set. In his comprehensive survey of minorities, T. Gurr listed 227 communal



**Figure 8.11 Relationship between the Geohistorical Index and the Level of Separatist Disturbances for European Nations in the Period 1945–1994.** The geohistorical index combines the geographical index (used in Figure 8.9) with the historical index (used in Figure 8.10a). The strong similarity between the present figure and Figure 8.10a shows that the historical index has a preponderant effect; nevertheless, the introduction of the geographical index results in an improvement of the correlation which increases from 0.56 to 0.59. The signification of the labels is as in Figure 8.10a; the two circles which are almost overlapping correspond to Alsace and Scotland.

groups.<sup>39</sup> Gurr, however, used a broader minority concept. Our definition corresponds approximately to two of Gurr's five subclasses, namely, "ethno-nationalist groups" and "indigenous people"; for these subclasses, Gurr's survey lists a total of 121 groups. Our own selection of about 40 cases was based on the following criteria: (1) Availability of data. (2) Within the previous constraint, we tried to make the sample as representative as possible by selecting minority groups from the five continents. The first criterion led us to put aside countries from the former Soviet Union. For the same reason, minorities in Africa and Asia are underrepresented. We have also left aside those separatist struggles which, besides their domestic significance, have become major issues in international relations. This is, for instance, the case for Ulster, the former Yugoslavia, the Kurd minorities, Cyprus and the Palestinians. In such cases the impact of foreign influence is so strong that it is likely to mask the effect of endogenous factors.

### Equivalence Factors

Let us briefly recall the rules introduced in chapter 6 in order to build an intensity

**Table 8.6 Spatial, Historical and Language Data for Minority Groups**

	Minor- ity popula- tion	Percent. of total popula- tion	Percent. of minority language speakers in minority population	Spatial index of inte- gration	Historical index of separatist disturbances 1845–1945	Separatist index (equivalent deaths) 1945–1994
	[million]	[%]	[%]	<i>g</i>	<i>h (h')</i>	<i>d</i>
<i>1) Europe</i>						
Belgium, Flanders	5.7	64.0	90	0.34		-0.33
Belgium, Wallonia	3.2	36.0	90	0.26		-0.33
Britain, Scotland	5.5	9.4	2	0.17	0.50	-1.00
Britain, Wales	2.7	4.9	25	0.52	1.30	0.42
Finland, Aland Islands	0.02	0.4	95	0.60	1.2	-1.00
France, Alsace	1.30	2.8	30	0.50		-1.10
France, Basque Provinces	0.25	0.50	36	0.45	1.75	1.75
France, Brittany	2.4	5.2	12	0.44	-1.34	0.27
France, Corsica	0.27	0.6	10	0.19	0.82 (0.3)	3.05
France, Guadeloupe- Martinique	0.70	1.4		-0.13		1.55
France, New Caledonia	0.05	0.1		-0.08	4.5 (3.16)	2.77
France, Occitania	3.4	7.3	1	0.87		-0.60
France, Tahiti	0.05	0.34		-0.07		1.78
Italy, South Tyrol	0.43	0.8	65	0.56		1.43
Spain, Andalusia	6.0	18		0.77		-0.78
Spain, Basque Provinces	2.0	3	35	0.72	4.19	2.80
Spain, Catalonia	5.7	13	70	0.62	3.34	0.24
Switzerland, Bernese Jura	0.08	1.3	80	0.52	0.69	1.43

(Continued on next page)

**Table 8.6 Spatial, historical and language data for minority groups (continuation)**

Table 8.6 (continuation)

	Minority population	Percent. of total population	Percent. of minority language speakers in minority population	Spatial index of integration	Historical index of separatist disturbances 1845–1945	Separatist index (equivalent deaths) 1945–1994
	[million]	[%]	[%]	<i>g</i>	<i>h</i> ( <i>h'</i> )	<i>d</i>
<i>2) North and South America</i>						
Canada, Quebec	6.0	25	80	0.47	2.33 (2.19)	0.02
Mexico, Chiapas	2.5	4.3		0.50	>1 (>1.44)	2.55
Peru, South	6.0	25.		0.71		2.56
United States, Hawaiians	0.18	0.1	10		(1.33)	0.74
United States, Mexicans (AZ,NM)	1.2	0.55	40	0.78	(2.59)	0.52
United States, Navajos	0.17	0.07	74	1.0	(2.60)	1.0
United States, Sioux	0.07	0.03	50	1.0	(3.38)	1.6
<i>3) Asia and Oceania</i>						
Australia, Aborigenes	0.14	1.0	15	0.66	(>3.3)	2.59
China, Xinjiang	16	16	50	0.18	3.60 (2.94)	
India, Kashmir	7.8	1.1		-0.30		3.42
India, Sikhs	14	1.9	80	0.88	4.15 (3.19)	3.11
Indonesia, East Timor	0.6	0.5		0.22		5.2
Indonesia, Aceh Province	3.0	1.8		0.40	(5.18)	3.27
Indonesia, South Moluccan	1.2	0.8		-0.63		>0.22
Myanna, Karens	3.0	10		0.23		3.1
New Zealand, Maoris	0.4	12	15	0.75	(3.0)	0.83
Philippines, Mindanao and Jolo	0.70	3.0		0.46	(2.9)	1.8
<i>4) Africa</i>						
Cameroun, Bamiléké	0.5	17		0.46		2.5
Nigeria, Ibos	10	11		0.63		4.3
Sudan, South	6	25		0.39		4.9

*Note:* The definitions of the spatial and historical indexes are given in the text: see chapters 5 and 6. The index *d* is defined as:  $d = \log(\text{number of deaths, 1945–1994} / \text{minority population expressed in million})$ .

*Sources:* **Language:** chapter 4; **historical index:** see appendix A; **separatist index:** newspaper data base of the FNSP (National Foundation for Political Sciences, Paris).

index suitable for a great variety of separatist movements. We converted standard separatist events into “equivalent numbers of deaths.” The following factors were used as equivalents for one death: (1) A demonstration of one million people (2) 30 bombs, or 60 arson attempts (3) 30 nonfatal casualties (4) a petition by 100,000 people. Once the equivalent number of deaths  $n$  has been obtained, the intensity index is defined by the logarithm of  $n$  referred to the total minority population  $p$ :  $d = \log(n/p)$ . By taking the logarithm, we follow a standard practice (see Richardson, for example) which has two distinct advantages. Firstly, it keeps the magnitude of  $d$  on the order of a few units, which is appropriate for an index, and secondly, it minimizes the incidence of estimation errors.

## Sources

Our data set was built by event analysis based on major newspapers. Most valuable in that respect was the newspaper database of the National Foundation for Political Science (FNPS: 27 rue St. Guillaume, Paris). It includes articles from a variety of papers (in English, French, German, Spanish and Italian) arranged by countries and topics of interest; the base covers the whole period from 1945 to the present. The coverage is not uniform, of course, either in time or space, a bias which is discussed in S. Olzak.<sup>40</sup> By and large, however, one may go along with Olzak’s conclusion that “few alternative sources contain so much information.” Anyone who has attempted a comparative study based upon published reports not originally prepared for this purpose has experienced the frustration that arises when accounts become mute at the very point when some crucial proposition is to be tested. Needless to say, we have also used monographs and journal articles whenever they permitted us to fill a major gap.

The following books and articles were used especially for the period prior to World War II. For the sake of clarity and concision, we omit the year of publication except when it is strictly required.

BELGIUM: Clough; SCOTLAND: Birch, Coupland, Hechter, Leruez, Sorokin, Tilly (1993); WALES: Coupland, Gilbert, Sorokin; ALAND ISLAND: Barros, Denier, Mémoire, Singleton; ALSACE: *Histoire, La Collaboration*, Reuss, Zeller; BASQUE PROVINCE (France): Letamendia; BRITTANY: Sérant, Dupuy; CORSICA: Antonetti, *Tables du Temps*, Pomponi; GUADELOUPE, MARTINIQUE: Bangou, Burton; NEW CALEDONIA: la Mélanésie, Dousset-Leenhardt; OCCITANIA: *Histoire, Tables du Temps*, Zeller; SOUTH TYROL: *Guardian* (Dec. 14 1948, Oct. 5 1984); BASQUE PROVINCES (Spain): Barrès du Molard, Davant, Richardson; CATALONIA: Dwelshauvers, Rossinyol, Tilly (1993), Richardson; BERNESE JURA: Jenkins, Rennwald; QUEBEC: Oliver, Rebellion; CHIAPAS: Benjamin, *Times* (17 Jan. 1959); PERU (South): Richardson; NAVAJOS: Cook, Dennis, Kroeber; NEW MEX-



ICO: Meier et al.; SIOUX: Dennis, *Tables du Temps*, Richardson; AUSTRALIA (Aborigines): Hughes, Richardson; PUNJAB: Richardson; ACEH: Cribb, Richardson, Zainu'ddin; SOUTH MOLUCCAS: Cribb; KAREN (Myanna, i.e., formerly Burma): Fistié; MAORI: Richardson; MINDANAO (Philippines): Wolff; IBOS (Nigeria): Aquarone; SOUTH SUDAN: Aquarone.

## Conclusion

### Plea for the Construction of a Newspaper Data Base

In this chapter we have used a small number of qualitative and quantitative tests. The number of the tests could certainly be increased and their accuracy improved if historical information for the period 1845–1945 were more detailed. A priori, this period could seem favorable because of the existence of numerous newspapers in practically all countries. Unfortunately, a number of obstacles stand in the way of using this information. One can mention the following. (1) Nineteenth-century newspapers are, even more than the newspapers of today, opinion sheets; they report mainly the events which are compatible with their editorial philosophy. (2) While each country generally has relatively complete archives of its own national press, the foreign press is accessible only in an incomplete way even in major libraries. (3) Even if a foreign newspaper can be located in a library, the language barrier is a problem. Observations on Latin America require a knowledge of Spanish and Portuguese, for China one would need to know Chinese, and so on. (4) Suppose, in the best of cases, that the desired newspaper is finally available and that it is written in an accessible language. There are then two cases: the precise dates of the events under study are known for instance because they have been mentioned in a monograph; or one wants to find out if separatist-type events have occurred or not. In the second case, an almost insurmountable task faces the researcher if the newspaper has no index; indeed it would be necessary to look at every issue which had appeared over a period of 20 or 30 years, a Herculean labor, to say the least.

In order to make micro-historical analysis possible, a certain number of improvements would be in order, among which one can mention the following.

(1) Every important newspaper should have a computerized index; with such an index, it is easy to sort out phenomena of a particular type for the whole of the period under study. The *CD-ROM Palmer's Index to the Times* (edited by Chadwyck-Healey in 1994) gives an idea of what such indexes could be.

(2) Every important newspaper should be available on line, along with the computerized index; this is already a reality for the most recent years. For instance, for the French newspaper *Le Monde* all issues which appeared after 1987 are available

on line along with a computerized index. Similarly Lexis-Nexis provides on line access to a selection of newspaper articles starting from 1980. A similar tool should be available for the period 1850–1980.


(3) The most important national newspapers should be translated into English, the language of scientific communication at the end of the twentieth century; they would thus be available to all historians, regardless of their own mother tongue.

The cost of such a project would be a small fraction of what is spent on some other scientific projects, like the Hubble space telescope or the huge telescopes in Hawaii or Chile. This database would provide researchers with a priceless tool for the study of nineteenth- and twentieth-century history, and would be the starting point for a truly quantitative study.

### Integration in the Future

Will separatist phenomena continue in their present form, or is it likely that we will witness a profound transformation of these phenomena in the coming decades? Several times in this chapter, we have pointed out that the spread of public education had the effect of giving languages a social and political importance that they did not previously possess. We also noted in preceding chapters that languages essentially recaptured a role formerly held by religion.

It could be asked if the computer revolution is likely to bring about another transformation. It is difficult to give an overall answer to this question, but we can engage in an exercise in historical fiction by looking at the impact that a system of automatic translation might have. An automatic speech translator would involve the following steps:



It is, of course, difficult to guess how long it will take for such devices to become widely used: 30, 50, 100 years? Even 100 years would be a short span of time in comparison to the several centuries required for the process of linguistic assimilation. Such a technological innovation would give multinational states a chance to realize their linguistic unity much more rapidly than might otherwise be expected. However, a number of qualifications are in order. First of all, it must be emphasized that the creation of an effective automatic translator is a very difficult problem. Studies regarding such a device have been going on for more than 50 years without notable progress to date. Automatic translation systems are presently effective only in areas so specialized that words have very narrowly defined meanings (for example, in the translation of administrative or legal texts). Second, in order for such a system to be a real plus, it will have to be sufficiently flexible. If it can translate only simple

phrases like, “I’d like two kilos of oranges” or “Where’s the post office, please?” such a device would be of little interest for at a relatively simple level of speech, many people are more or less bilingual especially in countries where more than one language is used.

# Chapter 9

## Unity versus Diversity

Many people tell us what ought to be done. The present book, on the contrary, has for its main theme that what has happened often is likely to happen again, whether we wish it or not.

—Lewis F. Richardson, *Statistics of deadly quarrels*

Usually in their concluding chapter, authors try to offer some advice to policy makers. Following the example set by Lewis Richardson we will refrain from making judgments or proposing policies. We believe that the mixing of genres is to be avoided: to scientists the search for empirical rules and theoretical explanations, to politicians the normative judgments and strategic choices.

In the same spirit, we have refrained from making predictions. This choice demands an explanation, a point which is discussed in the first section. In the second section we will examine the conceptual basis for the policies employed in reshaping national frontiers after the two world wars. Finally, we will briefly revisit the classic debate of unified states versus federal states.

### About Historical Prediction

The question has two facets, scientific and social.

#### The Scientific Facet

The scientific facet consists in testing a theory by confronting its predictions and historical evidence. In its principle, this seems to be simple: if the predictions come true, the theory will be confirmed; if observation shows the predictions to be false, the theory is invalidated. However, in this simplistic view we forget that every theory has conditions of applicability; and these conditions play a central role in the social sciences. Schematically a social theory takes the following form.

*If the system is in a state characterized by conditions  $P, Q, R$  and if circumstances  $A, B, C, \dots$  occur, then  $X$  will happen.*

This kind of statement is what Pareto calls a logicoexperimental statement.<sup>1</sup> Thus,

the fact that  $X$  does not occur means either that the theory is faulty, that conditions  $P, Q, R, \dots$  were not fulfilled, or that circumstances  $A, B, C, \dots$  did not occur. When one realizes that in the social sciences the conditions ( $P, Q, R, \dots$ ) and circumstances ( $A, B, C, \dots$ ) are generally fairly difficult to list in an exhaustive way it becomes obvious that it is not easy to know whether a theory is or is not confirmed by facts. It is only in the simplest of situations that the validity of the conditions of application can be controlled. Needless to say, such simple situations are very rare in the social sciences.

The problem we have just looked at is not proper to the social sciences alone; it is found also in the natural sciences as shown by the following illustrations.

- It is common knowledge that Newton proposed an explanation of the tides based on the combined attraction of the sun and moon. This explanation has certain virtues, but leaves a number of points in the shadows. Why is there no tide in a glass of water? Why are tides in the Mediterranean much weaker than in the Atlantic Ocean? The Newtonian explanation answers none of these questions. Does this mean that Newton's theory is false? Certainly not, but one must admit that it is incomplete. In fact, the questions that we raised concern the oscillations of a mass of water, a phenomenon which has nothing to do with astronomy but rather concerns the science of hydrodynamics. A correct theory of these oscillations was only developed about one century after Newton. This example suggests that caution must be exercised in drawing conclusions from the confrontation of theoretical predictions and evidence.

- Galileo is commonly considered to be the creator of experimental physics. His essential contribution was to make experiments that were selected more for their simplicity than for their possible usefulness and applications. One of these experiments consisted of rolling a cylinder down an inclined plane. Galileo observed that the distances traveled by the cylinder in successive, equal time intervals (e.g., one second, two seconds, three seconds) increase with the square of the time (1, 4, 9, etc.), whatever the inclination of the plane.<sup>2</sup> This was certainly an interesting result, which opened the way to Newton's theory of gravitation. However, from the perspective of the comparison between theory and observation two aspects should be emphasized. First, Galileo's observations were obtainable only under very strictly defined conditions: if the cylinder were replaced by a barrel filled with wine or any other liquid, the same law would not apply. Secondly, the rolling of a cylinder on a plane surface is by no means a simple phenomenon; even at the time of Newton, a complete mathematical model was out of reach; it would take at least one century until such a theory was put forward.

How do these considerations apply to the present study? Let us suppose that an observation is made and that it contradicts one of the rules we formulated in this book.

As an example suppose that claims for independence are made by a community living 100 kilometers south of Paris and speaking a language other than French. The very existence of such a community would be astonishing, to be sure, but before we reject our base axiom, namely that integration is determined by the frequency and intensity of social interactions, we should carefully study the particular circumstances of this phenomenon. We would undoubtedly discover that this community has been living in autarchy for decades in somewhat the same way that the Amish community in the United States has limited contacts outside its own group.

Here is another example. Suppose that after a particularly bloody and hard-fought struggle, which has lasted several years, a liberation movement has succeeded in winning out over a colonial power. If we read in the newspapers a year or two later that perfect fraternal harmony exists between the two communities, to the point that not one colonist had emigrated, we would be astounded; this is completely contrary to the historical evidence reviewed in chapter 7. A healthy reflex would be to ask if the information is indeed correct. For instance, it may be that the government of that newly independent country is seeking to give itself a good image to attract international investors.

A third example will allow us to make a better distinction between the questions whose outcomes would seem impossible to forecast and those for which predictions can be made with reasonable confidence. In 1998, no one would venture a guess as to when Kosovo would become independent. This question has multiple parameters which depend both on the internal evolution of Yugoslavia and the international situation. On the other hand, one would be astonished to see a sudden disappearance of the tensions which have been gathering for over a century. In short, even if there were a number of years of relative calm, no one would expect this to be the definitive long-term situation. Furthermore, unless there is a major sociopolitical change, we can foresee that the forms taken by the unrest will be similar to the those we have seen thus far, that is, guerrilla activity taking place in the rural areas near the Albanian border, with occasional large protest rallies in Pristina.

As a conclusion, we can say that in the social sciences at the present time, theories are still too crude to be tested by comparison between predictions and observations. In order to make valid tests, it is preferable to draw from the immense reservoir offered by history; historical tests give us far better controls over the conditions of the “experiment.”

### **The Social Facet**

Suppose for a moment that the social sciences had managed to develop a kind of crystal-ball theory allowing us to make predictions. A priori, we might think that this would allow us to prevent or at least to minimize conflicts; we will see that

this is far from evident because it supposes both that social actors believe in these predictions and that they accept to change their behavior. We will use three examples to show that neither of these two conditions is fulfilled in practice.

**Military strategy in 1914** On 13 August 1911, Winston Churchill, then Home Secretary in the Asquith cabinet, published a memorandum on the military aspects of a future conflict with Germany.<sup>3</sup> Churchill's predictions proved astonishingly accurate. He correctly predicted the German advance through Belgium, but even more remarkable was his prediction that after an initial retreat phase, the drawn-out lines of the German armies would allow for a decisive forward surge of the French armies on the 40th day of the battle. This was, almost day by day, what would happen with the retreat and counterattack of the French armies on the Marne in September 1914. Furthermore, Churchill republished his memorandum on 2 September 1914, just a week before the Marne counteroffensive, in order to (in his own words) "encourage my colleagues with the hope that, if my unfavorable predictions for the twentieth day were confirmed, there was at the same time a favorable prediction for the 40th day." Here was an accurate prediction, knowingly used in order to try to influence the course of events. The general staff, however, hardly profited from the perceptiveness of Churchill's memorandum. The hypotheses on which General Joffre's famous plan XVII were founded were quite remote from those of the memorandum; Churchill's predictions had only the most marginal influence on the development of the fighting in France. Plan XVII anticipated a deep French penetration into Alsace-Lorraine, and barely took into account the risk of the French left-wing being turned around by the German armies.

**Moving toward war: 1933–1939** In 1934, there appeared a little book written by the British financier, P. Einzig and entitled *Germany's default: the economics of Hitlerism*. The aim of the book went beyond the strictly financial sphere and proved to be a prophetic view of what were to be the major events of the following ten years. In particular, the author foresaw the annexation of Austria, the invasion of Poland and the outbreak of a new war in Europe. How did the author reach these conclusions? First, from the official platform of the National Socialist Party; second, from the orientation of the German economy toward the goal of self-sufficiency pursued even at the expense of economic profitability; and third, from the German rearmament program.

Why had these warnings such minimal influence on public opinion, and on the French and English governments? There were surely a number of specific and ancillary reasons, but their common denominator seems to be an unconscious desire to forget and to cast aside this troubling evidence. An intense rearmament program would have been inordinately expensive, and very unpopular in the wake of the re-



cession of the 1930s; better to hide one's head in the sand and believe that these warnings were not worthy of being taken seriously. Had they been taken seriously, the conflict would probably still not have been avoided. The example of 1914 shows that, in spite of intensive rearmament in France following the 1905 crisis in Tangier, the path to war unfolded inexorably.

*The collapse of the Soviet economic system* As a third example we consider the collapse of the economic system set in place by the Soviet regime after the October Revolution. The inefficiency of this system had been shown for a long time by many insightful economists (e.g., M. Allais<sup>4</sup>). As for the totalitarian character of the Soviet system, it had been described by numerous witnesses. In 1982, the present author published an article in which he showed on the basis of information theory that a heavily centralized hierarchical system can function only under iron discipline, like that of Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia. If this discipline is relaxed, as is almost inevitable in peacetime, the system will drift inexorably toward inefficiency and impotence.

Despite these predictions, there were probably few individuals who were ready to bet in 1984, that is to say, the year before Gorbachev's ascent to power, that the Soviet system would survive for only six more years. The drift toward inefficiency could have gone on for fifteen or thirty years. The suddenness of the change was also astonishing; it was for instance much faster than the gradual transition that Tsar Alexander tried to impose through the abolition of serfdom and other reforms between 1855 and his assassination in 1881.

In a general way, short-term predictions are extremely difficult to make for they involve numerous parameters and a succession of fairly random events.

## On Which Social Theories Are Policies Based?

There are moments in which nations, the great powers in particular, are faced with decisive choices. Following a great conflict, the world must be rebuilt, frontiers must be decided upon, and nations await recognition. In such discussions, political leaders and diplomats are obliged (without being perhaps fully aware of the fact) to rely on a certain conception of national identity. In the same way, when a country is preparing a new constitution, decisive choices are required concerning the nature of the state: unitary or federal state, monolingual or multilingual? Here as well, implicitly or explicitly, these choices will be based on a certain conception of national identity.

### Retracing Frontiers after World Wars

Although the expressions "First and Second World Wars" are consecrated by usage, these terms are deceiving in that they suggest that earlier wars had not been world

wars. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in fact, there were wars which were truly on a global scale, such as the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) and the Napoleonic wars (1799–1815). At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the diplomats made little effort to innovate. After the turbulence that had swept over Europe for 25 years as a consequence of the French Revolution, chancelleries returned to the monarchist principles which had served so well during the previous centuries. A hundred and thirty years later, in 1918, things were different. The world had changed profoundly: neither Germany nor Russia had emperors, and the United States had taken on a preponderant role on the world stage.

*The Paris Conference of 1918* On what principles was Europe reshaped after 1918? Two kinds of considerations played a role: strategic imperatives and what has been called the “rights of nationalities.” Schematically, the latter can be said to rest on two principles: (1) The preference for unitary states as opposed to federal states. (2) The primacy given to the language criterion and to a static rather than dynamic appreciation of linguistic reality. Let us examine these two points more closely.

With regard to the preference for unitary states, it should be noted that while constitutional choices in principle depended on the states themselves, the great powers could propose options and exert pressure.

Until 1918, Germany had a quasi-federal structure which gave considerable autonomy to certain regions, in particular to the ancient kingdoms. Thus, Bavaria, Saxony and Wurtemberg retained their kings until 1918. The constitution of the Weimar Republic was much more unitary, a characteristic which was accentuated after 1933. At this juncture, Bavaria for example, lost its special autonomy. In 1945, pressure from the Allies contributed to the reformation of Germany into a federal state.

In 1918 certain countries like Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia had important minorities which were relatively confined in the territorial sense. The Paris Conference certainly insisted on the formal recognition of the rights of minorities in the new constitutions, but there seems to have been no question of federal states. What justified this lack of interest in the federal solution?

The primacy given to the language criterion at the Paris Conference is demonstrated by the intensive use of maps of European languages which had been compiled by geographers and linguists. It was undoubtedly the first time that such maps had been used in such a systematic fashion. These maps gave an instantaneous and fixed vision of reality. On a linguistic basis, Alsace, with a population of 90 percent German speakers, should have been given back to Germany, which was of course not the case. This example clearly shows that such a static criterion was insufficient. Even popular referendums, such as those organized in Schleswig and Silesia, gave only a static view. To give an example in another context: if a referendum had been organized in New Mexico in 1848, the population (97 percent of which was Spanish

speaking) would certainly have voted against annexation by the United States. What we are trying to emphasize is that by taking a purely static view the Paris Conference gave no chance to the melting pot process and, in a number of cases, disregarded the historical roots which we have shown to be of paramount importance.

*The reshaping of frontiers following the Second World War* Following the Second World War, there was no formal peace conference. The Yalta and Potsdam conferences rather provided short-term practical arrangements. In Eastern Europe, the principle which seems to have guided reshaping was that of massive transfers of populations, an operation which, in the Yugoslavian context, would be called “ethnic cleansing.” In round numbers, two million Germans were evacuated from the Sudetenland (Czechoslovakia), two million from Silesia (Poland) and two million from West Prussia (now Poland) and East Prussia (now Poland and Russia). The evacuation from the Sudetenland seems to have been decided at the Potsdam Conference in August 1945, but a good proportion of the departures were made under local pressure.<sup>5</sup> It is worth nothing that there had been some population transfers between Greece and Turkey in the 1920s: in 1923, 1.5 million Greeks were moved from Turkey to Greece.<sup>6</sup> In contrast to the policy pursued after World War I few referendums were organized to secure popular sanction.

### **Unitary, Federal or Multilingual State?**

The following table gives several examples of each type of state.

<i>Unitary states</i>	Chile, China, France, Indonesia, United Kingdom
<i>Federal, monolingual states</i>	Argentina, Brazil, Germany, United States
<i>Federal, multilingual states</i>	Canada, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, South Africa, Switzerland, former USSR., former Yugoslavia, former Austria-Hungary

There have been numerous studies devoted to a comparative analysis of these questions. The first rule that must be respected is to compare comparable things. In the present case, this rule is particularly difficult to apply. Here are a number of possible stumbling blocks.

- It is vital to give precise criteria which allow us to distinguish a unitary state from a federal state. Insofar as most unitary states have elected regional assemblies possessing certain powers, the distinction is not self-evident; it would also be unwise to rely on texts alone because there can be a considerable spread between texts and

their application.

Take the case of India, for example, which at first sight seems to be a typical federal state. Yet, in case of social unrest the central government can be substituted for the executive power of any local state for an indefinite period. Between 1960 and 1990 the central government had recourse to this expedient more than ten times. The suspensory character of such a devolution is a serious limitation.

- The distinction between unitary state and federal state does not take the linguistic aspect into account; this aspect is undoubtedly of capital importance at the microsocial level.

- Lacking exterior shocks, it is difficult to judge the solidity of a building; schematically, the same can be said with states. To compare several forms of state, we must be sure that exterior disturbances have been the same. The case of Switzerland and Belgium illustrates this difficulty. These two countries are similar in size, but they experienced very different exterior disturbances. Because of its geographic setting, Switzerland has not been confronted with an exterior conflict for almost two centuries. The situation in Belgium is quite different; because of its location between France and Germany Belgium has been invaded and occupied twice in the last 80 years; these two occupations have revived and sharpened the conflict between Flemings and Walloons to the point of bringing the two peoples almost to the point of rupture in the 1960s.

## **The Delicate Balance between Unity and Diversity**

Present-day international institutions include organizations responsible for the protection of minority languages. In Europe, for instance, the Bureau for Lesser-used Languages was established by the European Parliament in 1982, and has been located in Dublin since 1984.<sup>7</sup> What should one think of that objective of protecting minority languages? On the one hand such a protection has a tendency to freeze the situation and block any melting pot phenomena; in that sense it repeats the policy of the Paris Conference in 1918. On the other hand one must be aware of the fact that the protection of minority languages is only part of the general issue of protecting diversity. In this book, we have on several occasions emphasized the nearly organic connection between a language and the everyday life of those who speak it. If local particularities disappear, whether in architecture, folklore, music or cuisine, what is the point of preserving minority languages? Would they not become empty shells? In the present book we have shown that both separatism and integration are slow dynamical processes whose roots reach into the distant past. We have given estimates for their typical response times; for instance melting pot processes have response times of a few decades, whereas the integration of a homeland minority into a nation-state may take one or two centuries. Moreover, we have emphasized the crucial role in a long-term perspective played by adequate communication means. Provided it is fairly cheap and easy to use, an European high-speed railroad network can play a major integration role. Similarly, the cohesion of a country like Indonesia much depends upon the effectiveness of its shipping lines. Another illustration of the thesis presented in chapter 5 is the observation that the degradation of communication means in several Central African countries that occurred in the late twentieth century proved quite prejudicial to their cohesion by encouraging centrifugal forces.

# Notes

## Chapter 1

1. Voogd, *Histoire des Pays-Bas*.
2. Gurr, "Why minorities rebel."
3. *Worldmark Encyclopedia of the States*.
4. Connor, "Nation-building or nation destroying"; Connor, "Beyond reason: The nature of the ethnonational bond."
5. Hechter, *Internal colonialism: The Celtic fringe in the British national development 1536–1966*.
6. Clark, "Language and politics in Spain's Basque provinces."
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# **Index**

*The existence on every text editor of a “search” function provides an easy way to locate any word. This method is much more effective than any index because a standard index, no matter how detailed, cannot foresee and satisfy the diverse wishes and interests of the readers.*

## About the authors

Bertrand Roehner holds a PhD degree in theoretical physics. and he is currently (2016) a researcher at the University of Paris 6, Pierre and Marie Curie. He is the author of *Pattern and Repertoire in History*, (Harvard University Press, 2002) and a number of other books and papers in fields ranging from sociology to physics and including economics and econophysics. He has been a guest a various leading institutions in the social sciences such as for example the departments of economics and sociology at Harvard University, the Santa Fe Institute, the Institute of Economics at the University of Copenhagen and the “School of Systems Science” of Beijing Normal University. The methodology developed in *Pattern and Repertoire in History* has the purpose of making history into a testable science; the present investigation is an application of this methodology in the sense that the analysis of each and every phenomenon is based on a *cluster of events*.

Leonard Rahilly holds a PhD degree in Romance Languages and Linguistics from Princeton University. He was a member of the faculty of the Department of Romance and Classical Languages at Michigan State University until his retirement in 1996. He is the author of several papers on medieval French manuscripts and on the pedagogy of language study. Several of the courses he has taught dealt with the problems of translation.